Safway Steel Scaffolds Co. of Georgia

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 24, 1965

153 N.L.R.B. 417 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

SAFWAY STEEL SCAFFOLDS COMPANY OF GEORGIA 417
Persons may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 1700 Bankers
Securities Building, Walnut and Juniper Streets, Philadelphia , Pennsylvania, Tele-
phone No. 735-2612, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions.
Safway Steel Scaffolds Company of Georgia and Aircraft and
Engine Maintenance and Overhaul , Building and Construc-
tion Manufacturing, Processing and Distribution and Allied
Industries Employees, Local 290, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica. Case No. 12-CA-3008. June 24, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 5, 1965, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
exceptions limited to the content of the notice attached to the Trial
Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.' The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs,2 and the entire record
'At the hearing, the Trial Examiner rejected a request of the Respondent for produc-
tion of a memorandum prepared by the General Counsel when he interviewed one of his
witnesses , Frechette . As the memorandum was not read , signed , or otherwise approved
or adopted by Frechette , we find no error in this ruling In any event , even if Frechette's
testimony be stricken , as the Respondent urges, the ultimate result we reach would remain
unchanged inasmuch as our essential findings need not rest on Frechette 's testimony.
z Atter issuance of the Trial Examiner ' s Decision , the Respondent , in connection with
certain alleged unlawful statements attributed to Manager Wallace, filed with the Board
a motion to reopen the record to adduce additional evidence as to his absence from the
plant on a certain date. The General Counsel filed an "Opposition To Motion
To Reopen Record." Under the circumstances here, the proffered evidence is immaterial,
cumulative , and would not, in any event, alter our findings . Moreover , no adequate reason
has been shown why the proffered evidence could not have been introduced at the hear-
ing. For each of these reasons, we hereby deny the motion to reopen the record. The
Respondent ' s request for oral argument is also hereby denied , as in our opinion , the record,
including the exceptions and briefs , adequately presents the issues and positions of
the parties.
153 NLRB No. 32.
796-027-66-vol . 153-28
418 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,3 conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner as modified
herein, and orders that the Respondent, Safway Steel Scaffolds Com-
pany of Georgia, Miami, Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order, as so modified :
Omit the sixth indented paragraph in the notice attached to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and, in lieu thereof, insert the following
paragraph:
WE WILL make whole P. E. Cogdell, John Cogdell, Quincy
Knox, John Johnson, Jimmy Anderson, Eunice Rozier, A. B.
James, and all employees in the appropriate unit who were on the
payroll as of July 1, 1964, or were newly hired thereafter, for any
loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of our discrimination
against them or by reason of the unilateral change in wage rates.
3 Unlike the Trial Examiner , we find it unnecessary to consider what motivated Man-
ager Wallace in assembling the Respondent 's employees at a meeting on May 15 , 1964, and
accordingly we do not adopt his findings in that regard Without regard to whether
Wallace had a legitimate reason for calling the meeting of employees on that occasion,
we are not persuaded that the Trial Examiner erred in not believing Wallace 's denial of
credible testimony that he made unlawful statements in the course of reading the exist-
ing collective -bargaining contract to the employees at the meeting.
The Respondent seeks to justify a unilateral wage cut on the ground that it was made
after consultation with the Union as to the change and after an impasse had been reached
in bargaining negotiations The Trial Examiner found that no impasse had been reached
Although the negotiations had reached an apparent deadlock at the time the Respondent
cut wages , the Respondent had not bargained in good faith , as the Trial Examiner found,
and thus there was not a genuine impasse in the bargaining negotiations which would
justify unilateral action. See Herman Sausage Co., Inc ., 122 NLRB 168 , 171-172, enfd.
