Technical College System of Georgiav.Louisiana Economic Development

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 29, 2012

No. 91191683 (T.T.A.B. May. 29, 2012)

Mailed:
May 29, 2012
Bucher

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

Technical College System of Georgia
v.
Louisiana Economic Development
________

Opposition No. 91191683
against Serial No. 77648122
_______

William H. Needle and Troy E. Larson of Ballard Spahr LLP
for Technical College System of Georgia.

Marc C. Whitfield of Taylor Porter Brooks and Phillips LLP
for Louisiana Economic Development.
_______

Before Bucher, Grendel and Ritchie, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Bucher, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Louisiana Economic Development, a Louisiana state
agency [hereinafter “applicant” or “LED”], seeks
registration on the Principal Register of the mark Louisiana
FastStart (in standard character format) for services recited in
the application, as amended, as follows:
business training services, namely, training
in the fields of headquarters operations,
call center operations, operation of
distribution centers, technical training
related to product manufacturing and team
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Opposition No. 91191683
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skills and leadership training in
International Class 41.1

Technical College System of Georgia, a Georgia state
agency [hereinafter “opposer” or “TCSG”], opposed
registration of LED’s mark, asserting as its ground for
opposition, likelihood of confusion, namely that as used in
connection with LED’s services, the mark so resembles TCSG’s
previously-used and registered mark QUICK START in
connection with “educational services; namely, industrial
training of managers and other employees of companies”2 in
International Class 41, as to be likely to cause confusion,
to cause mistake or to deceive.
Preliminary Matters
LED objects to substantially all of TCSG’s evidence.
We will examine each of these objections, as well as make
additional evidentiary observations of our own.
Each party to this litigation filed a motion to suspend
pending negotiations [December 1, 2009 and January 28,

1 Application Serial No. 77648122 was filed on January 13,
2009 based upon applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce. No claim is made to the exclusive
right to use the word “Louisiana” apart from the mark as shown.
2 Opposer claims ownership of Registration No. 1806463 that
issued on November 23, 1993, but as will be discussed in detail,
infra, failed properly to introduce into the record at any point
a status and title copy of the subject registration, so opposer
cannot rely upon this registration for purposes of standing or
priority.
Opposition No. 91191683
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2010]. TCSG’s Motion for Extension of Trial Periods with
Consent (October 14, 2010) was accepted by the Board, and a
corresponding Order was issued with deadlines as follows:
Discovery Closes: CLOSED
Plaintiff’s Pretrial Disclosures: December 15, 2010
Plaintiff’s 30-day Trial Period Ends: January 29, 2011
Defendant’s Pretrial Disclosures: February 13, 2011
Defendant’s 30-day Trial Period Ends: March 30, 2011
Plaintiff’s Rebuttal Disclosures: April 14, 2011
Plaintiff’s 15-day Rebuttal Period Ends: May 14, 2011

As of the close of its trial period on January 29,
2011, TCSG had not filed any evidence in support of its
opposition. LED timely filed its trial evidence on or
before March 30, 2011. On April 29, 2011, after the
expiration of both parties’ main trial periods, TCSG filed
the December 7, 2010, trial testimony of Ms. Heidi Green,
with attached exhibits. Then on May 16, 2011, after the
close of TCSG’s rebuttal period, TCSG filed five Notices of
Reliance. On July 6, 2011, TCSG filed a supplemental Notice
of Reliance regarding two exhibits to a discovery deposition
of a witness affiliated with applicant. On September 2,
2011, LED filed an objection to substantially all of TCSG’s
evidence. These objections were continued in LED’s final
brief on the case.
LED objects to all of TCSG’s notices of reliance as
well as the testimony of Ms. Heidi Green and the exhibits
attached thereto. Specifically, LED contends that none of
Opposition No. 91191683
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TCSG’s five Notices of Reliance were timely filed, pursuant
to 37 C.F.R. § 2.123(k); that TCSG has not authenticated the
proffered evidence or specified a reason or purpose such
documents would be used in this proceeding, pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 2.122; that reliance upon these documents for the
truth of the contents contained therein would be hearsay; as
well as additional specific objections to each category of
documents placed into the record.
We will review LED’s objections to several broad
categories of TCSG’s evidence as follows:
TCSG’s Notice of Opposition / Getting cited registration into evidence
TCSG’s Notice of Opposition averred as follows:
Opposer is the owner of the incontestable
federal registration for QUICK START®,
Registration No. 1806463, for “educational
services, namely, industrial training of
managers and other employees of companies”
…. Opposer’s registration is valid,
subsisting and is in full force and effect.

