Schill Steel Products, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 20, 1963

144 N.L.R.B. 69 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

SCHILL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. 69
Schill Steel Products , Inc. and United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 25-CA-1498 and 25-CA-1535. August 20,
1963
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 27, 1963, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermediate
Report. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Rodgers, Fanning, and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations
of the Trial Examiner.1
ORDER
The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the
Trial Examiner.
i Member Rodgers , in adopting the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent had
knowledge of Wilburn Brown's union interest and participation , does not rely upon the
circumstance that Respondent 's plant is a small one.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges and amended charges filed by United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO, herein called the Union , in Case No . 23-CA-1498 on September 26 and Novem-
ber 5 , 1962 , and in Case No. 23-CA-1535 on November 30 and December 4, 1962,
the General Counsel , on January 31, 1963 , issued a consolidated complaint, sub-
sequently amended, against Schill Steel Products , Inc., herein called the Respondent,
alleging that the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3 ), and (5 ) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat . 136, herein called the Act. More par-
ticularly , the complaint alleged in substance that the Respondent had (a ) violated
Section 8 (a) (1) by various independent acts of interference , restraint, and coercion; 1
(b) violated Section 8(a) (1) and ( 3) by discharging employee Wilburn H. Brown on
June 11 , 1962, because of his union membership and activities , and (c ) violated
i The same allegations of independent 8(a) (1) had been included 'in an earlier com-
plaint against the Respondent in Case No . 23-CA-1445 , litigated at a hearing held prior
to the issuance of the instant complaint . The allegations of the earlier case were found
supported in a Decision and Order issued by the Board on February 12, 1963 ( 140 NLRB
1164 ). On that basis , a motion made by the Respondent was granted to strike such
8(a) (1) allegations from the complaint in the instant proceeding It was made clear,
however , that official notice would be taken of the Board 's findings as reported in 140
NLRB 1164 for their bearing on other allegations of the complaint here in issue.
144 NLRB No. 11.
70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by refusing, since September 18, 1962, to bargain with
the Union as the duly certified exclusive representative of its employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, and also by unilaterally changing wage rates in the afore-
said bargaining unit on February 16 and March 6, 1962. The amended complaint
further alleged that a strike of the Respondent's employees, which began on March 11,
1962, was caused by the aforesaid unfair labor practices. In its duly filed answer,
the Respondent denied generally the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices,
and with specific reference to the 8(a)(5) allegations, averred affirmatively the
invalidity of the Board's certification referred to in the complaint. A hearing, at
which all parties were represented by counsel, was held before Trial Examiner Arthur
Leff at Houston, Texas, on April 16 and 17, 1963. Briefs were filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent on May 8, 1963.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witness, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Respondent, a Texas corporation with its principal office and warehouse at
Houston, Texas, and with branch warehouses at Dallas and Odessa, Texas, and at
Tulsa, Oklahoma, is engaged in business as a steel and metal products distributor.
The Respondent's interstate sales and purchases each exceed $50,000 in value per
annum. The Respondent admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
IT. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
This case must in a sense be considered as a supplement and in a sense a sequel
to a previous unfair labor practice proceeding involving the same Respondent.
litigated before the Board as Case No. 23-CA-1445. Trial Examiner Phil Saunders
issued an Intermediate Report in that case on November 28, 1962, and the Board, on
February 12, 1963, issued its Decision and Order-reported in 140 NLRB 1164-
adopting the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, of which,
as announced at the hearing, official notice is here taken.
The unfair labor practice allegations in Case No. 23-CA-1445 covered the period
generally from May 1 to August 27, 1962. They involved the identical acts of
independent interference, restraint, and coercion that were originally realleged in
the complaint in the instant proceeding, but were thereafter stricken on motion of
the Respondent on the ground that they had already been litigated and ruled upon
by the Board, and, in addition, an allegation that the Respondent had unlawfully
discharged employee Columbus Caldwell on June 13, 1962, because of his union
membership and activities. Caldwell's discharge was the only 8(a) (3) violation that
was charged, alleged, and litigated in the prior case , the charge relating to Wilburn
H. Brown, the alleged discriminatee in the instant case, not having been filed until
November 30, 1962. The Board in its Decision and Order in Case No. 23-CA-1445,
found the unfair labor practice allegations of the complaint sustained by the proof.
Reference is made to the Board's findings in the earlier case. As more fully appears
therefrom, the Union instituted an organizational campaign among the Respondent's
employees at its Houston plant in early May 1962, thereafter held various organiza-
tional meetings, and filed a petition with the Board for certification on May 21, 1962.
An election was held by the Board on August 23, 1962. In the intervening period.
the Respondent, through its managerial and supervisory employees, unmistakably
disclosed its strong opposition and hostility to the Union, engaging, as the Board
found, in various unfair labor practices that were calculated to restrain and coerce
employees in the exercise of their self-organizational rights. Among other things, the
Respondent (a) interrogated employees concerning their union sympathies and
activities, (b) promised wage and other benefits if the employees voted against the
Union, (c) threatened employees with the deprivation of existing benefits if the Union
were voted in, (d) warned employees that the Union's leaders, if their identity became
known, or those who voted for the Union, faced the danger of discharge, and (e)
terminated the employment of a member of the Union's organizing committee
(Caldwell) on June 13, 1962, ostensibly for other reasons, but actually because of
his union membership and activities.