275 F. 2d 229 (C A. 5).
4 As requested by the General Counsel , we will amend the notice attached to the Trial
Examiner's Decision to conform to his Recommended Order, as more fully hereinafter
indicated.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon original and amended charges filed by the above -named labor organization
on August 14 and September 2, 24, and 29, 1964, the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board on October 14, 1964, issued his complaint and notice of
hearing. On January 12, 1965, the complaint was amended . Answers were duly
filed by the Respondent . The complaint , as amended , alleges and the answers deny
that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(1), (3 ), and (5 ) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended . Pursuant
to notice , a hearing was held before Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore in Miami,
Florida, on February 2 and 3, 1965.
At the hearing all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to
present evidence pertinent to the issues , to argue orally , and to file briefs. Briefs
have been received from General Counsel and the Respondent.
SAFWAY STEEL SCAFFOLDS COMPANY OF GEORGIA 419
After the hearing I received from General Counsel a motion to correct the record
in certain minor respects. Attached to said motion is certification of its service
upon the other parties. No objection has been received. The motion is granted,
the record is hereby ordered corrected accordingly, and said motion is made a part
of the record.
Upon the record thus made, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make
the following•
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Safway Steel Scaffolds Company of Georgia is a Georgia corporation authorized
to do business in Florida. It is engaged in the fabrication, sale, and leasing of
scaffolding for construction purposes and its principal office and place of business
is located in Atlanta, Georgia. It maintains and operates offices and places of busi-
ness and conducts business in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, including a place of
business in Miami, Florida, the one operation with which this case is concerned.
During the year 1964 the Respondent purchased goods and materials valued at
more than $50,000 which were shipped directly to its Atlanta, Georgia, location
from States other than Georgia.
The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE CHARGING UNION
The Charging Union, named in the caption above, is a labor organization admit-
ting to membership employees of the Respondent at its Miami plant.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Setting and major issues
In June 1961 the Respondent and the Charging Union entered into a contract
which was due to expire May 31, 1964. By letter dated March 26, 1964, the Union
notified the Employer that it desired to renegotiate this contract within the pre-
scribed 60-day period, and asked for meeting dates. On March 31 John E. Wallace,
manager of the Miami operations, replied to this request by stating, in substance,
that no meeting date could be suggested before late April or early May, but further
offered, to "save negotiation time and expense," to "extend the existing contract for
one year." The same reply asked the Union to forward any written proposals it
might have, if extension was not agreeable.
On April 14 the Union sent the Company certain written proposals for consid-
eration, and urged that a meeting date be granted as early as possible in May, since
the contract would expire at the end of that month.
As described in more detail below, meetings were held on various dates between
May 4 and August 13, 1964. Despite its offer in March to extend the contract pro-
visions for another year, during the bargaining sessions the Respondent insisted
upon a substantial cut in wages, and on July 1 the employees went on strike.
The complaint alleges and the answer denies that: (1) throughout the negotia-
tions the Respondent failed to meet its obligations but in fact bargained in bad faith,
and (2) by its unlawful conduct the Respondent caused the strike.
On or about September 21, 1964, the employees then on strike offered uncondi-
tionally to return to work. With certain exceptions they were refused reinstatement
a refusal which General Counsel claims was in violation of the Act.
The alleged refusal to bargain and the refusal to reinstate striking employees, as
well as other conduct, especially on the part of Manager Wallace, is claimed by
General Counsel to constitute interference, restraint, and coercion of employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.
B. The refusal to bargain
1. Relevant facts
There is no dispute as to the following
(a) The Charging Union was certified by the Board in 1959 as the exclusive bar
gaining representative of all employees in a unit consisting of:
All truckdrivers, helpers, and warehousemen of the Respondent, but excluding
office clerical employees, professional employees, and guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
420 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) A 3-year contract between the parties expired on May 31, 1964. As noted
above, in an exchange of communications before the expiration date the Respondent
offered to extend the existing contract for 1 year The Union, however, apparently
preferred to attempt, through negotiations, to obtain additional benefits for employees.
