Russell-Newman Mfg. Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJul 6, 1965

153 N.L.R.B. 1312 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

1312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD NOTE.-We will notify Marvin Melvin if serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro- visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office , Fourth Floor, Citizens Building, 225 Main Street, Peoria, Illinois, Telephone No. 673-9283. Russell -Newman Mfg . Co., Inc. and International Ladies' Garment Workers Union , AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 16-CA-2116 and 16-CA- 2138. July 6,1965 DECISION AND ORDER On April 22,1965, Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint and rec- ommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Exam- iner's Decision and supporting briefs. Respondent filed exceptions and an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.' The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and finds merit in certain exceptions of the General Counsel and Charging Party. Accordingly, the Board adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent herewith. :' Four days before the hearing herein, Respondent received notice from the General Counsel that certain amendments to the complaint would be proposed . At the hearing, Respondent requested a continuance in order to prepare a defense to those amendments. The Trial Examiner denied the motion , with the understanding that Respondent would submit as an offer of proof the evidence that it would have introduced at a delayed hear- ing on the issues raised by the amendments . After the close of the hearing, Respondent submitted such offer of proof accompanied by a motion to reopen the hearing to introduce the evidence proffered. The offer of proof was rejected and the motion to reopen the hearing was denied by the Trial Examiner. Assuming the truth of the facts alleged in the offer of proof, the evidence which Respondent offers is merely cumulative and in no way would alter the result reached herein Moreover, the information in support of Respondent ' s assertions was substantially contained in Respondent 's own records or within its own knowledge and required no extensive investigation. Therefore, no prejudice could have occurred from the denial of a delay. Accordingly, we shall deny Respondent's motion to reopen the hearing. 153 NLRB No. 105. RUSSELL-NEWMAN MFG. Co., INC. 1313 1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the record evidence does not support the allegations that Supervisor Kenneth Griffith threat- ened Thelma Bruce with discharge because of her union activity and that Supervisor Madewell unlawfully interrogated Betty Stanford concerning her union activity. 2. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find that the record as a whole supports the other allegations of the complaint. As found by the Trial Examiner, in May 1964, the Union, with Respondent's knowl- edge, began an organizational campaign at Respondent's Denton and Pilot Point plants. On May 29 Respondent's Vice President, Frank Martino, delivered a speech to the employees at the Denton plant, in which he stated, among other things, that Respondent had given employees [c]ontinuous work all year and at many times at great expense to the company ... so that you would have something to do. As I understand, union plants generally shut down as soon as the work runs out... [We] operate differently from most lingerie manufac- turers. Before we ever receive an order from an independent customer, we buy hundreds of thousands of dollars of piece goods and trims so that we can keep you working. This is all done before the customer sees a sample. Would you risk this if there was an uncertain relationship between you and I [sic]. The Trial Examiner concluded that "since no part [of the speech] violates the right of free speech, it would be difficult to find that the sum of all its parts constitutes threats or promises to the employees, or is coercive respecting their rights to support or not support the Union." We disagree. Martino's entire speech was given in the context of an organizational campaign preceding the Board-conducted repre- sentation election held at the Denton plant on January 26, 1965.2 Examination of those portions quoted above discloses a threat that if its employees selected a union, Respondent would discontinue its make- work policies in slow seasons and would not manufacture goods until orders were received. Under these circumstances, we conclude that by statements made in the speech delivered to employees on May 29, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The record reveals that the day after the Denton election the Union, with the knowledge of Respondent, passed out a leaflet at Pilot Point announcing its victory at the Denton plant, and attached to the leaflet a union authorization card. On, January 28, the day after the distribu- 2 The Union became the bargaining representative of the employees by a vote of 108 to 75. The Trial Examiner inadvertently stated the vote to be 180 to 75 796-027-66-vol 153-84 1314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion of cards and 2 days after the election at the Denton plant, Respond- ent gave a general 5-cent-per-hour increase to the employees at the Pilot Point plant, and on January 31 allowed the placing of a "For Sale" sign on one of the buildings at the Denton plant. The Trial Examiner found that these acts did not unlawfully interfere with the rights of the employees under the Act. With respect to the wage increase at Pilot Point, the Trial Examiner accepted the justification advanced