SCHILL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. 71
The instant case supplements Case No. 23-CA-1445 in the sense that the alleged
discriminatory discharge of Wilburn H. Brown occurred at roughly the same time as
that of Caldwell and must be considered against the backdrop of the same unfair labor
practices as were found in the earlier case. It is a sequel to Case No. 23-CA-1445
in the sense that the alleged refusal to bargain-the only other substantive issue
in the instant case-brings down to date the story of the Union's thus far unsuccessful
efforts to achieve recognition . The two central issues of this case-the 8(a)(3)
issue involving Brown and the 8 (a) (5) issue-will be considered in the order men-
tioned. The only other issue here present-whether the strike which began on
March 11, 1963, was an unfair labor practice strike-has significance only in con-
nection with the remedial order to be entered. It will be considered last.
B. The discharge of Wilburn H. Brown
Wilburn H. Brown, before his discharge on June 11, 1962, had worked continuously
for the Respondent since November 1956. In terms of length of service, he was
the sixth oldest of the approximately 50 nonsupervisory employees-most of them
classified as laborers-employed by the Respondent at its Houston warehouse.
Brown started out as a laborer and order filler on the night shift, but after a year
was assigned additional duties as a burner, operating as occasion called, for it the
radiograph machine, also known as the electric torch. In the course of time, Brown
also became the chief order filler on the night shift until October 1961, when he
was transferred to the day shift principally to take over the duties of one Henry
Johnson, who until then had performed most of the work on the radiograph machine.
About the same time, Johnson was moved to a new machine, installed about that
time, commonly known as the electric eye, which did burning work of another kind.
While on the night shift, Brown had received a number of wage increases. He re-
ceived a further individual wage increase when he was transferred to the day shift,
and still another in February 1962, less than 4 months before his discharge. At
that time he was complimented by Plant Superintendent Terrell Sanders on his work
performance as a burner. Though Brown spent most of his time on the radiograph
machine, he was also assigned other duties, including at times the supervision of
truck loading, a task normally performed by supervisors and considered a highly
responsible function.
Immediately prior to the discharge, Brown and Henry Johnson were the only
two employees classified as burners? There was then more than enough work for
one burner on the electric eye machine alone, and Henry Johnson was working from
2 to 4 hours' overtime each day. To relieve the situation, the Respondent had as-
signed Henry Johnson to train Brown in the skilled operations of the electric eye
machine so that the machine might be used on two shifts with Brown operating it
on the second. At the same time Brown was assigned to train a junior employee in
the operations of the radiograph machine so that the latter might be prepared to
take Brown's place when Brown moved over to the night shift Johnson testified
credibly that Brown before his discharge was "progressing fine" in his training on
the electric eye burner.
Leroy Alsobrooks was Brown's immediate supervisor during the last 6 months of
Brown's employment. Alsobrooks testified that Brown, although somewhat slow
of gait, was a good steady worker, ranking in Alsobrooks' judgment among the best
five employees in the entire warehouse. Alsobrooks further testified that while he
was over Brown, he had only one occasion to reprimand Brown or to complain
about his work or attitude. That was about 6 months before Brown's discharge,
when Alsobrooks had first been made foreman. On that occasion, he had found it
necessary to have impressed upon Brown, and others as well, that employees were
required to obey his orders. He had experienced no difficulty with Brown thereafter.
Alsobrooks was no longer in the Respondent's employ at the time of the hearing,
having been terminated in a reduction of force several weeks after Brown's discharge.
He was, however, not only a disinterested witness, but one who by his overall testi-
mony and demeanor impressed me as a forthright one. I accept his testimony.
In an earlier union organizational campaign conducted about 1960, Brown had
taken a leadership role in solicitation activities. At that time he had served on the
employee organizing committee , and had signed up, among others , Alsobrooks,
then a rank-and-file employee. In the 1962 campaign, Brown was not as outstandingly
active. However, he signed a union designation card shortly after the start of the
campaign , attended all organizational meetings , and, although not on the "organiz-
ing committee" designated as such , served actively on another union committee that
9 This appears from a June 1, 1962, payroll record in evidence.
72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had been set up to ascertain through contacts with truckdrivers and others just how
many employees the Respondent had at its other plants.3
There is undisputed direct evidence that the Respondent' s supervision , at least at
its lower echelons, was aware of Brown's interest in the Union. Thus, as appears
both from the Board's findings in Case No. 23-CA-1445 and from Brown' s undis-
puted testimony in the instant proceeding, Foreman Alsobrooks inquired of Brown
sometime in May 1962 whether he was still the leader of the Union; 4 Alsobrooks, in
addition, interrogated Brown as to how he felt about the Union and as to the progress
the Union was making. Foreman Karl Lovett, who at the time professed a friendli-
ness toward to the Union, also spoke to Brown about the Union on a number of
occasions. On one occasion in May, Lovett asked Brown how the employees were
coming on with the Union, drawing from Brown the response, "Pretty good so far."