(c) On April 14 the Union submitted a list of five items concerning which it pro-
posed negotiations. In summary, the Union asked for: (l) reduction of the proba-
tionary period from 90 to 30 days; (2) one additional paid holiday; (3) allowance for
sick leave of 1 day each month; (4) paid vacations of 3 weeks after 6 years of
service; and (5) a wage increase of 20 cents "across the board "
(d) Six negotiating meetings were held on various dates between May 4 and
June 30 inclusive . On the latter date, and following a union meeting, the union
representative notified the Respondent's representative that the members had voted
to strike, and a strike began on July 1.
It is General Counsel's contention that the strike was caused by the Respondent's
conduct during the negotiations up to this point, an allegation denied by the
Respondent.
Without attempting to set out, in meticulous detail, the testimony of witnesses as
to what occurred according to their recollections at each of the bargaining sessions,
I find that the course of negotiations followed by the parties was, in substance, as
follows, including relevant conduct on the part of Manager Wallace. These findings
are based upon what I believe to be the more credible testimony and the probability
inherent in circumstances concerning which there is no dispute.
(a) On May 4 the parties met in what was described by the Respondent's spokes-
man, James W. Hoyt, as "primarily an exploratory meeting." "Without any conclu-
sions being reached," he said, they agreed to meet again later in the month.
(b) On or about May 15 it is undisputed that Manager Wallace, who had attended
the May 4 negotiating meeting summoned all employees to a special assembly and,
according to his own testimony, read to them the entire then existing contract, "from
front to rear, read it all the way through."' Wallace told these colored employees
bluntly that he was not getting enough work out of them, and that he could be a
"bastard" if he wanted to be He then declared that no union official would come into
the yard again, and that he was getting "rid of the Union." 2
(c) On May 21 the parties again met for a brief half or three-quarters of an
hour. They discussed the Union's demand for 20-cent-an-hour increase. The com-
pany representatives contended that they were already paying more than competitors
were, but did not name them They agreed to meet the next week when the Company
would submit a counterproposal.
(d) On May 28 the Respondent submitted a 12-page proposed contract. This
document, despite the Respondent's written offer of March 31 to extend for a year
the contract then in effect, proposed to cut the wages up to 29 cents an hour, and
measurably reduced other current benefits. Confronted with this long proposal of
reduced wages and benefits, the union representative asked for an opportunity to
study it.
(e) At the next meeting, on June 17, the Union abandoned all of its initial demands
for an improvement in the existing contract, and cut its wage request of 20 cents an
hour in half. The Respondent rejected these greatly reduced demands, and insisted
that the wages be cut as it had proposed, and that other alterations as it had proposed
become effective. Such alterations included the hiring of itinerant workers and the
increase of the workweek from 5 to 6 days. No agreement was reached.
1 Wallace explained that he called this meeting because one employee, John Cogdell, had
protested a day or so before this that the Company was responsible for a traffic ticket he
had received. Having observed Wallace throughout the hearing, I can place no reliance
upon any of his testimony which is without the corroboration of more credible witnesses.
Scrutiny of the record reveals that reasons advanced by him for his conduct lack logic or
reason According to one part of his testimony, it appears that he disposed of the em-
ployee's protest about the ticket by telling him, "Well, it is immaterial to me. Your
name is on the ticket. You will be the one they will be looking for " Why he should
then have called all employees together to read to them the entire contract on entirely
unrelated matters is without reasonable explanation by him.
2 Wallace denied making these statements . The denials are not credited . The man-
ager's subsequent conduct, as described hereinafter , was plainly in furtherance of his
threats. The findings rest upon the credible testimony of P. E. and John Cogdell, the
former being then the union steward among the employees
SAFWAY STEEL SCAFFOLDS COMPANY OF GEORGIA 421
(f) Shortly after this June 17 meeting,3 which Wallace had attended, the manager
called P. E. Cogdell, the union steward, into his office and, in apparent reproach
for the brief walkout of a few days eailier, told him he was "no dumb fellow" and
should have known that there would be no actual cut in pay. Wallace then told the
steward that the only way he could give him more pay was for the men to get out of
the Union. He asked him to tell the men not to worry about being "cut a penny,"
because Werner, president of the Company, had "plenty" of money, but when he said
he would get rid of the Union he would. Wallace also said he was not satisfied with
his present foreman, and implied that he might well give Cogdell the job. After
discussing the contract and wages for some time, Cogdell finally agreed to talk to
the men and report what the manager had said, but said he could not "make up their
minds" for them.
