Superex Drugs, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJun 26, 1963

143 N.L.R.B. 110 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Allied Industrial Workers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of our employees , by dis- charging employees , or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment , or any term or condition thereof. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce our em- ployees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form, join, or assist the above-named labor organization or any other labor organization , to bar- gain collectively through representative of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL offer to James N. Lott immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges , and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. All our employes are free to become or remain or refrain from becoming or remaining members of the above -named or any other labor organization. COUNCIL MANUFACTURING CORP., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) NOTE.-We will notify the above -named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon applica- tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act of 1948 , as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate with the Board's Regional Office, Seventh Floor, Falls Building , 22 North Front Street, Memphis, Tennessee , 38103, Telephone No. Jackson 7-5451, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Superex Drugs, Inc., and Superex Drugs of Kentucky , Inc. and Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1099 , Retail Clerks Inter- national Association , AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-2741. June 26, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On March 29, 1963, Trial Examiner David London issued his In- termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter- mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire record in this case, including the Intermediate Report, the exceptions, 143 NLRB No. 20. SUPEREX DRUGS, INC., & SUPEREX DRUGS OF KENTUCKY 111 and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner. I In his Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner inadvertently refers to a quote from the testimony of employee Judith Miller as being from the testimony of Store Manager Paul Ruwe. We hereby correct this inadvertent error by striking the word "testimony," page 114, and substituting the word "statement" in hen thereof. INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge filed by Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1099 , Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO , herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the Board , acting through the Regional Director for the Ninth Region , issued a complaint dated January 11, 1963, against Superex Drugs, Inc., and Superex Drugs of Kentucky , Inc. The complaint alleges that on or about July 6, 1962, Respond- ent interfered with , restrained , and coerced its employees by conduct specifically alleged, and that on or about November 17, 1962, Respondent discharged its em- ployees Augusta Louise Crain and Judith Ann Miller, because of organizational activities by the Union among Respondent 's employees , and/or because of their sympathy for , membership in, or activities on behalf of , the Union . By its answer, Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held before Trial Examiner David London at Cincinnati , Ohio, on February 13 and 14, 1963 . All parties appeared by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to examine and cross -examine witnesses . All parties thereafter filed briefs which have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Superex Drugs, Inc., and Superex Drugs of Kentucky, Inc., are Ohio corpora- tions engaged in the operation of retail drugstores in the States of Ohio and Kentucky, respectively.' During the year preceding the filing of the complaint herein, each of said corporations had gross sales in their various stores in excess of $500,000. During that same period, each corporation purchased and received merchandise of a value in excess of $50,000 which was shipped in interstate com- merce to the said stores in Ohio and Kentucky directly from points outside of said States. At all times material herein, Superex Drugs, Inc., and Superex Drugs of Kentucky, Inc., were wholly owned subsidiaries of, and operated by, the Kroger Co., an Ohio corporation. At all times material herein, Respondent has been an employer as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce, as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1099, Retail Clerks International Associa- tion , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Respondent owns and operates a chain of drugstores in the greater Cincinnati area, including a store at Covington, Kentucky, where the events with which we are concerned took place. The Covington store was opened on or about Novem- ber 1, 1961, at which time, Louise Crain, one of the alleged discriminatees herein, was employed as a cosmetician and was thereafter retained in that capacity until 1 Throughout the proceeding, the parties have uniformly referred to the two Superex corporations in the singular , as Respondent , and I have followed that practice herein. 