The Boeing Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 9, 2016

364 NLRB No. 24 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 24
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
The Boeing Company and Society of Professional En-
gineering Employees in Aerospace, Affiliated
with International Federation of Professional &
Technical Engineers, Local 2001. Case 19–CA–
093656
June 9, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MISCIMARRA, HIROZAWA,
AND MCFERRAN
On July 31, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Dickie
Montemayor issued the attached decision. The Boeing
Company (the Respondent) filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief. The General Counsel and Society of Pro-
fessional Engineering Employees in Aerospace, affiliated
with International Federation of Professional & Tech-
nical Engineers, Local 2001 (the Union) filed answering
briefs, and the Respondent filed a reply brief. The Union
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions1 and briefs and has decided to

1 The Respondent’s exception that the Board lacked a quorum at the
time that it announced the appointment of Ronald K. Hooks as Region-
al Director for Region 19, and that consequently the issuance of the
complaint was unauthorized and void, is without merit. Although
Regional Director Hooks’ appointment was announced on January 6,
2012, the Board approved the appointment on December 22, 2011, at
which time it had a quorum. See Longshoremen ILWU, Local 4 (Tide-
water Barge, Inc.), 362 NLRB No. 40, slip op. at 1 fn. 1 (2015); see
also Mathew Enterprise, Inc. v. NLRB, 771 F.3d 812, 813 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (“[T]he President’s recess appointment of Member Becker was
constitutionally valid.”); Gestamp South Carolina, LLC v. NLRB, 769
F.3d 254, 257–258 (4th Cir. 2014) (same).
On August 18, 2015, the Respondent submitted to the Executive
Secretary a document that it describes as “supplemental authority in
support of Exception No. 37 to the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge.” That document cites SW General, Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67
(D.C. Cir. 2015). In its Exception 37, the Respondent excepts to the
judge’s “failure to find that the issuance of the Complaint against [the
Respondent] was unauthorized and void.” In its brief in support of its
exceptions, the Respondent states that “this case presents the jurisdic-
tional question of whether the issuance of the complaint was unauthor-
ized and void,” and cites Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Services, No.
C13–5740 BHS, 2013 WL 4094344 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2013), for
the proposition that the “Acting General Counsel could not delegate
authority to initiate legal action to Regional Director for Region 19
because Acting General Counsel was not validly appointed.”
For the reasons set forth below, we find no merit in the Respond-
ent’s assertion that the Acting General Counsel was not validly “ap-
pointed.” At the outset, we note that under the Federal Vacancies Re-
affirm the judge’s rulings,2 findings,3 and conclusions
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.4

form Act (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345 et seq., a person is not “appoint-
ed” to serve in an acting capacity in a vacant office that otherwise
would be filled by appointment by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Rather, either the first assistant to the vacant
office performs the functions and duties of the office in an acting ca-
pacity by operation of law pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1), or the
President directs another person to perform the functions and duties of
the vacant office in an acting capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
3345(a)(2) or (3).
On June 18, 2010, the President directed Lafe Solomon, then-
Director of the Board’s Office of Representation Appeals, to serve as
Acting General Counsel pursuant to subsection (a)(3)—the senior
agency employee provision. Under the strictures of that provision,
Solomon was eligible to serve as Acting General Counsel at the time
that the President directed him to do so. See SW General, supra. Thus,
Solomon properly assumed the duties of Acting General Counsel, and
we find no merit in the Respondent’s argument that the Acting General
Counsel was not validly “appointed.”
We acknowledge that the decision in SW General also held that Sol-
omon lost his authority as Acting General Counsel on January 5, 2011,
when the President nominated him to be General Counsel. While that
question is still in litigation, the Respondent failed to raise that argu-
ment to the judge or in timely filed exceptions, and we find that the
Respondent thereby has waived the right to do so.
Finally, on February 9, 2016, General Counsel Richard F. Griffin,
Jr., issued a notice of ratification that states, in relevant part,
I was confirmed as General Counsel on November 4, 2013. After ap-
propriate review and consultation with my staff, I have decided that
the issuance of the complaint in this case and its continued prosecution
are a proper exercise of the General Counsel’s broad and unreviewa-
ble discretion under Section 3(d) of the Act.
My action does not reflect an agreement with the appellate court rul-
ing in SW General. Rather, my decision is a practical response aimed
at facilitating the timely resolution of the charges that I have found to
be meritorious while the issues raised by SW General are being re-
solved. Congress provided the option of ratification by expressly ex-
empting “the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board”
from the FVRA provisions that would otherwise preclude the ratifica-
tion of certain actions of other persons found to have served in viola-
tion of the FVRA. [(Citation omitted.)]
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby ratify the issuance and continued
prosecution of the complaint.
Even if the Respondent had not previously waived its right to chal-
lenge the continued authority of the Acting General Counsel following
his nomination by the President, this ratification by the General Coun-
sel would render moot any argument that the SW General holding con-
cerning the former Acting General Counsel’s authority precludes fur-
ther litigation in this matter.
2 The Respondent excepts to the judge’s rejection of its Exhibits
11(a), 11(b), and 12. We find that the judge did not abuse his discre-
tion by rejecting those exhibits.
3 The Respondent excepts to the judge’s reliance on General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 7 in finding that the Union demonstrated the relevance of
its information requests. General Counsel’s Exhibit 7 is a September 6,
2012 Bloomberg article titled “Boeing May Use Non-Seattle Engineers
as Seattle Costs Up,” and it contains statements attributed to Boeing
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
We affirm the judge’s findings that the Union demon-
strated the relevance of the disputed portions of its Sep-
tember 11 and 20, 2012 information requests, and, thus,
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
failing and refusing to provide this requested information
to the Union.
The Respondent contends, however, that it satisfied
certain portions of the Union’s September 11 information
request. We find no merit to that contention.
In its September 11 request, the Union asked what
“premium” was currently paid to engineering employees
in the Puget Sound area and how it was calculated. The
Union also asked for data supporting the calculation, and
data showing how employees in other areas received no
such premium. On September 25, 2012, the Respondent
answered, in relevant part, as follows:
1. As the Company has communicated consistently
throughout the negotiation process, wage rates in the
Puget Sound are well above the national market. This
information is available publicly from sources to which
the Union has ample access. The Company also has in-
formation available through ERI illustrating the differ-
ences between the specific markets identified in your
request. Moreover, the Company has also presented
extensive data to the Union in previous meetings re-
garding our position on wages relative to market.
Much of that data was presented months ago, in our
April 19th and 20th sessions.
. . .

