Quazite Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 21, 1994

315 N.L.R.B. 1068 (N.L.R.B. 1994)

1068
315 NLRB No. 132
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties.
2 We affirm the judge’s granting of the General Counsel’s motion
in Limine, precluding the Respondent from eliciting testimony from
General Counsel witness Lawson for the purpose of impeaching
Lawson regarding a collateral matter that arose during an internal
General Counsel investigation. While the General Counsel’s motion
did prevent the Respondent from asking questions regarding the col-
lateral matter, we find that under Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence the Respondent was not precluded from asking the
broader evidentiary question as to whether or not Lawson was ever
convicted of having committed perjury or of having suborned per-
jured testimony. The Respondent failed to make this inquiry. If the
Respondent had done so and Lawson had responded affirmatively,
the Respondent could have engaged in a detailed inquiry in an at-
tempt to impeach Lawson’s credibility. Even if Lawson had re-
sponded in the negative and the judge’s ruling had taken effect, the
Respondent would have been able under Rule 801(d)(1) to impeach
Lawson’s credibility by showing during cross-examination that he
had made prior inconsistent statements in his testimony on direct ex-
amination.
In the absence of any formal finding of perjury, we agree with the
judge that the testimony the Respondent sought to elicit, whether for
direct or for cross-examination purposes, pertained to a strictly col-
lateral matter, was not privileged by any Federal Rule of Evidence
on admissibility, and was not relevant to or probative of the allega-
tions contained in the amended complaint.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
Quazite Corporation and Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, Local
3-987. Cases 10–CA–25383, 10–CA–25449, 10–
CA–25485, 10–CA–25867, and 10–CA–26320–2
December 21, 1994
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS STEPHENS
AND COHEN
On June 23, 1993, Administrative Law Judge Law-
rence W. Cullen issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions
and brief and has decided to affirm the judge’s rul-
ings,2 findings,3 and conclusions and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Quazite Corporation,
Lenoir City, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Frank F. Rox Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel.
A. McArthur Irvin, Esq. (Stuart & Irvin), of Atlanta, Georgia,
for the Respondent.
Hugh A. Jacks, International Representative, Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers, International, AFL–CIO, for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LAWRENCE W. CULLEN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard before me on December 9 and 10, 1992, and
January 13 and 14, 1993, at Loudon, Tennessee, pursuant to
an order consolidating cases, third amended consolidated
complaint entered by the Regional Director of Region 10 of
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) on Novem-
ber 6, 1992. The charge in Case 10–CA–25383 was filed on
June 19, 1991. The charge in Case 10–CA–25449 was filed
on July 24, 1991. The amended charge in Case 10–CA–
25449 was filed on August 9, 1991. The second amended
charge in Case 10–CA–25449 was filed on September 12,
1991. The charge in Case 10–CA–25485 was filed on August
9, 1991. The charge in Case 10–CA–25867 was filed on
March 17, 1992. The amended charge in Case 10–CA–25867
was filed on June 16, 1992. The charge in Case 10–CA–
26320–2 was filed on October 21, 1992. The charges were
all filed by the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Inter-
national Union, AFL–CIO, Local 3-987 (the Union). The
consolidated complaint as amended at the hearing alleges
violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act) were committed by Quazite
Corporation (the Respondent). The Respondent by its answer
filed November 19, 1992, has denied the commission of any
violations of the Act.
On the entire record, in this proceeding, including my ob-
servations of the witnesses who testified herein, and after due
consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel for
the Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Business of Respondent
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
at all times material herein Respondent is now and has been
a Delaware corporation, with an office and place of business
located at Lenoir City, Tennessee, where it is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of polymer concrete products, that dur-
ing the past calendar year, a representative period, it sold and
shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000 from
its Lenoir City, Tennessee plant directly to customers located
outside the State of Tennessee, and that Respondent is, and
has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
at all times material, the Union is and has been a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1069QUAZITE CORP.
III. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
at all times material, that the appropriate bargaining unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act is and has been:
All production and maintenance employees employed at
the Respondent’s Lenoir City, Tennessee, plant, but ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, professional em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background
Respondent manufactures polymer concrete products in
Lenoir City, Tennessee. The Respondent and the Union en-
tered into their first collective-bargaining agreement effective
June 1990 until December 1991. The parties commenced ne-
gotiations for a successor agreement in November 1991, but
were unsuccessful in obtaining agreement. Respondent is al-
leged to have committed numerous violations of the Act. The
employees engaged in a strike from June to August 1992,
when the employees offered to and were returned to work.
On August 4 the Respondent withdrew recognition from the
Union based on the receipt by the Respondent of signed no-
tices by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit
that they no longer desired to be represented by the Union.
The withdrawal of recognition is also alleged as a violation
of the Act.
1. The alleged denial of an employee’s request for
union representation for an investigatory meeting which
could lead to disciplinary action
This allegation involves an instance in July 1991 wherein
Supervisor Richard Robbins called small-box casting em-
ployee Keith Sartin into his office to discuss his low produc-
tion. On the way to the office Sartin testified he saw Union
President Thomas Lawson and told him he was being written
up for his production. Sartin testified further that when
Lawson attempted to represent him, Robbins refused to per-
mit Lawson to attend the meeting. At the meeting Robbins
compared Sartin’s production records with those of other em-
ployees, and according to the testimony of Sartin told him
that if he did not improve his productivity he would be sub-
ject to further discipline. Sartin testified he asked for rep-
resentation during the course of this meeting and was then
told by Robbins that the meeting was terminated. Sartin testi-
fied he had previously received a written warning for low
production and that he received another warning the Friday
following this meeting. Union President Thomas Lawson cor-
roborated the testimony of Sartin and testified that in late
afternoon in July 1991 he observed Supervisor Richard Rob-
bins and employee and union member Keith Sartin coming
toward the office and that Sartin told him, ‘‘Come on, I’m
going to be written up for my production.’’ Lawson followed
them to the office door and Sartin said to Robbins, ‘‘I need
him to represent me.’’ Lawson testified that Robbins said,
‘‘No, we don’t need you Thomas [Lawson], and just sort of
took his hand like that and shut the door in front—front of
me.’’ Supervisor Richard Robbins testified that in July 1991,
he spoke to Sartin who was a small box caster under his su-
pervision. He asked Sartin if he could talk to him about his
production and ‘‘told him it wasn’t a disciplinary meeting.
I just needed to talk to him about his production and show
him some records and he said, Do I need a rep [Union] and
I said, ‘No, you don’t.’ I said, ‘That’s—I just want to show
you your previous week’s production and see what we can
do to improve it.’’’ Robbins testified that the meeting was
held in the supervisor’s office and lasted 8 to 10 minutes.
He had the production records for all the other 10 to 12 cast-
ers for the prior several weeks. He showed Sartin the produc-
tion records of other casters and Sartin responded by saying,
‘‘He just more or less told me, you know, he couldn’t com-
pete with other guys and I kept telling him, ‘Well, you’re
one of my older casters, you know, I just need you to get
up there with some of the other casters, close to their pro-
duction.’’’ Robbins testified further, ‘‘After I asked Keith
[Sartin], you know, if there was something I could do to help
him on his production, I told him, you know, I expected him
to start seeing an improvement in his production. He got
upset and said he wanted to see Thomas [his union represent-
ative]. I told him, I said, ‘You don’t need to see Thomas
right now.’ I said, ‘You can see him after work but right
now’ ‘I said, I just want you to increase your production’
and he says, ‘Oh, you’re threatening me,’ and said, ‘I want
a Union rep,’ and I said, ‘No, I’m not, you know, so that’s
all I’ve got to say, you know, the meeting’s terminated,’ you
know and this was right at about 3:30 anyway.’’ Robbins
testified he talked to all of the other casters to ‘‘get every-
body up to par on their production.’’
On cross-examination Robbins testified he did not remem-
ber seeing Lawson prior to the meeting. He also testified that
he did not know one way or the other whether he had written
up Sartin prior to the meeting, but that he did eventually
write him up. He did write Sartin up a week or so after the
meeting. He also acknowledged that he had written him up
more than once for poor production but did not recall the
dates of these writeups.
Analysis
I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by the actions of its supervisor, Richard Robbins, in denying
employee Keith Sartin union representation upon his request
both before and during the meeting. I credit Sartin’s specific
testimony as to what happened before and during the meeting
as corroborated by Lawson with respect to the request for
representation before the meeting. The testimony of Sartin
and Robbins of what took place during the meeting does not
differ significantly. By both accounts at the meeting Robbins
apprised Sartin that his production was low and that he ex-
pected it to improve with the threat of discipline if it did not.
