T. L. Lay Packing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 3, 1965

152 N.L.R.B. 342 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink & Distillery
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
2. By laying off the aforenamed 10 employees on February 27, 1964, and refusing
to reinstate said employees until varying dates thereafter, thereby discriminating in
regard to their hire and tenure of employment, and discouraging union membership
and activities among its employees, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( I) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
T. L. Lay Packing Company and United Packinghouse , Food and
Allied Workers , AFL-CIO. Case No. 10-CA-5758. May 3,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 15,1965, Trial Examiner Owsley Vose issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had not
engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint, and rec-
ommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth
in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions, the Respondent filed cross-exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision, and both parties filed supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Order recommended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that
the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
MEMBER BROWN took no part in the consideration of the above Deci-
sion and Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed by the Charging Party on June 15, 1964, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 10,
152 NLRB No. 30.
T. L. LAY PACKING COMPANY 343
issued a complaint on August 13, 1964, alleging that the Respondent had violated
Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act, by unilaterally announcing a wage increase on
March 26, 1964, and by refusing to bargain collectively with the Charging Party
(herein called the Union) thereafter. The Respondent filed an answer in which it
admitted the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint but denied engaging in any
unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to due notice a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Owsley Vose in
Knoxville, Tennessee, on September 16 and 17, 1964. All parties were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, and to present oral argu-
ment. Counsel for the General Counsel and the Respondent submitted briefs, which
have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Tennessee corporation, having its principal office and place of
business at Knoxville, Tennessee, is engaged in the processing, sale, and distribution
of meat products. During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint,
a representative period, the Respondent sold and shipped products valued in excess
of $50,000 from its Knoxville, Tennessee, plant directly to customers located outside
of Tennessee. Upon these facts, which are admitted by the Respondent, I find that
the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union's majority status in the appropriate unit
The Respondent's answer admits that the following employees at its Knoxville
plant constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All the over-the-road truckdrivers, including truck mechanics, excluding all office
and managerial employees, clerical employees, salesmen, buyers, guards, production
and maintenance employees, and all supervisors, as defined in the Act.
Cards authorizing the Union to act for the signers "as a collective bargaining
agency in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment" signed by 20 of the 28 employees in the above-
stated appropriate bargaining unit were received in evidence in this case. The NLRB
date stamp on the cards establishes that they were all signed before 9:55 a.m.,
March 24, 1964. The Respondent does not now challenge the authenticity of any
of the signatures on these 20 cards Upon the basis of these signed bargaining
authorization cards, I find that the Union represented a majority of the employees in
the above-stated appropriate unit on and after March 24, 1964.
The Respondent, relying on the testimony of eight of the signers of the cards,
contends that the employees were fraudulently induced to sign the cards with the
representation that they would be used to obtain a National Labor Relations Board
election and that no other use for them was suggested. The following facts are
undisputed: Fifteen cards were signed at the first union meeting which was held
on Sunday, March 1, 1964, at the home of Clifford Ballinger, one of the employees.
At least two additional employees, Robert McNallie and Melvin Cameron, signed
cards in the interval between the first and second meeting, which was held on
March 15, 1964. These two cards and three others were turned in to Union Repre-
sentative George Rines at the second union meeting on March 15. The Respondent's
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation is based upon the testimony of the six of the
employees who signed at the March 1 meeting, and the testimony of McNallie and
Cameron, who each signed at the request of a fellow driver in the interval between
the first and the second meeting.
There is a conflict in the testimony concerning the remaining events at the union
meetings, particularly regarding events at the March 1 union meeting at which the
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
first 15 union cards were signed. The record also does not present a clear picture
of the statements made to McNallie and Cameron before they signed their cards.
After weighing the conflicting testimony and considering the probabilities involved,
I find the facts to be as follows : Union Representative Rines spoke to the group
at the March 1 meeting concerning the procedure to be followed to secure union
representation . He explained that they would first have to sign membership cards
and said that if a majority signed cards the Union would write a letter to the
Respondent requesting that it sit down and bargain collectively about wages and work-
ing conditions . In response to a question concerning what would be done if the
Respondent refused to recognize the Union, Rines stated that the cards would be
used to petition the Board to hold an election . In answer to another question, Rines
said that the actual negotiations would be conducted by a committee elected by the
employees who would accompany him to a bargaining conference with the Respond-
ent's representatives . After this discussion , Rines invited the men to think about the
matter and to sign the bargaining authorization cards if they felt they had made up
their minds . All of those present signed cards and handed them to Rines. These
cards, in addition to authorizing the Union to act as their "collective bargaining
agency in all matters pertaining to rates of pay . . . or other conditions of employ-
ment," recited that the signers "accept[ed] membership" in the Union.
