Swift & Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 31, 1963

145 N.L.R.B. 756 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

756 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
circumstances, not here present, unlawful.10 At the same time, it is readily apparent
that the rule was not applied to union activity during nonworking time, nor so
intended.
Accordingly, I find, upon all of the credible evidence, that the Respondent's broad
no-solicitation rule in effect until March 26, 1963, was, under Board law, unlawful,
and that its promulgation and maintenance (as distinguished from enforcement)
constitutes a technical violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. However, under all
of the circumstances, including the fact that (a) immediately upon notification by
the Board as to the unlawful aspect of the rule, the Respondent stopped the dis-
tribution of the employee handbook, revised the rule accordingly, and at the time
of the hearing had distributed a new handbook to all of its employees, and (b) the
Respondent, in 20 years of contractual relations with a number of unions, including
the Charging Union, has no history of unfair labor practices, I am of the opinion,
and so find, that no further remedial action is necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the Act and that no useful purpose would be served in issuing the usual cease-
and-desist order.ll Therefore, I shall recommend that the complaint herein be
dismissed.12
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. General Dynamics, Fort Worth, a Division of General Dynamics Corp., is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Aeronautical Industrial Lodge 776, International Association of Machinists,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By promulgating and maintaining until March 26, 1963, a broad no-solicitation
rule, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
For the reasons above expressed, it is hereby recommended that the complaint
be dismissed in its entirety.
10 It is not contended, nor does the record disclose, that the Respondent, in promulgating
the rule, was prompted by circumstances necessitating such a rule in order to maintain
production or discipline.
n See The Crossett Company, 140 NLRB 667; see also Acro Diviswn, Robertshaw-Fulton
Controls Company, 127 NLRB 64.
>a At the close of the hearing, I reserved ruling upon the Respondent's motion to dismiss
the complaint. Consistent with my findings herein, said motion is hereby granted
Swift & Company and National Brotherhood of Packinghouse
& Dairy Workers, Petitioner and Swift & Company, Petitioner
and United Packinghouse , Food & Allied Workers, AFL-CIO,
and its Local 457,1 Union . Cases Nos. 4-RC-5510 and 4-Riff-455.
December 31, 1963
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held before Hearing Officer
Harold Bernard, Jr. The Hearing Officer's rulings made at the hear-
ing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
i United Packinghouse , Food & Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, and Its Local 457, herein-
after referred to as UPWA or the Intervenor , was also permitted to intervene in Case
No. 4-RC-5512 on the basis of its contractual interest.
145 NLRB No. 73.
SWIFT & COMPANY 757
Upon the entire record 2 in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
2. United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, and its
Local 457, and National Brotherhood of Packinghouse & Dairy Work-
ers are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section
9(c) (1) (A) or (B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, for the fol-
lowing reasons :
On December 15, 1950, following a stipulated election, the United
Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, now known as the United
Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, the Intervenor
herein, was certified in the unit of production and maintenance em-
ployees at the Employer's Hallstead, Pennsylvania, plant. For some
years thereafter, Swift and the Intervenor entered into agreements
limited to the Hallstead plant. More recently, however, the Hallstead
plant has been included Within a nationwide contract unit of Swift's
UPWA meatpacking plants.' The current 3-year master agreement,
encompassing production and maintenance employees from Hallstead
and approximately 20 other plants scattered throughout the country,
became effective on September 16, 1961. In the face of employer as-
sertions that it could not operate the Hallstead plant profitably under
master agreement wages and benefits, the parties entered into a sep-
arate guaranteed annual compensation plan (GACP) at Hallstead
effective for 1 year (April 1962-63) during the term of the master
agreement. This GACP purportedly provided the Employer with'the
operational flexibility needed to maintain that plant.