Moreover, as I have credited Sartin’s testimony that he had
received a written warning for low production prior to this
meeting, I find under all of the objective circumstances, that
Sartin had a reasonable basis for believing that this meeting
was an investigatory meeting which could lead to discipline.
In fact Robbins acknowledged that he reviewed the produc-
tion records of other employees and asked Sartin what could
be done to improve his production and told him he expected
it to improve by the next week. When it did not improve,
he issued Sartin a written warning for poor production a
week or so later.
1070 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), the Supreme
Court upheld the ‘‘Board’s construction that Section 7 cre-
ates a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit
without union representation to an interview which the em-
ployee reasonably fears may result in his discipline . . . .’’
The Court also upheld the contours and limits of the statu-
tory right shaped by the Board in prior decisions:
First, the right adheres in Section 7’s guarantee of the
right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid and
protection. . . . Second, the right arises only in situa-
tions where the employee requests representation. . . .
Third, the employee’s right to request representation as
a condition of participation in an interview is limited to
situations where the employee reasonably believes the
investigation will result in disciplinary action . . . .
[Emphasis added.] Fourth, exercise of the right may not
interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives, Fifth,
the employer has no duty to bargain with any union
representative who may be permitted to attend the in-
vestigatory interview. [Id. at 256–259.]
In Quality Mfg. Co., 195 NLRB 197, 199 (1972), cited
with approval by the Supreme Court in its Weingarten deci-
sion, the Board said:
This seems to us to be the proper rule where as here,
the interview, whether or not purely investigative, con-
cerns a subject matter related to disciplinary offenses.
We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill
shop-floor conversation as, for example, the giving of
instructions or training or needed corrections of work
techniques. In such cases there cannot normally be any
reasonable basis for an employee to fear that any ad-
verse impact may result from the interview, and thus
we would then see no reasonable basis for him to seek
the assistance of his representative.
In his brief the Respondent contends that the ‘‘conversa-
tion’’ between Robbins and Sartin was not an interview as
Robbins ‘‘sought no information from the employee, but
rather was communicating production information.’’ How-
ever, Robbins’ own testimony indicates that he was inquiring
of Sartin about what could be done to improve his produc-
tion. Linked as this was with the threat of further discipline
if Sartin’s production did not improve, I find that this was
an investigatory interview to learn what the problem was
with Sartin’s production and I further find that Sartin had a
reasonable basis for believing that this meeting could lead to
discipline. See Columbia Portland Cement Co., 294 NLRB
410, 413 (1989).
2. The alleged promise of benefit to employee Donald
Brooks Wade if he would resign from the Union
Employee Donald Brooks Wade testified that in October
or November 1991, he had been awarded employee of the
month at a meeting and after the conclusion of the meeting,
his supervisor, Scott Elrod, asked him to walk out the back
of the plant with him. Elrod then said, ‘‘I didn’t bring you
here so nobody would see us talking.’’ ‘‘I just wanted to
congratulate you on being Employee of the Month,’’ and ‘‘If
you weren’t in the Union we would probably work better to-
gether.’’ Wade was an officer of the Union at the time of
this conversation. Wade testified further that about 2 weeks
to a month later Elrod asked him to step out to the front of
his work area and asked him, ‘‘Have you thought anymore
about what we were talking about?’’ Wade replied, ‘‘Yeah,
I have no intentions of coming out of the Union.’’ Elrod re-
plied, ‘‘Okay.’’
Supervisor Scott Elrod acknowledged having had a con-
versation with Wade at the time of his award of employee
of the month and testified he congratulated Wade on his se-
lection. He denied, however, having told Wade that if he
were not in the Union, he and Wade could work together
better. He also acknowledged having had a conversation with
Wade several weeks later, but denied having made any ref-
erences to the effect that he and Wade could work together
better if Wade were not in the Union.
Analysis
I credit Wade’s specific testimony regarding the comments
made to him by Elrod over Elrod’s denial thereof, I find the
comments concerning his ability to work together better with
Wade if Wade were not a union member were unlawful en-
ticements of benefits to be bestowed on Wade if he resigned
from the Union and that Respondent thereby violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The alleged promise of the removal of a disciplinary
warning if the employee would resign from the Union
Former employee Mike Summitt testified that in late 1991
he received a disciplinary writeup for poor job performance
and he filed a grievance concerning it. However, the union
representatives did not agree to arbitrate his grievance. He
became upset about this and ‘‘was blowing off some steam’’
on the plant floor including the use of profanity to anyone
who would listen. As he got ready to go on a break Super-
visor Scott Elrod stopped him and told him ‘‘that if I would
withdraw from the Union that he would get my write-up took
out of my records.’’
‘‘I told him I would not withdraw from the Union.’’
Summitt told Union President Lawson of this offer by Elrod.
Summitt did not withdraw from the Union. Elrod denied ever
having made such a statement to Summitt nor having having
had any conversation with him about withdrawing from the
Union and testified further that he did not supervise Summitt
nor did he maintain the personnel records.
Analysis
I credit Summitt’s testimony concerning the offer by Elrod
of the removal of a disciplinary writeup from his file if he
would withdraw from the Union. I found his testimony spe-
cific and credible and I credit it over Elrod’s denial. This
was an unlawful offer of a benefit if Summitt would with-
draw from the Union and the Respondent thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See House Calls, Inc., 304 NLRB
311, 313 (1991), wherein the Board held promising employ-
ees improved terms and conditions of employment if they
voted against the union was unlawful.
4. The alleged statement that employees would be paid
monyes due them if they resigned from the Union
Employee Steve Sloan testified that in January 1992 he
and fellow employee Charles Price noticed a 15-cent-per-
1071QUAZITE CORP.
hour decrease in their pay on their checks. This refers to a
deduction of a premium they had formerly been paid for
doing casting work which deductions and the issues concern-
ing them will be discussed, infra. Sloan and Price went to
see Supervisor Steve Carr about the reduction in their pay.
Carr said he would try to find out the reason for the reduc-
tion and then sent Price off to do a job. Carr then told Sloan,
‘‘Steve, you’re a good worker.’’ ‘‘You quit the Union I’ll get
your money back.’’ Sloan told Union President Lawson
about this conversation. Employee Charles Price testified that
in January 1992, Steve Sloan asked him if he had observed
any difference in his pay. Price had not noticed anything, but
looked at his check that evening and noted a 15-cent deduc-
tion. The next day he and Sloan went to Supervisor Steve
Carr and asked him about it. Carr told them he would find
out about it and told him to go back to work and Carr and
Sloan remained and talked. Later Sloan came up to Price and
told him that Carr had told him (Sloan) that, ‘‘if he [Sloan]
would get out of the Union that he could probably get his
money back for him.’’ Price then confronted Carr and told
him ‘‘he couldn’t say that, that that was illegal. Carr said he
didn’t say it just like that.’’
The Respondent called Supervisor Steve Carr who testified
that in late January 1992, Sloan approached him and said
that he had just discovered that he had received $6.50 per
hour instead of his prior rate of $6.65 per hour. Carr told
Sloan he did not realize this and noted at the hearing that
Sloan was no longer working for him at the time. Carr testi-
fied however that he told Sloan he would check into it. Price
also said he wanted the reduction in rate checked into for
him and Carr agreed to do so. Carr testified he went to talk
to Plant Superintendent Mike Riordan who told Carr to
check into the payroll records to find out what was happen-
ing. Carr checked the records and found that the pay rate re-
duction had occurred as reported to him by Sloan and Price,
and also verified that they had not been ‘‘casting’’ during
this time which ‘‘casting’’ carries the extra premium rate of
15 cents per hour. He gave this information to Plant Manager
Richard Hammat and Riordan. Carr denied ever having any
conversation with Sloan in which he told Sloan that he
would help him get the money (15-cent premium) back. Nor
did he have any similar conversation with Price.
Analysis
I credit the testimony of Sloan as corroborated in part by
Price over the denials of Carr. I thus find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the promise made by
its Supervisor Carr to employee Sloan that Carr would get
his money (the extra casting premium) back if Sloan would
quit the Union which was a promise of a benefit to Sloan
if he abandoned his Section 7 right to belong to a union. See
Fabric Warehouse, 294 NLRB 189, 191 (1989).