112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS HOARD she was discharged on November 17, 1962. She joined the Union in the latter part of May 1962, talked to the other girls employed there during "breaks" or the lunch hour, and got "signed union cards" from 6 to 10 of the approximately 15 employees at that store. Pursuant to a consent-election agreement between Respondent and the Union, an election was conducted on July 6, 1962, among a unit of Respondent's em- ployees at Covington and three other stores in the greater Cincinnati area which election was lost by the Union by a margin of four votes, with four additional un- opened and challenged ballots. Crain served as an observer for the Union at that election. Following the filing, by the Union, of timely objections to conduct of Respondent affecting the results of the election, the Board's Regional Director for the Ninth Region, on September 12, filed his report sustaining that objection and recommending to the Board that the foregoing election be set aside. On No- vember 7, 1962, the Board adopted the Regional Director's report and recommenda- tions, set the election aside, and ordered that another election be conducted. At the second election, held on November 30 following the discharge of Crain and Miller, the Union again lost, this time by a margin of eight votes, with five unopened, challenged ballots? As indicated above, Crain was discharged on November 17. Respondent con- tends that she was discharged for failing to comply with a company rule or policy requiring employees to fill out an "employee purchase slip" covering a purchase made by her during the evening before under the circumstances detailed immediately below. About 9:50 p.m. on November 16, Crain purchased a necklace and a magazine, and paid the full retail price thereof, approximately $1.50, to Cashier Judith Miller, the other alleged discriminatee herein. Paul J. Ruwe, the store manager, who was standing within 3 feet, admitted that he saw Crain make the purchase at Miller's register, but denied that he knew whether or not an employee purchase slip had been made out. On the following morning, in checking the employee purchase slips of the previous day, he noticed that there was no slip for Crain's purchase of the night before. He testified that because he had seen the purchase being made at Miller's cash register, he called both girls to his office. There, he asked Crain whether she had made a purchase the night before and asked Miller whether she had rung up the sale. Both girls answered that they had .3 Ruwe asked why the sale was not written up and Crain replied that it was because she had not taken any discount on the purchase, a fact verified by Miller .4 When Ruwe remonstrated that the purchase had, nevertheless, to be written up, Crain asked whether that was so if she didn't take a discount and had paid the full pur- chase price. Ruwe replied in the affirmative and that he "thought [she] knew that." Both girls denied knowing that they were required to do so when no discount was allowed. Crain told him she "was sorry, that [she] didn't know or [she] wouldn't have done it, and wouldn't do it again without writing up the purchase," adding that she was certain "the other girls were unaware that they had to write up merchandise if they did not take a discount." Ruwe several times stated "he didn't know what he was going to do," and then suddenly turned around and fired both girls. Concluding Findings The record abundantly establishes, and Respondent does not deny, that it had knowledge of Crain's union membership or activity. Her role as an observer for the Union at the election of July 6 precludes any contention to the contrary. And, in a conversation with Crain about a week later, James Hardesty, then the store manager, told her that he knew she had been working for the Union and that she was going to be the observer for the Union at the election. On the other hand, it is undenied that Respondent, as was its legal right, was opposed to the Union's entry into the Covington store. Thus, it was undenied that in May 1962, Hardesty told Crain that the union representative had been in the store but that he, Hardesty, "didn't want a union in the store, he didn't feel that 2 The facts pertaining to both elections were either stipulated at the hearing, or have been officially noted by me from the Board's file in the representation proceeding, Case No 9-RC-5019. 8 Respondent concedes that no question of dishonesty was involved. 4It was Respondent's policy to give its employees an established discount on certain merchandise purchased in the store. However, no discount was allowed on magazines and several other small items. SUPEREX DRUGS, INC., & SUPEREX DRUGS OF KENTUCKY 113 [the employees] needed one." And, on the day of the first election, July 6, Hardesty, in his office, told employee Jayne Pugh, in a private interview, that he had "tried to be fair" with the girls, that he didn't see how a union could help them any more, and that if the Union got in they "might have to punch in and out on a timecard, for breaks [and that] things would not be as easy as they were." By that threat Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. I have no hesitation in finding that Respondent sought to maintain a record- keeping system which reflected employee purchases. S. W. Stephens, director of drug operations for the Kroger Co., testified that among the reasons for establish- ing such a system was that in "most" of the 48 drugstores presently operated throughout the United States by the various drugstore subsidiaries of the Kroger Co., the leasing arrangements excepted employee purchases from a rental based on a percentage of gross sales The system was also designed to aid in determining the reason for inventory shrinkage,5 and to what extent employees were patronizing Respondent by the purchase of its merchandise. The policy was reduced to writing, made a part of its operating manual, and distributed to the managers of each store, including the Covington store. In pertinent part that policy statement read as follows: SUPEREx DRUGS Employee Purchases: 1. All employee purchases must be entered on form 1351-5 Employee Pur- chase Slip, except for purchases of newspapers, magazines, candy bars, single packs of cigarettes and cigars. 