The second union meeting on March 15, 1964 , was attended by 19 drivers. By
this time the Union had secured cards from a substantial majority of the drivers.
Union Representative Rines asked for a show of hands of those favoring his proposal
that a letter be sent to the Respondent requesting recognition of the Union as the
representative of its drivers and the commencement of bargaining negotiations. All
present raised their hands
Upon the foregoing facts I conclude that while Union Representative Rines men-
tioned at the March 1 meeting the possibility of the Union having to establish its
majority status through a Board-conducted election in the event that the Respondent
refused the Union's request for recognition, he did not represent that the cards would
not be used as a basis for seeking immediate recognition and bargaining or that they
would be used only as a basis for obtaining a Board-conducted election. The
Respondent's contention to the contrary is not borne out by credible testimony.
Accordingly, the cards of Kenneth Catlett, Lewis Clayton, Wilbur Pryor, P. A. War-
wick, Ray Adams, and Ralph Cannon are entitled to be counted towards the Union's
majority.1
'The foregoing findings are based largely on the testimony of Union Representative
Rines . The significant portions of his testimony as to the statements made by him
to the employees regarding an election at the March 1 meeting are fully corroborated by
the testimony of one of the Respondent ' s witnesses , Armour Campbell.
I do not credit the testimony of the six employees relied upon by the Respondent,
that Union Agent Rines represented to them at the March 1 meeting that the cards would
be used to obtain an NLRB election and that no mention was made by him of using the
cards as the basis for seeking recognition from the Respondent . Their testimony was,
in part , highly confused and contradictory They appeared to be attempting to parrot
the phrases used by their predecessors on the stand which appeared to be meeting favor
with the Respondent ' s counsel . Never in my experience have I observed a group of
witnesses who appeared as fearful of giving testimony which would antagonize their
employer or as eager to restore themselves to their employer ' s good graces by giving
helpful testimony . In my opinion it is contrary to the realities of such organizing situa-
tions for such a group of employees to have attended successive union meetings and to
have signed bargaining authorization cards if all they were seeking was an opportunity,
later on in an election , to accept or reject a union. While I do not believe the versions
given by these six witnesses , this does not mean that I accept the version of Union
Representative Rines in tote . Rines was mistaken , to say the least , when he testified
that McNallie was present at the first union meeting and consequently Rines' Identifica-
tion of McNallie's card was erroneous . However , when I consider the version of Rines
and Respondent ' s witness , Campbell, in light of the background of events in this case
and'compare this version against the version of the six men in question , I unhesitatingly
give preference to the version of Rines and Campbell.
In any event , in most instances the testimony relied on by the Respondent , even if
credited , does not establish that kind of material misrepresentation or fraud which re-
quires the Board to disregard the employees ' affirmative act in signing cards which
expressly authorized the Union to act as their collective -bargaining agent. See Peterson
Brothers , Inc, 144 NLRB 679, 681-683 , and cases therein cited ; Jas H. Matthews & Co.,
149 NLRB 161 ; of. N.L R B. v. Gene Hyde, d / b/a Hyde's Supermarket , 339 F. 2d 568
(C.A. 9), 58 LRRM 2005, 2006-2008.
T. L. LAY PACKING COMPANY 345
There remains the question of the cards signed by Robert McNallie and Melvin
Cameron, who were solicited to sign cards by fellow employees in the interval between
the first and second union meetings. I cannot accept Cameron's or McNallie's testi-
mony that it was represented to them before they signed cards that the cards were
to be used for an election. McNallie's testimony, in particular, was contradictory
and implausible on its face. Kenneth Catlett, who solicited McNallie's signature,
when asked, "You heard Mr. Rines make further statements at that meeting, that
if enough signed cards, the company would be asked to recognize the union and if
they didn't recognize the union, they would petition for an election?" replied, "Yes,
sir." Ralph Cannon was the employee who solicited Cameron to sign an authoriza-
tion card. When asked what Rines had said at the March 1 meeting "about why
employees should sign a union card," Cannon replied as follows: "Well, I don't think
he ever said. I think everybody knowed why they was signing a union card. I think
they was there for that purpose. They knowed, to get a union." In view of the
above-quoted testimony of Catlett and Cannon I find it highly improbable that they
would have represented to others that the cards were being signed only for the pur-
pose of obtaining an election. Under all the circumstances, I conclude, as in the
case of the six employees who signed cards at the March 1 meeting, that no misrepre-
sentations concerning the holding of an election were made to McNallie and Cameron
before they signed authorization cards.