by Respondent that the wage increase was part of an anni- versary year celebration; that the industry had given increases which were being adhered to; that plant efficiency justified such an increase; and that it was in accord with a consistent pattern of wage increases at Pilot Point beginning in 1959 through 1965. In regard to the "For Sale" sign, the Trial Examiner found that the building offered for sale, one in a plant consisting of several buildings, is not owned by Respondent but by a separate corporation; that the decision to sell the building was made 5 years ago ; that there was no intention by Respondent to sell the business ; and that there was no evidence that employees at Pilot Point knew the building was being sold. We disagree with the Trial Examiner's conclusions. The granting of the wage increase to the Pilot Point employees during an organiza- tional campaign, but not to Denton employees, 2 days after the latter voted for the Union, and a day after the Union's known solicitation of authorization cards from the Pilot Point employees, constituted an inducement to those employees not to support the Union. Moreover, any relevant anniversary raise would have been given in June or July 1964, not in January 1965; Respondent's wages compared favorably with industry wages as set out in the AAMA report cited by Respond- ent to support this contention; the efficiency only equaled that previ- ously established at this plant; and the wage records fail to establish a consistent pattern of wage increases at the time this one was given. Similarly, Respondent's placing of a "For Sale" sign on the main production building at Denton on January 31, 5 days after the employ- ees there selected the Union in the election, with no assurance to its employees of its intention to sell only the building,3 coupled with Respondent's indication expressed in Martino's May 29 speech that it 3 Contrary to the Trial Examiner , we find no significance , so far as probable impact upon employee rights is concerned , in the distinction of whether the building or plant was being sold. Moreover, the record shows that although the decision to sell the building was made 5 years ago, the arrangement to place the "For Sale" sign on the building was not made until after the election ; that this is the first time such a sign has been placed on the building; that Newman Realty Company has common officers and direc- tors with Respondent and in fact Vice President Martino participated in the decision to post the property for sale. Also, the record reveals that the building posted for sale is the one where a major part of the production work is performed, and where Martino delivered his May 29 speech. Thus, it cannot be said that the employees would view Respondent' s action as merely a real estate transaction unrelated to their tenure of employment. RUSSELL-NEWMAN MFG. CO., INC. 1315 would retaliate against the employees if they supported the Union, conveyed to the Denton employees a clear threat to close in retaliation and to the Pilot Point employees the futility of unionism. It is well settled that the test of intereference, restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a) (1) turns not on motive for the conduct, but on its reasonable effect on the employees. "The test is whether the employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to inter- fere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act." 4 Accordingly, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that by granting the wage increase and the placing of a "For Sale" sign under the cir- cumstances herein, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Sec- tion 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) thereof.' THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices set forth above, we shall require it to cease and desist there- from and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. We shall order the Respondent to cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act by granting economic benefits to its employees. However, nothing herein shall be construed as requir- ing the Respondent to vary or abandon any economic benefit. We shall also order the Respondent to cease and desist from threatening its employees with loss of jobs if they select a union. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Russell-Newman Mfg. Co., Inc., Denton and Pilot Point, 'Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by the granting of economic benefits; provided, however, that nothing in this Order shall be construed as requiring the Respondent to vary or abandon any economic benefit which it has heretofore established. (b) Threatening employees either directly, or by posting "For Sale" signs, with loss of work or jobs if they become or remain members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. 4 Exchange Parts Company, 131 NLRB 806 , 812, affd. 375 U.S. 405. 5 Member Jenkins would not find Martino's speech nor the posting of the "For Sale" sign to be violative of Section 8(a) (1). 1316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at its plants in Denton and Pilot Point, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 16, shall, after being duly signed by the Company's representative, be posted by the Com- pany immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 6In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order". APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by granting of economic benefits, provided, however, that nothing in this Decision and Order requires us to vary or abandon any eco- nomic benefit which has heretofore been established. WE WILL NOT threaten employees either directly, or by posting "For Sale" signs, with loss of work or jobs if they become or remain members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed in Section 7 of the Act. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becom- ing or remaining, members of any labor organization. RUSSELL-NEWMA_N MFG. Co., INC., Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) RUSSELL-NEWMAN MFG. CO., INC. 1317 This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date ,of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Sixth Floor, Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street, Fort Worth, Texas, Telephone No. 335-2145, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case was tried before Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom in Denton, Texas, on February 8, 1965. The Respondent, Russell-Newman Mfg. Co., Inc., is a manufac- turer of women's garments. Two plants are involved, one at Denton and the second at Pilot Point, about 18 miles distant. By appropriate order in a representation proceeding it was determined that each plant constituted an appropriate unit. In an election held January 26, 1965, the Union became the bargaining representative ,of the employees at the Denton plant by a vote of 180 to 75. At all times material to the issues in this case, the Union was engaged in organi- zational activity at the Pilot Point plant, and was so engaged at the time of the hearing. No demand had been made for bargaining by the Union at Pilot Point at the time of the hearing. Respondent acknowledges however that it had full knowl- edge of the organizational effort at Pilot Point. In Case No. 16-CA-2116 the original charge was filed August 28, and in Case No. 16-CA-2138, September 22, 1964. A first amended charge was filed in the first numbered case on October 23, and a first amended charge was also filed in the second case on February 4, 1965. The last mentioned charge was filed just 4 days before the hearing and telegraphic notice of the charge, and of an amendment to the com- plaint, was given by counsel for the General Counsel to other parties on the day the amended charge was filed. The case involves three allegations of violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act; i e., (1) Respondent's Supervisor Kenneth Griffith threatened employees at the Pilot Point plant with discharge because of union activity; (2) Respondent's officer Frank Martino "warned" its Denton plant employees would be "laid off" if they selected the Union as their bargaining representative at the coming election ("warned" is here interpreted to mean "unlawful threat of reprisal"); and (3) Opal Madewell, a supervisor, interrogated Denton plant employees unlawfully concerning their union activities. The case also involves two other issues: (1) that Respondent granted a wage increase and other benefits at Pilot Point as an inducement to the employees to refrain from joining or assisting the Union; and (2) threatened to sell its Denton plant because the employees there had selected the Union as their representative, and to discourage the employees from remaining or becoming members of the Union. Briefs were filed on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case, the briefs, and my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses on the witness stand, it is recommended, for the reasons hereinafter set forth, that the complaint be dismissed. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I find as facts the allegations of the complaint as to the nature and volume of business done by the Respondent, which are admitted by the answer, and conclude that, within the meaning of the Act, Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce; and also find and conclude that the Union named in the caption is a labor organization, a matter also admitted in Respondent's answer. The Alleged Threats by Kenneth Griffith Thelma Bruce is a sewing machine operator at Respondent's Pilot Point plant, and was known by Respondent to be a member of the Union's organization committee. The only evidence offered in support of the allegation that Kenneth Griffith threat- ened to discharge employees at Pilot Point is the testimony of Thelma Bruce. Griffith is manager of the plant. 1318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Bruce became distraught when she was not notified of her son's telephone call to the plant, advising her of a grandchild's illness. Through another member of the union committee, Bruce sent word that she wanted to see Griffith. He received the message on the day following the telephone call and went to see Bruce promptly. When asked, on her direct examination, whether anyone of management ever spoke to her about the Union, Bruce responded "just one time, Mr. Griffith." She then related that when Griffith came, in response to her request, she first discussed with him the telephone call concerning her grandchild's tonsillectomy. Griffith explained to Bruce that employees could be called to the telephone only in case of emergency, and that when she asked what an emergency was he replied "sickness " Then she testified, "I asked him what was that but sickness and he mentioned the Union." To the question "what did he say to you?" she testified, "He said you are for every Union and work for it if you are for it, but for me I am against it and I will work against it .... Then be said that he could get rough if he had to, but he liked us girls and he wanted to keep us working after this, but he did not know." On cross-examination, this witness testified concerning her conversation with Griffith, "He told me everybody could not go to the phone