2 On August 2, 1963, subsequent to the hearing, Robert H. Kleeb, Esq, was appointed a
special assistant to the attorney general of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to repre-
sent the Commonwealth's interest in the instant proceeding. By letter dated August 5,
Kleeb requested that the Board reopen the record, or, at least, permit the Commonwealth
to intervene for purposes of filing a brief. On August 15, the Associate Executive Secre-
tary granted the Commonwealth's request to file an annous brief (over the Intervenor's
opposition) and indicated that a decision with respect to reopening the record would have
to await the Board's examination of the entire case. On September 9, the Commonwealth
filed its brief. The Intervenor responded on September 18 by urging that if the Board is
disposed to give any credence to the Commonwealth's "public interest" and/or "public
policy" arguments (discussed infra), it must first reopen the record and explore fully those
those aspects of the case. The Intervenor thereupon made a motion to reopen the record
for this purpose if the Board considers such matters relevant. On September 27, Swift &
Company responded thereto, urging that the only issue involved is whether a question
concerning representation presently exists and that no purpose would be served by re-
opening the record. For reasons set forth infra, we hereby deny the Commonwealth's
and Intervenor's request to reopen the record.
Additionally, the Commonwealth's request for oral argument is hereby denied, as the
record, including all the briefs, adequately sets forth the issues and positions of the parties
Lastly, on July 25, 1963, the Employer filed a motion to correct several errors in the
official transcript herein. The Intervenor stated that it has no objection to the correc-
tions requested and the motion is hereby granted.
2 While the record does not establish a definite date, it is clear that the Hallstead plant
was included in the Employer's nationwide contract unit for several years prior to
September 1961
758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shortly before the GACP terminated, negotiations were conducted
wherein the parties generally explored the possibility of reexecuting
the GACP or a comparable alternative. Despite the Company's as-
sertion of its intention to shut the plant down if forced to return to the
3-year nationwide contract, no agreement was reached. Accordingly,
under the express provisions of the GACP, the master agreement went
back into effect 'at Hallstead on April 1, 1963. The Employer simul-
taneously gave written notice to the 40 or 50 bargaining unit employees
at Hallstead of its intention to close the plant on June 29.' In the
interim period, members of Local 457 (at Hallstead) attempted to
convince their International to accept wage concessions which, Swift
asserts, would have kept Hallstead operational. However, Inter-
national President Helstein refused to endorse this proposed course of
action. He took the position that the Company was bluffing, that to
negotiate a separate contract for Hallstead now would make it difficult
for him to negotiate a favorable nationwide master agreement in 1964,
and that therefore he would not bargain for anything less than the
master agreement at Hallstead.
The Local's dissatisfaction with Helstein's position ultimately led
to a special disaffiliation meeting on June 3. There, the membership
voted by secret ballot 29 to 6 in favor of disaffiliation from Local 457,
UPWA (AFL-CIO) ; they then were introduced to Don Mahon, presi-
dent of the National Brotherhood, and proceeded to establish a local
chapter of the Brotherhood at the Hallstead plant 5 and elect a slate
of officers therefor.
On June 4, Mahon wrote Plant Manager Ostrander requesting
recognition for the Hallstead production and maintenance employees;
2 days later, Mahon filed the instant petition in Case No. 4-RC-5512.
Ostrander informed Mahon on June 12 that ". . . the company has no
way of knowing whether or not a majority of our employees have
authorized your union as their collective-bargaining agency as you
allege and accordingly, we are unwilling to grant recognition . . . ."
Ostrander likewise advised McKinney, Local 68's newly elected presi-
dent, that "we [Swift] had a contract with the AFL-CIO Inter-
national and, as such, until there was something straightened out we
had no way of recognizing him."
On June 14, Holstein wrote to Swift's national office and pointed
out that his union would oppose the aforementioned petition on the
grounds that the existing master agreement constitutes a bar and
further that recognition of the National Brotherhood would constitute
4 The master agreement required 90 days' notice prior to any plant closing.
s Not only did employee John McKinney initiate the disaffiliation movement from
Local 457 , he also contacted Don Mahon of the National Brotherhood In late May and
asked if his Union was interested in representing the Hallstead employees . Authorization
cards from the National Brotherhood were forwarded by Mahon and distributed by
McKinney during the last few days in May and beginning of June. Mahon arrived in
Hallstead in time for the above -mentioned June 3 meeting.