Commercial Airplanes Vice President of Engineering Mike Delaney.
The judge admitted this exhibit to show what is on the face of the arti-
cle, not to show the truth of any matter asserted in the article. The
Board has established that a union is “not required to show that the
information which triggered its request was accurate or ultimately
reliable,” and that “a union’s information request may be based on
hearsay.” Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994); see
also Dodger Theatricals Holdings, Inc., 347 NLRB 953, 968–969
(2006); Magnet Coal, 307 NLRB 444, 444 fn. 3 (1992), enfd. 8 F.3d 71
(D.C. Cir. 1993). Therefore, we find no merit to the Respondent’s
exception.
The Union excepts to the judge’s inadvertent omission of paragraph
2b of its September 11, 2012 information request from the list of para-
graphs that the Union demonstrated to be relevant. We agree with the
Union that it demonstrated the relevance of the information requested
in that paragraph, as the judge’s discussion elsewhere makes clear.
4 We have amended the judge’s conclusions of law consistent with
the unit descriptions in the Respondent and the Union’s collective-
bargaining agreements and amended the judge’s remedy consistent with
our legal conclusions herein. We shall modify the judge’s recommend-
ed Order to conform to our findings and to the Board’s standard reme-
dial language, and we shall substitute a new notice to conform to the
Order as modified.
2. It is a statistical and publicly available fact that the
Puget Sound has higher wage rates than other geo-
graphic regions.
The Respondent argues that any references to a “pre-
mium” paid to employees were references to the fact that
under the Respondent’s three-tiered compensation sys-
tem, Puget Sound employees receive Tier 1 compensa-
tion (7 percent more than the national average). The
Respondent contends that the Union was well aware of
the three-tiered compensation system and that the Re-
spondent had provided information about that system
during bargaining.
We reject the Respondent’s contention that its Sep-
tember 25 response adequately answered this part of the
Union’s request. That response never mentioned either
“premiums” or the Respondent’s three-tiered compensa-
tion system, and certainly never stated that the Respond-
ent’s references to a “premium” or a lack of a “premium”
were referring to the three-tiered system. Further, the
response neither provided the data that the Union re-
quested nor referred the Union specifically to any infor-
mation that the Respondent might previously have pro-
vided. Assuming that “premium” refers to the Respond-
ent’s Tier 1 level of compensation, the Respondent could
simply have said so. In addition, it could have explained
how its Tier 1 compensation level is calculated5 and pro-
vided the data underlying its three-tiered compensation
system or, at a minimum, directed the Union to specific
information, previously provided, that would have ex-
plained those matters.6 See Postal Service, 332 NLRB
635, 638 (2000) (finding that the employer failed to satis-
fy the union’s information request by directing the union
generally to its Employment and Labor Manual (ELM)
513 instead of specifically to the subsection of ELM 513

5 Our review of the record indicates that, during negotiations, the
Respondent gave the Union only an overview of how it establishes its
three-tiered compensation system.
6 The Respondent claims that it offered to share the underlying sur-
vey data with the Union but that the Union declined this data. Howev-
er, this claim is not an accurate reflection of the record. The Respond-
ent’s Director of Employee Compensation Jeannie Denbo merely testi-
fied that the Respondent previously offered to share this data with the
Union each year when the Respondent updated its Salary Reference
Tables, but that, “about a couple of years ago,” the Union indicated that
it no longer wished to receive this data annually. However, there is no
evidence that the Respondent offered this data in response to the Un-
ion’s September 11 information request or that the Union declined to
accept it during the 2012–2013 negotiations. Indeed, on October 5,
2012, the Union entered into a confidentiality agreement with the Re-
spondent in order to receive such confidential data, but the Respondent
still failed to provide it.
BOEING CO. 3
that explained why an employee’s absence documenta-
tion was insufficient).7
In its September 11 request, the Union also asked for
data, including assumptions and analyses, supporting the
Respondent’s September 7, 2012 statement to employees
that “Boeing cannot sustain the rate of growth [of wages]
outlined in the previous contract.” The Union also asked
for a projected date at which the growth rate would be-
come unsustainable, along with data, assumptions, and
analyses on which that projection was based. The fol-
lowing is the relevant portion of the Respondent’s Sep-
tember 25 response:
4. As noted in response to the above requests 1–3,
while the Company seeks to remain market leading, it
must provide compensation that is sensitive to the cur-
rent market. No company can sustain its competitive-
ness if its cost of labor continues to significantly out-
pace the growth among its market competition. . . .
[W]age increases must be based on fiscally prudent
analysis of the Company’s position relative to market
in order to remain and sustain the Company’s competi-
tive position. We shared the basis for our opinions in
detail during the Company’s presentation on the com-

7 Member Miscimarra would find that the Respondent adequately
responded to the Union’s request for information regarding a wage
“premium” and thus did not violate Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) in this respect.
The relevant part of the Union’s request states:
2. With respect to your statement that Boeing is willing to pay a
“premium” to do engineering in Seattle and the Puget Sound area.
Please provide the following information:
a. What is the current “premium” paid to the engineering em-
ployees, if any?
b. Provide a detailed explanation of how that “premium” is cal-
culated, the data supporting that calculation and the data from
other [Boeing] locations [where similar work is performed]
showing how they do not pay such a “premium”.
The Union’s information request came in response to statements quoted
in a September 6, 2012 Bloomberg article titled, “Boeing May Use
Non-Seattle Engineers as Seattle Costs Up.” In this article, Boeing
Commercial Airplanes Vice President of Engineering Mike Delaney
was quoted as saying, “We’re willing to pay a premium to be in Seattle
because there’s a base, there’s capability, we’ve got a great team.” In
Member Miscimarra’s view, the term “premium” was plainly a figure
of speech referring to the higher wages in the area and not, as the Union
made it out to be, a specific amount that the Respondent calculated and
added only to the wages of Seattle and Puget Sound-area employees.
Member Miscimarra believes that Boeing’s response—stating that “[i]t
is a statistical and publicly available fact that the Puget Sound has
higher wage rates than other geographic regions”—adequately in-
formed the Union what Delaney meant by “premium.” Moreover, the
Union was aware that the Seattle and Puget Sound-area employees are
paid in the same top tier of Boeing’s three-tier compensation system as
employees in other high-wage markets, such as Southern California,
Washington, D.C., and Chicago, which Member Miscimarra believes
reinforces the adequacy of the response.
petitive business environment delivered during our Au-
gust 16, 2012 meeting and throughout the negotiations
to date.
Again, the Respondent argues that it provided an ade-
quate response to the Union’s request, and again we dis-
agree. When asked by the Union to support its assertion
that wages could not continue to grow at the current rate,
the Respondent merely restated that proposition in dif-
ferent words. It provided none of the data, none of the
assumptions (other than, implicitly, that the Respondent
could not continue indefinitely to raise wages faster than
its competitors), and none of the analysis that the Union
had specifically requested. And the Respondent did not
even mention the Union’s request for a projected date by
which the growth of wages would become unsustainable,
let alone furnish the evidentiary or analytical basis for
any such projection. In essence, it simply said, “We told
you all this before.” As indicated above, that is not
enough. If the Respondent had actually previously fur-
nished the Union with the information needed to assess
the Respondent’s contentions, it should have indicated
what specific information it relied on and when specifi-
cally it disclosed that information to the Union. See
Postal Service, supra, 332 NLRB at 638.8
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Substitute the following for the judge’s Conclusion
of Law 3.
3. At all material times the Union has been the desig-
nated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the following bargaining units of the Respondent’s em-
ployees:
a. Professional Unit
Professional employees, including those working
at the Respondent’s facilities in the State of Wash-
ington, the State of Oregon, Edwards Air Force
Base, California, Palmdale, California, Weber and
Davis Counties, Utah, and Boeing Atlantic Test
Center, Florida, as set forth in Article 1 and Ap-
pendix B of the Collective-Bargaining Agreement
for the Professional Bargaining Units.