and then he talked to me about the Union, I do not remember just how that came up." She reiterated how- ever, on cross-examination, that Griffith brought up the subject. She testified, "I can- not remember the exact words that he said, but he brought it up about the Union." She also repeated, on cross-examination, essentially what she said Griffith had said about "getting rough", and added concerning his attitude about the Union "he was against it and he would work against it." Griffith was called by Respondent to testify concerning this conversation. After relating the circumstances of a girl bringing the message that Bruce wanted to see him, he said he went to talk to her. He testified: "She started in and said that it was about her grandbaby and that since she was a union organizer that we would not let her talk on the phone. I told her, I said, Thelma, this is not true." Griffith denied categorically that he brought up the subject of the Union and said that she first mentioned it. He also denied that he made any such statement that he "could get rough" at the time attributed to him by Bruce and added, "I did not make a state- ment like this in my life." There is no other evidence whatsoever in the entire record bearing directly on this allegation of the complaint. The witness, Kenneth Griffith, was straightforward and convincing in his testi- mony. I accept his version of the conversation with Bruce, and therefore find and conclude that he did not say he "could get rough with the girls", and that he did not threaten them in any other manner on account of their union activity or on any account whatsoever. I resolve this credibility problem not on the basis that Bruce deliberately gave false testimony but rather on her uncertain recollection as to what was said in their conversation, and the strong probability that Bruce, having sent for Griffith and relating the cause of her grievance to her union connection, quite naturally initiated the subject of the Union Furthermore, she was still excited over the failure to get the telephone call concerning her grandchild's illness, and was not in a reflective mood that would have induced recollection of what she did say. There is little ques- tion but that she believed the telephone conversation had not been relayed to her because of her union connection. In these circumstances, she undoubtedly was the one who initiated discussion of the Union. It is not unlikely that something was said which settled in her mind as the thought she gave expression to when she testi- fied that Griffith told her that he "could get rough" with the girls. But the record evidence does not justify a finding that he made such statement. In making this reso- lution, I give weight to the circumstance that Griffith went to Bruce not of his own volition but because she sent for him. The Alleged Threat of Martino to Lay Off Employees The allegation is that "on or about May 29, 1964," Martino warned the employees at the Denton plant "that if the Union were selected by its employees as their col- lective bargaining representative" Respondent would lay them off. The allegation of this violation involves a speech by Frank Martino, vice president of Respondent. The speech was recorded by a tape recorder Counsel for the General Counsel had subpenaed the speech and had not heard it at the time of the hearing At the hear- ing, the tape was heard by all parties, in recess, and thereafter was offered by counsel for the General Counsel and admitted in evidence It is very difficult to find which parts, if any, of the speech go beyond the limits of an employer's right to resist unionization of his plant. Since, as it seems, no part RUSSELL-NEWMAN MFG. CO., INC . 1319 violates the right of free speech, it would be difficult to find that the sum of all of its parts constitutes threats or promises to the employees, or is coercive respecting their rights to support or not support the Union. These excerpts fairly characterize the speech: With the Union you surrender your rights to discuss your problems with us . outside influence cannot obtain more than the Company in the past has willingly done A Union would create a division of employees here .... There are three things a union can do. 1. It can charge you dues .... 2. They can call you out on strike .... 3. They can talk to the Company about your problems but you can do that yourselves now and it doesn't cost you $4 a month. Now, some of the things that the Union cannot do; it cannot pay the employ- ees wages or benefits; only the Company can do this .... 2. The Union cannot promise or assure you of anything They only negotiate for you .... In clos- ing, I would like to remind you that you do not have to vote for the Union just because you signed a card .... Texas has a right to work law which means you do not have to belong to the Union and pay dues just because someone else does.... Counsel for the General Counsel argues in the brief, citing Dal-Tex Optical Com- pany, Inc., 137 NLRB 1782 and other cases, that the employer has, by the speech, impressed upon its employees the danger and futility of selecting the Union as their bargaining representative, and thereby has interfered with the employee's Section 7 rights. But the only parts of the speech counsel cites in the brief are these two para- graphs, stressing Respondent's accomplishments for its employees. 