QVC, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 27, 1999

No. 74688038 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 27, 1999)

Paper No. 17
PTH
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB APRIL 27, 99
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re QVC, Inc.
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Serial No. 74/688,038
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Manny D. Pokotilow of Caesar, Rivise, Bernstein, Cohen &
Pokotilow, Ltd. for QVC, Inc.
Katherine Stoides, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
109 (Deborah S. Cohn, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Simms, Seeherman and Hairston, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Hairston, Administrative Trademark Judge:
QVC, Inc. has filed an application to register the
mark SPORT SAVVY (SPORT has been disclaimed) for goods
which were subsequently identified as “women’s clothing;
namely, suits, jackets, t-shirts, shorts and vests sold
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through home shopping services through the use of
television.”1

1 Application Serial No. 74/688,038 filed June 14, 1995, claiming
first use and first use in commerce on April 15, 1995.
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The Examining Attorney has finally refused
registration pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. 1052(d), on the basis of two registrations owned
by the same entity: Registration No. 827,202 for the mark
for men’s and boys’ sweaters, jackets, sport shirts, dress
shirts, sweatshirts, slacks, trousers, belts, neckwear, and
hosiery;2 and Registration No. 913,818 for the mark
for women’s and girls’ dresses, shifts, skirts, sweaters,
shirts, pants and shorts.3
Applicant has appealed. Briefs have been filed, but
no oral hearing was requested.
In urging reversal of the refusal to register,
applicant maintains that the inclusion of the word SPORT in
its mark obviates any likelihood of confusion. Also,
applicant argues that the cited mark is weak and is

2 Issued April 11, 1967, renewed.
3 Issued June 8, 1971, renewed.
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therefore entitled to a limited scope of protection.
Further, applicant argues that the respective goods are
sold in different channels of trade and, therefore,
confusion is not likely.
While we have carefully considered applicant’s
arguments, we nonetheless agree with the Examining Attorney
that confusion is likely. With respect to applicant’s mark
SPORT SAVVY and the cited SAVVY marks, applicant is correct
that the respective marks must be compared in their
entireties. Nevertheless, in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of likelihood of
confusion, “there is nothing improper in stating that, for
rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a
particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their
entireties.” In re National Data corp., 752 F.3d 1056, 224
USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For instance, “that a
particular feature is descriptive ... with respect to the
involved goods ... is one commonly accepted rationale for
giving less weight to a portion of a mark ...” 224 USPQ at
751.
Here, we agree with the Examining Attorney that, in
view of the descriptive significance of the word “SPORT”
(as confirmed by applicant’s disclaimer thereof), the more
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prominent or distinguishing element of applicant’s mark,
when considered as a whole, is the word “SAVVY.” We note
that although applicant has argued that the inclusion of
the word SPORT in its mark obviates any likelihood of
confusion, it has not indicated how the commercial
impression or connotation of SPORT SAVVY differs from SAVVY
such that purchasers would see these marks as indicating
clothing from different sources. We find, therefore, that
when the marks SAVVY and SPORT SAVVY are considered in
their entireties, they convey similar commercial
impressions.
Turning then to the goods, we note that certain of the
goods are identical (women’s shorts) and others are
sufficiently related (women’s suits, jackets, t-shirts and
vests, on the one hand, and women’s dresses, shirts,
skirts, sweaters, shirts and pants, and men’s sweaters,
jackets, sport shirts, dress shirts, slacks, and trousers,
on the other hand) such that, when sold under similar
marks, confusion is likely to occur among purchasers. See,
e.g.: Kaufman Knitting Co. v. Oberman Mfg. Co., 125 USPQ
196 (TTAB 1960) [Women’s shirts, blouses and sportswear,
including slacks, and men’s trousers and slacks are goods
of such nature that their sale under the same or similar
marks would be likely to result in confusion]. Moreover,
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as the Examining Attorney points out, there are no
restrictions in either of the cited registrations with
respect to channels of trade. Thus, we must assume that
the clothing in the cited registrations travels in all
normal channels of trade for such goods, and that could
include home shopping services through the use of
television, the trade channels for applicant’s goods.
Also, both applicant’s and registrant’s clothing would be
purchased by the same class of customers, namely ordinary
consumers. Even if we were to assume that applicant’s and
registrant’s clothing were sold in different channels of
trade, the same consumers who are exposed to applicant’s
clothing through television home shopping could encounter
registrant’s clothing in retail stores, and vice-versa. As
a result, consumers would come in contact with both
applicant’s and registrant’s clothing. Thus, we find that
purchasers familiar with registrant’s women’s and men’s
clothing sold under the cited SAVVY marks are likely to
believe, upon encountering applicant’s women’s clothing
sold under the mark SPORT SAVVY, that the goods emanate
from or are sponsored by the same source. In particular,
purchasers may well believe that SPORT SAVVY is a new line
of “sport” clothing from the makers of SAVVY clothing.
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In reaching our decision, we have not overlooked
applicant’s argument that SAVVY is a weak mark and
therefore entitled to a narrow scope of protection. In
support of its position, applicant submitted the results of
a search of the Dun & Bradstreet database for
company/business names that contain the words SPORT and/or
SAVVY, along with the declaration of Yet Mui, president of
TM Investigations Group, Inc., a company which investigates
the use of trademarks. According to Mr. Mui, he
investigated the trade name use of SAVVY by several
companies listed in the Dun & Bradstreet report, and at
least nine retail clothing stores were doing business under
trade names which included the word SAVVY. There is, of
course, a difference between retail clothing stores and
clothing per se. Moreover, applicant has provided no
information with respect to the purchasing public’s level
of exposure to these uses. Stated differently, there is no
information concerning these clothing stores’ customer
base, sales, or advertising which would indicate that
consumers are so familiar with SAVVY marks for retail
clothing stores or for clothing per se, that they would
assume that SAVVY and SPORT SAVVY when used for identical
and closely related articles of clothing indicate separate
sources for such goods. To the extent that applicant is
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relying on these third-party uses to show the suggestive
significance of the word SAVVY with respect to the involved
goods, we would point out that even weak marks are entitled
to protection against the registration by a subsequent user
of a substantially similar mark for identical and closely
related goods.
Finally, to the extent that there is any doubt on the
issue of likelihood of confusion, it is settled that such
doubt must be resolved in favor of the prior registrant.
In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed with
respect to both cited registrations.
R. L. Simms
E. J. Seeherman
P. T. Hairston
Administrative Trademark
Judges, Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board
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