8 At the hearing, the Respondent introduced certain evidence on
which it purportedly relied in making its September 7 statement to
employees. Even if that information would have been responsive to the
Union’s request, it was provided more than a year after the Union made
that request; the disclosure, thus, was obviously untimely. See, e.g.,
Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 356 NLRB 1275, 1280 (2011), enfd.
692 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 2012); Earthgrains Co., 349 NLRB 389, 400
(2007), enfd. in pertinent part sub nom. Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v.
NLRB, 514 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2008).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
b. Technical Unit
Technical employees, including those working at
the Respondent’s facilities in the State of Wash-
ington and the State of Oregon and at its Inertial
Upper Stage program at Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station, Florida, as set forth in Article 1 and Ap-
pendix B of the Collective-Bargaining Agreement
for the Technical Bargaining Units.
AMENDED REMEDY
Although we find that the Respondent violated the Act
by failing and refusing to provide the Union with the
information requested on September 11 and 2012, we
must separately consider whether it is appropriate to or-
der the Respondent to provide that information to the
Union at this time.9
As the Board has explained with respect to infor-
mation-request cases:
[T]he issue of whether there is a violation is to be de-
termined by the facts as they existed at the time of the
union request. However, the remedy for that violation
must take into account the facts as they exist at the time
of the Board’s order.
Borgess Medical Center, 342 NLRB 1105, 1107 (2004)
(emphasis in original). If the requesting union has no need
for the information requested, the Board will not order the
employer to produce it, despite finding the violation. Id. at
1106–1107. Here, the Union requested information to assist
it in bargaining during the 2012–2013 negotiations, but, on
May 3, 2013, the Respondent and the Union executed new
collective-bargaining agreements for the professional and
technical units.10

9 We address two other remedial matters, as well. First, the Union
excepts to the judge’s failure to order the Respondent to post the notice
at all of its facilities that employ employees in the professional and
technical bargaining units. We agree that all of the professional and
technical unit employees were affected by the bargaining, and shall
order the Respondent to post the notice at those facilities because the
notice must be adequately communicated to all employees affected by
the unfair labor practices found. Second, we shall change the date in
the final sentence of paragraph 2(b) of the Order to reflect the date of
the first unfair labor practice, September 11, 2012. See Excel Contain-
er, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997).
10 The execution of a collective-bargaining agreement does not nec-
essarily eliminate the need for relevant information that was requested
by the union during bargaining, if the union has an ongoing need for the
requested information. See, e.g., Dodger Theatricals Holdings, Inc.,
supra, 347 NLRB at 972 fn. 44 (“Although the 2004 contract has been
negotiated and agreed on, the issue is not moot, since by the time this
case is finally decided by the Court of Appeals, it could very well be
time to negotiate a new agreement.”); LBT, Inc., 339 NLRB 504, 506
(2003) (the union needed the requested information to understand how
the layoff process actually worked under the new agreement and to
formulate a layoff proposal for the next contract); Merchant Fast Motor
The employer bears the burden of proof of establishing
that the union has no need for the requested information.
Borgess Medical Center, supra at 1107 (declining to or-
der production of information after finding that employer
had “met its burden of showing that the stated need for
the information is no longer present” and that there was
“not even a contention by the union” of “another need for
the information”). Where the employer has demonstrat-
ed that the original, stated need for the information is no
longer present, the General Counsel or the union—in
order to join the issue—must articulate a present need for
the information. See Finley Hospital, 362 NLRB No.
102, slip op. at 10 (2015) (ordering production of infor-
mation only “if the Union articulates a present need for
this information”).
The Board’s decisions have not set out a clear proce-
dural framework for litigating this remedial issue. We do
so today, to provide guidance to the parties before the
Board and to ensure that the Board may accurately and
efficiently decide the issue:
1. If a respondent, based on evidence available before
or during the merits hearing before the administrative
law judge, wishes to argue that production should not
be ordered because the union has no need for the in-
formation, the respondent must introduce the relevant
evidence during the merits hearing and argue the issue
to the judge. The judge should permit the General
Counsel and the charging party to contest the respond-
ent’s claim and/or to state an ongoing need for the re-
quested information and to introduce evidence accord-
ingly.
2. If evidence that the union has no need for the infor-
mation first becomes available after the merits hearing
has closed, the respondent may raise the issue in the
compliance stage of the case.11 If the issue is not re-
solved informally, the respondent must plead in its an-
swer to the compliance specification the absence of a
need for the information as the equivalent of an affirm-

Lines, Inc., 324 NLRB 562, 563 (1997) (requested information was still
relevant to the union’s ongoing concern about the employer’s compli-
ance with the 401(k) plan and the union’s grievance regarding the em-
ployer’s previous failure to make contributions to the plan); Armored
Transport of California, 288 NLRB 574, 579 (1988) (requested infor-
mation was still relevant to the union’s negotiations at the employer’s
other facilities); Lumber & Mill Employers Assn., 265 NLRB 199, 204
(1982) (the union still needed the requested information “for its proba-
ble and potential use in determining the advisability of grievances or
other action over the nonapplication of the agreement to certain firms
or locations”), enfd. 736 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S.
934 (1984).
11 The respondent may alternatively move to reopen the record pur-
suant to Sec. 102.48 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, if applica-
ble.
BOEING CO. 5
ative defense, and then introduce evidence establishing
its contention, which the General Counsel and the
charging party should be permitted to contest, as de-
scribed. As stated above and in prior decisions, the re-
spondent has the burden of establishing that the union
has no need for the information.12
Under the circumstances of this case, which, of course,
predates our articulation of the framework laid out here,
we refer the issue of need to the compliance proceeding,
rather than parse the conduct of the parties and the judge
during the merits proceeding.13 Accordingly, we will
order the Respondent to produce the requested infor-
mation, unless the Respondent establishes in the compli-
ance proceeding that the Union has no need for this in-
formation. During the compliance proceeding, the pro-
cedure described above should be followed, as appropri-
ate.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Society of
Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace, affil-
iated with International Federation of Professional &
Technical Engineers, Local 2001 (the Union) by failing
and refusing to furnish it with requested information that
is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of

12 In Member Miscimarra’s view, the procedural framework set
forth above should not affect the Board’s established distinction be-
tween information that is presumptively relevant to the union’s role as
collective-bargaining representative and information that is not. Thus,
where the information requested concerns wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment for unit employees and is there-
fore presumptively relevant, and the employer shows that the union has
no need for the information, the union need only state an ongoing need
for the requested information. But where the information requested is
not presumptively relevant, Member Miscimarra would require that the
union both state an ongoing need for the requested information and
demonstrate the relevance of the information in relation to that stated
need, unless it is apparent from the circumstances that the demonstra-
tion of relevance in relation to the original (but no longer existing) need
equally applies to the stated ongoing need.
13 During the hearing, the General Counsel attempted to elicit testi-
mony from the Union’s Director of Strategic Development Rich Plun-
kett about any possible ongoing need that the Union has for the re-
quested information. The Respondent objected to this line of question-
ing, and the judge sustained the objection. (The Respondent incorrectly
states in its supporting brief that the judge improperly shut down its
attempt to question Plunkett about any possible ongoing need for the
information.) Neither the General Counsel nor the Union now argues
that the judge abused his discretion in this respect, but in the exercise of
our remedial discretion, we find that the judge’s action supports refer-
ring the mootness issue to compliance.
its functions as the collective-bargaining representative
of the Respondent’s unit employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner the infor-
mation requested by the Union in paragraphs 1, 2, 3b and
d, and 4b and c of its September 11, 2012 information
request and in paragraphs 1 and 3 of its September 20,
2012 information request (excluding the wage infor-
mation previously provided) unless it is established in the
compliance proceeding that the Union has no ongoing
need for this information.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the region, post at
its State of Washington, State of Oregon, Edwards Air
Force Base, California, Palmdale, California, Weber and
Davis Counties, Utah, Boeing Atlantic Test Center, Flor-
ida, facilities and at its Inertial Upper Stage program at
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”14 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 19, after being signed by the Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical post-
ing of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electron-
ically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an in-
ternet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respond-
ent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. If the Respond-
ent has gone out of business or closed any of the facili-
ties involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at those facilities at any time
since September 11, 2012.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 19 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 9, 2016