4. Continuous work all year and at many times at great expense to the com- pany. We have just been through one of these periods when you were making a lot of tailored pajamas in some odd ball colors that you probably hadn't seen in years and years and some 15 denier sets. These were cut so that you would have something to do. As I understand, union plants generally shut down as soon as the work runs out. 5. We have built a strong company where one does not worry about a pay- check being cashed. This is in light of the fact that we operate differently from most lingerie manufacturers. Before we ever receive an order from an inde- pendent customer, we buy hundreds of thousands of dollars of piece goods and trims so that we can keep you working. This is all done before the customer sees a sample. Would you risk this if there was an uncertain relationship between you and I. The only evidence of a written communication from management to the employees during the organization period is an exhibit offered by the General Counsel consisting of a form letter from Respondent to all or substantially all of its employees While it is not alleged in the complaint that this letter contains either threats or coercive mate- rial, and no direct reliance is made on it by the General Counsel, reference has been made to it as background material in the inquiry as to whether the speech discussed contained threats. There is nothing in the letter that supplies new meaning to the language of the speech or that is threatening or coercive in itself. The only other material in the record relating to communications between the Respondent and its employees are references in the Union's campaign literature, to questions and answers posted by Respondent on its bulletin boards during the campaign period. The Union carried on an extensive campaign, as evidenced by the pieces of campaign literature introduced by the Respondent as its Exhibits Nos. 4 through 44. Several of these exhibits make reference to the Respondent's questions and answers placed on the bulletin boards, and in each such instance the union literature sought to gi,e the cor- rect or true answers to the questions posed by Respondent. No reliance was made on these questions and answers as support for the General Counsel's case with respect to Martino's alleged threats to lay off the employees The Union sought in its volumi- nous campaign material to reply to everything the employer said. I find and conclude that neither Martino nor any other agent or representative of Respondent warned or threatened the employees that they would be laid off if they selected the Union as their bargaining representative in the election; also that there were no threats or coercive statements made to encourage the employees not to remain or become members of the Union. Opal Madewell's Alleged Interrogatories Proof of this allegation of the complaint consists entirely of the testimony of wit- ness Betty Stanford. She testified that Opal Madewell, admittedly in supervisory status for Respondent, spoke to her on the day that Martino made a speech to the 1320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees. When asked what Madewell said to the witness on this occasion, the witness testified, "Well, she asked me what I thought. We had just got two new tackers in behind me, they had just been there a few days and I thought she wanted to talk about the tackers so, I walked over to the table and she said something else. I do not remember now the exact conversation Any way she asked me what I thought about the Union." Counsel for the General Counsel, suggesting by his ques- tion that her testimony was a bit vague and inconsistent, then asked, "Now, you said you do not remember what she said, then you said she asked you about the Union. Do you remember her asking you about the Union)" The witness answered, "Yes, I do." Then she testified, "Well, we discussed if employees could strike-employees on the line-but we discussed about who had been threatened and I said no, I did not know who had been threatened and she said she thought it may have been me." The reference to "who had been threatened" related to a statement presumed to have been made by Martino concerning threats made to employees by union repre- sentatives, and his advice to the employees that "if anyone had been threatened to tell the supervisor or Bill Hardy or himself." There is no evidence concerning any such statement by Martino excepting this indirect reference to it by witness Betty Stanford. Her testimony is vague, uncertain, and confusing. She was at a total loss as to even an approximation of the date of the conversation with Madewell, when the alleged unlawful questioning concerning the Union is supposed to have taken place. Great latitude was given counsel for the General Counsel in his effort to get this witness to fix the date Even so, the record is cloudy as to when the conversation took place. Such uncertainty casts doubt on the accuracy of all she said; and uncer- tainty characterizes all of her testimony. I find and conclude that there is nothing in the record to support the allegation that Opal Madewell interrogated Respondent's employees unlawfully. I further find and conclude that the testimony of witness Stanford is so vague and uncertain that it will not support any substantial finding of fact. The Wage Increase Two days after the election at the Denton plant, which the Union won, Respond- ent gave a general 5-cent-per-hour increase to most if not all of the employees at Pilot Point. As stated, this wage increase became an issue in the complaint by an amendment made on the day of the hearing, and of which notice had been given to the parties by counsel for the General Counsel 4 days previously, counting the week- end. The precise allegation is that "Respondent granted to its employees at its Pilot Point plant a general wage increase and other benefits or improvements and terms and conditions of