5. Alleged threat of reprisals if employees Thomas
Lawson and Mike Summitt returned to work
after the strike
The Union called a strike which was honored by a number
of employees in June 1992 and offered to return in August
1992. Union President Thomas Lawson testified that approxi-
mately 2 weeks prior to the offer of the Union to return to
work, Supervisor Denny Walker called him and asked if it
were true that some of the employees wanted to come back
into the plant. Lawson told Walker he could not discuss it
with him. Walker then said if it were true, ‘‘it would be in
my [Lawson’s] best interest not to return to the plant, that
he had been in a meeting with Mr. Hammat and Mike Rior-
dan and the rest of the supervisors that if I thought it was
rough up until this time, I would not see nothing until—
when I came back, it would be made so rough enough for
me to quit this time.’’
Employee Mike Summitt testified that his Supervisor
Denny Walker called him up about a month before the strike
was over (the strike ended August 4, 1992) and asked
Summitt how he was doing and Summitt replied, ‘‘Just
fine.’’ Walker then said, ‘‘I heard you got another job,’’ and
I said, ‘‘Yes.’’ He said, ‘‘Well you better stay where you are
because if you come back into Quazite,’’ says, ‘‘You’ll never
have a minute’s peace.’’ Summitt replied, ‘‘I wasn’t planning
on coming back to Quazite because I had got a real job.’’
On cross-examination Summitt was asked if Walker called
him at his home and he replied in the affirmative.
Respondent presented Denny Walker concerning both alle-
gations and Dick Hammat to respond to the allegation con-
cerning Summitt. Walker denied telephoning Lawson at any
time. Walker also testified that he did not telephone Summitt
at any time during the strike and that prior to the strike he
called the telephone number listed in the personnel records
for Summitt to offer him overtime work and that a neighbor
answered the telephone and advised that Summitt did not
have a telephone. Hammat also testified that Respondent’s
management had attempted to contact Summitt after the
strike and the telephone number in Respondent’s record was
that of a neighbor who would get Summitt and Summitt
would call them back. Respondent contends this impacts neg-
atively on Summitt’s credibility and that Lawson’s overall
credibility was destroyed by reason of other testimony he
gave at the hearing.
Analysis
I credit the explicit testimony of Lawson and Summitt and
find that they were threatened with unspecified reprisals by
Supervisor Walker as they testified and that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I reject Respond-
ent’s assertion that Lawson’s overall credibility was de-
stroyed by other testimony he gave at the hearing. I also find
that Respondent’s questioning of Summitt as to whether he
received the call from Walker at home to which Summitt re-
sponded, ‘‘[Y]es,’’ does not compel the conclusion that
Summitt was not telling the truth as his answer in the broad-
er sense could well be accurate in that he was home at the
time of the call as opposed to at work or elsewhere. I do not
find it determinative whether Summitt had his own telephone
or relied on a neighbor’s telephone assuming arguendo that
Summitt did not have a phone at his home. See Outboard
Marine Corp., 307 NLRB 1333 (1992).
6. The alleged 8(a)(4) violation—the denial of premium
pay for casting to union members Sloan and Price and
the deduction of previous casting pay paid to nonunion
members Tatham and Price
In support of this allegation the General Counsel produced
testimony concerning the meetings held by Plant Super-
1072 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
intendent Mike Riordan with the four employees affected by
the adjustment in premium pay for casting after unfair labor
practices charges had been filed concerning the loss of pre-
mium pay for casting. Price testified as follows:
A. Mike Riordan said that . . . he made some mis-
take he was going to fix it. But he got our charges in
that morning where we’d filed a charge. He said we
wouldn’t get our money because of that, that—at first
he said that we would get our money and then he said
that we wouldn’t get our money because we filed the
charge. He got our charges in that morning.
[Respondent] said that instead of us getting the
money back that they owed us, that they’d just take the
money back away from [Tatham and Honick].
Sloan testified as follows:
A. Well, as soon as we walked in [Riordan] said,
‘‘Boys, I admit I made a mistake.’’ He said, ‘‘I’s going
to give you your money back.’’ He said, ‘‘But I got
this Labor Board charge today an instead of getting
your money back I’m going to take away David
Tatham’s an Ken Honick’s.’’
While Sloan and Price had been asked into Riordan’s of-
fice together, nonunion members David Tatham and Ken
Honick were called into the office together.
Tatham testified:
Q. And [Riordan] said . . . content to . . . what
now?
A. To pay the other two fellows . . . Price and
Sloan the $50 but they . . . filed a charge with the
Labor Board and his hands were tied in the matter.
The General Counsel also relies on testimony from Plant
Manager Hammat that he could not ‘‘resolve the situation’’
because of the unfair labor practice charges and contends that
Respondent ‘‘resolved’’ the situation by refusing to pay the
wage premium to union employees and taking the money
away from Tatham and Honick and contends the ‘‘illegality
arises not from the pay adjustment, per se, but by Respond-
ent’s telling employees that the reason for its action was
caused by the filing of charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. By linking the filing of ULP charges to a dimi-
nution of employees’ wages, Respondent diminished the
Union’s status in the eyes of all non-member employees, and
thereby contributed to employee disaffection from the
Union.’’
The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that it at-
tempted to resolve the matter by treating the employees
equally by deducting casting premium amounts which em-
ployees Honick and Tatham were incorrectly paid for times
when they were not casting and that employees Price and
Sloan were not penalized as they had performed no casting
work since the shutdown of the drain line in August 1991.
Supervisor Stephen Carr testified he had been in charge of
the casting line with six employees reporting to him until the
line was shut down in August 1991. The six employees were
David Tatham, Ken Honick, Willie Smith, Arvil Buckner,
Sloan, and Price. Carr testified that when the drain line was
shut down, the six employees were scattered throughout the
plant to different jobs. Sloan ‘‘mainly was on a fork truck.’’
Price was ‘‘mainly on a fork truck and working out in the
yard doing odd jobs.’’ Smith went to the brick line as a cast-
er. Buckner did various jobs including casting and eventually
quit. Honick did casting, mainly on the lid line and also did
other jobs. Tatham casted catch basin and end caps and did
various jobs. Casters received a 15-cent premium per hour
for casting. In late January 1992 Sloan asked Carr why he
had been cut from $6.65 per hour to $6.50 per hour. Carr
told Sloan he was not aware of this as Sloan was no longer
working for Carr, but told Sloan he would check into it.
Price also approached Carr and said he wanted his paycheck
checked on and Carr agreed to do so. Carr checked on the
production records which showed that as of the week ending
‘‘10/27/91’’ Honick and Tatham were paid at the $6.65 per
hour rate and Price and Sloan were paid $6.50 as they did
no casting work from ‘‘11/16/91’’ forward. The records also
disclosed that Tatham and Honick did not do casting for the
entire period although they had been paid for the entire pe-
riod at the $6.65 casting rate until January 26, 1991, when
Carr checked the records. Carr turned this information over
to Hammat and Riordan and testified he did not discuss it
further with Sloan or Price and denied having told Sloan that
if he quit the Union, he would try to get his money back and
also denied that he had any conversation with Price about an
earlier discussion with Sloan concerning an alleged statement
by Carr that if Sloan would leave the Union, he would get
him his money back. On cross-examination Carr acknowl-
edged that he was present when Sloan and Price were called
into Hammat’s office to discuss the matter and that after hav-
ing Price and Sloan in, Tatham and Honick were called in.
Plant Superintendent Mike Riordan testified that when the
drain line ceased to operate in August 1991, the six employ-
ees on it were assigned to other jobs and in November 1991,
he had eliminated the 15-cent casting premium for Sloan and
Price since they were no longer doing casting. However,
from August when the drain line went out of existence until
November when the premium was eliminated Sloan and
Price received the casting premium although they were no
longer doing casting. When the drain line had shut down
four of the six employees who had prior casting experience
were moved to other casting positions whereas Sloan and
Price who had no casting experience were moved into the as-
sembly area doing noncasting jobs, driving forklift trucks,
and working in other departments as required. Of the four
employees with casting experience, employee Willie Smith
did 100-percent casting on the brick line, and the other three
employees also did considerable casting during the period
from August to November 1991. Supervisor Carr raised with
him the question concerning the reduction of the premium
for Sloan and Price and questioned why Honick and Tatham
were continuing to receive the casting premium as he was
aware there had been some days when they were not casting.