B. The Respondent's unilateral announcement of a wage increase on Maich 26,
1964, and its subsequent failure to bargain collectively with the Union
1. The facts
The Respondent has granted wage increases to its employees every year for the
past 10 years, except 1962. In 1955, 1956, and 1957 two across-the-board increases
were granted to the Respondent's employees. With the exception of 1956 and 1958,
some increase was granted during the second quarter of the year and all the recent
increases have been granted in April or May. The 1963 increase was made retro-
active to the week ending April 4, the first week in the second quarter. This required
the issuance of separate checks for the retroactive pay.
The minutes of the Respondent's board of directors' meeting which was held on
December 23, 1963, contain the following entry:
The Board went on record, intended to pay 6 cents across board, wage increase
some time in the next quarter, provided profits justify.
Frank Higdon is the cashier, credit manager, and office manager of the Respondent.
One of his responsibilities is the typing of the minutes of the Respondent's board of
directors' meetings so that they can be placed in the Respondent's official minute
books. Higdon did not get around to typing up the minutes of the December 23, 1963,
meeting until sometime in March 1964. Upon typing up the minutes, Higdon noticed
the entry about the wage increase contemplated for "some time in next quarter."
Remembering the extra work involved in figuring the amounts due and in making
out the checks for retroactive pay for the 1963 increase, Higdon suggested to Ira V.
Lay, Sr., the Respondent's president, that if the Respondent were going to put the wage
increase into effect during the first quarter, if possible, to put it into effect during the
quarter and not to delay until after the quarter was over because of the considerable
amount of additional clerical work involved in figuring the retroactive pay and in
preparing the separate checks.
President Lay called a meeting of the Respondent's board of directors on Wednes-
day, March 18, 1964. At this meeting the Board voted to grant the employees a
6-cent across-the-board increase effective the payroll week beginning the following
morning. The Respondent's payroll week begins on Thursday and ends on Wednes-
day. The employees are paid on Thursdays and some on Fridays. Under this deci-
sion to grant an increase, the employees would receive paychecks including the
increase for the first time on Thursday, March 26, 1964.
On March 19, 1964, Ira V. Lay, Jr., the Respondent's vice president and superin-
tendent of the plant, drafted the following letter, and placed the date, March 19,
1964, on the draft:
HAPPY EASTER
To: ALL EMPLOYEES
Your Board of Directors voted last December 23, at the same meeting your
bonus was voted, that if the profits during the first quarter permitted, a .06¢
raise would be put into effect.
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As you remember last year, we waited until the Auditors report was received
on May 13th and then made your increase retroactive to April 4th. This cre-
ated a lot of extra bookkeeping and two separate checks. Today your board
decided to gamble on the outcome of March profits results in view of profits thus
far this year and the general business outlook for the balance of the year and
put the raise in effect for Easter. We hope we have not jumped the gun and
counted our chickens before they hatched . Without profits there can be no
raises.
With everyone doing his best work, making every effort to decrease costs,
giving full cooperation , and striving for 100 % teamwork by pulling together in
peace and harmony, we can continue to enjoy the benefits of our association
together.
This raise will be received by all hourly paid and salaried Employees except
Officers of the Company , Salesmen , Handicapped Workers, and Beef Boners
piece work . Beef Boners hourly rate will show the iaise
LAY PACKING COMPANY
Lay, Junior , gave the draft of the letter to one of the Respondent 's secretaries with
instructions to have mimeographed copies ready for distribution with the next week's
checks.
The Respondent 's office force reports for work at 7 a .m. Shortly after Vice Presi-
dent Lay reported for work at 7 a.m. on Thursday, March 26 , he passed by the pay-
roll clerk's office . Lay credibly testified that he paused long enough to have the
following conversation with Catherine Mincey, the payroll clerk:
I said, "You are using the new pay increases , aren't you ." And she says, "No;
what increases are you talking about." I said, "Didn 't dad tell you about it?
We had a meeting the 18th and I assumed that he told you about it." She said,
"Well, if he did , I don't remember it." and I said , "Well, put them into effect,
they are supposed to go out on today's checks ." She said, "All right," that she
would.2
At least an hour later Vice President Lay was summoned to his father 's office.