On another occasion in late May or early June, Lovett asked Brown whether he was
on a committee for the Union. Brown replied that he was serving on the "organizing
committee," although actually, as noted above, the committee on which he was serv-
ing was not so styled.5
Both Alsobrooks and Lovett also warned Brown of the consequences of union
activity. Alsobrooks sometime prior to Brown's discharge told Brown that the Re-
spondent had had a meeting of its supervisors and that Sanders had instructed the
supervisors to ascertain, when they saw men conversing in groups, as to whether
the men were talking about the Union and to report to him what they learned.
Alsobrooks reported Sanders as having further stated that the Company was going
to get rid of the union leaders when it discovered their identity.6 Lovett-as appears
from Brown's undenied testimony both in this and the prior proceeding-also told
Brown that President John Schill of the Respondent was looking for the Union's
leaders and planned to discharge them when he found out who they were.
Brown was discharged about 11 a.m. on Monday, June 11, 1963. The discharge
was effected by Sanders. When Brown asked why he was being let go, Sanders told
him that it was because he had been involved in an incident the previous Thursday
in which-so Sanders said-Brown had "cursed [his] foreman, Leroy Alsobrooks."
Brown denied then, as he also did at the hearing, that the specific conduct attributed
to him occurred.
The evidence concerning the incident on Thursday, June 7, 1962, was as follows:
On that day the regular crane operator was absent, and Alsobrooks was operating
the overhead crane to place a steel plate on the cutting table which Brown used for
his burning work. Brown was assigned to assist Alsobrooks. One of his functions
was to direct from the ground the manner in which the steel plate was to be positioned
for placement on the cutting table. Sanders at the time was observing the crane
operation from a point in the yard some distance away. Alsobrooks experienced
some difficulty in setting down the plate. Taking issue with some of Brown's direc-
tions, he irratably shouted at Brown to shut his "damn mouth" and he (Alsobrooks)
would get the plate down his own way. Up to this point, there is no dispute as to
what occurred.
There is a conflict in the testimony, however, concerning Brown's reaction to
Alsobrooks' shouted remark. Brown testified he told Alsobrooks "not to curse me
because I didn't curse him," and that that was the end of the incident. Sanders'
version is different. His testimony, although marked by a number of variances and
inconsistencies , was broadly to the effect that Brown responded to Alsobrooks' re-
mark by cursing Alsobrooks and threatening to "come up the ladder" after him,
thereby precipitating a violent argument between the two that Sanders was obliged
to stop. Alsobrooks-the only other witness to the incident who testified-stated
that he did not hear Brown's response; that if Brown cursed him he was not aware
of it; and that there was certainly nothing about Brown's demeanor at the time that
indicated to him Brown was threatening him in any way. Alsobrooks' testimony
'That information was desired by the Union to enable it to appraise its chances of
success in establishing a majority on the basis of a companywide bargaining unit
4 Brown replied that he was not
5 The findings as to Brown's conversations with Lovett are based on Brown's undisputed
testimony. Lovett, although still employed by the Respondent as a foreman and available
as a witness, was not called by the Respondent
e The Respondent did not specifically dispute in the instant proceeding that such a meet-
ing was held. It is noted, however, that Sanders at the hearing in Case No 23-CA-1445
(as appears from the Board's findings in that case) denied that any supervisors' meeting
was held at which union activities were discussed Sanders' denial in that case was re-
jected by the Trial Examiner and the Board, principally on the basis of Alsobrooks' con-
trary and credited direct testimony in that case.
SCHILL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. 73
does not support Sanders' assertion that a "fuss" or argument resulted from the ex-
change requiring Sanders' intervention.
To the extent Brown's and Sanders' versions are in conflict , I credit Brown's. For
one thing, Alsobrooks' testimony, particularly with respect to what followed the
exchange, corroborates Brown's account rather than Sanders'. For another, it ap-
pears unlikely that Sanders who was further removed from Brown than Alsobrooks
could possibly have heard what Alsobrooks credibly testified he was unable to hear.
Finally, Sanders' account inherently reveals that what he says he heard was based
on speculation rather than knowledge, if indeed it was not contrived. Thus, in
describing the crane incident , Sanders initially testified , "I think [Brown ] cursed
[Alsobrooks]. I am sure he did." At a later point he testified, "I think he [cursed].
I couldn't swear he did." Still later, he testified that he fired Brown "for him cursing
at Leroy for letting the plate down the way he did." But in the prior proceeding in
Case No. 23-CA-1445, Sanders testified oppositely, "I didn't hear [Brown] cuss at
Leroy Alsobrooks."
In any event, I am satisfied that Sanders did not at the time regard the crane
incident flareup , such as it was, as of any particular moment. Brown testified that
Sanders said nothing to him about it at the time. Brown's testimony in that respect,
as earlier noted, is substantially corroborated by Alsobrooks' account. It is credited?
Sanders made no mention of the crane incident to Brown during the balance of
that Thursday, nor on Friday, nor on Saturday when Brown was called upon to
work overtime.
Not long before Brown's discharge, however, probably on the very morning of
the discharge, Sanders did bring up the incident in a conversation with Alsobrooks.