He explained the reason for the loss of the casting premium
to Sloan and Price on an occasion when he was making his
rounds in the plant and on a subsequent occasion in the plant
he explained it to Honick and Tatham who asked him about
it. Initially he told them they were going to check the records
to determine if anyone was paid incorrectly and that he
would get back to them and he asked Supervisor Stephen
Carr to check the records. He denies having made any state-
ment to the employees that he was going to give an increase
1073QUAZITE CORP.
to one group (Sloan and Price), but now would not because
they had filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board
concerning this pay reduction. He told all four employees
that they were attempting to resolve the matter and had re-
ceived the charges and were reviewing them to determine
what effect they might have on the matter.
Plant Manager Richard Hammat testified that approxi-
mately half of the plant was in the casting department in late
1991. The drain line was a machine line under the same
groupings as the casting department. Respondent ceased op-
erating the drain line in August 1991 and the six employee
who were then working on the drain line were transferred to
other jobs. The six employees were Arvil Buckner, Ken
Honick, David Tatham, Charles Price, Steve Sloan, and
Willy Smith. All of the six, except David Tatham and Ken
Honick, were known by Hammat to be members of the
Union. Following the shutdown of the drain line an issue
arose with employees Charles Price and Steven Sloan who
had been taken off of caster incentive pay of 15 cents per
hour while the other four employees remained on caster pay.
Hammat testified it was brought to his attention in late De-
cember 1991, or early January 1992, that Price and Sloan
were not receiving the same pay as Tatham and Honick who
continued to receive the 15-cent-per-hour incentive pay. He
explained that in accordance with the contract language, the
drain department which was a casting operation had been
shut down for lack of work and that the employees had been
transferred to other areas in the plant and Honick and
Tatham ‘‘had continued casting and were in a casting
mode,’’ and were thus paid as casters whereas Sloan and
Price correctly no longer received casting pay as Sloan was
driving a forklift truck and Price was working at odd jobs
in the plant and both were no longer doing casting work. He
also explained that according to the contract language after
30 days employees assigned to a temporary position no
longer received the rate of pay for the area from which they
were transferred, but that they then received the rate of pay
for the job to which they have been transferred. A supervisor
had been instructed to look at the records and determined the
accuracy of the rate change. Subsequently he received notice
that an unfair labor practice charge had been filed alleging
that Price and Sloan had been discriminated against by elimi-
nating the 15-cent-per-hour incentive rate for them because
of their membership in the Union whereas Tatham’s and
Honick’s pay were not affected because they were not mem-
bers of the Union. Hammat testified he talked with the em-
ployees and told them he could not ‘‘resolve the situation be-
cause we needed a third party now between the Union, the
Company, and the Labor Board would make a decision or
determination of what the correct thing to do would be.’’
At that point, we said we would not pay the two in-
dividuals [Sloan and Price] that had not received the
casting rate because we felt that was the wrong thing
to do. Since they had not done casting, we didn’t see
the need to pay them the higher rate of pay.
We reviewed the two people [Tatham and Honick]
that had been receiving the casting rate, and there was
some time periods where they were not casting in the
casting mode.
[W]e took the total time difference between the cast-
ing and the non-casting time, subtracted that difference
out. That equated to about fifty dollars ($50), in terms
of what could be construed that they were over paid for
the time they were not casting.
Analysis
I find the General Counsel has failed to establish a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act by Respondent’s actions
in refusing to pay Sloan and Price the casting incentive pay
and by deducting the amount of overpayment from Tatham
and Honick’s wages. I have reviewed the testimony of the
foregoing participants in the actions and discussions as set
out above and I conclude the evidence is insufficient to es-
tablish that any of the employees were discriminated against
because of the filing of the unfair labor practice. In fact
based on the testimony presented by Respondent which I
credit as supported by Respondent’s records, Respondent ul-
timately resolved this matter by paying the employees in ac-
cordance with their proper rates based on what they were ac-
tually doing. Moreover, even assuming the testimony of the
employees as to what Respondent’s representatives told them
with respect to what the reason was (the filing of the unfair
labor practices) for the ultimate resolution of the matter,
these comments do not rise to the level of an unfair labor
practice and were factual under the circumstances. I, accord-
ingly, will recommend the dismissal of these allegations.
7. The extension of Billy Trollenger’s
probationary period
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act when it extended employee Billy
Trollenger’s probationary period because he joined the
Union. Former employee Billy Trollenger testified that he
was hired by Respondent on May 13, 1991, as a lid caster
and underwent a required 31 working days’ probationary pe-
riod. Trollenger testified that at the end of his probationary
period he had a conversation with his supervisor, Richard
Robbins, who told him he ‘‘was doing great and doing better
than people who had been there for a year, and I asked him
was I full-time and he said, ‘Yes,’ and he give me the card.’’
This refers to a brown plastic insurance card issued to em-
ployees after they become permanent. The effective date on
the card was June 24, 1991. Trollenger testified that he
joined the Union on the next day, signed a union dues-check-
off authorization card and received a union hat which he
started wearing. The following day he was again called back
to Robbins’ office and Robbins told him that he was going
to extend his probation as he needed to get his production
up to 135 percent. Trollenger testified that Robbins had not
spoken to him about his production prior to the day he joined
the Union. On cross-examination Trollenger testified that at
the initial meeting, at about 31 working days Robbins told
him he was making good quality parts, but denied that Rob-
bins showed him any production records. He testified also
that at this meeting Robbins told him to keep up the good
work. The day after this initial meeting he joined the Union.
It may have been as many as 4 days later that he was called
into the second meeting with Robbins at which time Robbins
told him he was going to extend his probation. He was hired
at a rate of $5.85 per hour and then received a raise bringing
his rate up to $6.10 after he became a permanent employee
and received another raise to $6.65 per hour after a year.
1074 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent called Supervisor Richard Robbins who super-
vised Trollenger, who testified that in the first month of em-
ployment he spoke to Trollenger on the production ‘‘line on
his mold’’ and ‘‘I told him his quality was looking real
good. I was well pleased with his quality. He needed to start
working on his quantity and getting his production higher.’’
Robbins testified that Trollenger responded, ‘‘[O]kay,’’ and
did not complain. Around June 17 he and Plant Superintend-
ent Michael Riordan decided to extend Trollenger’s proba-
tion ‘‘because his production wasn’t up to par where it
should have been for an employee of that length of time.’’
The quality of his work was good. His production, however,
‘‘varied. It would jump anywhere from the 70’s to the 80’s
back down to the 70’s or 69’s, you know. It would vary. It
was just very inconsistent.’’ He delivered the plastic insur-
ance card to Trollenger 2 or 3 weeks after he became a per-
manent employee as his insurance papers were processed and
it normally takes 2 or 3 weeks for the card to be issued. The
date of ‘‘6/24/91’’ on the card is the date Trollenger became
a permanent employee and signed up for his benefits which
information would be mailed to the insurance company and
the card would be issued ‘‘several weeks later.’’ On cross-
examination Robbins testified that Riordan made the decision
to extend Trollenger’s probation on June 16 or 17, but that
he had input into the decision. He saw a written copy of the
extension of probation but does not believe Trollenger re-
ceived one. He did notice Trollenger wearing a union hat to
work but does not recall when he initially noticed it but it
was after his probationary period.
Plant Superintendent Michael Riordan testified and identi-
fied an hourly payroll status change form for Trollenger
which was initially prepared shortly after Trollenger was
hired on ‘‘5/20/91’’ for a projected 31-day pay change. On
this form Riordan wrote on ‘‘6/16/91’’ a Sunday afternoon
‘‘pouring good parts, need to get production up.’’ He then
discussed with Robbins that they needed to talk with
Trollenger as his production was dropping off. Riordan
talked with Trollenger the next day on the shop floor and
told him ‘‘he’d started out good and that he was catching on
good but he’d let his production drop over the last week to
ten (10) days and in all likelihood probably at the end of the
week when his thirty-one (31) working days would be up,
we’d probably end up extending his probation period for an-
other twenty (20) days giving him an opportunity to show
that he can bring that production back up.’’ ‘‘He [Trollenger]
said he thought he could do that.’’ ‘‘On Friday, the 24th (of
June), I got back with him and told him—again, his produc-
tion didn’t come up much the rest of that week. I got back
with him and told him indeed that we were going to go
ahead and extend his probationary period for twenty (20)
days and he said okay to that.’’ Robbins was present at this
time. He testified further that when a person reaches his 31
working days and he is to become a permanent employee he
is sent to the payroll office to sign up for his insurance bene-
fits. This paperwork is then sent to the insurance carrier and
it generally takes 3 to 4 weeks for the employee to receive
his plastic card. Even though Trollenger’s probationary pe-
riod was extended he automatically received the insurance
coverage and received his raise at the end of the 31 working
days. Riordan testified that Trollenger’s production started
off in the 50–60-percent range. The production they would
like a caster to attain is 135 percent. At 100 percent produc-
tion the incentive rate ‘‘starts kicking in’’ and the casters
start making incentive pay for each part over 100-percent.