There, his father handed him a copy of the Union 's petition for certification as bar-
gaining representative of the Respondent 's drivers , together with a letter from the
Board's Atlanta Regional Office about the petition . The petition had just been received
in the morning mail. Both President Lay, Senior , and Vice President Lay, Junior,
credibly testified that prior to receiving this letter enclosing the petition they had no
knowledge that the drivers were interested in the Union
Lay, Junior, suggested to his father that in view of this development , they should
call Hutcheson , the Respondent's attorney in Chattanooga . When Hutcheson was
not in, Lay , Junior, asked to speak to Harold Humphreys, one of Hutcheson 's part-
ners. Then, as Lay, Junior , credibly testified , the following conversation with Attor-
ney Humphreys ensued:
I said, "We have just received a petition for the truckdrivers ." and I said.
"Harold, here is our situation : the board voted on December 23 if profits justify
a six-cent wage increase the first quarter." I said, "In addition to that, we've
got the notices . We had a meeting on the 18th and decided to put it into effect
and the letter has been written and the pay clerk has already been notified and
probably by this time she has already written some checks. Should we void
these checks)"
He says, "Well, give me some information on your history of past wage
increases ," and I explained to him that in the past ten years , with the exception
of 1962, that we had given a wage increase every year and there had been three
or four years that we gave two increases." .. .
He says, "Well , based on the past practices , let it alone , let the wage increase
stay into effect." He says, "Now , the reason for that is this," and I said , "Well,
let me write it down." And I wrote it down exactly what he said ... and Harold
said the wage increase was given consistent with past practices and in accordance
with the decision made to giving increases on a specific date prior to receiving
the petition.
... He just said let it stand and he said , ... "There are conditions since there
are more people involved than just the truckdrivers , after all you've got 250
other employees down there that there are conditions under which you could
be charged if you didn 't give a pay increase."
2 Mincey's testimony regarding this conversation corroborates that of Lay, Junior.
T. L. LAY PACKING COMPANY 347
Pursuant to Attorney Humphreys' advice, the decision was reached to release the
announcement of the wage increase (the March 19, "Happy Easter" letter) along
with the checks, as had been originally planned. The payroll clerks continued with
the work of preparing the checks and stapling the March 19 letter to them.
Later during the day the Respondent received by registered mail a letter from
T. H. Vincent, the director of District 7 of the Union, asserting that a majority of
the Respondent's over-the-road drivers were members of the Union, and requesting
that the Respondent recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of the
drivers and set a date for the commencement of bargaining negotiations. This letter
came to Respondent's attention about 2 p.m. on March 26, when President Lay
opened it. Despite the receipt of this letter, the Respondent adhered to its earlier
decision to let the wage increase stand. The Respondent did not consult with the
Union at any time before putting the wage increase into effect and it has not since
bargained collectively with the Union.
The Union has not sought to prove its majority status to the Respondent by any
means other than the Board-conducted election which it requested in the petition
mailed to the Board the same day that it mailed its request for recognition and bar-
gaining to the Respondent. After a propaganda campaign among the drivers and
mechanics in which the Respondent's president repeatedly expressed his strong oppo-
sition to the employees' selection of the Union as bargaining agent, the Union lost
the election, which was held on April 24, 1964. The vote was 21 to 7.
2. Conclusions
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent had a full opportunity to with-
hold the wage increase, which he characterizes as a "non-conforming" one,3 and that
the Respondent's failure to do so upon being informed of filing of the Union's petition
constituted an act of interference and coercion which made a free election impossible,
and that consequently the Respondent cannot be permitted to defend its subsequent
failure to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union upon the ground that it
doubted the Union's majority status While I do not question the proposition of law
upon which the General Counsel relies (Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, 1264-
1265, enfd. as modified 185 F. 2d 732, 741-742 (C A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S.
914), I find it inapplicable upon the facts of this case.