14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with So-
ciety of Professional Engineering Employees in Aero-
space, affiliated with International Federation of Profes-
sional & Technical Engineers, Local 2001 (the Union) by
failing and refusing to furnish it with requested infor-
mation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s per-
formance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the
information requested by the Union in paragraphs 1, 2,
3b and d, and 4b and c of its September 11, 2012 infor-
mation request and in paragraphs 1 and 3 of its Septem-
ber 20, 2012 information request (excluding the wage
information previously provided) unless it is established
in the compliance proceeding that the Union has no on-
going need for this information.
THE BOEING COMPANY
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-093656 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
Anastasia Hermosillo Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles N. Eberhart, Esq., for the Respondent.
Thomas B. Buescher, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DICKIE MONTEMAYOR, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried before me on February 4, 2014, in Seattle, Washing-
ton. The case involves an allegation that Boeing (the Respond-
ent) failed to provide the Society of Professional Engineering
Employees in Aerospace, affiliated with International Federa-
tion of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 2001 (the
Union) certain information requested by the Union. The em-
ployer, for its part, denies that it failed to bargain in good faith,
or that it failed to provide the Union information it was required
to provide under the Act. I find that Respondent violated the
Act as alleged.
This case was originally a part of a group of four cases that
were consolidated pursuant to a complaint and notice of hearing
dated April 29, 2013. Prior to the hearing on the consolidated
cases, Respondent on May 10, 2013, moved to sever this case.
By Order dated May 14, 2013, Respondent’s motion to sever
was granted and this matter proceeded to trial independently of
the other three consolidated cases.1
The complaint alleged that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to provide the Union cer-
tain relevant requested information. Respondent filed a timely
answer to the complaint denying all violations of the Act.
Counsel for the General Counsel, the Union, and the Re-
spondent filed briefs in support of their positions on March 12,

1 On May 15, 2014, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gerald
Etchingham issued a decision in The Boeing Company and Society of
Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace, IFTPE Local 2001,
JD(SF)–23–14. In that case, the ALJ concluded that Respondent vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by “surveilling employees” and “creating
an impression of surveillance” of employees. I make my findings that
the employer violated the Act independently, and without reliance
upon, Judge Etchingham’s decision in the prior case.
BOEING CO. 7
2013. On the entire record, I make the following findings,
conclusions of law, and recommendations.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at
all material times, Respondent has been a State of Delaware
Corporation with its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, that
manufactures and produces military and commercial aircraft at
various facilities throughout the United States, including Ever-
ett, Washington, and others in Seattle, Washington, and the
Portland, Oregon metropolitan areas.
The complaint further alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that at all material times Respondent, in conducting these oper-
ations, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and pur-
chased and received at its corporate headquarters products,
goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
points located outside the State of Washington.
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
Respondent is and has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and
further, the Union, is, and has been a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects com-
merce and that the Board has jurisdiction of this case, pursuant
to Section 10(a) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at
all times material herein, the Union has been a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent, is an airplane manufacturer, with facilities lo-
cated in Washington; Oregon; California; Mesa, Arizona; Tex-
as; Charleston, South Carolina; St. Louis, Missouri; Philadelph-
ia, Pennsylvania; and Huntsville, Alabama. (Tr. 47–49:193.)
Respondent employs between 150,000 and 200,000 employees
nationwide. (Tr. 47.) Respondent is divided into four major
groups: (1) Boeing Commercial Airplanes(“BCA”); (2) Boeing
Defense and Space Group (“BDS”); (3) Engineering Operations
and Technology (“EO&T”); and (4) Shared Services Group
(“SSG”). (Tr. 45.)
1. The professional and technical bargaining units
The Union has a long history of representation with Re-
spondent and has represented many employee bargaining units
dating back to the 1940s. (Tr. 143–144.) This case involves
the professional and technical units whose work is covered by
the professional and technical collective-bargaining agreements
(“professional agreement” and “technical agreement”; collec-
tively, the “agreements”). (GC Exh. 3; GC Exh. 2.) The pro-
fessional agreement covers five bargaining units. (Tr. 43; GC
Exh. 3 at 1–2). Employees covered by the professional agree-
ment perform engineering work. (Tr. 43–44). The technical
agreement covers three bargaining units. (GC Exh. 2 at 1.)
Those covered by the technical agreement perform jobs con-
necting engineering to manufacturing, such as sequencing or
drafting. (Tr. 44.)
2. Respondent’s use of non-Boeing and nonbargaining
unit labor
In addition to its own employees, Respondent also utilizes
“Non-Boeing labor.” Non-Boeing labor refers to work per-
formed by third parties, such as a contractors or vendors. Non-
Boeing labor may work in the same facilities as represented
employees and perform bargaining-unit work. (Tr. 49.) “Non-
Bargaining-unit labor” refers to Respondent’s employees who
are not part of the bargaining units. (Tr. 50.) These employees
may also perform bargaining unit work at the same facilities as
SPEEA represented employees; if, for example, the employee
is on travel assignment from an unrepresented facility. (Tr. 50.)
However, these employees generally work at nonunionized
facilities. (Tr. 50.) Nonbargaining unit labor may perform both
engineering and technical work. (Tr. 50.)
3. Professional and technical employee compensation
The compensation scheme for SPEEA-represented profes-
sional and technical employees can best be described as a sala-
ry or wage pool wherein specific rates or wages are not identi-
fied but rather wage raises are pooled together and divided
amongst employees. (Tr. 44.) The agreements provide for a
guaranteed “minimum increase percentage,” the amount re-
ceived beyond the minimum is determined by two other varia-
bles: (1) individual employee performance; and (2) how the
employee’s current pay compares to the Respondent’s salary
reference table (“SRT”). (Tr. 45, 173–174; GC 2 at 24–25; GC
3 at 24.) Respondent’s SRTs are charts which “display the
range of salaries [Respondent] has established for the jobs . . .
performed by nonexecutive salaried employees.” (R. 13 at 3.)
Respondent maintains an SRT for each employee position. (Tr.
235.)2
B. Negotiations
1. Overview
During all times material to this case, the parties were en-
gaged in contract negotiations which formally began in April of
2012. (Tr. 55.) At the time of negotiations, the Union sought
to reach a “status-quo agreement.” Their desire was to extend
the prior agreement for four more years. (Tr. 62.) When Re-
spondent presented its first proposal it proposed to cut the cur-
rent five-percent wage pools to three-percent. (Tr. 150, GC
Exh. 5 at 37, GC Exh. 6 at 34.) The Union presented the pro-
posal to its membership. The Union members rejected the pro-
posal. (Tr. 157, 229.)
2. The bargaining teams
The Union’s bargaining team consisted of 25 members; 10 of
whom were bargaining unit employees and 15 were SPEEA
staff. (Tr. 57.) Director of Strategic Development Rich Plun-
kett (“Plunkett”) was a SPEEA staff member on the Union’s
bargaining team. (Tr. 41.) Plunkett’s role on the team was to
advise and speak on behalf of the Union. (Tr. 53–54.)