SWIFT & COMPANY 759
an unfair labor practice. Additionally, the executive board of the
UPWA on June 21, acting pursuant to its International constitution,
appointed Don Smith as administrator of the affairs of Local 457 6
Meanwhile, Swift filed a petition on June 24 (Case No. 4-RM-455)
and advised its employees in writing on June 21 of its decision to "ex-
tend" the date of plant closing from June 29 until July 27. In so
doing, Swift noted that the entire problem was currently before the
National Labor Relations Board and concluded : ". . . we have decided
that there should be time allowed so that we can watch local develop-
ments and take another look at the overall situation. We would still
like to find a way to provide work for employees and avoid closing the
plant." [Emphasis supplied.] When pressed for -a further explana-
tion at the hearing, Plant Manager Ostrander' acknowledged that the
outcome of this hearing could be crucial-that the decision whether
to continue the plant operation or shut it down will be based primarily
on whether the Company will at some time in the future be permitted
to pay a GACP wage rate or its equivalent which, in turn, could depend
on the outcome of this proceeding.
When the hearing ended on July 12, the Hallstead plant was still
scheduled to'be closed on July 27. However, on July 23, Swift advised
its Hallstead employees by letter that :
[T] he Company has now decided to further postpone the date of
closing until a date to be determined by the Company in the
future. What that date may be will 'depend upon any and all
relevant factors, and we will be considering such factors pe-
riodically to determine our future course of action.'
The plant apparently remains open and Swift's aforementioned letter
reflects the most recent statement of the status quo.
e The Petitioner contends that Local 457 is "defunct ." However, the record facts clearly
do not support such a finding . Thus, Local 457 is currently operational-it has three
officers and maintains a bank account , books, and records; on July 2 it conducted a regu-
lar membership meeting ( attended by approximately 10 to 12 employees ) to discuss the
impending plant shutdown ; and, finally , Local President Jaskulski and International
Representative Bouchard participated in three meetings with local plant officials in June
to discuss orderly plant closing and a variety of general grievances affecting large numbers
of employees . Cf Hershey Chocolate Corporation , 121 NLRB 901 , 911-912; Hebron
Brick Company, 135 NLRB 245; and Durado Beach Hotel, 144 NLRB No. 72.
7 Ostrander testified without contradiction that he does not have the authority to make
the decision concerning plant closing ; the Chicago national office is empowered to do so.
8 On July 26 , Swift filed a motion with the Board to include this letter in the instant
record. Shortly thereafter , the UPWA responded by contending , in part:
we must oppose the motion , if it contemplates merely adding this post-hearing
letter as an exhibit , without testimony concerning it. On the other hand, we recog-
nize that the letter , and whatever change of plan it reflects , may constitute important
and relevant information which should be before the Board , if, for any reason not
now apparent , the contract-bar issue does not fully dispose of this proceeding. In
that event , we would move that the hearing be reopened for the limited purpose of
receiving the letter and other evidence with respect to the Company 's plans and in-
tentions as to continued operation of the plant . . . .
The Board hereby grants the Employer 's motion to include this letter for the limited
purpose of demonstrating that the date of plant closing has been postponed indefinitely.
760 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Although the Employer, Petitioner, and Commonwealth do not
make identical arguments, it is possible to consolidate their positions
essentially as follows :
(a) A question concerning representation exists in view of two
conflicting current recognitional demands and the Employer's bona
fide doubt as to which labor organization is the proper collective-
bargaining agent of a majority of its employees. And the 1961-64
contract is not a bar because: (1) the incumbent union is unwilling to
carry out this agreement according to the original intention of the
parties-i.e., UPWA refuses to permit the Hallstead production and
maintenance employees to decide for themselves whether "to do
something about making a concession in wages"; (2) the Hallstead
plant was originally included in the master agreement on a "provi-
sional basis" and later lost its status as a "Master Agreement plant"
by virtue, inter alia, of the execution of the GACP; (3) the Em-
ployer's two notices (dated April 1 and June 21, 1963) concerning
plant closing render the September 1964 termination date set forth
in the master agreement inapplicable to the Hallstead plant, thereby
making timely the petitions filed herein; and (4) the Employer's
July 23 letter shows that the Hallstead plant is operating under a
contract of indefinite duration-a contract which cannot act as a bar.
(b) Assuming that the above contentions are rejected, a schism
exists here which has created a sufficient state of confusion in the bar-
gaining relationship to justify directing an election. The Petitioning
Union urges that the requirement of the Hershey Chocolate doctrine
(121 NLRB 901)-that a basic intraunion conflict must exist at the
international level to establish a schism-is "unsound and should be
discarded" ; on the other hand, the Employer, while acknowledging
that no policy conflict exists at the highest level of an International
union, urges that an election would be consistent with the spirit of
the Hershey rule since it would clear the confusion and stabilize the
bargaining relationship.