(g) On June 29 another negotiating meeting was held, also attended by Wallace.
Union Steward Cogdell was also present with the union representative. Except for
reducing the insisted-upon cut in wages by 5 cents, the Respondent made no further
concessions from its own proposals. The union representative expressed his doubt
that the employees would accept even this slightly reduced cut, but said he would
submit it to them at a meeting that night, and report the results at a meeting the next
day, June 30.
(h) Later that day, Wallace called the union steward aside and asked him how
the other men felt about the offer made earlier. Cogdell replied that they did not
want a cut The manager reminded him that he had told him to assure them they
would actually lose no money, and suggested that if the men did not want to "go up
there" (presumably to the union meeting), that night, he could go and vote for the
whole crew. Cogdell finally said he would at least talk to them. Wallace gave him
his home telephone number and asked him to call him that night and let him know
what "happened." After the meeting Cogdell telephoned to Wallace, and reported
that the men had rejected the offer and would go on strike July 1 4
(i) Wallace did not attend the June 30 meeting of the parties. Hoyt was formally
notified of the Union's vote the night before, whereupon he announced that the wage
cut would become effective anyway, the next day.
(j) On July 1 seven of the eight employees then working went on strike. Matters
relevant to the subsequent offer to return to work will be discussed in a later section.
(k) Also on July 1 the Respondent unilaterally changed the wage rates although,
as subsequent negotiations establish, bargaining on this issue had not reached an
impasse.
(1) A Federal mediator brought the parties together again on August 6. The
Union offered to reduce its wage demand again-this time to a 5-cent increase above
the old rates. The Company countered by withdrawing its offer of June 29 to reduce
the full cut by 5 cents.
3 While admitting his uncertainty of the exact date Cogdell , upon whose credible testi-
mony the findings as to this interview rest , placed it as a Saturday after a 3-day work
stoppage which admittedly began on June 15 This would have been June 20. It is
clear that Cogdell was mistaken In believing it to have been June 20, but in my opinion
an inadvertent error in a date does not disqualify a witness ' entire testimony , as counsel
for the Respondent in his harsh brief would have it held. Behind this barrier of his brief
counsel twice characterized Cogdell as a "liar ," chiefly upon the ground of his uncertainty
as to dates . Yet his own witness , the Reverend Lanier , whose credible testimony cor-
roborates that of Wallace to the effect that both were fishing on Saturday , June 20,
candidly admitted that he had only been able to fix the date by consulting with his sons
and calling Wallace 's relatives in Atlanta , before taking the stand. As the minister aptly
said , "Can anybody just pull a date out of the air?" Cogdell 's detailed account of the
interview was unshaken by rigorous cross-examination . Counsel for the Respondent had
the advantage , during his cross-examination of both P E . and John Cogdell , of affidavits
each had given to a Board agent during the investigation of the case . Yet he cited no
instance of inconsistency , on the part of either Cogdell, between his testimony on the
witness stand and his previously given affidavit.
4 Again Cogdell was obviously in error when he placed this incident as occurring on
June 30 , instead of June 29 All circumstances as to which there Is no dispute make
Cogdell's testimony plausible with the one exception of the date . Wallace was informed
at the June 29 meeting that the members would vote that night He went to Key West
on June 30 , and did not attend the negotiating meeting of that date . It is wholly un-
ieasonable to believe that he had not been intormed of the Union ' s rejection before he
left His denial that his interview with Cogdell occurred is not credited.
422 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(m) At the final meeting on August 13, the day before the initial charge was filed,
the Union capitulated completely, and offered to accept the terms of the expired
contract in full-which was precisely what Wallace had proposed in his March 31
letter to the Union, quoted above. The Company rejected even this full capitulation,
and no further meetings have been held.