(Notice of Opp. at ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 1). TCSG claims that it
“downloaded the ‘463 Registration to its Notice of
Opposition via the Board’s ESTTA electronic filing system.”
While it is true that the ESTTA cover sheet contains a
reference to the claimed registration, this does not provide
current status of, and current title to, the registration,
as required by Trademark Rule 2.122. 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d).
See also TBMP § 704.03(b)(1)(A). Moreover, in its answer,
Opposition No. 91191683
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LED said that “Applicant does however admit the existence of
a registered trademark for QUICK START to a registrant other
than Opposer and lacks knowledge regarding whether this mark
has been validly assigned to Opposer.” (Answer at ¶ 2, Dkt.
No. 4.) We find that this is not an admission on LED’s
part, so LED’s answer is not deemed to be an admission of
TCSG’s ownership of this registration or its validity. See
TBMP § 704.03(b)(1)(A) n.19 (3d ed. 2011) and cases cited
therein.
Even in the absence of a counterclaim attacking the
validity of TCSG’s ’463 Registration, we must carefully
scrutinize whether any actions taken by either party to this
litigation permits us to treat the registration’s currency
and ownership by TCSG as having been correctly introduced or
that those issues were tried by express or implied consent.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Hence, if it is neither properly
introduced nor tried by consent, TCSG cannot rely on this
registration for proving its standing, priority, or
likelihood of confusion.
Opposition No. 91191683
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TCSG’s Notices of Reliance
On May 16, 2011, TCSG filed five different Notices of
Reliance. The materials on which TCSG was relying consisted
of: (i) a United States Patent and Trademark Office
printout pertaining to TCSG’s mark: QUICK START (Dkt. #16);
(ii) LED’s response to TCSG’s Interrogatory No. 3, (Dkt.
#17); (iii) additional portions of, and exhibits from, a
discovery deposition taken by LED of TCSG’s representative,
Ms. Jackie M. Rohosky, on September 27, 2010, (Dkt. #18);
(iv) excerpts and exhibits from a discovery deposition taken
by TCSG of a witness affiliated with LED, Jeff Lynn, on
August 31, 2010, (Dkt. #19); and (v) excerpts and exhibits
from a discovery deposition taken by TCSG of a witness
affiliated with LED, Stephen Moret, on August 31, 2010,
(Dkt. #20). Later, on July 16, 2011, TCSG filed a
supplemental Notice of Reliance regarding two exhibits
inadvertently excluded from the submission of Mr. Moret’s
discovery deposition (Dkt. #20), (Dkt. #22).
LED argues that each of TCSG’s Notices of Reliance were
required to be filed during TCSG’s testimony period pursuant
to 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(j), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d) and/or
§ 2.122(e). Syngenta Crop Protection Inc., v. Bio-Chek,
LLC., 90 USPQ2d 1112, 1115 (TTAB 2009) (“A notice of
reliance must be submitted during the testimony period of
Opposition No. 91191683
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the offering party.”) LED argues that inasmuch as they were
not timely and properly filed, TCSG’s Notices of Reliance
should be disregarded entirely.
Although TCSG responds that it disagrees with LED’s
characterization of this evidence as untimely and LED’s
characterization of portions of it as hearsay and/or
irrelevant, TCSG notes that it did not rely on these
materials in its trial brief or in its reply brief, making
this objection moot. Of course, one of the submitted
evidentiary matters that TCSG has therefore agreed not to
rely upon (according to TCSG’s latest response to LED’s
objections) would have been the notice that placed a status
and title copy of TCSG’s registration into the record.
Accordingly, to the extent opposer intends to rely upon
these notices of reliance, we deem them to have been
untimely submitted after the close of opposer’s main
testimony period.
The testimony deposition of Ms. Heidi Green and exhibits thereto
The testimony deposition of Ms. Heidi Green was taken
on December 7, 2010. While this deposition appears to have
been taken before TCSG’s thirty-day testimony period
actually began, LED’s counsel appeared without objection on
the ground of untimeliness at the scheduled deposition. Of
course, TCSG’s premature scheduling of a deposition is an
Opposition No. 91191683
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error which could have been corrected on seasonable
objection, and hence we find that LED has waived this ground
for objection. See Of Counsel Inc. v. Strictly of Counsel
Chartered, 21 USPQ2d 1555, 1556 n.2 (TTAB 1991) (objection
to untimeliness of testimony deposition taken two days
before period opened was waived); TBMP § 707.03(b)(1) n.2
(3d ed. 2011) and cases cited therein. Hence, we have
considered this testimony despite the fact that it was taken
outside TCSG’s testimony period. Additionally, although
this testimony deposition was not served on LED within the
time frame set by the rules, Trademark Rule 2.125(a)
(requiring service of a copy of testimony “within thirty
days after completion of the taking of that testimony”),
applicant made no motions to reset its briefing period as a
result of opposer’s failure to serve this testimony,3 and so
we deem applicant to have waived any objection to timeliness
because it did not seek the remedy specified in the rule.
LED also objects to the testimony of Ms. Green inasmuch
as she is an employee of the TCSG Department of Economic
Development (GDEcD), which is a separate State agency from