2 See GC Br. at p. 3 and 4 for a more detailed, concise, and accurate
explanation of how the SRTs are created.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
Respondent’s negotiation team principals were: BCA Vice
President of Engineering Mike Delaney; Vice President of
Commercial Aviation Services Support Todd Zarfos; Director
of Engineering Conrad Ball; Director of EO&T Mark Burgess;
Western Region Director of Employee Relations Bill Hartman;
BCA Vice President of Human Resources Julie Ellen Acosta;
Director of Human Resources Engineering Rich Hartnett; and
Vice President of Labor Relations Gene Woloshyn. (Tr. 58–
59.)
IV. The Information Violation
A. The Information Requests at Issue in This Case
The allegations in this case rest on information requests that
were sent by the Union to the Respondent on September 11 and
20, 2012. The information requests were triggered by a
Bloomberg news article and statements made at the bargaining
table. The article was published online September 6, 2012, and
was titled “Boeing May Use Non-Seattle Engineers as Costs
Up.” The thrust of the article was that Boeing was considering
having some work done at other less expensive sites. The arti-
cle quoted Mike Delaney, Boeing of America chief engineer as
saying, “we’re committed to Puget Sound . . . But we will do—
and I have told SPEEA this—when we do the next airplane, I
will do and use whatever resources it takes to launch the air-
plane.” (GC Exh. 7 p. 1.) “We’re willing to pay a premium to
be in Seattle because there’s a base, there’s great capability,
we’ve got a great team, but you if took SPEEA’s proposal,
Boeing’s costs would balloon and it wouldn’t be competitive.
No customer will pay that kind of premium.” (GC Exh. 7 p. 2.)
The “proposal” was a clear reference to the Union’s proposal to
maintain the status quo.
Within 2 days of the article’s publication, the Union on Sep-
tember 11, 2012, submitted an information request which di-
rectly referenced statements made at the bargaining table and
statements made to the media presumably referring to the
statements attributed to Delaney. Some of the initial requests
are no longer in issue in this litigation and have been purposely
omitted. The requests which are still in issue are set forth be-
low:
1. With respect to your statements that engineering costs are
higher in Puget Sound than many other Boeing locations.
Please provide the following for each of the past three fiscal
years for the Puget Sound area, St. Louis. MO. Philadelphia,
PA. Houston, TX, San Antonio, TX, Huntsville, AL, Charles-
ton. SC and any other Boeing location where engineers and
technical employees perform work similar to that performed
by members of the SPEEA bargaining units in Puget Sound:
a. Detailed calculations and explanations of how Boeing
calculates productivity at each of these locations, includ-
ing a line by line item breakout of local engineering la-
bor costs at each location including benefits and any oth-
er costs allocated as engineering labor costs.
b. Detailed calculations and explanations of how Boeing
calculates engineering costs per Unit of production (in-
cluding specifically defining the unit of production).
c. A detailed line by line summary of engineering over-
head for each location.
2. With respect to your statement that Boeing is willing to
pay a “premium” to do engineering in Seattle and the Puget
Sound area. Please provide the following information·
a. What is the current premium paid to the engineering
employees, if any?
b. Provide a detailed explanation of how that "premium”
is calculated, the data supporting that calculation and the
data from other locations described in request number 1
above showing how they do not pay such a “premium".
3. With respect to your statement that with SPEEA’s current
proposal Boeing's engineering costs would "balloon and it
[Boeing] would not be competitive” and ''no customer would
pay that kind of premium", please provide the following:
b. All information available or known to you about pro-
jected changes in engineering costs for the competitors
over the next three years.
d. A detailed statement of exactly how the “premium''
you claim that no customer would pay is calculated and
all information available or known to you support such a
statement.
4. With respect to the statement in the September 7, 2012,
message to employees that “Boeing cannot sustain the rate of
growth outlined in the previous contract'', please provide the
following information:
b. All data, including all assumptions and analyses used to
make this determination.
c. A projected date for when growth rate becomes unsustaina-
ble, including all data, assumptions and analysis used to make
this determination. (GC Exh. 8.)
On or about September 20, 2012, the Union submitted an-
other request for information. The Union asked to be provided
information. The requests that are still in issue are set forth
below:
1. Amounts paid by Boeing to outside entities of any kind for
persons who perform bargaining unit work. Data should be
broken down to indicate the number of engineers, the type of
engineers and the time period they have worked each year.
The same breakdown should be made for technical employ-
ees. To be clear, the data should be provided in a manner that
will allow SPEEA to do a simple arithmetic calculation show-
ing the cost per hour of a contract employee to Boeing for the
period of time he/she worked during these four years.
3. The compensation paid to engineers and technical employ-
ees provided by outside entities of any kind to Boeing who
are performing bargaining unit work. This data should be bro-
ken down by skill type and separately list not just base pay but
things like overtime and fringe benefits, to the extent they ex-
ist. (GC Exh. 10.)
Respondent did not provide the information that was re-
quested by the Union instead, on September 25, 2012, Mark
Brenaman, the employee relations specialist, responded via
BOEING CO. 9
email to the first request. In his email he stated:
1. As the Company has communicated consistently through-
out the negotiation process, wage rates in the Puget Sound are
well above the national market. This information is available
publicly from sources to which the Union has ample access.
The Company also has information available through ERI il-
lustrating the differences between the specific markets identi-
fied in your request. Moreover, the Company has also pre-
sented extensive data to the Union in previous meetings re-
garding our position on wages relative to market. Much of
that data was presented months ago, in our April 19th and
20th sessions. Given the confidential nature of much of the
ERI data and the information presented during our meetings,
the Company agreed to provide the presentations subject to a
confidentiality agreement. We iterated on a proposed confi-
dentiality agreement to the Union, but received no final re-
sponse. If the Union now wishes to revisit its position on the
execution of a confidentiality agreement, the Company would
be happy to discuss it further.
2. It is a statistical and publicly available fact that the Puget
Sound has higher wage rates than other geographic regions.
See the Company's response to request number 1 above.
3. This request is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad, and calls
for information with at best tangential relevance to the ongo-
ing negotiations. It contains such vague requests as "infor-
mation on the "quality differences (perceived and actual), ma-
terials, workmanship, engineering, functionality, service, on
time delivery and any kind of government subsidy received
between Boeing products and the competitors' products that
would be purchased by customers. If there are specific ques-
tions the Union has relating to these topics, we ask that it pose
those specific questions and state their relevance to the ongo-
ing collective bargaining.
As to the requests that the Company cost out the Union's pro-
posals article by article, the Company is under no obligation
to cost out the Union's proposals in this fashion. However,
the Company has evaluated the Union's wage proposal of
7.5% each year and determined that if accepted, it would
place the bargaining unit's salaries at almost 30% above the
market. (See Respondent’s Chart) 3
4. As noted in response to the above requests 1–3, while the
Company seeks to remain market leading, it must provide
compensation that is sensitive to the current market. No
company can sustain its competitiveness if its cost of labor
continues to significantly outpace the growth among its mar-
ket competition. The Company is not financially insolvent or
claiming a present inability to pay. It is simply reiterating
that wage increases must be based on fiscally prudent analysis
of the Company's position relative to market in order to re-
main and sustain the Company's competitive position. We
shared the basis for our opinions in detail during the Compa-
ny's presentation on the competitive business environment de-