2. Conclusions
In his able brief General Counsel urges that the Respondent failed throughout
negotiations to bargain in good faith. I agree. The record amply supports the con-
clusion that from May 15, when Wallace told employees he was going to "get rid"
of the Union, to the final meeting, the Respondent conducted its bargaining with the
design of reaching this very end. Negotiations so designed as to deprive employees of
their right to be represented fall far short of "good faith" bargaining.
The Respondent offered no credible evidence to explain why any cut in wages was
required, in view of its offer on March 31 to continue the existing contract for a
full year.5 And, as noted above, the Respondent unilaterally reduced wage rates on
July 1, although no final impasse on this issue had been reached.
In short, I conclude and find that the Respondent, by its entire course of conduct
during negotiations, including Wallace's efforts through Cogdell to undermine the
Union's status, refused to bargain in good faith with the Union, and thereby caused
the strike of July 1, and interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.6
C. The refusal to reinstate strikers
Seven of the ten employees in the unit took part in the strike. One of the seven,
Quincy Knox, was in a hospital as the strike began. About July 6 he reported for
work but was told by Wallace that his rate would be reduced from his regular $1.74
per hour to $1.45, and when the employee objected, the manager said he could have
the money he had been giving the Union as additional take home pay. Knox then
joined his fellow employees on strike.
On July 1 the Respondent sent to each striker, except Knox, a letter which informed
him that unless he returned to work by July 6 he would be replaced and "officially
discharged." None returned and on that date each was informed by another letter
that he had been replaced and was "officially discharged."
On September 18 the Union sent a wire on behalf of the seven employees offering
unconditional return to work on September 21. All seven reported on the latter date,
but were told by Wallace that he could not use them. As they started out of the
plant, however, the manager said he could use two warehousemen at the reduced
rate, but no drivers. None returned on that date. Five of the seven were later per-
mitted to return,7 P. E. Cogdell and John Cogdell had not, at the time of the hearing,
been reinstated.
Since it has been found that the Respondent caused the strike by its unfair labor
practices, it was obligated to reinstate the seven strikers on September 21, 1964, the
date of their unconditional offer to return. Its refusal to reinstate all who reported
that day constituted unlawful discrimination, as well as interference, restraint, and
coercion of employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade. traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
6 Even if certain figures placed in evidence by the Respondent are to be believed, they
show that the "net loss" for the first 6 months of 1964 was proportionately considerably
less than for the last 9 months of 1963 The documents indicate a loss of $21,689 for
the 1963 period, and only n loss of $10,667 for the 1964 period It appears clear that
either the offer on March 31 to extend the contract for a year was made in bad faith, or
that its insistence upon a drastic cut in wages was in bad faith.
6 General Counsel appropriately cites Herman Sausage Company, Inc, 122 NLRB 168,
enfd. 275 F . 2d 229 (C.A. 5).
7 Knox and Johnson on September 22 ; Anderson on October 20 ; Rosier on October 26,
and James ( apparently ) at some undisclosed date.
SAFWAY STEEL SCAFFOLDS COMPANY OF GEORGIA 423
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I will
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
It will be recommended that the Respondent offer to P. E. Cogdell and John
Cogdell immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and
make them and Quincy Knox, John Johnson, Jimmy Anderson, Eunice Rosier, and
A. B. James whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them, by payment to each of them, in the cases of the two
Cogdells, from Septembei 21, 1964, to the date of offer of full reinstatement, and in
the cases of the other five employees named above, from September 21, 1964, to the
date of reemployment, of a sum of money equal to that which he would normally
have earned as wages, absent the discrimination against him, less his net earnings
during the respective period of refusal to reemploy, and in a manner prescribed by
the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and with interest on the
backpay due in accordance with Board policy set out in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co,
138 NLRB 716. It will be further recommended that all employees named above, all
employees on the July 1, 1964, payroll, and all newly hired employees since that date
in the appropriate unit, be made whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by
reason of the unilateral change in wage rates which became effective on July 1, 1964,
as described herein.