Plant Manager Hammat identified the union-dues authoriza-
tion card signed by Trollenger and dated ‘‘6/30/91,’’ a Sun-
day, which he testified he received from Brooks Wade, then
the Union’s treasurer and which was received after
‘‘6/30/91’’ as he was not working at the plant that Sunday
and the cards were usually received 1 to 3 days after the sig-
nature.
Analysis
I find the General Counsel has failed to establish a prima
facie case of a violation of the Act. Initially, I do not credit
Trollenger’s testimony that he joined the Union and wore the
union hat 1 day after Robbin’s initial discussion with him at
which Robbins told him he was becoming a permanent em-
ployee and a day prior to a second meeting with Robbins at
which he was told his probation was to be extended. Rather
I credit Riordan’s and Robbins specific recount of the se-
quence of events. I conclude that Trollenger’s testimony in
this regard was in error and confused concerning the timing
of these events. Moreover there does not appear to be any
motive or events which would support the inference that the
extension of Trollenger’s probationary period was motivated
by Respondent’s desire to retaliate against him because he
had joined the Union. Thus, Riordan testified that Trollenger
received the normal raise and received the insurance benefits
on time at the end of his initial 31-day probationary period.
Trollenger apparently successfully completed the extended
probationary period as he was still employed a year later
when he received another raise. I thus conclude that the ex-
tension of Trollenger’s probationary period was not moti-
vated by antiunion animus but rather was based on business
and operational considerations. Assuming arguendo that a
prima facie case has been established I find it has been re-
butted by the preponderance of the evidence. Wright Line,
251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. on other grounds 662 F.2d
899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982); NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1953);
Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984).
8. The requests for information
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its refusal to furnish the Union
with information regarding the Respondent’s attendance poli-
cies and the enforcement thereof which requests were encom-
passed in the following letters. On February 19, 1991, Union
President Thomas Lawson wrote to Plant Manager Richard
Hammat requesting a copy of employee Clyde Bradley’s at-
tendance and production records for the prior 24 months to
prepare for Bradley’s upcoming arbitration case. This request
was never honored. Hammat testified that the arbitration was
settled and he assumed that since the parties were attempting
to settle the case, it was unnecessary to furnish the records
which would have required a great deal of time to do so.
However, Lawson testified he never relinquished his request
for these records. In April Lawson was verbally cautioned
concerning excessive absences and considered this discipline.
On April 22, 1991, he wrote to Production Superintendent
Michael Riordan requesting the absentee records of five non-
union employees. His letter states in part,
1075QUAZITE CORP.
Concerning absentees, as for my employment
(Thomas Lawson), I have never been reprimanded for
absentees or tardies until the past month. I have had 5
tardies in the past 3 months due to two personal reasons
and three due to sickness. Two of the sick days, I was
so sick that I could hardly work, but yet I came in any-
way to do my job and I was still reprimanded. Upon
this I am requesting to view some of the following peo-
ple’s records of absentees and disciplinary action taken.
Daniel Meadows, Mark Peeler, Sharon Vinroe, David
Harold, Rick Carol
Please set up a time to view these records as soon
as possible as I am to meet with the NLRB on Wednes-
day to file charges.
Lawson testified that he considered the verbal counseling
concerning his then recent absences to be discipline and
wanted the records to compare his record against the above-
named nonunion employees to determine if he was being
treated fairly. Hammat and Riordan testified they offered to
summarize the records for Lawson and asked why he wanted
them as they did not regard the verbal discussion with
Lawson about his absences to be discipline. They testified
they refused to allow Lawson to review the requested records
on privacy grounds as they believed Lawson wanted the
records of the aforesaid nonunion employees in order to har-
ass them because of their nonunion status and because they
had worked during a previous strike in 1990. They also testi-
fied that they had received numerous reports by Sharon
Vinroe who told them that Lawson repeatedly harassed her
because she had worked during a prior strike which he and
coworker and union secretary Lori Johnston had participated
in and because he believed she had retained part of his job
and that of Lori Johnston when they returned to work after
the strike. Lawson acknowledged on the stand that he had
called Vinroe numerous names including ‘‘scab’’ and had
told her he would get her job. Hammat testified that on one
occasion after Vinroe had changed her phone number and
obtained an unlisted number, Lawson called her at home and
told her he was able to get her phone number. According to
Hammat this situation between Lawson and Vinroe became
so tense that Vinroe asked for and obtained permission to
tape record conversations between herself and Lawson in
order to obtain evidence of what Lawson was saying to her.
Both Riordan and Hammat testified that Vinroe specifically
requested that Lawson not be allowed to obtain her records.
On April 26, 1991, Lawson again wrote to Riordan in part
as follows:
As for our letter on April 22, 1991 concerning ab-
sentee requests I have yet to get a response from you
on this matter. Since this letter, the UNION has had an-
other employee with a write-up, which his last write-
up is over six months old. It has been told to us by
yourself, Mike, that after a period of time has gone by
and your record is cleared, an employee would be re-
issued another verbal and then they would have 1-1/2
points to receive a written warning. This is why it is
so very important that everyone in the plant should be
able to review the absentee program. Again, the
UNION requests that a copy of the absentee policy be
put in the window of the supervisor’s office and on the
bulletin board so that each employee can review this
material and will firmly understand what he or she is
getting into.
It is the desire of the UNION that this be done so
that everyone will be able to know exactly what is ex-
pected and hopefully there will be no more attendance
problems. As the UNION has felt that there has been
discrimination in the past as for absentee discipline, this
would also assure every employee that there is a con-
sistent policy dealt out by the COMPANY.
On May 6, 1991, Lawson wrote to Hammat:
Again, I am asking to review the following em-
ploye’s records so that I can determine whether Charles
Bradley or myself has a grievance which needs to be
filed: DANIEL MEADOWS, MARK PEELER, SHAR-
ON VINROE, DAVID HAROLD, RICKY CARROLL,
JEFF CORUM. I am willing to view these records at
any time to determine whether there is a justification of
a grievance or not. I am also requesting an absentee
policy be posted. After discussing this with the NLRB
attorney, Deanna Williams, she has informed me that it
is an employee’s right to know any rule or regulation
which will affect their job and employment.
The harassment of UNION members still continues.
I would appreciate this stopping and that everyone
would be treated equally.
On May 13, 1991, Lawson again wrote to Hammat in part
as follows:
Again we are requesting to view the absentee records
of some employees so that we can determine whether
Charles Bradley or myself have a grievance. We re-
quest records on the following employees: DANIEL
MEADOWS, JACKIE DAVIS, MARK PEELER,
SHARON VINROE, DAVID HAROLD, RICKY CAR-
ROLL, JEFF CORUM, and possibly others may be
needed to strengthen our case. I am also requesting that
the COMPANY post an absentee policy so that each
and every employee would know what the policy is.
There have been several occasions this week in
which UNION workers were harassed and discrimi-
nated against by their supervisors. For example, Keith
Sartin was harassed on several occasions by Richard
Robbins. Lori Johnston and Thomas Lawson have been
harassed by Scott Elrod and Mike Riordan.
On May 20, 1991, Lawson again wrote Hammat in part
as follows:
As for the last letters which the UNION had written
requesting absentee records on several employees, we
again are asking so that we can investigate grievances
pertaining to other employees who have had verbal and
written warnings. This is a great concern to the
UNION. There is discrimination being shown on behalf
of non-union members. We respectfully ask again as we
have from June 10, 1990, an absentee policy be posted
for everyone to observe and follow so that we will
know that there is no discrimination going on.
1076 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As for the harassment of UNION members, this
week has chilled out on some, but for others, it still re-
mains a problem. As for Lori Johnston and Thomas
Lawson, no one stood on their behalf in the advisory
meeting but themselves. As for Willie Smith, no one
stood for him but himself. There was no UNION rep-
resentation. As for the non-union employees in these
situations, it was clear that the COMPANY was on
their side and in each meeting, had total control of ev-
erything. We again plea that this harassment cease.