3 “If the transcript with exhibits is not served on each
adverse party within thirty days or within an extension of time
for the purpose, any adverse party which was not served may have
remedy by way of a motion to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
to reset such adverse party’s testimony and/or briefing periods,
as may be appropriate.” Trademark Rule 2.125(a).

Opposition No. 91191683
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TCSG. While we agree that we must restrict the scope of Ms.
Green’s testimony to matters within her direct knowledge,
the mere fact she is employed by a different Georgia state
agency is not relevant. Ms. Green can testify as to any
relevant fact of which she has personal knowledge, and we
will accord the probative value to every aspect of Ms.
Green’s testimony that it is due.
Opposer's Reliance Upon Deposition Excerpts for Jackie Rohosky
As we discussed earlier in the context of LED’s
objection to the timeliness of TCSG’s notices of reliance,
this deposition is another one of the submitted evidentiary
matters that TCSG has apparently agreed not to rely upon
according to TCSG’s response to LED’s objections. However,
LED also argues that while TCSG said in its notice that this
discovery deposition was taken by opposer, this deposition
was clearly scheduled and taken by LED. Accordingly,
inasmuch as under Trademark Rule 2.120(j) a party may not
ordinarily rely upon the discovery deposition of its own
agent, we find that this discovery deposition this
deposition does not properly form a part of the record
herein. See Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon
Industries, Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980); and Rogers
Corporation v. Fields Plastics & Chemicals, Inc., 172 USPQ
377 (TTAB 1972).
Opposition No. 91191683
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Moreover, given that LED had earlier submitted part of
this discovery deposition, TCSG was entitled to introduce
under a notice of reliance any other part of the deposition
which should in fairness be considered so as to make not
misleading what was offered by LED, the submitting party.
However, in such a case, the notice of reliance filed by
TCSG must be supported by a written statement explaining why
it needs to rely upon each additional part listed in TCSG’s
notice. Inasmuch as TCSG failed to do this, we have not
considered these additional parts. 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(j)(4);
and TBMP § 704.09, n.1 (3d ed. 2011) and cases cited
therein.
The Record
In light of the resolutions above of LED’s objections,
TCSG’s evidence is limited to the testimony deposition of
Ms. Heidi L. Green, taken on December 7, 2010. A copy of
the transcript of the deposition and exhibits were filed
with the Board on April 29, 2011. (Green Test. Dep., Dkt.
No. 15.)
LED took the testimony deposition of its Executive
Director, Jeff Lynn, on March 9, 2011, and a copy of the
transcript of the deposition and exhibits were filed with
Opposition No. 91191683
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the Board on March 30, 2011. (Lynn Test. Dep., Dkt. Nos.
12, 14.).
Also on March 30, 2011, LED filed Notices of Reliance
on the following:
• Excerpts from the discovery deposition of Ms.
Jackie M. Rohosky, Economic Development Programs
Assistant Commissioner of Georgia Quick Start,
taken on September 27, 2010. (Rohosky Disc. Dep.,
Dkt. No. 11); and
• Third-party registrations for educational services
wherein the marks contained formatives of FAST-,
QUICK-, JUMP-, etc. (Dkt. No. 13).
Standing
As we noted recently in the case of Syngenta Crop
Protection, 90 USPQ2d at 1118:
Opposer must demonstrate its standing to
pursue this opposition, i.e., that it has a
reasonable belief that it would be damaged by
registration of applicant’s mark. Cunningham
v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d
1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lipton Indus., Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ
185 (CCPA 1982). … As noted above, opposer
failed to properly introduce the pleaded
registration … .