2. Employees are to do their shopping before or after work hours, during breaks or during lunch periods. They will place their purchases in a designated area and an authorized employee will prepare form 1351-5. Considerable testimony was received pertaining to the extent that the need for enforcement of the policy under consideration was discussed at a national meeting, conducted by Stephens, of the five district managers covering the Nation which meet- ings was held on October 16, 1962. It was also discussed at a meeting on October 17 between Hoskins, district manager of the Cincinnati area operations, and Ruwe, the Covington manager. Without minimizing the effect that these management con- ferences had on the decision to discharge Crain and Miller, and being fully mindful of that testimony, I nevertheless, in view of Crain's and Miller's disclaimer of knowl- edge of the breadth of that policy, deem of equal, if not greater, relevance and significance the extent to which these two employees had knowledge of the scope of that policy. As previously indicated, both Crain and Miller believed that the policy did not cover sales where the full retail purchase price was paid by the employee. Hardesty testified that at a group meeting of employees when the store was first opened, he exhibited "every store form and explained their use and function," including the employee purchase slip, and that he explained that the latter "slips were to be used for all purchases excluding single candy bars and single packs of cigarettes." 6 Because these slips had separate columns for the "retail" price of the article purchased and another for the "employee cost," it could reasonably be concluded by Crain that the slips were to be used only when an employee discount was taken In any event, no testimony was offered that Hardesty made it clear, or specifically mentioned, that the slips were to be used when the full retail price was paid. On the entire record, coupled with my observation of the demeanor of the respec- tive witnesses involved as they testified, I am convinced and find that neither Crain nor Miller were aware that it was Respondent's rule or policy that employee pur- chase slips had to be made out when the full retail or list purchase price was paid. Thus, though Crain made purchases in the store other than that which precipitated her discharge, and though Respondent offered in evidence five employee purchase slips signed by Crain in the period beginning January 12, 1962, and extending through October 3, 1962, every one of those slips contained one or more items on which a substantial employee's percentage discount was taken by her. Not a single slip signed by Crain was produced on which no discount was taken. When Crain made her purchase during the evening of November 16, Ruwe was standing less than 3 feet away, a fact of which Crain was aware. Indeed, Ruwe 5 Though Stephens testified that the inventory shrinkage at the "various Superex stores-were running as high as 17%," the shrinkage at Covington, at the last inventory, was only 2.2 percent. He further testified that he considered a shrinkage of not more than 2 percent to be a normal shrinkage 6 Hardesty admitted that he should also have excluded magazines , but that he failed to do so 114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD admitted he saw her make that purchase. Neither Crain nor Miller impressed me as employees who would willingly flaunt their employer's instructions, especially on this occasion, almost directly under Ruwe's eyes. Though I have found above that Respondent had knowledge of Crain's union activity, that knowledge does not establish that Ruwe discharged her because of that activity. Union activity conferred no privilege upon Crain to flaunt company rules. Since it is undisputed that no employee purchase slips were made out on the occasion in question, the crucial issue is whether Ruwe discharged Crain for that reason or whether he was merely seeking a pretext by which to rid Respond- ent of an active union adherent. In resolving that issue, I have been fully mindful that the burden to establish the unlawful motive rests on the General Counsel. It is equally well settled, how- ever, that direct evidence of an intention to violate the Act is not a prerequisite to a finding of violation. Such evidence is rarely obtainable, and findings of dis- criminatory motivation must frequently rest on inference and on circumstantial evidence. N.L.R.B. v. Piedmont Wagon and Manufacturing Company, 176 F. 2d 695-696 (C.A. 4); Hartsell Mills Company v. N.L.R.B., 111 F. 2d 291, 293 (C.A. 4). Here, I am convinced and find that the General Counsel has sustained the burden resting on him. Crain had been steadily employed by Respondent since the Coving- ton store