Sanders asked Alsobrooks whether Brown had cursed him. When Alsobrooks
replied that so far as he knew Brown had not, Sanders asked whether Alsobrooks
had anything else against Brown. Alsobrooks said he did not. As appears from
Alsobrooks' credited testimony, Sanders then told Alsobrooks "he had to let [Brown]
go." Sanders then went on to say that he wanted Alsobrooks "to make [Brown]
mad so he would have a reason to fire him " 8
Defending the discharge, the Respondent at the hearing did not confine itself to
the reason given Brown, although Sanders while testifying did state that "the crane
operation was the main reason." The Respondent's basic contention now is that
Brown was discharged as part of an economic reduction in force. According to
the Respondent, Brown was selected for release not only because of the asserted
crane incident, but also because he was generally an undesirable employee, more
specifically-so it says-because he was continually insubordinate to Alsobrooks
and was besides a "lazy, shiftless worker."
The General Counsel in turn takes issue with the Respondent's claim that Brown's
discharge was an outgrowth of an economic reduction in force, disputes in any
event the bona fides of the reasons the Respondent now advances for Brown's
selection, and insists that in truth it was the Respondent's antipathy to the Union
and Brown's interest therein that powered its discharge decision.
Apropos of its economic defense, the Respondent adduced testimony from its
president, John Schill, and its plant superintendent, Terrell Sanders, to the following
general effect: In May, Schill learned at a Steel Service Institute meeting he attended
that the Respondent's handling costs per ton were higher than that being experienced
by its competitors in the steel warehousing industry. A subsequent trip he made
to visit other warehouses in the same industry confirmed his feeling that the Re-
spondent was conducting its operations less efficiently than its competitors. Then,
in early June, Schill received a quarterly earnings report from the Respondent's
comptroller, reflecting that for the 9-month period ending May 31, 1962, the Respond-
ent had operated at a deficit of some $17,000.9 The foregoing circumstances led the
9 On that same point, as on others, Sanders' testimony was both vague and replete with
inconsistencies. He testified at one place that he spoke to both Brown and Alsobrooks
and made them stop their argument ; at another place that he spoke only to Brown, repri-
manding him. when asked what he said to Brawn when he assertedly reprimanded him,
Sanders testified , "I told him to go ahead and let the plate down and get it over with "
8 Sanders denied making the last-quoted remark. His denial is not credited
9 The General Counsel questioned at the hearing, as he does also in his brief, the re-
liability of the comptroller's report He points out that it was prepared on a different
basis than the certified annual reports that are prepared by the Respondent's outside
auditors and excluded certain items which , if included , would, according to the General
Counsel , have shown a different result. The General Counsel also points out that the
certified auditors ' report for the entire fiscal year , including the last 3 months, can be
read as showing a substantial profit comparable to the Respondent's profits in earlier
74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent to institute a program to cut costs and expenses in its warehouse and
otherwise to improve efficiency in its warehouse operations in an effort to bring
its tonnage-cost ratio in line with that of its competitors. At first the Respondent
sought to achieve that end by economies in nonlabor costs, but, when that proved
insufficient, Schill finally instructed Sanders to effect a reduction in force by screening
out inefficient personnel. Schill's testimony is contradictory as to the number he
suggested be dropped. At one point he testified he did not suggest any specific
number, leaving it entirely to Sanders; at another, that he suggested "about four
or five, maybe six."
I do not doubt that the Respondent did decide sometime around that period to
economize on plant costs. But I am not persuaded that Brown's discharge was
either rooted in or part of a broader economic reduction in force. Schill in his
testimony did not attempt specifically to tie in Brown's discharge with the economic
reduction in force he says he ordered And Sanders testified that Schill instructed
him to effect economies and a reduction in force "probably a week or two" after
the crane incident referred to above. If so, this would fix the time on a date after
Brown's discharge. Moreover, so far as appears, the Respondent neither terminated
nor laid off any other employee on the same day or during the same week that
Brown was discharged, except for Caldwell who was fired 2 days later, and he, as
the Board found in the earlier proceeding, was discharged discriminatorily and not
for economic reasons. There is some indication in the record that the Respondent
did discharge some five or six employees who were not replaced, but their termina-
tions apparently occurred some 2 weeks or more after Brown's discharge 10 Other
facts present in this record also reflect adversely on the bona fides of Respondent's
claim that Brown's discharge was part of an economic reduction in force effected by
the Respondent at that particular time. Thus it is undisputed that either immediately
before or about the same time that Brown was discharged the Respondent hired
three college boys as summer employees on a full-time basis." I regard it as sig-
nificant too that nothing was said to Brown at the time of his discharge about any
need to reduce the Respondent's work force. I think that if in fact that were the
reason, or one of the reasons, it would have been so stated.12
At any rate, even were I to accept the Respondent's claim that Brown's discharge
was part of an economic reduction in force, there would still remain the question
of whether his selection as one of the first, if not indeed the very first, to go was in
truth bottomed on the reasons the Respondent now assigns. On all the credible
evidence, I am convinced it was not. The "main reason" advanced by the Respond-
ent-tbe asserted crane incident-has already been considered and discredited. It
was at most a trivial occurrence, and apparently so regarded by the Respondent
at the time, as evidenced in part by the Respondent's long delayed reaction. The
further reason now given by the Respondent-Brown's alleged continual insubordi-
nation to Alsobrooks-is likewise not supported by the evidence I find credible.