Nonetheless, the testimony of Ms. Heidi L. Green
establishes that at some point opposer likely used the mark
Georgia Quick Start in connection with business training
services as pleaded by opposer. Green Test. Dep., Dkt. No.
15, at 9-47. This testimony is sufficient to support
Opposition No. 91191683
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opposer’s allegations of a reasonable belief that it would
be damaged by registration of applicant’s mark. We note
that proof of standing in a Board opposition has a low
threshold, intended only to ensure that the plaintiff has a
real interest in the matter, and is not a mere intermeddler.
See e.g., Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023,
1025-26 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Priority
Having found that Ms. Green’s testimony about TCSG’s
use of the Georgia Quick Start mark is sufficient to
demonstrate TCSG’s standing, we turn then to the question of
whether her testimony is sufficient to allow TCSG to prevail
on its priority / likelihood of confusion claim. Had TCSG
properly introduced its trademark registration, the
registration itself would have been sufficient to remove
priority as an issue to be proven. King Candy Co. v. Eunice
King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA
1974). But having found that TCSG has not proven ownership
of a trademark registration in its Notice of Opposition or
in later, untimely-filed Notices of Reliance, TCSG must rely
upon the testimony of Ms. Green to establish its ownership
of a prior common-law service mark right. She was not asked
to prove ownership of this registration, nor is it clear she
Opposition No. 91191683
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had such knowledge. Accordingly, it is TCSG’s burden under
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act to demonstrate that it owns a
common law service mark that was used prior to LED’s mark,
and not abandoned.
Ms. Green worked on former Georgia Governor Sonny
Perdue’s transition team (2002) and served for four years
(2003-2007) as Governor Perdue’s director of
intergovernmental affairs and as his senior advisor in
economic development. Green Test. Dep., Dkt. No. 15, at 7.
In mid-2007, she became Deputy Commissioner of the Georgia
Department of Economic Development (GDEcD) for Global
Commerce.4 Then in mid-2010, Ms. Green became Commissioner
of that department – the position she held at the time of
her testimony herein, on December 7, 2010. Id. at 8-9.
It is clear from her testimony that TCSG’s own Georgia
Quick Start workforce training program works closely with
the GDEcD, for purposes of business recruitment projects for
the state of Georgia. Id. at 9-47.
Georgia Quick Start is allegedly administered by
applicant, the Technical College System of Georgia (TCSG),
formerly Georgia’s Department of Technical and Adult

4 We do note instances of confusion on Ms. Green’s part about
the dates on which she served in various state government
positions. E.g., Id. at 7:17-27; 8:8-9; 50:15-24.

Opposition No. 91191683
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Education (DTAE). Id. at 11, 59. In short, TCSG, through
Georgia’s system of technical colleges, oversees the state’s
economic and workforce development programs. Id. at 10-15.
The Georgia Quick Start program is a TCSG satellite program
located in the same building with the GDEcD. Id. at 12.
The following exchange reflects the most definitive
information that Ms. Green provided about the timing of
TCSG’s adoption and use of the mark:
Q [Mr. Needle]: Are you familiar with the
Quick Start program?
A [Ms. Green]: Yes, I am.
Q: The first use of it, as far as stated in
the trademark registration for Quick Start
from the federal government indicates a
use of July 1, 1968.
To your knowledge, has that use of Quick
Start been continuous since then?
A: As far as I am aware, yes.
Q: When did you first become aware of the
Quick Start Program?
A: That would have been when I started with
Governor Perdue in 2003.
Quick Start – I traveled the United
States and the world with Governor Perdue
both in my current capacity and when I
worked for him as his policy advisor.
And Quick Start is one of the – it is
our leading workforce training program and
one of the programs that he often refers
to as he is out talking about the economic
development success of Georgia.
Q: I see references sometimes to the nature
of the services of Quick Start being a
comprehensive workforce solution.
Is that a definition of the services
that you agree on?
A: Yes, definitely.
Q: What does it mean comprehensive
customized workforce solutions?
Opposition No. 91191683
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A: Well, that means that when a new company
is coming into the state and adding jobs
or an existing company is here that Quick
Start will come in and provide a
customized training program to help that
company get up and running or to expand
here in Georgia.
And it’s very important the customized
tailored piece because it really shows –
it is a service that the state of Georgia
provides above and beyond most other
training programs in the country. And
it’s [tailored] specifically for that
company.
Q: Is there an entity within the Department
of Economic Development that oversees this
training program, this Quick Start
training program?
A: No. That is really overseen by Quick
Start. It falls within the Georgia
Technical College System.
And, however, Quick Start is really
considered part of the – informally part
of the Department of Economic
Development’s team, we actually are all in
the same building…