3 Respondent’s email provided a chart supporting its calculation
which appears in the original email but was omitted. (See GC Exh. 11
p. 2.)
livered during our August 16, 2012 meeting and throughout
the negotiations to date.
On October 5, 2012, Boeing and the Union entered into the
confidentiality agreement referenced in paragraph one of
Brenaman’s emails. (GC Exh. 12.) Similarly on October 5,
2012, William Hartman, the director of employee relations
responded to the Union’s October 5, 2012 request pertaining to
Non-Boeing Labor and stated among other things that the re-
quested, “data remains presumptively irrelevant to the current
negotiations, and the Union still would be required to articulate
a basis for the request.” (GC Exh. 17.) Enclosed with the re-
sponse was a matrix with information pertaining to contractors.
The chart however did not contain information that was specifi-
cally requested by the Union including amounts paid to outside
entities, compensation paid to employees by outside entities
including any overtime and fringe benefits. (GC Exh. 18.)
Thereafter, on November 1, 2012, the Union sent an email
asserting that despite signing the confidentiality agreement that
Brenaman asserted was a prerequisite to Respondent complying
with the request, and the Union’s explanation of the relevance
of the information sought, Respondent still had not provided
information responsive to its requests. Specifically Respondent
failed to provide information pertaining to “rates paid to non-
Boeing personnel performing bargaining unit work.” (GC Exh.
19, p. 2.)
On November 7, 2012, Respondent provided a chart which
contained information regarding the hourly rates paid to con-
tractors listing the minimum, average, and highest amounts
paid. (GC Exh. 20.)4 The chart however did not provide any
information regarding contract house fees, overtime, or fringe
benefits. (GC Exh. 20.)5
After receiving the chart, the Union’s representative, Rich
Plunkett contacted Brenaman by phone to discuss the infor-
mation requests. Brenaman when questioned about information
that still had not been provided told Plunkett, “what you’ve got
is all you’re going to get” (Tr. 140:18). Thereafter, no other
information was received regarding either the September 11 or
20, 2012 requests.
B. The Duty to Provide Information
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of its employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
As the Board explained in A-1 Door & Building Solutions, 356
NLRB No. 76, slip op. at 2 (2011): An employer's duty to bar-
gain includes a general duty to provide information needed by
the bargaining representative in contract negotiations and ad-
ministration. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–
153 (1956) [parallel citations omitted]. Generally, information
concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of