Quite clearly, Brown's conduct in the crane incident does not reflect insubordination;
certainly Alsobrooks did not regard it as such. Sanders testified generally that Brown
had been involved in earlier incidents of insubordination to Alsobrooks. But Sanders'
testimony in that regard was unsupported by any specifications of detail. It was,
moreover, directly contradicted, not only by Brown , but also by Alsobrooks. As
earlier found, Alsobrooks, who impressed me as a forthright witness, testified that he
had but one occasion to complain about Brown's attitude toward him, and that was
some 6 months before Brown's discharge. Sanders' third stated reason-that Brown
was a "lazy, shiftless worker"-was no more impressive. It is refuted both by
years For purposes of decision here, however, I find it unnecessary to resolve this par-
ticular factual issue raised by the General Counsel. The findings and conclusions made
below assume the accuracy of the comptroller's report
10 The General Counsel adduced evidence to the effect that almost all of those in the
group subsequently discharged were among those most prominent in union activities and
that except for the most prominent leader who held a skilled job which he alone could
perform, the Respondent eventually terminated all of those most active in union organiza-
tional work. However, the General Counsel has asserted no claim in this proceeding that
the others were discharged for discriminatory reasons, and no inference adverse to the
Respondent may be drawn from the circumstances just noted
11 Schell sought to explain the hiring of the summer employees as needed to promote good-
will, stating that they were sons of customers of the Respondent. However, Sanders'
testimony discloses that none of them was related or owed his hiring to any of the Re-
spondent's customers.
12 It is noted that when Alsobrooks was let go, several weeks after Brown's discharge, he
was told-as appears from his undisputed testimony-that it was because of an "economic
layoff "
SCHILL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. 75
Alsobrooks' contrary, and in view view more credible, testimony and, even more con-
vincingly, by the numerous wage increases the Respondent gave Brown during his
long period of employment, the penultimate one only 8 months, and the final one
only 4 months, before Brown's discharge.
On all the evidence, I find that the Respondent's discharge action was not in truth
motivated either by the single reason given Brown at the time of his termination or
by the several reasons since added. The real reason must accordingly be sought
elsewhere.
There can be little doubt that the Respondent was anxious at the time to rid
itself of Brown for reasons wholly unrelated to Brown's work performance or atti-
tude. This is unmistakably shown by Sanders' conversation with Alsobrooks, shortly
before Brown's discharge, wherein Sanders declared that he "had to let [Brown] go,"
inquired as to whether Alsobrooks had anything against Brown, and suggested that
Alsobrooks "make [Brown] mad so that [Sanders] would have a reason to fire him."
An employer desirous for legitimate reasons of ridding himself of an employee he
considers undesirable has no need to search for a possible reason or to seek to manu-
facture an incident that might provide a colorable basis for such action. The circum-
stances thus strongly suggest an unlawful motivation. Absent any other plausible
explanation, the key to the Respondent's true motivation, I am persuaded, is to be
found in the Respondent's strong opposition and hostility to union organization at
the time, as more particularly reflected by the Respondent's substantially con-
temporaneous other unfair labor practices heretofore found by the Board in Case
No. 23-CA-1445.
I am mindful that Sanders, who claims he alone made the discharge decision,
denied he then had any knowledge of Brown's union activities or interest and of the
absence of any direct evidence to the contrary. But on the facts of this case I do not
regard the absence of such direct evidence fatal to the conclusion I reach. The
principle that knowledge of union activities, no less than discriminatory motivation,
may be, and often of necessity must be, based upon circumferential evidence, is one
firmly rooted in Board and judicial precedent.13 In the total circumstances of the
case, I find unconvincing both Sanders' claim that he acted entirely on his own and
his denial of knowledge. Sanders' statement to Alsobrooks that he "had to let
[Brown] go" indicates that he was being guided by instructions from higher man-
agement authority.14 And, as found above, there is direct evidence that members
of the Respondent's supervisory staff, at the lower levels at least, were aware of
Brown's union interest. This alone is sufficient to support a reasonable inference,
particularly in a plant the size of the Respondent's, that similar knowledge also spread
to the notice of higher management. And especially is that so when one also con-
siders the active interest displayed by the Respondent in the Union's organizational
activities as shown by the findings in Case No. 23-CA-1445, including, inter alia,
the interrogation of employees (including Brown) as to their union activities and
sympathies and the instructions issued by Sanders to supervisors to report to him
employee conversations about the Union.15 When to the foregoing circumstances
are added the others outlined above that have been found to support an inference
of unlawful motivation, particularly the context of antiunion activity in which
Brown's discharge occurred and the Respondent's inability to come forward with any
other plausible and rational explanation for its action, the inference is for me in-
escapable that the Respondent must have possessed knowledge of Brown's union
activities and have acted on that premise I so find.
I conclude that the General Counsel has proved by a fair preponderance of credible
evidence the complaint's allegations relating to the discriminatory discharge of
Wilburn Brown.
C. The refusal to bargain
(1) On May 21, 1962, the Union filed a representation petition in Case No.
23-RC-1917. After a hearing, the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region,
on July 13, 1962, issued a Decision and Direction of Election, finding, inter alia, that
13 See, e g, N.L R.B. v Link-Belt Company, 311 U.S 584, 602, F. W Woolworth Com-
pany v. NLRB., 121 F. 2d 65'8, 660 (C A. 2) ; Wiese Plow Welding Co , Inc, 123 NLRB
616, 618.