Analysis
The Respondent contends that it lawfully responded to the
Union’s request for information but that Lawson on behalf
of the Union failed to communicate the reasons for the need
to review the requested absentee records. It also contends
that it acted lawfully in attempting to protect the privacy of
nonunion members particularly Sharon Vinroe who did not
want their records disclosed to the Union. I find, however,
that the General Counsel has established a prima facie case
of violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by the Re-
spondent’s refusals to furnish the requested information as
set out above. It is clear from these letters that the Union
was engaged in the representation of its members and was
concerned about disparate treatment and harassment of union
members and possible grievances as well as the actual proc-
essing of a grievance in the case of Bradley. I thus find that
the information sought by the Union was relevant to the
Union’s obligations to represent the employees in the bar-
gaining unit. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967). A-Plus Roofing, 295 NLRB 967 (1989); New Jersey
Bell Telephone Co., 289 NLRB 318 (1988). With respect to
the alleged confidentiality of the information, the Respondent
has the burden of proof concerning this issue AGA Gas, 307
NLRB 1327 (1992). I find that the Respondent has failed to
sustain the burden of proof as its position is basically that
the Union is not entitled to review the records of any non-
union employees because of possible harassment of them by
union members. Obviously if it is unable to do so it cannot
compare the records against those of union employees to de-
termine disparate treatment or harassment of union employ-
ees. In the case of Sharon Vinroe, I find that the Respondent
has demonstrated that she was concerned about at least al-
leged harassment by Lawson and the Respondent had a basis
for concern here. However, it did not offer to furnish her
record withholding only personal information. I will rec-
ommend that Respondent do so.
9. The refusal to allow review of personnel files
In February 1991, Lawson testified he asked his Super-
visor Scott Elrod to see his personnel file. Elrod told him he
would have to check and eventually told him no. Elrod told
him that everything in his files was company property and
confidential. Prior to this ‘‘anytime an employee had any
questions about their absentees, production, certain informa-
tion that would be kept in their folder which [was] consid-
ered to be [their] personnel file, you would be allowed to go
up at the Company’s convenience to look at, to see if there
was something—if you had an absentee problem you could
look and know to straighten it up or whatever.’’ Subse-
quently on cross-examination he testified that the best he
could remember it was Scott Elrod who had told him he
could not look at his personnel records. Elrod testified he
told Lawson he would have to check with Riordan. Elrod
testified that ‘‘at one time’’ Lawson ‘‘saw his file’’ which
confirms the past practice as testified to by Lawson.
Analysis
I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by its refusal to permit Lawson to review his per-
sonnel file which constituted a unilateral change from the
past practice of permitting employees to do so without bar-
gaining that change with the Union.
10. The alleged unlawful surveillance
The complaint alleges that the Respondent engaged in un-
lawful surveillance of its employees in violation of their Sec-
tion 7 rights. In support of this allegation the General Coun-
sel elicited the testimony of Union President Thomas
Lawson. Lawson testified that there was a surveillance cam-
era set up in the men’s restroom at the top of the ceiling
above the restroom stalls. He also testified there were several
other areas in the plant and outside above the lower roof of
the plant where he and other employees believed the Re-
spondent had set up surveillance cameras. Four employees
testified similarly concerning the camera in the men’s rest-
room and their suspicions that Respondent had set up other
cameras in other areas of the plant and outside on the roof
of the plant. No witness, however, specifically testified that
they had observed a camera in any place other than the cam-
era in the men’s restroom.
The Respondent called its plant manager, Richard
Hammat, who testified concerning the protracted contract ne-
gotiations started in November 1991 and extended into Feb-
ruary 1992, during which there was unrest and dissension
among certain of the employees including the Union nego-
tiating team. Hammat testified that during the period from
late January to March 9, 1991, Respondent experienced six
bomb threats which required the evacuation of the plant for
substantial periods of time and six false fire alarms also ne-
cessitating the loss of production time. As a result of its in-
vestigation the Respondent determined that there was an ex-
posed wire which was located at the top of the exposed ceil-
ing beams in the men’s restroom which had been shorted out
on the occasions of the false fire alarms. In order to find out
the cause of the false fire alarms Respondent’s management
inserted a video camera in the ceiling of the men’s restroom
which was trained solely on the area of exposed wire of the
alarm system which had been previously shorted out. The
camera did not show any of the area below this point and
did not photograph anyone using the facilities unless they
were to climb to the top of the ceiling. On the next occasion
of a false alarm the camera photographed one of Respond-
ent’s employees who was engaged in tampering with the ex-
posed fire alarm wire in the ceiling of the restroom. The em-
ployee was terminated and prosecuted by Respondent. There
have been no more false alarms set off on its fire alarm sys-
tem since that date.
Analysis
I find that the General Counsel has failed to establish a
prima facie case of any illegal surveillance engaged in by the
1077QUAZITE CORP.
Respondent of its employees. Assuming arguendo that a
prima facie case has been established, I find that it has been
rebutted by the preponderance of the evidence. Initially the
General Counsel did not produce any evidence other than
that there was a camera located in the ceiling of the men’s
restroom. It presented only suspicions of its witnesses that
there were other cameras placed inside and outside the plant
to surveil its employees. It also produced no evidence to sup-
port the inference that the camera in the men’s restroom was
placed there to engage in surveillance of its employees.
The Respondent produced the unrebutted testimony of
Plant Manager Hammat whom I credit fully in this regard as
set out above that the sole purpose of the use of the camera
was to find out who was setting off the fire alarm by tamper-
ing with the wire in the ceiling of the men’s restroom and
that the camera was trained solely on the ceiling area and not
on the lower part of the facility so as to film anyone utilizing
the facilities. This was borne out by the introduction in evi-
dence of the film taken by the camera which showed only
the upper ceiling of the restroom and showed the employee
actually tampering with the fire alarm wire on the occasion
of the last false alarm. I therefore find that the sole purpose
of the placement of the camera and the limitation of the area
photographed to the area of the fire alarm wire, was for le-
gitimate business reasons to find out who was setting off its
alarm system and there was no evidence that the Respondent
engaged in any surveillance of the employees except insofar
as they engaged in the tampering with its fire alarm system.
Accordingly, I find that this allegation of the complaint
should be dismissed.
I find no merit to the Union’s and the General Counsel’s
contentions that the installation of the camera and surveil-
lance of the bare wire part of Respondent’s fire alarm system
constituted a unilateral change in working conditions which
was subject to bargaining with the Union. Initially, according
to the unrebutted testimony of Richard Hammat, Respond-
ent’s plant manager, which testimony I credit, this was the
only camera installed in Respondent’s premises and it was
trained only on the ceiling where the bare wire to the alarm
system was situated. Thus employees were not being mon-
itored as they went about their daily tasks in the workplace
or as they used the restroom facilities. Moreover, Respondent
had ample business justification for installing the camera to
find out who was setting off the fire alarm or at least to find
out who did so after the installation of the camera. The con-
tinued unlawful setting off of the fire alarm exposed Re-
spondent’s employees to potential safety hazards, and loss of
income and exposed Respondent to possible property damage
and a loss of production time and earnings.
11. Bypassing the Union and dealing directly with
bargaining unit employees
On July 30, 1991, Union President Thomas Lawson filed
a second-step grievance on behalf of employees Anthony
Johnson and Daniel Meadows concerning a warning they had
received. Plant Superintendent Riordan called Johnson and
Meadows to his office to discuss the grievance and con-
ducted a 15- to 20-minute meeting with them in the absence
of union representation during which they presented their
grievances to Riordan and he told them why he believed the
warning was proper according to the testimony of Johnson
which I credit. Lawson did not learn of the meeting until
later. He then asked Riordan why he had not been apprised
of the meeting and Riordan told him the matter had been
‘‘settled.’’ Lawson complained to Plant Manager Hammat
about this and Hammat went directly to the employees and
asked them if they wanted to have another meeting. They
asked if there would be any change in Respondent’s position
denying the grievance and Hammat said there would not
whereupon they told him they did not want another second-
step meeting. The Union then filed a third-step grievance on
behalf of Johnson and Meadows. Hammat again went to the
employees and asked them if they were aware that the Union
had filed the third step and asked them what they wanted to
do with the grievance and they told Hammat they had
‘‘dropped’’ the grievance. Hammat then told the union rep-
resentatives that the employees had dropped the grievance
and that the matter was closed.
Step two of the grievance procedure provides
If a satisfactory settlement was not reached in Step
1, the grievance shall be reduced to writing on a griev-
ance form furnished by the Union, duly signed by the
employee. The written complaint must include the spe-
cific provision of the Agreement alleged to have been
violated and the specific remedy sought by the UNION.