4 The actual dollar amounts that appeared in the original exhibit
were redacted to preserve the confidentiality of the information. (GC
Exh. 20.)
5 Counsel for the General Counsel conceded in its brief that only
two items from the September 20, 2012 request remain at issue. The
first being the Union’s request for the amounts paid to outside entities
and second, the compensation including overtime and fringe benefits
paid to contractors. (See GC Br. at 28.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
employment for unit employees is presumptively relevant to the
union's role as exclusive collective-bargaining representative.
See Southern California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235 (2005).
By contrast, information concerning nonunit employees is not
presumptively relevant; rather, relevance must be shown.
Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 315 NLRB 257, 259 (1994).
The burden to show relevance, however, is “not exceptionally
heavy,” Leland Stanford Junior University, 262 NLRB 136,
139 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1983); “[t]he Board
uses a broad, discovery-type standard in determining relevance
in information requests.” Shoppers Food Warehouse, supra at
259.
Notably, once the burden of showing the relevance of
nonunit information is satisfied, the duty to provide the infor-
mation is the same as it is with presumptively relevant unit
information. Depending on the circumstances and reasons for
the union's interest, information that is not presumptively rele-
vant may have “an even more fundamental relevance than that
considered presumptively relevant.” Prudential Insurance Co.
of America v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396
U.S. 928 (1969). “[A]n employer's duty to bargain includes a
general duty to provide information needed by the bargaining
representative to assess claims made by the employer relevant
to contract negotiations.” Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159,
1159–1160 (2006). NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149,
152–153 (1956). As the Supreme Court explained in Truitt,
when a party asserts its positions without permitting proof or
independent verification, “[t]his is not collective bargaining.”
351 U.S. at 153 (quoting Pioneer Pearl button Co., 1 NLRB
837, 842–843 (1936)).
C. Relevance
1. The presumptively relevant information requests
The evidence of record establishes, and I find that some of
the information requested by the Union was presumptively
relevant. More specifically, I find that the request for infor-
mation regarding “premiums” paid to engineering employees
represented by the Union (September 11, 2012)-Item Number
2(a) and (b) were presumptively relevant as it directly related to
wages paid unit employees. See Maple View Manor, Inc., 320
NLRB 1149 (1996).
2. The other relevant information requests
The discovery standard for relevance is construed “broadly
to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could
lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or
may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340, 351 (1978), Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 51
(1947). Although not presumptively relevant, I find that items
1a, 1b, 1c, 3 b, 3d, 4b, and c of the September 11, 2012 request
and items 1 and 3 of September 20, 2012, all relevant.
In this case, the Union sought the information because the
Union wanted to know first and foremost the rationale underly-
ing the statements made at the bargaining table and those at-
tributed to Delaney in the news article. The question is whether
the requests for the information satisfy the “broad, discovery-
type standard” of relevance utilized by the Board. I find that
they do. The information regarding calculations and explana-
tion of productivity costs, engineering costs, and engineering
overhead all directly relate to statements made at the bargaining
table, and the news article statements attributed to Delany re-
garding the expense associated with the Union at Puget Sound
and the inference that work would be sent elsewhere absent
some agreement that contained costs. (Tr. 78:11–21, Tr.
70:11–18, 73:4–18, Tr. 69–70, Tr. 73). This information is
directly relevant to the Union’s evaluation and/or reevaluation
of their bargaining position as it related to the fundamental and
basic underlying contract wage issues.
Similar reasoning is applicable to the data and calculations
showing how premiums are not paid at other facilities, project-
ed changes in engineering costs for the next 3 years, a detailed
statement of how the “premium” referenced at the bargaining
table and attributed to Delaney in the news article is calculated,
information regarding whether Respondent could sustain the
rate of growth (referenced both in a memo to employees and
the news article), along with information when rate of growth
would become unsustainable. (GC Exh. 9.) I find that all these
information requests are directly relevant to the Union’s eval-
uation of its position regarding Respondent’s claims that the
Union’s initial bargaining position would harm its competitive-
ness. The relevance of the information was generally explained
by Plunkett who testified “[i]f we’re going to price them out of
business, we’re out of work. So we needed to know what is
this premium. And if no customer is going to pay, we need to
understand that.” (Tr. 90:10–16.)
So too, I find relevant the two September 20, 2012 infor-
mation requests pertaining to the amounts paid to outside enti-
ties during the prior 4 years and compensation including over-
time and fringe benefits paid to contractors for the last 4 years.
This information was also directly relevant to underlying con-
tractual wage issues that were at the heart of the negotiations
between the parties. The information was relevant to the Un-
ion’s evaluation of the overall “market rate” referenced by Re-
spondent and whether the rate took into account rates being
paid contract workers and those paid to a “contract house.” (Tr.
104:10–20.) Mr. Plunket generally described the relevance
stating, “we wanted to understand the market . . . and we’re
trying to understand the market to the greatest level of detail so
we could structure a counter or have a dialogue about interests
not simply I want to be x percent in the market.” (Tr. 105:10–
16.).
In sum, Respondent’s proposal to reduce the annual wage
growth percentage, its direct statements (and those attributed to
Delany) directed at the Union’s initial “status quo” proposal
asserting that Boeing’s costs would “balloon and it wouldn’t be
competitive” were a public invitation and/or warning to the
Union to reevaluate its bargaining position. This triggered the
Union’s duty to evaluate in detail Respondent’s statements to
determine the accuracy of such statements and whether in fact
their position required some alteration.
I further find that it is inherently contradictory for Respond-
ent on the one hand to assert at the bargaining table and public-
ly that these matters are broadly relevant to bargaining and then
during the litigation assert that these very matters have abso-
lutely no relevance to the negotiations. I find that all of the
information requests referenced above would have assisted the
BOEING CO. 11
Union in assessing the accuracy of the Respondent's factual
assertions and developing its own counterproposals. The rec-
ord evidence unambiguously demonstrates that the Union’s
requests were made directly in response to specific assertions
made by the Respondent while bargaining was ongoing.
D. The Failure to Provide Relevant Information.
The Union was entitled to all of the relevant information ref-
erenced above and I find that Respondent’s refusal and/or fail-
ure to provide the information violated the Act. “The refusal of
an employer to provide a bargaining agent with information
relevant to the Union’s task of representing its constituency is a
per se violation of the act without regard to the employer’s
subjective good or bad faith.” Piggly Wiggly Midwest, LLC,
357 NLRB 191 (2012); Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 220 NLRB
189, 191 (1975); Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 237 NLRB 747,
751 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1979). The failure to
provide the information is in direct contravention to the funda-
mental objectives of the Act. “The objective of the disclosure
[of requested information] obligation is to enable the parties to
perform their statutory function responsibly and ‘to promote an
intelligent resolution of issues at an early stage and without
industrial strife.” Clemson Bros., 290 NLRB 944, 944 fn. 5
(1988).
The Respondent's arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
Respondent contends that it had no duty to provide the infor-
mation because (1) “Boeing never claimed an inability to pay;
(2) Boeing never put “engineering costs” at issue; (3) NBL
costs and compensation is irrelevant to SPEEA employee com-
pensation and (4) SPEEA did not need the information to per-
form its bargaining function.”
1. Inability to pay
Respondent argues that it never claimed “inability to pay”
and therefore the duty to provide information was never trig-
gered. Respondent’s assertions regarding “inability to pay” fall
short. The Board in Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159, 1160
(2006), openly rejected the notion that only assertions of “ina-
bility to pay” will trigger a duty to disclose information. The
Board instead held that “when there has been a showing of
relevance, the Board has consistently found a duty to provide
information such as competitor data, labor costs, production
costs, restructuring studies, income statements, and wage rates
for nonunit employees.” In Caldwell, the Board specifically
held that “the General Counsel established that the information
was relevant, because it would have assisted the Charging Party
in assessing the accuracy of the Respondent’s proposals and
developing its own counterproposals. The record evidence
demonstrates that the Charging Party’s requests were made
directly in response to specific factual assertions made by the
Respondent in the course of bargaining.” (Id. at 1160.) A simi-
lar result was reached in KLB Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 700
F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012), wherein the company sought wage
concessions on the basis of competitive pressures it claimed to
be facing. In KLB, the court reaffirmed the Board’s holding
that when the company relied on competitive pressures to justi-
fy wage concessions it “made the veracity of that claim relevant
to the negotiations.” (Id. at 557.) The reasoning and rationale
of Caldwell and KLB is particularly applicable to the facts of
this case and directly addresses the very questions presented.
2. Respondent directly and indirectly put engineering costs in
issue
Respondent’s assertion that it never put “engineering costs”
in issue ignores the plain and obvious statements attributed to
Delaney, statements made at the bargaining table, and state-
ments made by Brenaman in response to the information re-
quests themselves. Unmistakably, the news article’s plain fo-
cus was on “engineering costs.” Wage rates are undoubtedly a
part of what makes up “engineering costs.” Brenaman, in his
September 25, 2102 response to the Union’s request for infor-
mation regarding “engineering costs” stated, “as the company
has communicated consistently throughout the negotiation
process, wage rates in the Puget Sound are well above the na-
tional market (emphasis added).” (GC Exh. 11.) Brenaman’s
statement is a clear admission that “throughout the bargaining
process” engineering costs were in fact “in issue.”
Respondent further argues that the requests for information
were “based upon the false premise derived from an inaccurate
and unreliable news article.” (R. Br. at 31.) Respondent fur-
ther argues that the Bloomberg article was not “substantive