14 It is noted that Schill in his testimony did not specifically deny knowledge of Brown's
union interest
15 Sanders' testimony that his only knowledge of union activities was derived from the
representation petition the Union filed, and that the "only time" he ever talked to Schill
about the Union was on the morning the Respondent received a copy of the representation
petition, appears to me on its face incredible in the light of the Respondent's pronounced
anitiunlon activities.
76 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the following employees of the Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within Section 9(b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at
its Houston, Texas, establishment, including truckdrivers and plant clericals,
but excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, watch-
men, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
On July 20, 1962, after denial of a motion for reconsideration, the Respondent filed
with the Board a request for review of the said decisions.16 The request was denied
on August 10, 1962. Thereafter, on August 23, 1962, the Regional Director con-
ducted an election among the Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit de-
scribed above. A majority of the eligible voters cast their ballots for representation
by the Union. On August 31, 1962, the Regional Director issued a certification of
representation, certifying the Union as the exclusive representative of all employees
in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, within
the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
On September 4, 1962, the Union by letter requested relevant wage and other
information required by it to prepare a contract proposal. The Respondent con-
strued the Union's letter, correctly, as a demand upon the Respondent to recognize
and bargain with the Union as the certified representative of its employees in the
unit found appropriate by the Board. On September 18, 1962, the Respondent
notified the Union that it was declining to comply with the Union's demand. The
Respondent assigned as its only reason that it deemed the Board's certification "illegal
and contrary to law for the reason that it does not pertain to a unit of this company's
employees which is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining."
(2) The Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union as aforesaid
resulted in the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the Union against the Re-
spondent, docketed as Case No. 23-CA-1498. Based upon such charges, the Gen-
eral Counsel issued a complaint in that case on November 6, 1962, alleging that the
Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1). In its original answer, filed
November 13, 1962, the Respondent defended solely on the alleged ground that the
employee bargaining unit as certified by the Board was inappropriate. However,
in an amended answer filed on November 29, 1962, the Respondent alleged as an
additional defense that the Board's election and certification in Case No. 23-RC-1917
were invalid and unlawful because its request for review of the Regional Director's
decision in that case had, contrary to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act,
been delegated to, considered and ruled upon by only one member of the Board.
On December 14, 1962, the Board, with all five members participating, issued a
ruling on reconsideration of the Respondent's request for review in Case No.
23-RC-1917 that had been denied on August 10. The ruling on reconsideration
stated that the Board had "been administratively advised that the Employer has
questioned the Board's action in denying [the] aforementioned Request for Review"
and in the circumstances had "decided sua sponte to reconsider [that] Request." 17
Following issuance of the Board's ruling on reconsideration, the Union, under
date of December 19, 1962, repeated its demand that the Respondent recognize
and bargain with it as the certified bargaining agent for employees in the appropriate
1e The Respondent contended then as it does now that the unit found was inappropriate
because it was limited to employees of its Houston facility and failed to Include its em-
ployees at its Dallas and Odessa, Texas, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, branches.
17 At the hearing, the Respondent contended, inter alia, in a motion to strike and dis-
miss the complaint herein, that the Board-assertedly in violation of Section 5(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act-was led to reconsider the request for review as a result
of "advice and suggestions" to the Board "by the Assistant Regional Director of the
Twenty-third Region and/or by other officers and employees engaged by the General
Counsel of the Board In investigative functions in the instant matter." The "advice and
suggestions" were stated to be to the effect that the Respondent had interposed as a defense
to the 8(a) (5) allegations that the Board had failed properly to consider the request for
review in Case No 23-RC-1917, and that the request for review should therefore be re-
considered by at least a three-man panel of the Board in order to "obviate" the Respond-
ent's defense For the stated purpose of proving that contention, the Respondent served
subpenas upon the Assistant Regional Director, an Assistant General Counsel, and the
Board's Associate Executive Secretary. At the hearing, the subpenas were quashed upon
motion of the General Counsel in accordance with the provisions of Section 102 118 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations. After the quashing of the subpenas, the Respondent made
an offer of proof in support of its contention to the same general effect as set out above,
but adduced no evidence on the basis of which factual findings may be made.
SCHILL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. 77
unit as found by the Board. The Respondent, by letter dated January 4, 1963, again
declined to honor the Union's certification on the stated ground that it considered
the unit certified by the Board "not appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining." The Respondent declared its intention "to seek review of the appropriate
unit question in the United States Court of Appeals."
(3) The parties stipulated, and it is found, that on or about February 16 and
March 6, 1963, the Respondent, unilaterally and without prior consultation with
,or notification to the Union, granted wage increases to an unspecified number of its
employees in the certified bargaining unit.