The written grievance must then be presented to the Su-
perintendent within five (5) working days following the
Step 1 oral answer by the immediate supervisor or the
matter will be considered satisfactorily adjusted. The
Superintendent will give his written reply within five
(5) working days following the receipt of the written
grievance to the employee or the employee’s steward.
[Emphasis added.]
Respondent contends based on the above language that
there is no reference to a meeting or discussion required in
step two but rather there is only provision for the presen-
tation of a written grievance to the Superintendent and relies
on the language that the Superintendent ‘‘will give his writ-
ten reply to the employee or the employee’s steward’’ as evi-
dence that the grievance procedure does not provide for the
Union’s participation. Respondent also relies on the testi-
mony of Riordan that of 80 grievances he processed as the
second-step representative for Respondent, in only three to
four instances were meetings actually conducted and also re-
lies on the testimony of Union Secretary Lori Johnston that
the Union attempted to change the second step during nego-
tiations to provide that the second-step answer be given to
the union steward rather than to the employee. With respect
to Hammat’s direct discussions with the employees concern-
ing their grievance, the Respondent contends Hammat was
merely attempting to accommodate the Union by offering to
conduct another second-step meeting but that Lawson was
unwilling to meet.
Analysis
I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by Riordan’s conduct of the second-step meeting
without affording the union representatives the right to be
there in their representative capacity. While it is true that the
contractual language relied on does provide for the grievance
to be signed by the employee and the answer to be given to
the steward or the employee, it also states, ‘‘The written
1078 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complaint must include the specific provision of the Agree-
ment alleged to have been violated and the specific remedy
sought by the Union.’’ This language clearly encompasses a
more formal complaint than in the first step and one that in-
cludes ‘‘the specific provision of the agreement alleged to
have been violated and the specific remedy sought by the
Union.’’ This necessarily entails union representation. With
respect to Respondent’s contention that the past practice sup-
ports its position, as most second-step grievances did not en-
tail meetings, I find this lends no support to its position as
in the instant case there was a meeting lasting 15 to 20 min-
utes during which Riordan discussed the merits of the griev-
ance with the employees and the employees presented their
position without the benefit of union representation and Re-
spondent gave its answer. Under these circumstances I find
Respondent bypassed the Union and dealt directly with the
employees concerning their grievance in violation of Section
8(a)(5). I also find that Hammat’s actions in going directly
to the employees to inquire about whether they wanted an-
other second-step meeting and whether they wanted to pursue
the third step and his refusal to further process the grievances
as requested by the Union were all violative of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. See Van Can Co., 304 NLRB
1085 (1991); Top Mfg. Co., 249 NLRB 424, 425 (1980).
12. Discontinuance of incentive pay to
assembly employees
There are three basic processes used to produce Respond-
ent’s products. The initial one is casting wherein a concrete
like substance is poured into a mold either by hand or by
use of machinery and the product is then removed from the
mold after it is dried. The second one is grinding wherein
employees work at stations and grind the casted product to
remove extra material on it and smooth out defects. These
employees work in a vented booth and wear protective
breathing equipment to prevent their inhaling dust and debris
which is ground from the molded product. The third oper-
ation is assembly wherein products are given a final once
over and minor defects are smoothed out or patched up and
the products are packed for shipment. Each category receives
an incentive rate for the amount of products they cast, grind,
or assemble. According to the testimony of Plant Supervisor
Riordan there had been a practice of occasionally having an
assembler grind a product which still needed some grinding
after it had passed through the grinding stations and to pay
the assembler the grinding incentive rate for doing so. Rior-
dan testified that during the summer of 1991, a practice de-
veloped of having the assemblers routinely regrind products
which had not been properly ground by the grinders, with the
results of Respondent paying a double incentive rate (one to
the grinder and one to the assembler for regrinding the prod-
uct). Riordan testified that when he learned of this in Octo-
ber 1991, which he characterized as a misapplication of the
rule, he told his supervisors, Don Grob and Scott Elrod, to
meet with the assemblers to tell them that except in unusual
cases, products that need additional grinding should be sent
back to the grinder who originally ground the product and
the assemblers should not grind it, thus resulting in only one
grinding incentive rate for the grinders and the loss of the
grinding incentive rate for the assemblers who were to no
longer do this.
The Union was not informed of this desire to change the
procedure and Union President Lawson only learned of the
meeting when called by another employee on the floor who
was going to the meeting and who told Lawson that Re-
spondent was taking away the assembler’s grinding incentive
pay. The meeting by Supervisor Grob with the employees
got out of hand according to the testimony of Riordan and
Lawson and Supervisor Scott Elrod got into a confrontation
over the matter without any agreement reached. According to
Riordan the matter was subsequently resolved by returning
the misground or unground products back to the grinders. It
is undisputed that there was no written procedure covering
this situation and there was no agreement reached between
the Union and the Respondent prior to the change according
to the testimony of Lawson which I credit.
Analysis
I find that there was an established past practice of paying
assemblers grinding pay and permitting them to regrind
unground or misground products that had passed through the
grinding station and Respondent’s unilateral announcement
of a change in this procedure and the elimination of the in-
centive pay for assemblers performing grinding operations
was violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Top Mfg.
Co., supra.
13. The alleged bad-faith bargaining
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent en-
gaged in bad-faith bargaining relying on the totality of the
circumstances in which the bargaining took place citing At-
lanta Hilton & Tower, 271 NLRB 1600, 1603 (1984), and
pointing to Respondent’s alleged ‘‘unreasonable bargaining
demands, unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, efforts to bypass the Union and withdrawal of
agreed-upon contract proposals.’’ The General Counsel also
notes that ‘‘the Board looks not only at the parties behavior
at the bargaining table, but also to their conduct away from
the table as bearing on the issue of good faith citing Port
Plastics, 279 NLRB 362, 382 (1986). The General Counsel
contends that ‘‘the Respondent’s numerous and egregious un-
fair labor practices reflected an attitude contrary to good faith
bargaining and provided the context in which the Respondent
and Union commenced negotiations in November of 1991.’’
The General Counsel also contends that the ‘‘Respondent’s
conduct at the bargaining table establishes that Respondent
entered negotiations lacking the requisite mien which would
evidence a desire to reach an agreement with the Union’’ cit-
ing Atlanta Hilton, supra, quoting NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied 236
U.S. 887 (1953), wherein the court stated that an employer
is ‘‘obligated to make ‘some’ reasonable effort in ‘some’ di-
rection to compose his differences with the union, if Section
8(a)(5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation
at all.’’
Specifically, the General Counsel contends that ‘‘Respond-
ent’s Unyielding Approach on Contract Issues of Substance’’
and ‘‘Respondent’s Withdrawal of the Parties Agreement on
Temporary Transfers’’ were violations of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. The General Counsel contends, relying on the testi-
mony of Plant Manager Hammat, that although Hammat tes-
tified extensively concerning areas of agreement reached dur-
1079QUAZITE CORP.
ing contract negotiations these were almost always areas
where the parties both sought the change such as changes in
the grievance and arbitration procedure and the operation of
the safety committee. However, the General Counsel con-
tends that in areas of disagreement, Respondent was intran-
sigent such as with the refusal to offer automatic dues check-
off, Respondent’s refusal to compromise its proposal to re-
duce the seniority retained by laid-off employees from the 12
months contained in the prior contract to 6 months, and the
Respondent’s wage proposal of an increase of only 15 cents
an hour for production employees and 40 cents an hour for
five leadpersons. While negotiations had been initiated in
November 1991 with Union President Tom Lawson as the
Union’s chief spokesman and Plant Manager Hammat as the
Respondent’s chief spokesman, on February 19, 1992, an
outside labor representative named Joseph Lawson took over
as chief spokesman for the Respondent and International
Representative Hugh Jacks became the chief spokesman for
the Union. The General Counsel called Lori Johnston, the
secretary-treasurer and a trustee of the Union and a member
of the Union’s negotiating committee who testified that the
Respondent’s position was basically virtually unchanged dur-
ing the negotiations and that the Union was placed in a posi-
tion of having to offer counterproposals to its own proposals.
International Representative Hugh Jacks testified that he indi-
cated at the February meeting to Respondent’s spokesman
Joseph Lawson that the Union was willing to move on its
proposals and that Respondent’s spokesman Joseph Lawson,
looked at me and [said], if the Union wants a contract,
they will accept what the Company has proposed . . .
no dues check off, seniority—employees have rights on
seniority for six months and after that if they was laid
off more than six months, they could not be returned.