evidence” and “unsubstantiated hearsay.” (Id.)
The news article falls outside the definition of hearsay be-
cause it was never offered to prove the truth of the matters as-
serted therein. (Tr. 81.) See Fed. Rules of Evidence 801(c)(2).
I also reject the underlying premise of Respondent’s argument
that somehow it was insulated from responding to the requests
for information because the requests were partly triggered by
quotes attributed to Boeing’s VP of engineering and chief
spokesperson for Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA). The
article was published while negotiations were ongoing and
specifically referred to the Union’s proposal. The language
used in the news article mirrored other statements made in bar-
gaining. I find the totality of these to facts sufficient to trigger
the Union’s statutory duties and responsibilities. The infor-
mation sought clearly had a bearing on the bargaining process
and the Union had a reasonable belief supported by objective
evidence i.e. a printed news article with statements attributed to
the chief spokesperson for BCA requesting the information.
See Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994).
Further, there is no evidence in the record from which to
conclude that the news article was either inaccurate or unrelia-
ble. Delany was never called as a witness and no person who
was called to testify called into question the accuracy or relia-
bility of the article. Nor did any of Respondent’s officials sug-
gest during the various communications between the parties
during bargaining that the news article was inaccurate or unre-
liable. There was no testimony or evidence offered which es-
tablished that Delany, the chief spokesperson for BCA, was not
authorized to speak on behalf of Boeing in his official capacity.
There was also no evidence introduced which established that
Boeing sought any retraction or correction from Bloomberg.
Nevertheless, the information request was not predicated solely
on the news article. The Union’s request on September 12,
2012, on its face referenced both, “statements made at the bar-
gaining table and to the media.” (GC Exh. 8.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
3. Non Boeing Labor (NBL) costs and compensation
was relevant.
Respondent’s assertions that NBL costs and compensation
were irrelevant are also misplaced. The comparison of what
others were paid is directly relevant to the Union’s evaluation
of the market rate of pay. This is especially true given the fact
that Non-Boeing contract workers can perform the same work
and in fact work side by side with bargaining unit employees.
(Tr. 49:9–24.) As previously noted, wage rates and their com-
parison with what Boeing was characterizing as the “market
rate” were matters that were at the heart of the negotiations and
were directly relevant to bargaining.
E. Respondent Has No Legal Right to Unilaterally Decide
What Information the Union Needs to Perform its Statutory
Responsibilities.
Respondent’s assertion that the Union did not need the in-
formation to perform its bargaining function also lacks merit.
Respondent has no legal right to determine unilaterally what
information the Union needs to engage in meaningful negotia-
tions nor to unilaterally force the Union to rely upon the accu-
racy of its assertions without independent verification. The
need for the information was directly triggered by the actions of
Respondent and the assertions it made and/or were attributed to
it in the news article. It was the Union’s legal right and respon-
sibility to assess and verify for itself the accuracy of the Re-
spondent's claims in bargaining. Shoppers Warehouse, supra.
As the Supreme Court noted in Truitt, supra, if “an argument is
important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining,
it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accu-
racy.” 351 U.S. at 152–153. The Supreme Court in Truitt rec-
ognized the right for independent verification noting that with-
out permitting proof or independent verification, “[t]his is not
collective bargaining.” 351 U.S. at 153 (quoting Pioneer Pearl
Button Co., 1 NLRB at 842–843.
Respondent’s Other Defenses
I reject the Respondent's other asserted defenses as being
contrary to clearly established Board law. The Respondent’s
contention that the Union's information requests were made in
bad faith is without any factual support. “[T]he presumption is
that the union acts in good faith when it requests information
from an employer until the contrary is shown.” Hawkins Con-
struction Co., 285 NLRB 1313, 1314 (1987), enf. denied on
other grounds, 857 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1988); International
Paper Co., 319 NLRB 1253, 1266 (1995), enf. denied on other
grounds, 115 F.3d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997). There is not a scintil-
la of evidence to support the assertion the Union acted in bad
faith. In Land Rover Redwood City, 330 NLRB 331, 331–332
fn. 3 (1999), the Board held that “the requirement that an in-
formation request be made in good faith is satisfied if at least
one reason for the demand can be justified.” As was discussed
above, the Union’s requests were all relevant to the ongoing
bargaining and therefore justified. Respondent asserted that the
timing of the requests suggests that the real purpose behind the
requests was to “delay-not facilitate-the negotiations.” (R. Br.
at 35.) I disagree, the timing of the requests were triggered by
statements made at bargaining and those attributed to Delany
and there was no showing to the contrary. Respondent also
argues that the “sheer quantity of SPEEA’s information re-
quests established bad faith.” (Id. at 36.) While it is clear that
in some circumstances an overly burdensome request can con-
stitute bad faith, the requests in this case simply do not fall
within that category. I find that the requests were not overly
burdensome or “excessive” as characterized by Respondent.
Rather, they were carefully and narrowly tailored and sought
relevant information that was put in issue directly by Respond-
ent.
Respondent’s assertions of waiver similarly lack merit. Re-
spondent can point to no evidence in the record (and there is
none) which would support a finding that the Union relin-
quished its rights to the information sought. See Clinchfield
Coal Co., 275 NLRB 1384 (1985). Nor has there been the
requisite showing that the Union expressly waived its right to
information. NLRB v. Perkins Mach. Co., 326 F.2d 488(1st
Cir. 1964).
I also find Respondent’s assertions that the subsequent
reaching of a collective-bargaining agreement renders moot the
Union’s claims unpersuasive. Respondent’s assertions ignore
well-established Board precedent to the contrary. See Lumber
Mills Employers Assn’s, 265 NLRB 199, 204 (1982), enfd., 736
F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984).
F. The Practical Effects of the Failure to Provide Relevant
Information
I find Respondent’s failure to provide requested information
undermined and tainted the bargaining process. “Collective
bargaining is often described as a struggle of brute economic
power between an employer and union. It is, but at the same
time the Act regulates the process of that struggle by requiring
good-faith bargaining that encourages reasoning, problem solv-
ing, and honest discussion. This reasoned side of the Act is
essential if the Act's goal of industrial peace is to be furthered.
There is a right to engage in knowledge-based bargaining
where parties can verify each other's statements, and just as
importantly, have information necessary to creatively search for
solutions to the problems and differences that arise in collective
bargaining.” National Extrusion & Mfg. Co., 357 NLRB 127
(2011). Respondent’s actions in failing to provide the request-
ed information deprived the Union of its right to engage in
“knowledge based bargaining.”
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, The Boeing Company, is an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party the Society of Professional Engineer-
ing Employees in Aerospace, affiliated with International Fed-
eration of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 2001
(Union) is a labor organization with the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. At all material times the Union has been the designated
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following
bargaining units of Respondent's employees:
a) Professional Unit
Professional employees, including but not limited to those
BOEING CO. 13
working at [Respondent’s] facilities in the State of Washing-
ton and the State of Oregon, as set forth in Appendix B of the
Collective-Bargaining Agreement for the Professional Bar-
gaining Units.
b) Technical Unit
Technical employees, including but not limited to those work-
ing at [Respondent’s] facilities in the State of Washington and
the State of Oregon, as set forth Article 1 and Appendix B of
the Collective-Bargaining Agreement for the Technical Bar-
gaining Units.
4. By failing and refusing to provide information requested
by the Union and relevant to the Union's representational duties
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent
affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall provide the Union with the infor-
mation requested in paragraphs 1, 2, 3b and d, and 4 b and c of
its September 11, 2012 request for information. Respondent
shall also provide the Union with the information requested in
paragraphs 1 and 3 (excluding the wage information previously
provided) in its September 20, 2012 request for information.
To remedy the Respondent's unlawful failure to bargain in
good faith with the Union, the Respondent shall be ordered to
bargain in good faith with the Union.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended6
ORDER
The Respondent, [name, city, State], its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with the Union as the
representative of its employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit by failing and refusing to provide information requested by
the Union that is relevant and necessary to the Union's repre-
sentational status.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) In a timely manner, furnish the Union with the infor-
mation requested by the Union in paragraphs 1, 2, 3b and d, and
4b and c of its September 11, 2012 request for information.
(b) In a timely manner, furnish the Union with the infor-
mation requested by the Union in paragraphs 1 and 3 of its
September 20, 2012 request for information (excluding the
wage information previously provided referenced herein).
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-

6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
cility in Seattle, Washington, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since November 23, 2012.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 31, 2014
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the
above rights.
WE WILL NOT fail to collectively bargain in good faith with
the SPEEA, IFPTE LOCAL 2001 (the “Union”), by refusing
and failing to provide the Union with requested information
that is relevant and necessary to the performance of its duties
as the collective-bargaining representative of our employees in
the units as described in article 1 of the most recent collective-
bargaining professional and technical agreements between the
Union and us.

7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
WE WILL provide the Union with the information it requested
as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3b and d, and 4b and c of its
September 11, 2012 request for information; and in paragraphs
1 and 3 (other than wages which were provided on November
5, 2012) of its September 20, 2012 request for information.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with
your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
THE BOEING COMPANY
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-093656 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.