(4) As appears from the factual findings made above, the Respondent predicates
its admitted refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union basically on the asserted
ground that the plantwide production and maintenance unit, confined to its Houston,
Texas, establishment, for which the Union was certified in Case No. 23-RC-1917, is
an inappropriate bargaining unit. It insists that the only appropriate unit is a
companywide one, embracing also its employees situated at its branch warehouses
in other distant cities. The Respondent's contentions in that regard, however, were
fully presented to and considered by the Board in the representation proceeding and
were there rejected.18 They are similarly rejected here. As an added defense, the
Respondent attacks the Board's certification in Case No. 23-RC-1917 on the stated
ground that the Board did not pass on its initial request for review in compliance
with Section 3(b) of the Act. Assuming arguendo, however, that this might have
rendered the Board's original certification defective, it is quite clear that the defect
was cured by the full Board's subsequent reconsideration of the Respondent's re-
quest for review.19
On the basis of all the evidence, it is concluded and found, as alleged in the
complaint, that at all times since September 18, 1962, the Respondent has refused
to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of all employees in the unit which the Board in the representation pro-
ceeding found, and which I here likewise find, to be appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of 9(b) of the Act. This perhaps adds
little to the finding already made, but it is further found, as also alleged in the
complaint, that the Respondent likewise violated Section 8(a)(5) by bypassing the
Union as the exclusive bargaining agent and unilaterally granted wage increases to
employees on February 6, 1963.
11 The Respondent in the instant proceeding offered no new evidence to show any change
of circumstances The only item of evidence it did offer was a letter dated July 5, 1962,
addressed by the Union to the Regional Director, with a copy to the Respondent, wherein
the Union advised the Regional Director that it had "no objection to proceeding to an elec-
tion on a companywide basis or a single plant unit basis " That letter predated the
Decision and Direction of Election and was available to the Respondent prior to its motion
to the Regional Director for reconsideration and its subsequent request for review to the
Board It obviously was not considered of sufficient import by the Regional Director to
alter the unit finding made, nor is it so considered here.
1e The Respondent in its brief also presses its contention, earlier noted, with regard to
the alleged violation of Section 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, and renews its
motion made at the hearing to dismiss the substantive 8(a) (5) allegations of the com-
plaint on that ground The Respondent's renewed motion is denied. The record as it
stands contains no factual predicate for the Respondent's motion. All we have is an offer
of proof which, contrary to the Respondent's assertion, may not be considered, even in
the particular circumstances of this case, as the equivalent of proof itself However, even
if it be assumed that the Respondent could prove what it has offered to prove, I would find
its motion without substance For one thing, the asserted violation of Section 5(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act involves at most an entirely collateral administrative matter,
neither germane to the substantive merits of the Respondent's alleged unfair labor practice
violation nor litigable in the instant complaint proceeding. Further, assuming the facts
the Respondent asserts , I am unable to agree that any violation of 5 (c) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act is involved. Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, by its
express terms, excepts from its scope agency proceedings involving "the certification of
employee representatives." The advice and suggestions complained of by the Respondent,
if they occurred, quite clearly were directed to the correction of a possible procedural de-
fect in Case No 23-RC-1917, a proceeding involving "the certification of employee repre-
sentatives." There was no commingling of prosecutive and judicial functions in the sense
condemned by 5(c) At any rate, the Respondent is scarcely in a position to complain of
substantive prejudice when the only effect of what it says was done was to obtain for it
the kind of review it claims it was entitled to but did not got in the first 1l9ce.
78 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. The strike as an unfair labor practice strike
Beginning on March 11, 1963, employees of the Respondent in the certified bar-
gaining unit described above engaged in a union-sponsored strike. The uncontro-
verted evidence discloses that the strike was called and conducted because of the
Respondent's refusal to recognize, meet, and negotiate with the Union, and that it
was so advertised to the public through leaflets distributed by pickets. The strike
ended on the morning of April 4, 1963, some 12 days before the commencement
of the hearing in this case.20
The complaint alleges that the aforesaid strike was caused and prolonged by
the Respondent's unfair labor practices. The proof supports a finding to that effect.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with its operations described in'section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative
of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
It will be recommended that the Respondent offer employee Wilburn H. Brown
immediate and full reinstatement to his former or a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges. and make him
whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would
have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination against him to the date of
the offer of reinstatement, less interim earnings, in a manner consistent with Board
policy as set out in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Interest on backpay
shall be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
It has been found that the strike, which began on March 11, 1963, was caused by
the Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain with the Union. The strikers, there-
fore, were entitled to reinstatement, upon application, irrespective of whether or
not their positions were filled by the Respondent. Accordingly, in order to effectuate
the policies of the Act,21 it will be recommended that the Respondent, upon applica-
tion, offer reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, to all employees, if any
there be, who engaged in the strike beginning on March 11, 1963, and who have
not heretofore been offered such reinstatement,22 dismissing, if necessary, any em-
ployees hired after March 11, 1963, to replace the striking employees. It will further
be recommended that the Respondent make whole those strikers entitled to rein-
statement for any loss of pay they have suffered or may suffer by reason of the
Respondent's refusal, if any, so to reinstate them, by payment to each of them of
a sum of money equal to that which he would have earned as wages during the
period from 5 days after his application to return to work to the date of the Re-
spondent's offer of reinstatement, less interim earnings, in a manner consistent with
Board policy set out in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 Interest on
backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co,
13 8 NLRB 716.
It will also be recommended that the Respondent, upon request, bargain with
the Union as the statutory representative of the Respondent's employees in the ap-
propriate unit as found by the Board in Case No. 23-RC-1917, and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
20 There was some question at the hearing as to whether all striking employees had up
to that time been reinstated to their former positions That question, however, was not
litigated at the hearing.