Id. at 9-11.
Ms. Green’s testimony does not indicate when opposer
began using its Georgia Quick Start mark. She certainly has
no first hand knowledge of relevant events dating back to
the 1960s, and did not provide any foundation (e.g., review
of previous business records, etc.) for the vague assertion
in her testimony (“As far as I am aware, yes”) as to
continuous use of this mark since 1968. Inasmuch as the
1968 date is simply recited into the record by opposer’s
Opposition No. 91191683
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counsel, it does not constitute evidence of opposer’s first
use or priority.
Ms. Green testified that she first became aware of the
existence of the Georgia Quick Start program in early 2003,
and then in 2007 started working informally with the TCSG
personnel working on the Georgia Quick Start program who
were located on another floor from the GDEcD but in the same
building. Id. at 10-12. We infer that as of 2003, she was
“aware” that the service mark was being used in connection
with the recited educational services. Accordingly, we find
that Ms. Green’s testimony on this point is minimally
sufficient to establish that TCSG was using the mark at
least as early as 2003, and has used the mark continuously
since then.
Applicant may rely without further proof upon the
filing date of its application as a “constructive use” date
for purposes of priority. See Trademark Act § 7(c)
(contingent upon registration); and Levi Strauss & Co. v.
R. Josephs Sportswear Inc., 36 USPQ2d 1328, 1332 (TTAB
1994). The subject application was filed on January 13,
2009, before any date that opposer has established for the
use of its mark.
Although we have no testimony establishing exactly when
opposer’s use commenced, we find that TCSG has demonstrated
Opposition No. 91191683
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that its mark was in use prior to LED’s date, and not
abandoned. Accordingly, in this case, although opposer
failed properly to introduce its trademark registration into
the record, we find that opposer has met its burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that its use predates the
filing date of the subject application.
Likelihood of Confusion
We turn, then, to the issue of likelihood of confusion
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. Our determination
must be based upon our analysis of all of the probative
facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing
on the issue of likelihood of confusion. See In re E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA
1973). See also In re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc.,
315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Relationship of the services
LED has applied to register its mark for “business
training services, namely, training in the fields of
headquarters operations, call center operations, operations
of distribution centers, technical training related to
product manufacturing and team skills and leadership
training.” According to the testimony of Ms. Green, TCSG
offers comprehensive, customized educational programs for
Opposition No. 91191683
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employees as an incentive for businesses to expand or
relocate to the state of Georgia. Whether denominated as
“educational” services or “business training” services, we
find these services to be highly related inasmuch as both
programs are essentially in the business of workforce
training. We find this to be true even if there may be a
dearth of testimony about particular, named businesses for
which LED and TCSG were in active contention. Accordingly,
this du Pont factor favors a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
The similarity of trade channels
Opposer argues that the parties’ workforce training
services are offered through overlapping trade channels and
to the same classes of customers. Certainly, neither party
has placed any restrictions on claimed trade channels.
According to the testimony of record, both LED and TCSG
market their services to both U.S.-based and international
businesses. Lynn Test. Dep. at 70-71, Ex. 18, Green Test.
Dep. at 9-10, 14, 17. Moreover, they target similar
industries (e.g., automotive, biotech, pharmaceutical,
etc.). Green Test. Dep. at 20-21, 25-26; Lynn Test. Dep. at
20, 90, Ex. 19 at 1.
Opposition No. 91191683
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According to the testimony of Mr. Lynn and Ms. Green,
both organizations follow similar processes in pitching
their respective state’s incentives, including workforce
training. While the details may differ, both are in the
business of offering customized training program based on
the specific needs of a business’s operations. Hence, this
du Pont factor also favors a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
Strength of QUICK START mark
TCSG alleges that it has used its “Quick Start” mark in
connection with its customized workforce training program
for over forty years. TCSG claims that its Quick Start
program is the premier program in the United States. Green
Test. Dep. at 13. For more than a decade, the hundreds of
projects lured to Georgia by opposer and other state
agencies have brought average annual investments exceeding
$2 billion. We acknowledge that this appears to be a
successful program on behalf of the state of Georgia. On
the other hand, there is not a sufficient showing to find
that the mark is famous for purposes of our likelihood of
confusion determination.
As to the inherent strength of the Quick Start mark, we
agree with applicant that this is clearly not an arbitrary
Opposition No. 91191683
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choice. The enabling legislation for this program describes
it as follows:
[T]here is hereby established within the
State Department of Education, a supplemental
program to provide special quick start
training to meet the employment needs of new
and expanding industry. The program shall be
administered by the State Board of Education.
(emphasis supplied).