Here, the Respondent had decided upon, had prepared the announcement of, and
had issued the necessary instructions to put into effect, the March 26 wage increase
before it became aware that its drivers were interested in the Union. All that
remained to be done at the time the Respondent received the copy of the Union's
petition for certification was the issuance of the checks and the announcement of the
increase. These facts clearly establish that the grant of the March 26 increase was
not for the purpose of interfering with the drivers' choice of bargaining representa-
tives. Nor can it be said on the facts of this case that the Respondent's failure to
withhold the wage increase at the last minute reasonably tended to interfere with the
free exercise of employee rights under the Act. There was nothing about the
March 26 increase to distinguish it from past increases which had been almost every
year in the past, except that it was given 1 or 2 months earlier. But the reasons for
advancing the date was fully explained by the Respondent's officials-the desire to
avoid the additional clerical work involved in figuring and writing the separate checks
for retroactive pay-and this explanation was included on the announcement of the
wage increase which was prepared a week before the Respondent first received notice
that the drivers were organizing Under all the circumstances, I find that the Respond-
ent's going ahead with its previous plans and putting into effect the previously decided-
3 This apparently is a reference to the fact that this was the first wage increase
granted by the Respondent without having available for consideration financial state-
ments showing the results of the full first quarter's operations. When the increase was
decided upon, the Respondent had available only the monthly statements showing the
results of the Respondent's January and February 1964 operations. However, the fact
that the March 1964 increase may have in this respect constituted a departure from
past practice is significant only if it affords a basis for inferring that the increase was
decided upon with knowledge that the drivers were interested in the Union and was
put into effect in an effort to dissuade them from adhering to the Union. The record
as a whole establishes to my complete satisfaction that this increase was decided upon
and ordered into effect before the Respondent had any knowledge of the union activities
of the drivers For this reason I do not believe it significant that this increase was put
into effect 1 or 2 months earlier than previous increases.
348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
upon increase, despite its last minute notice that the drivers were organizing, was not
accomplished in such a way that it reasonably could be said to interfere with its
employees' rights of self-organization and collective bargaining under the Act.
In this connection it also should be borne in mind that the March 26 increase was
intended to be an across-the-board increase, covering all of the Respondent's employ-
ees, not only the Respondent's 28 drivers and mechanics, but also 250 other produc-
tion and maintenance employees as well. To have deprived these 250 employees of
a previously planned wage increase because of the last-minute discovery that the
28 drivers and mechanics were organizing, as Attorney Humphreys advised Vice
President Lay, might have subjected the Respondent to charges that it was interfering
with the rights of these 250 production and maintenance employees.
For the foregoing reasons I conclude that the Respondent has not violated Section
8(a)( I) of the Act by putting into effect its previously planned March 26, 1964, wage
increase, and therefore has not engaged in such conduct as would render a free elec-
tion impossible. See Derby Coal & Oil Co., Inc., et al., 139 NLRB 1485, 1486; True
Temper Corporation, 127 NLRB 839, 842-844; cf. C. J. Glascow Co., 148 NLRB 98.
Accordingly, the Respondent was within its rights in awaiting the outcome of the
election before recognizing and bargaining collectively with the Union as the repre-
sentative of its drivers and mechanics. Since the Union lost the election, the
Respondent was under no obligation to bargain collectively with it, and the Respond-
ent, therefore, has not refused to bargain collectively with the Union in violation of
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act .4
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is ordered that the complaint herein be , and it is hereby, dismissed.
'In view of the result which I have reached in this case, it is perhaps unnecessary
for me to mention an alternative defense raised by the Respondent, namely, that the
Union's request for bargaining related to a different unit from that found herein to be
an appropriate unit and one which was inappropriate for collective-bargaining purposes.
However, since the Board may disagree with my conclusion herein, it may be helpful
to state my views regarding this contention . Assuming, as contended by the Respond-
ent, that a unit of 25 drivers alone is not appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining and that upon the facts of this case the 3 mechanics who work on the trucks
and occasionally substitute for the drivers must be included in the unit with the drivers,
nevertheless , I conclude that a request for bargaining as to a unit of drivers alone is
not such a substantial variance from a request for bargaining upon behalf of the unit
herein found appropriate ( consisting of 25 drivers and 3 mechanics ) as would excuse
the Respondent from bargaining collectively with the Union. See The Lone Star Com-
pany, 149 NLRB 688, and cases therein cited.
Maritime Advancement Programs and Office Employes Interna-
tional Union, Local 153, AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Case No. 2-RC-
13596. May 3, 1965
DECISION ON REVIEW AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
On September 23, 1964, the Regional Director for Region 2 issued
a Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding, dismissing the
petition on the basis of his finding that the operations of the Employer,
a nonprofit organization, are noncommercial in character and that it
would not effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, to assert the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdic-
tion. Thereafter, the Petitioner, in accordance with Section 102.67 of
the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, filed with the
Board a timely request for review of such decision asserting that the
Regional Director departed from officially reported Board precedent.
152 NLRB No. 34.