21 See, e g , City Packing Company and Trinity Packing Company, 98 NLRB 1261;
Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc, 111 NLRB 244, 262; Tom Thumb Stores, Inc, 123 NLRB
833, 835
22 This is a matter to be determined upon compliance under the usual procedures per-
taining thereto.
SCHILL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. 79
It will be further recommended, in view of the nature of the unfair labor practices
the Respondent has engaged in, as found in this proceeding and in Case No.
23-CA-1445, that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner
upon the rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Wilburn H.
Brown, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
4. All production and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at its
Houston, Texas, establishment, including truckdrivers and plant clericals, but ex-
cluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, watchmen, and
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. The Union at all times since August 23, 1962, has been, and now, is the ex-
clusive representative of the Respondent's employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5)
of the Act.
6. By refusing on and after September 18, 1962, to bargain collectively with
the Union as the aforesaid exclusive representative, and by unilaterally and without
consultation with or notification to the Union changing existing wage rates of
employees in the aforesaid appropriate bargaining unit, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and
(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. The strike engaged in by employees in the appropriate bargaining unit between
March 11 and April 4, 1962, was an unfair labor practice strike.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recom-
mended that the Respondent, Schill Steel Products, Inc., its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or
in any other labor organization, by discharging, refusing to reinstate, or in any other
manner discriminating against employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO, as the duly certified exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the
following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at
its Houston, Texas, establishment, including truckdrivers and plant clericals,
but excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, watch-
men, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) Granting any wage increase or otherwise altering the terms and conditions of
employment of any employees in the above unit without prior notification to, con-
sultation, and, if requested, bargaining with the Union with respect thereto.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join
or assist the above-named Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of
the Act:
(a) Offer Wilburn H. Brown immediate and full reinstatement to his former
or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of
80 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the discrimination against him , in the manner set forth in the section above entitled
"The Remedy."
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment , and other conditions of employ-
ment, and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(c) Upon application , offer reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, to all
those employees who engaged in the strike beginning on March 11 , 1963, and who
have not heretofore been duly offered such reinstatement , dismissing , if necessary, any
person hired by the Respondent on or after that date , and make them whole, in the
manner set forth in the section of this report entitled "The Remedy ," for any loss
of pay they have suffered or may suffer by reason of the Respondent 's refusal, if any,
to reinstate them.
(d) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying , all payroll records , social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due and the right to reinstatement under the terms of the Recom-
mended Order.
(e) Post at its plant in Houston , Texas, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix ." 23 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the Twenty-third Region , shall , after being signed by a representative of the Respond-
ent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region , in writing, within
20 days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order,
what steps it has taken to comply herewith 24
23 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "A De-
cision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a
decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "A Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the wards "A Decision
and Order."
21 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the di to of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , by discharging or refusing to re-
instate any of our employees , or in any manner discriminating in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT grant any wage increase or otherwise alter the terms and con-
ditions of employment of any employee in the appropriate unit described below,
without prior notification to, consultation, and, if requested , bargaining with
the aforesaid Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form labor or-
ganizations , to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection , and to refrain from any and all such activities.
WE WILL offer to Wilburn H. Brown immediate and full reinstatement to
his former or a substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his senior-
ity and other rights and privileges , and make him whole for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
THE WEST SIDE LUMBER CO., ETC. 81
WE WILL bargain collectively , upon request , with the above -named Union as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described
below with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment , and other conditions
of employment , and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding
in a signed agreement . The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees employed by us at our Hous-
ton, Texas , establishment, including truckdrivers and plant clericals, but
excluding office clerical employees , professional employees , guards, watch-
men, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL, upon their application , offer reinstatement to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges , to all our employees in the above bargaining unit, if any
there be, who engaged in the strike beginning on March 11 , 1963, and who have
not heretofore been duly offered such reinstatement , and make them whole for
any loss of pay suffered as a result of our refusal , if any, to reinstate them upon
such application.
All our employees are free to become, remain , or refrain from becoming or re-
maining members of United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
SCHILL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
NOTE: We will notify any of the above -mentioned employees presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended , after discharge from the Armed
Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 6617
Federal Office Building, 515 Rusk Avenue , Houston 2 , Texas, Telephone No. Capitol
8-0611 , Extension 271, if they have any question concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions.
The West Side Lumber Co., the F. A. Requarth Co., the Peter
Kuntz Lumber Company , the Kuntz Johnson Lumber Com-
pany, Petitioner and General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers Local Union No. 957, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America I
The West Side Lumber Co., the F. A. Requarth Co., the Peter
Kuntz Lumber Company, Petitioner and Millmen's Local 684,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
AFL-C10.2 Cases Nos. 9-RM-259, 9-RM-262, 9-RM-363, 9-RM-
9365, 9-RM-260, 9-RM-9261, and 9-RM-264. August 00, 1963
DECISION AND ORDER CLARIFYING CERTIFICATIONS
On May 23, 1961, in Cases Nos . 9-RM-259, 9-RM-262, 9-RM-263,
and 9-RM-265 , the Teamsters was certified as the collective-
bargaining representative for a multiemployer unit of all truck-
Herein called Teamsters.
2 Herein called Carpenters.
144 NLRB No. 14.