Clearly, this suggests that newly-trained employees can
quickly start working with businesses relocating to the
state of Georgia. This concept is not a novel one in the
area of educational services. For example, LED has
introduced the following examples of third-party
registrations in the field of educational services:
Quick Start for “two week training program for new
California real estate agents” in
International Class 41;5
PR QUICKSTART for “educational services, namely,
providing web-based training in the
field of public relations” in
International Class 41;6
DP QUICKSTART for “educational services, namely,
providing instruction and training in
the fields of warehousing,
distribution, and material lifting,
transporting and handling equipment” in
International Class 41;7

5 Registration No. 3054751 issued on January 31, 2006.
6 Registration No. 3574863 issued on February 17, 2009. No
claim is made to the exclusive right to use the letters “PR”
apart from the mark as shown.
7 Registration No. 3380170 issued on February 12, 2008.
Opposition No. 91191683
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FASTART for “educational services, namely,
instructing individuals in the use of
the required software and hardware
prior to a business quality control
methodology training program” in
International Class 41;8
FAST START for “educational services; namely,
conducting courses and seminars in the
field of real estate” in International
Class 41;9
FAST START for “educational services, namely,
conducting interactive workshops
concerning technical systems analysis,
development and implementation” in
International Class 41;10

for “training services in the field of
teaching sales skills to new and
current sales associates in the
financial industry” in International
Class 41;11
JUMPSTART for “educational services, namely,
conducting classes, seminars and
workshops in the field of multiple
sclerosis to be taken by people who
have multiple sclerosis, their families
and support partners and distributing
course materials in connection
therewith” in International Class 41.12

Applicant has also shown that states offering similar
workforce training services are using marks that are
substantially similar to opposer’s mark: QUICKJOBS

8 Registration No. 3021421 issued on November 29, 2005.
9 Registration No. 1661997 issued on October 22, 1991;
renewed.
10 Registration No. 2194878 issued on October 13, 1998;
renewed.
11 Registration No. 2985314 issued on August 16, 2005.
Opposition No. 91191683
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CAROLINA,13 VWCC QUICK CONNECT,14 QUICK RESPONSE TRAINING,15
OKLAHOMA FASTFORWARD,16 FASTTRACK TENNESSEE,17 RAPID
RESPONSE,18 and RURAL FAST TRACK.19 Hence, the term “Quick
Start” alone is highly suggestive for TCSG’s services.
We also note that inasmuch as TCSG failed to get its
registered mark into the record, the actual form of its
source identifier in its most frequent common law usage
becomes more critical. As noted by LED, TCSG admits that it
often refers to itself as “Georgia Quick Start.”20 Its
website is http://georgiaquickstart.org. On the “About Us”
web page of opposer’s website, the page header is “About
Georgia Quick Start” while the email address for “Georgia
Quick Start” is marketing@georgiaquickstart.org.21 Hence, in
many cases, the service mark actually appears to be “Georgia
Quick Start,” not just “Quick Start” alone.
On balance, therefore, we find that this du Pont factor
favors a finding of no likelihood of confusion.