was opened. During that period her salary was raised several times in accordance with Respondent's schedule of salary adjustments. She had never been criticized, reprimanded, or warned for any dereliction or neglect of duty. Under these circumstances, the reason assigned by Respondent for her discharge must be carefully scrutinized. Though an employer may discharge or discipline an employee for any good, bad, or no reason at all, except only that he may not do so for a reason proscribed by the Act, human experience has taught that employers do not lightly, or without cause, dispense with the services of competent, experienced employes. It accord- ingly becomes necessary to scrutinize and consider all the circumstances surround- ing Crain's discharge. I have already alluded to Respondent's opposition to the entry of the Union into Respondent's operations. Of significance also, is the timing of Crain's dis- charge occurring as it did about a week after Respondent received notice of the Board's Order setting aside the first election, and ordering another election to take place within the following 30 days. Also to be considered, is Ruwe's testimony that though, at the time of Crain's discharge, he "was aware this kind of thing was going on, the taking of things out of the store without writing up a purchase slip," the evidence fails to disclose that any other employee of the store had ever been discharged for that reason, warned, or disciplined in any other manner. In view of Ruwe's testimony just alluded to, and Crain's working record, con- sideration must also be given to the severity of the discipline imposed upon her. Stephens testified that his instructions to the district managers pertaining to the need for maintaining the policy in question were merely "that disciplinary action should be taken." In view of Crain's avowed disclaimer of knowledge that she was required to make out the slip where the full retail price was paid, and which in fact was paid, imposition of the most severe disciplinary action possible seems most unusual? By reason of all the foregoing I conclude and find that Crain was not discharged for the reason assigned by Respondent but because of her union activities, and that by doing so Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Judith Miller, a sophomore student at a nearby college, was employed by Re- spondent about February 1, 1962, as a salesgirl and subsequently promoted to cashier. About 2 weeks before her discharge, about 9:50 p.m., of a day when she was off work, she came into the store to buy something to relieve a cold or sore throat. She selected some cough drops, walked to the cash register operated by Ruth Byrge, and found Ruwe checking out the adjoining register. She told Ruwe that she had a bad cold and asked him whether the cough drops she had selected were "good for it." Ruwe replied that they were, but suggested that the Cepacol tablets, which were then "on sale," were better. She complied with his suggestion, paid the .,on sale" 8 price of the tablets to Byrge, and walked out of the store without mak- ing out any purchase slip. She heard nothing more about it, nor is there any 7 Crain testified, without contradiction, that though at the time of her discharge she was entitled to a week's vacation, it was not given to her nor was she paid for it. s Respondent's policy provided that no discount would be allowed on items already re- duced in price. SUPEREY DRUGS, INC., & SUPEREX DRUGS OF KENTUCKY 115 ,evidence that any criticism or discipline was imposed upon either Miller or Byrge arising from that incident. Miller testified, without contradiction, that she had never been given any instruc- tions by either Hardesty or Ruwe concerning employee purchase slips. At the time she was hired by Hardesty, he told her "that the other girls would show [her] how to do things," and that if she had any questions, she should ask the girls about them. With respect to employee purchase slips, he told her that the girls would show her "how to fill [them] out." She was subsequently told, presumably by the "girls," that the slips had to be filled out only when employees took "a 20 percent discount on something." The record conclusively establishes that Miller's plea to Ruwe on the day of her discharge, that it was her impression and belief that no slip was required for Crain's purchase of the previous evening, was genuine, honest, and sincere.9 The events of the evening of November 16, being assigned by Respondent as the only reason for Miller's discharge, and there being no evidence to the contrary, it may reasonably be inferred that Respondent otherwise considered her a satis- factory employee. What has heretofore been said about the unusualness and severity of the discipline imposd upon Crain applies more forcibly with respect to Miller. Why then, was she discharged? The General Counsel impliedly concedes, and the record establishes, that Miller had no interest in the Union and was not engaged in its activities. Such a finding, however, does not necessarily require dismissal of the allegations pertaining to her discharge. Discrimination in regard to the hire or tenure of employment of em- ployees, "including non-union employees, . . . or union members not known by the employer to be union members, tends to discourage union membership and activities no less than discrimination against known union members alone. All victims of discrimination are, in such cases, entitled to the same relief under the Act as are known union members." Arnoldivare, Inc, 129 NLRB 228; Englewood Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394. On the entire record, I am convinced and find that Ruwe and Respondent were aware on November 17, that there was no legitimate reason for discharging Miller, but that her termination "was considered necessary by Respondent in order to give an appearance of legitimacy to" Crain's discharge. Willard's Shop Rite Markets, Inc., 132 NLRB 1146, 1149; Arnoldware, Inc., supra, and Englewood Lumber Com- pany, supra. By discharging Miller under those circumstances, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of theAct. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, appearing in con- nection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow thereof. V THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent unlawfully discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Louise Crain and Judith Miller, I recommend that Respondent offer each of them immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suf- fered by reason of the discrimination against them, by the payment to each of a sum of money equal to that she normally would have earned during the period of discrimination, with backpay and interest thereon computed in a manner prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. In view of the serious nature of Respondent's unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire record in the case , I make the following: 9 Respondent , in its exhaustive brief, makes no contention that Miller had any notice that Respondent' s Tule or policy was otherwise than had been reported to her by "the girls." 717-e72-----d4--vol. 143-9 116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act , Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 2. By discharging Louise Crain and Judith Miller, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record , it is recommended that the Respondent , Superex Drugs, Inc , and Superex Drugs of Kentucky, Inc., its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Directly , or by implication , threatening employees with the withdrawal of existing privileges , or other economic reprisals , to discourage union membership and activity. (b) Discouraging membership in Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1099, Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organiza- tion , by discharging , or in any other manner discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (c) In any other manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named Union or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer to Louise Crain and Judith Miller immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges. (b) Make whole Louise Crain and Judith Miller for any loss of pay suffered by them in the manner set forth in the section of this Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy." (c) Preserve and , upon request , make available for the Board and its agents, for examination and copying , all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at all its stores in the greater Cincinnati area, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, shall , after being duly signed by Respondent's au- thorized representative , be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region , in writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith." 10 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order Is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order." 11 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify our employees that. SCHOENFELD CORDAGE CO., INC. 117 WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1099 , Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , by discharging any of our employees , or in any manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT directly, or by implication, threaten employees with the with- drawal of existing privileges or with other forms of reprisals because of their union membership or activities. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form organizations, to join or assist the above -named or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities , except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem- bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to Louise Crain and Judith Miller immediate and full re- instatement to their former or a substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to seniority and other rights and privileges , and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against them. SUPEREx DRUGS, INC., Employer. Dated---- --------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) SUPEREx DRUGS OF KENTUCKY, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify any of the above-named employees presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Transit Building, Fourth and Vine Streets, Cincinnati , Ohio, 45202, Telephone No. Dunbar 1-1420, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Schoenfeld Cordage Co ., Inc. and Leonard L . Eythell, Curtis C. Meeker, Leo W. Eythell, James Chappel , Belton Brown, Jr., and Leo Smothermon. Cases Nos. 23-CA-1508-1, 33-CA-1508-2, 33-CA-1508-3, 23-CA-1508-4, 23-CA-1508-5, and 23-CA-1508-6. June 26, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On April 22, 1963, Trial Examiner Robert E. Mullin issued his In- termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermedi- 143 NLRB No. 12.