(c) Apart from all the above considerations, the contract-bar rule
is nonetheless discretionary, not mechanical, and in the instant cir-
cumstances, the extreme "public interest" in relieving depressed eco-
nomic areas and unemployment 9 dictates that the normal contract-bar
O The Petitioner 's and amicus brief cite various studies of the U.S. Department of
Labor which indicate that the entire Scranton area ( including Hallstead ) has been ap-
proved for Federal area redevelopment assistance and suffers from "relatively substantial
and persistent unemployment" ( the usual unemployment rate fluctuating between 9 0
and 11 9 percent).
The amicus brief also includes 14 exhibits in the form of letters and affidavits from
prominent local and State officials and local businessmen and clergy explaining the
detrimental effect which the closing of the Hallstead plant would have on the local
economy. Additional affidavits of a similar nature addressed to the Chairman were also
received. Essentially, they point out that the loss of a major industry will not only hurt
the economy directly but will also mean the loss of an important source of revenue to
the local school district, thereby retarding education and its fight against unemployment.
SWIFT & COMPANY 761
rules should not be applied and an election should be directed.10 The
Commonwealth contends lastly that a strict application of the
contract-bar rule here would, in effect, force the Employer to close the
Hallstead plant and thereby produce the anamolous result of destroy-
ing rather than fostering industrial stability.
The Intervenor, on the other hand, seeks dismissal of the represen-
tation petitions 11 and urges that : (a) the master agreement is in ef-
fect at Hallstead and constitutes a bar thereto; (b) there is no schism
within the meaning of Hershey; and (c) with respect to "public in-
terest" considerations, the requirements of "due process" and the
statutory language of 9(c) (1) preclude the Board from placing re-
liance on the "ex parte" economic-oriented statements submitted, at
least in part, by persons with special interests.12 Moreover, the Inter-
venor presents numerous arguments designed to take issue with the
position that keeping the Hallstead plant open by acceptance of less
than master agreement wages and benefits would necessarily advance
the "public interest."
Certain of the aforementioned conflicting contentions can be dis-
posed of summarily. The Employer's April and June termination
notices do not demonstrate that Hallstead is operating under a con-
tract of indefinite duration. Rather, the contract under which Hall-
stead has been operating since April 1, 1963, is for a definite duration
(until September 1964) -the only indefiniteness is whether the plant
Will remain open for the duration of the contract period. Nor is there
any factual support for the contentions that Hallstead lost its master
agreement plant status or that the aforementioned plant closing no-
tices rendered the September 1964 termination date inapplicable to
the Hallstead plant. Indeed, to adopt the latter argument would be
to invite abuses of the contract-bar rule.
In addition, it is clear from the above facts that the production
and maintenance employees at the Hallstead plant have been in the
past and are presently included in Swift's UPWA nationwide con-
tract (effective until September 1964). It is thus clear that the
10 In support of this position , the amicus brief cites general language from the Board's
recent decision in Aerojet-General Corporation ( 144 NLRB No . 42) emphasizing that we
should not "carry out our responsibilities with myopic disregard for other important con-
siderations affecting the national interest and well-being." It is noteworthy , however,
that Aero)et arose out of a factual milieu far removed from that of the instant case.
11 In addition to the contentions here set forth , the Intervenor 's brief urges that the
representation petitions should be dismissed because the plant was scheduled for per-
manent closing on July 27 . Events subsequent to the filing of the brief have rendered
this argument moot . For the Company no longer has an established , fixed date to close
the plant . Alternatively , the Intervenor contends that the unfair labor practice charges
it filed against Swift, alleging violations of Section 8(a) (1), (3 ), and (5) of the Act,
should have caused the Board, in the absence of any waiver , to delay the instant proceed-
ing We do not agree The Regional Director was justified in continuing his investigation
of the representation petitions and conducting a hearing thereon despite the existence of
unresolved unfair labor practice charges. Moreover , these charges have since been with-
drawn , and in the present posture of the case this particular contention is likewise moot.
12 See footnote 9, supra.
762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
master agreement is a bar and the petitions must be dismissed 13 unless
an exception to the Board's contract-bar rules is warranted by the
allegedly unique problems posed by the instant circumstances.