12 Registration No. 3055438 issued on January 31, 2006; Section
8 affidavit accepted and Section 15 affidavit acknowledged.
13 South Carolina, Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 42-44, Ex. 5.
14 Virginia, Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 48-50, Ex. 6.
15 Florida, Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 51-52, Ex. 7.
16 Oklahoma, Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 52-53, Ex. 8.
17 Tennessee, Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 53-54, Ex. 9.
18 Iowa, Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 54-56, Ex. 10.
19 Utah, Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 56-58, Ex. 11.
20 Green Test. Dep. at 48; Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 18.
21 Lynn Depo. Test. Dep. at 18, Ex. 1 at 2.
Opposition No. 91191683
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Similarity of the marks
As to the du Pont factor focusing on the respective
marks, we compare the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imports
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is
determined based upon a comparison of the marks in their
entireties, the decision cannot be narrowed to a focus on
select parts of the marks. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master
Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 23, 234 (CCPA 1981) [“It
is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and
considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a
whole in determining likelihood of confusion”]. On the
other hand, different features may be analyzed to determine
whether the marks are similar. Price Candy Company v. Gold
Medal Candy Corporation, 220 F.2d 759, 105 USPQ 266, 268
(CCPA 1955). In fact, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been
given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the
ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in
their entireties. In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056,
224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Opposition No. 91191683
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In the case at hand, LED’s mark, Louisiana FastStart, begins
with the state name “Louisiana.” TCSG claims the mark
“Quick Start.” As seen several places in the record, TCSG
often refers to itself as Georgia Quick Start. As shown above,
the designations “quick start,” “fast start,” and similar
designations cannot be considered strong for educational
programs. Hence, within the composite mark for which LED
seeks protection, the word “Louisiana” has to be considered
the dominant element. Even without the addition of the
leading word “Georgia” to TCSG’s “Quick Start” term, the
word “Louisiana” would seem to create a strong dissimilarity
in the marks. To the extent that the state name, “Georgia,”
is combined with “Quick Start,” we find that Louisiana Faststart
does not resemble Georgia Quick Start as to sound, appearance,
connotation or commercial impression. In the instant case,
we find that this factor is significant. See Kellogg Co. v.
Pack’Em Enters. Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 21 USPQ2d 1142 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
The sophistication of purchasers
Opposer makes the argument that the determination
herein should be affected by the mere possibility of pre-
sale confusion, and especially among representative of
international businesses. Presumably some foreign nationals
Opposition No. 91191683
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may confuse various states within general regions of the
United States, like “the South,” and may not be aware that
“individual states have any particularized interest” that
competes with the interests of another jurisdiction.
Applicant, on the other hand, contends that the
undisputed evidence in this record makes it clear that the
decision to locate a company in a distant state “is a
complex and time-consuming decision that is only made after
careful evaluation by sophisticated business people.” The
record shows that the Georgia Department of Economic
Development has permanent offices located around the world.
Former Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue allegedly traveled the
globe for eight years pitching the state of Georgia with a
great deal of success. Inasmuch as the governors of most
states are similarly engaged in this kind of competition, it
seems likely that most foreign ventures contemplating the
planting of a large business enterprise in the United States
will be well aware that fifty separate states within our
federalist system are all competing for their investments.
Accordingly, we agree with applicant that it is a fairly
remote chance that some foreign national will inadvertently
be led to invest millions of dollars into the wrong state
based on the superficial resemblance of these two marks.
Opposition No. 91191683
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Conclusion on Likelihood of confusion
After careful consideration of the evidence and the
parties’ briefs, in spite of the fact that the services are
quite similar and both parties may well occasionally find
themselves in competition for the same businesses, given the
overall suggestiveness of the “Quick Start” mark, the
leading term “Louisiana” in applicant’s mark, the fact that
opposer often uses the term “Georgia Quick Start,” the
frequency with which “Quick Start” and similar marks are
used in connection with educational services, and the
overall sophistication of the potential purchasers, we
conclude that opposer has failed to shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that the use of Louisiana FastStart on
applicant’s services will result in a likelihood of
confusion with the Quick Start mark.
Decision: The opposition to the registration of the
mark Louisiana FastStart is hereby dismissed under Section 2(d)
of the Lanham Act.