employment if they refrained from becoming or remaining members of the Union or giving any assistance or support to it, or in order to induce them to do so." Literally the pleading seems first to allege that the increase was made con- ditional on the employees refraining from supporting the Union. This could hardly have been the intention, and in any event there is no evidence whatsoever to support any such interpretation of the allegation. The case produced, in this respect, on the theory that the wage increase interfered with the employees' rights to join and sup- port the Union and induced them to refrain from so doing. The evidence offered consists entirely of testimony of the vice president of Respond- ent, Frank N. Martino, who was first called as an adverse witness by the counsel for the General Counsel and who testified later as Respondent's witness. There is nothing to refute directly his testimony except the inferences that might be drawn from the fact of the election, the fact of the existence of an organizational campaign by the Union at the Pilot Point plant, and the timing of the wage increase. Martino testified that the board of directors first gave consideration to the granting of this wage increase when plans were being made to celebrate the anniversary year of the Company, that is, 1964. He said further that if it had not been for the inter- vention of the Union's organizational campaign at both Denton and Pilot Point, and the direction of the election at Denton, the wage increase would have been given during the anniversary year in June or July 1964; that it was not given sooner on advice of counsel for the reason that it would be interpreted, if given sooner, as an unlawful interference with the free expression of the employees' choice in the Denton election. Martino testified at considerable length concerning a formula used in the trade to determine the operating efficiency of a garment manufacturer's plant. He then read into the record the efficiency rating of the Pilot Point plant under this formula. The record reveals, by indirection only, that the witness and the management of Respondent Company considered the plant's efficiency ratings as thus stated in the testimony, to be a justification for the increase at Pilot Point. The witness also RUSSELL-NEWMAN MFG. CO., IN C. 1321 testified that the increase was in keeping with increases being generally given by industry, and in line with this trend, the increase would have been given sooner had it not been for the representation election at the Denton plant, also that the earlier payment, had "we been allowed" would have just been in keeping with "what we had done in the past." The witness connected the disputed increase to general increases within the industry as they were dealt with in a trade association publica- tion, the AAMA Index. This testimony concerning plant efficiency and industry increases including the trade association index, is credited as furnishing justification for the wage increase granted at Pilot Point. While it is clear, however, that the witness was able to relate efficiency and the wage index to the disputed wage increase in his own mind, his testimony does not make clear just how these two factors bore on the decision to pay the increased wages. Respondent's Exhibit No. 44 reveals a consistent pattern of wage increases at Pilot Point beginning in the year 1959 and running through 1965. With the excep- tion of one year, 1961, when a greater increase was given because of minimum wage law, each of the increases was in the amount of 5 cents, the same amount granted in the increase in dispute. While the pattern of increases does not show great con- sistency as to the time of year in which the increase was granted, the record fairly reveals that the mciease given 2 days after the election was sufficiently in keeping with past practice as not to be deemed a device to impinge on the employees' rights under the Act. I find and conclude that the Respondent was justified in granting the wage increase and that it did not unlawfully interfere with the rights of the employees under the Act. I see no reason to discredit the testimony of witness Martino as he related the reasons for the increase, and I give full credence to such testimony. There is no evidence whatever that Respondent "granted . other benefits or improvements and terms and conditions of employment" as alleged. The "For Sale" Signs The second issue injected late into the case, in addition to the wage increase, relates to the placing of "For Sale" signs on one of Respondent's buildings at the Denton plant after the election. The issue is raised by this allegation of the amended com- plaint filed on the day of the hearing: "On or about February 1, 1965, Respondent threatened to sell its Denton plant because its employees [there] had selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative and in order to discourage its employees from becoming or remaining members of the Union or giving any assistance or support to it." The only evidence produced by the General Counsel to support this allegation is the testimony of witness Frank N. Martino called by counsel for the General Counsel as an adverse witness under rule 43(b) [Fed. R. Civ. P.]