With respect to the possible exceptions advanced by the parties,
we find initially that there is no merit to the contention that a schism
exists here. In essence, there was merely a dissaffiliation movement
within Local 457 born out of a policy conflict between that local and
its International. This state of affairs alone does not, however,
satisfy the Board's current requirements for a schism as set forth
in the Hershey Chocolate doctrine.14 Thus, the record discloses
neither the presence of a "basic intraunion conflict"-i.e., "any conflict
over policy at the highest level of an international union. . .." 15
[emphasis supplied] nor any realignment affecting an International
union or federation of unions, resulting from such a policy conflict.16
There remains for consideration the further contention that the
pressing "public interest" requires lifting the contract bar and di-
recting an election among the Hallstead employees. This contention
rests on the premise that the contract-bar rule can be applied with
sufficient flexibility to permit deviations under extraordinary cir-
cumstances-such as the existence of a compelling public interest.17
The public interest argument proceeds thusly : the Employer can-
not operate its Hallstead plant profitably under master agreement
wages and benefits. Nevertheless, the International (UPWA) repre-
sentatives refuse to agree to renegotiate the experimental 1-year
GACP which expired on April 1, 1963; they likewise refuse, contrary
to the wishes of Local 457's membership, to agree to any alternative
comparable to the GACP, thereby depriving the Employer of neces-
sary operational flexibility. This adamant position of the Inter-
national compelled the Employer to issue a notice of plant closing
on April 1, 1963, originally effective on June 29 but now delayed
indefinitely. How, the Employer, Petitioner, and ammious then ask,
can the closing of any plant serve the interests of industrial stability
when it spells finis to a bargaining relationship? More specifically,
how can this particular plant closing possibly reflect the public in-
terest when it will create a severe problem for the entire Hallstead
community and surrounding area-an area already economically
downtrodden, plagued by a high unemployment rate, and selected
for Federal Area Redevelopment Assistance. It therefore behooves
1$ General Cable Corporation, 139 NLRB 1123.
14 121 NLRB 901. See also, in accord, Durado Beach Hotel, 144 NLRB 712; Clayton
& Lambert Manufacturting Company, 128 NLRB 209; and Oregon Macaroni Company,
et al, 124 NLRB 1001.
15 Hershey Chocolate Corporation, supra, footnote 14, at 907.
10 Id. at 908.
17 See footnote 9, supra.
SWIFT & COMPANY 763
the Board, the argument concludes, to salvage the Hallstead plant
and, in so doing, the local economy which is dependent thereon, by
processing the instant petitions.
On the surface, the problem thus presented is a simple one and
the remedy suggested is equally appealing. However, an amalgam
of countervailing considerations discloses the true nature of the com-
plexities at hand. First there are factual uncertainties. The Em-
ployer's contentions are based essentially on the assertion that it will
close down the Hallstead plant unless these petitions are processed.
But will the Employer do so, or is this threat, as International Presi-
dent Helstein claimed, merely a bargaining tactic? In any event,
despite the Employer's alleged inability to operate Hallstead profit-
ably under the master agreement, it has nevertheless maintained that
plant under the master agreement since April 1. Even if the Board
directs an election, there is no absolute assurance that the Petitioner
will win or that, if it does, subsequent negotiations with the Employer
will result in a contract under which the Hallstead plant will remain
open.
Second, even assuming an election victory for the Petitioner will
produce the above result, the Board is mindful of the potentially,
serious consequences which could flow from adopting this proposed
course of action. The questionable wisdom of permitting a threatened
plant closing to influence a Board decision whether to direct an elec-
tion in the face of an existing contract is self-evident, especially in
this day of increasing automation and substantial unemployment.
Third, in directing an election here, despite the International's asser-
tion that it is justified in pursuing a bargaining tack which could sacri-
fice the interests of 40 to 50 employee-members at Hallstead (by not
accepting a wage concession) for the benefit of many thousands cov-
ered by the nationwide contract, it is arguable that the Board would
thereby substitute its judgment for that of the International concern-
ing a subject matter which should be resolved by the parties within
the collective-bargaining framework.