It will be further recommended that, upon request, the Respondent bargain col-
lectively in good faith with the Charging Union and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
Finally, in view of the serious and extended nature of the Respondent's unfair labor
practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist from in any manner infring-
ing upon the rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Charging Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
2. All truckdrivers, helpers, and warehousemen of the Respondent, but excluding
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. By virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, at all times since February 17, 1959, and
continuing to date, the Charging Union has been the exclusive representative of all
employees in the above-described unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions
of employment.
4. By refusing since May 15, 1964, to bargain in good faith with the Charging
Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the said unit, the Respond-
ent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
5. By discriminating against employees, as described herein, to discourage member-
ship in and activity on behalf of the Charging Union, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act.
6 By interfering with, restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the Respondent, Safway Steel
Scaffolds Company of Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in and activities on behalf of Aircraft and Engine
Maintenance and Overhaul, Building and Construction Manufacturing, Processing
and Distribution and Allied Industries Employees, Local 290, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any
other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging or refusing to reinstate any
424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of its employees, or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Discharging employees for exercising the right guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the above-named labor
organization as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit
described herein with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
(d) Making unilateral changes in wages, rates of pay, or other terms and condi-
tions of employment of employees in the said unit, in a manner violative of the Act
(e) Threatening employees with economic reprisals or making promises of benefit
to discourage membership in and activity on behalf of the above-named labor
organization.
(f) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act-
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named labor organization
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropmate unit in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employ-
ment and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement.
(b) Revoke the unilateral wage changes instituted on July 1, 1964, and revert
to the wage scale and benefits existing immediately prior to said date.
(c) Offer to P . E. Cogdell and John Cogdell immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges.
(d) Make them and employees Knox, Johnson, Anderson, Rosier, and James, and
all employees in the appropriate unit on the payroll as of July 1, 1964, or newly
hired thereafter, for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimi-
nation found herein or of the unilateral change in wage rates, as set forth in the sec-
tion above entitled "The Remedy."
(e) Notify P. E. Cogdell and John Cogdell if presently serving in the Armed
Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces
(f) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all records necessary to determine the amounts of backpay
due
(g) Post at its operations in Miami, Florida, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." S Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 12, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representa-
tive, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any material.
(h) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of the receipt of this Trial Examiner's Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.9
8 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board the words "a
Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board ' s Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order ," shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order".
In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall read : "Notify the said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of
this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to conduct our labor relations in compliance with the
National Labor Relations Act, we notify you that:
WE WILL NOT unlawfully discourage you from being members of Aircraft and
Engine Maintenance and Overhaul, Building and Construction Manufacturing,
FLEETWOOD TRAILER CO., INC. 425
Processing and Distribution and Allied Industries Employees, Local 290, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with reprisals or piomise any benefits to discourage
you from joining any union.
WE WILL NOT violate any of the rights you have under the National Labor
Relations Act, to join a union of your own choice or not to engage in any union
activities.
WE WILL offer reinstatement to P. E. Cogdell and John Cogdell.
WE WILL revoke the wage cut which became effective July 1, 1964.
WE WILL make whole P. E. Cogdell, John Cogdell, and all employees in the
appropriate unit who were on the payroll July 1, 1964, or who came on the
payroll after that date, for any loss of wages due to the wage cut.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the union named above, if
an understanding is reached, sign an agreement covering such understanding.
The unit represented by this union includes all our truckdrivers, helpers, and
warehousemen, but excludes office cleiical employees, professional employees,
guards, and supervisors.
SAFWAY STEEL SCAFFOLDS COMPANY OF GEORGIA,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE.-We will notify P. E. Cogdell and John Cogdell if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon applica-
tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 706,
Federal Office Building, 500 Zack Street, Tampa, Florida, Telephone No. 228-7711,
if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Fleetwood Trailer Co ., Inc. and Lionel Richman. Case No. 21-
CA-6160. June 4,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 16, 1965, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and
a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and
Jenkins].
The Loard has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
153 NLRB No. 43.