. The testimony of this witness (all of which is credited, because there is nothing to refute it and also because the witness testified in a forthright and convincing manner) establishes that the decision to sell the building on which the "For Sale" sign was placed, was made about 5 years previously; that there was no intention whatever to sell any part of the manufacturing operation, only the building, and no evidence that anyone believed the plant was being sold; that the last previous effort to sell was in July of 1964 through private negotiations with the First State Bank and that previously there had been other efforts. When this same witness was called by Respondent in the defense of this issue, he testified that: The Respondent has taken an option on land at a stated location at Denton for the purpose of expansion of the plant, the building offered for sale, about 30 years old, actually is not owned by Respondent but by a separate corporation, The Newman Realty Company, Inc.; in the arrangement under which the old building was offered for sale, Respondent took steps to protect its operation through a stipulation in the sales contract permitting the Company to rent the building for a period of 1 year at a price of $1,500 per month; the "For Sale" sign was posted at the Denton plant January 31, 1964, on that date one sign 2 by 3 feet was placed; and there were three such signs posted as of the date of the hearing, the two extra ones being placed 3 or 4 days after the first. The General Counsel's case with respect to this issue depends on the proposition that the natural inference to be drawn from the "For Sale" sign is that the business rather than the building was being offered. The only other evidence that throws any light on the problem appears in the testimony of witness Thelma Bruce and, if it bears at all on the natural inference, it detracts from the General Counsel's case. Her testimony related almost entirely to another aspect of the case-that of the alleged threats of Plant Manager Kenneth Griffith to discharge employees at Pilot Point. Counsel for the General Counsel 1322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ventured into the issue of the alleged threat to sell the business, with this witness, by first establishing that she had heard the testimony concerning the "For Sale" sign . He then asked her this question: "Prior to this hearing, had you heard any- thing about that "For Sale" sign? The witness answered "just that a girl told me that the building was for sale and that is all I know about it." Counsel for the Gen- eral Counsel pursued this subject no longer with this witness, and called no other witnesses to testify on the subject of the "For Sale" signs. The allegation of the complaint on this issue is broad enough to admit evidence of unlawful interference and coercion with respect to all of Respondent's employees- those working at the Denton plant and also the plant at Pilot Point. At the plant where the building being offered for sale was situated, Denton, the Union had just won an election. The coercive effect of a "For Sale" .sign on one building in a plant consisting of several buildings, with no evidence of any kind of any rumor, belief, or understanding that the business would be sold, is negligible if not completely nonexistent . There is nothing whatever in the record to indicate that the employees at the other plant, Pilot Point, had any knowledge that the building was being offered for sale. I find and conclude that Respondent's employees were not restrained or coerced or their rights interfered with in anyway by the "For Sale" signs. Respondent's Offer of Proof and Motion to Reopen Hearing Counsel for Respondent objected strenuously to proceeding to hearing on the allegations of the amended complaint, filed on the day of the hearing, respecting the wage increase and the placing of "For Sale" signs on the building at the Denton plant. The ground for his motion for continuance, as the hearing opened, was that Respond- ent had been denied due process in being called upon to defend allegations with scarcely any notice, or time to prepare its defense. After full consultation between me and all counsel, the motion for postponement was denied. As a result, how- ever, of the discussion it was agreed that Respondent should submit as an "offer of proof" the evidence that it would introduce on these two issues if , as counsel contended, time had permitted proper preparation of the defense. The record was held open for this purpose only. Pursuant to such understanding, and after the hearing closed, Respondent submitted to the parties and to me a comprehensive offer, culminating in a motion to reopen the hearing to enable Respondent to introduce the evidence set forth in the offer of proof. The opposition of both counsel for the General Counsel and the Charg- ing Party were also received and, together with the offer of proof, were duly con- sidered. The offer of proof and motion to reopen the hearing were, by separate order, denied, and the offer and the papers in opposition were made part of the record as Trial Examiner's exhibits. While Respondent reasserts in the brief that it is a denial of due process to refuse to grant the motion for continuance on the issues raised by the amended charge and complaint, and to reject the offer of proof and to refuse to reopen the hearing as to such issues , Respondent suffers no prejudice from such rulings, even if erroneous, in view of the recommended dismissal of the complaint in its entirety; and in the main, the proffered evidence was cumulative to that admitted. For all the reasons hereinbefore set forth, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed. Frantz & Co., Inc. and Chauffeurs , Teamsters and Helpers "Gen- eral" Local 200, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America . Case No. 30-CA-138. July 6, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On May 5, 1965, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his Deci- sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain 153 NLRB No. 113.