These factors alone are sufficient to dissuade the Board from proc-
essing the instant petitions. Additionally, we are not persuaded there
is any definitive support for the contention that keeping the plant
open, in the instant circumstances, necessarily comports with the pub-
lic interest. Clearly, in one sense, the record reveals and the Board
could justifiably find that there is an immediate, tangible "public in-
terest" element in keeping Hallstead operational. The desire to sta-
bilize what has already been described as the weak economy of the
Hallstead area furnishes adequate support for this proposition. But
the Board is likewise cognizant that there are other dimensions to this
multifaceted phrase-the "public interest." To illustrate, there could
764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be numerous possible costs of accomplishing what appears to be the
worthy immediate objective of maintaining the Hallstead plant. If
the Petitioner accepts a lower wage and benefit scale at Hallstead,
would this decrease in labor costs motivate the Employer to eliminate
jobs and/or close other plants 18 while expanding the Hallstead f a-
cility? Would a wage cut at Hallstead have a depressing effect on
and eventually lead to a downward spiral in wages paid to employees
under the nationwide contract? If so, what, if any, short-term or
long-term impact would this exert on the employees and those com-
munities affected thereby?
Obviously, there are no ready-made answers to these questions. Nor
does the instant record provide any basis for resolving them. The
questions, nevertheless, do serve to place this issue in proper perspec-
tive by highlighting the complexities involved in defining the precise
nature of the public interest here and demonstrating that the "equities"
are not all one-sided. We are thus confronted with a situation where
to direct an election because of the so-called immediate and tangible
public interest in keeping Hallstead operational might well be tanta-
mount to shutting our eyes to other long range, yet perhaps more vital,
aspects of the public interest-as reflected by the interests of employees
covered by the Employer's extensive nationwide contract or, more gen-
erally, by the ultimate public interest in preserving favorable terms
of employment on a nationwide basis and encouraging free collective
bargaining. In such circumstances, and since we are unable to per-
ceive how the public interest issue would be brought into sharper focus
by reopening the record, we cannot find that the public interest war-
rants applying an exception to the contract-bar rules and directing
an election among the Hallstead production and maintenance
employees.
Because of the widespread interest that this case has aroused, we
believe the following additional observations may be in order.
If the agreement which the parties have made proves more onerous
than one of the parties can endure, it is not the Board that created this
burden. If the other party for reasons it deems good and sufficient
declines to make concessions which would ease this burden, it is not
the Board that denies the contractual relief. If the aggrieved party
decides that its losses under the contract are intolerable and that it
must close its operation, this is the Employer's, not the Board's
determination.
And if the negotiation, the making, the application, and the revi-
sion of the substance of collective-bargaining agreements are to be
left in the hands of the parties, where Congress clearly intended them
to be, the Board cannot properly turn off or turn on its contract-bar
is Employee 'McKinney testified that , based on information received from numerous truck-
drivers , the neighboring Harrisburg plant was to be closed and Hallstead expanded.
BROWNE AND BUFORD, ENGINEERS AND SURVEYORS 765
doctrine depending on its own evaluation of the economic situation
of the parties and of their community. Were the Board to endow
itself with such powers over the substance of collective bargaining,
it would introduce uncharted instability into the application of a
doctrine, contract bar, basically designed to endow the agreements
made by the parties themselves with a reasonable, predictable stability.
The assumption or intrusion of governmental evaluation of the vital
content of agreements relating to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment would inevitably relieve the parties to a
substantial degree of that sense of responsibility for the various af-
fected interests, private and public, which is essential to successful
collective bargaining in a free system.
The interests invoked in behalf of, and against, the appeal for
Board action are important. But the parties to the contract can
also do something about them. And in our view the Board cannot
do so here, without undertaking determinations beyond the scope
of the record before it or the duties given to it'and without endanger-
ing principles at the very foundation of our national employment
relations policies.
In view of all the foregoing, we find that no question concerning
representation of the Employer's employees exists at this time and
we shall accordingly dismiss the petitions.
[The Board dismissed the petitions.]
Browne and Buford , Engineers and Surveyors 1 and Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers , Local 101, Petitioner.
Case No. 17-RC-4125. December 31, 1963
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Hearing Officer Harold L.
Hudson. The Hearing Officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds:
1. The Employer involved herein is a partnership located in Kansas
City, Kansas, engaged in rendering surveying, design, and inspection
services. A considerable portion of these services are rendered to the
State of Kansas and its political subdivisions, in connection with
projects financed in significant part by the Federal Government.
' The Employer 's name appears as amended at the hearing.
145 NLRB No. 74.