The whole nine yards that was outstanding and looked
at me and said again, if the Union wants a contract,
they will accept the Company’s proposal.
The General Counsel further contends that ‘‘the most egre-
gious and telling example of Respondent’s lack of good faith
during the negotiation process was its withdrawal from the
parties’ agreement on the issue of ‘temporary transfers’.’’
International Representative Jacks testified that at the mid-
February 1992 meeting which he attended, the parties
reached agreement on the issue of temporary transfers and
agreed that long-term temporary transfers of employees
would not exceed 4 to 5 months and that Respondent’s chief
negotiator, Joseph Lawson, offered to have the agreement
typed for the parties to initial at the next bargaining session,
but that when he submitted the agreement at the next session
it had been changed and permitted temporary assignments to
be filled until the particular job or customer order were com-
pleted which would require no limit whatsoever on the dura-
tion of these temporary assignments. Hugh Jacks testified
that when he protested these changes to Lawson, that
Lawson told him ‘‘verbal agreements don’t matter.’’ Jacks’
testimony in this regard was corroborated by Lori Johnston.
The General Counsel further contends that Respondent’s po-
sition ‘‘that no final agreement was reached on temporary
transfers is without merit,’’ citing Plant Manager Hammat’s
testimony that Respondent wanted ‘‘the transfer language to
indicate for the length of the job and [Respondent] agreed
not to exceed one year.’’ Thus General Counsel argues that
Respondent’s typed version does not agree even with
Hammat’s testimony as it contains no limits which would
thus ‘‘render meaningless the seniority and bidding proce-
dures contained within any collective bargaining agreement
ultimately reached by the parties.’’ Union President Thomas
Lawson was not asked about these issues when he testified
on other matters.
Thus the General Counsel argues that the withdrawal of
the agreed upon proposal concerning temporary transfers was
evidence of bad-faith bargaining in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act, citing Mead Corp., 256 NLRB 686
(1981); citing American Seating Co. of Mississippi v. NLRB,
424 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1970), enfg. 176 NLRB 850
(1969). Also citing Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 253
NLRB 706 (1980); Langston Cos., 304 NLRB 1022 (1991);
and Thill Inc., 298 NLRB 669 (1990).
Respondent contends there was no credible evidence of
bad-faith bargaining on its behalf noting that Union President
Thomas Lawson was not questioned concerning the negotia-
tions although he had been the chief spokesman for a consid-
erable period of the negotiations commencing in November
1991 and continuing up until February 19, 1992, when Hugh
Jacks took over as chief spokesman for the Union. With Re-
spect to the issue of temporary transfers Respondent relies on
the testimony of Plant Manager Hammat that at the close of
the February 19 meeting there had been no agreement re-
garding temporary transfers and that Respondent’s negotiator
Joseph Lawson attempted to reduce to writing a lengthy dis-
cussion of this issue which had taken up several hours of the
February 19, 1992 session. Respondent also relies on ground
rule 4 which had been agreed to by the parties and signed
by Lawson at the outset of negotiations as follows:
Verbal proposals and counter proposals may be pre-
sented in support of the good faith bargaining efforts of
both sides to reach tentative agreement on contract lan-
guage. However, there will be no final tentative agree-
ment until it is reduced to written form, reviewed by
both negotiating committees, and signed off by the chief
spokesman for each negotiating committee. [Emphasis
added.]
Respondent counters the issue of its alleged intransigence by
citing the notes taken by union negotiator, Lori Johnston,
that union spokesman, Thomas Lawson, had asked Respond-
ent for a ‘‘best and final’’ proposal, and thus contends that
the ‘‘best and final’’ characterization of Respondent’s pro-
posal was made in response to the Union’s request. Respond-
ent also relies on Hammat’s testimony that the negotiations
were difficult and protracted by reason of the Union’s initial
proposal which sought to change virtually every section of
the contract which had been the first contract ever negotiated
only a year prior thereto and a lengthy meeting spent on only
the issue of a special job description for Thomas Lawson
wherein none of the other members of the bargaining unit
were covered by job descriptions.
Analysis
I find based on the foregoing and the record as a whole
that the evidence is inconclusive regarding alleged bad-faith
bargaining by Respondent. Rather it could also support a
1080 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conclusion that the parties were engaged in hard bargaining
with some difficult issues having been encountered. I find
the evidence does not support a finding of surface bargaining
in this instance. With respect to the issue of temporary trans-
fers I find Hammat’s explanation of Lawson’s intent to re-
duce something to writing to be credible and find the lan-
guage of the ground rule 4 supports Respondent’s contention
that tentative agreements were not to be considered final
until they had been reduced to writing and signed by both
parties. I thus find that these allegations should be dismissed.
14. The withdrawal of recognition
On August 4, 1992, Respondent withdrew recognition
from the Union based on the receipt of individual petitions
from 37 employees in the bargaining unit of 68 employees
stating that the employees no longer desired to be rep-
resented by the Union. The petitions from employees con-
stituted a majority of the employees and there is no evidence
of supervisory taint in the initiation or gathering of the peti-
tions. However, the General Counsel alleges that the with-
drawal of recognition from the Union was not made in a
context free of unfair labor practices. As noted above I have
found that the Respondent committed several violations of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act including promises of ben-
efits if employees withdrew from the Union, threats of re-
prisal because of engagement in protected concerted activi-
ties in striking against the employer, bypassing the certified
exclusive collective-bargaining representative in dealing with
grievances, denying an employee union representation during
an investigatory meeting concerning his production which
could have and apparently did lead to discipline, by failing
and refusing to furnish relevant information to the collective-
bargaining representative, and by instituting a unilateral
change in the past practice of paying assemblers an incentive
rate for performing grinding duties without bargaining that
change with the Union.
These violations individually and cumulatively were the
type of violations which tend to undermine the Union’s sta-
tus in the employees’ eyes and I find they did so and con-
tributed significantly to the loss of support for the Union
among the employees leading to the ultimate apparent loss
of majority support for the Union. I reject Respondent’s con-
tention that the sole contributing factor leading to the loss of
majority was the alleged advent of strike violence or mis-
conduct occurring during the strike. Rather I conclude that
the loss of majority was the result of the unfair labor prac-
tices committed by Respondent which had the effect of un-
dermining the Union’s effectiveness in the sight of the bar-
gaining unit employees. Accordingly, I find that the with-
drawal of recognition occurred in an atmosphere and context
poisoned by Respondent’s commission of unfair labor prac-
tices which had the effect of contributing significantly to the
Union’s loss of majority among the bargaining unit employ-
ees. I thus find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by its withdrawal of recognition from the
Union. See Riverside Cement Co., 305 NLRB 815 (1972).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Quazite Corporation, is and has been
at all times material, an employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO, Local 3-987 is, and has been at all times
material, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. The appropriate bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees employed at
the Respondent’s Lenoir City, Tennessee, plant, but ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, professional em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by:
(a) Denying employee Keith Sartin’s request for union
representation during an investigatory meeting which could
have led to discipline.
(b) Promising its employee Brooks Wade benefits if he re-
signed from the Union.
(c) Promising its employee Mike Summitt that a discipli-
nary warning issued to him would be removed from his file
if he resigned from the Union.
(d) Promising its employee Steve Sloan that he would re-
ceive money if he would resign from the Union.
(e) Threatening its employees Thomas Lawson and Mike
Summitt with reprisals if they returned to work at Respond-
ent’s facility after their engagement in a strike.
5. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(4) of the Act
by withholding moneys from union supporters and deducting
moneys from nonunion employees’ paychecks.
6. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
by:
(a) Extending the probationary period of employee Billy
Trollenger.
(b) Reducing the wages of employees Charles Price and
Steve Sloan.
7. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by:
(a) Refusing to furnish attendance records of certain
named nonunion employees to the Union as requested by the
Union.
(b) Refusing to allow employee and Union President
Thomas Lawson to view his own attendance record.
(c) Bypassing the Union and holding grievance meetings
directly with bargaining unit employees Anthony Johnson
and Daniel Meadows and refusing the Union’s request to
process the grievances.
(d) Unilaterally eliminating grinding incentive pay for as-
semblers doing grinding work without bargaining the change
with the Union.
(e) Withdrawing recognition from the Union with
unremedied unfair labor practices outstanding.
8. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by:
(a) Installing a surveillance camera trained on a wire
which had been the previous source of tampering resulting
in false fire alarms in the facility.
(b) Its conduct of bargaining with the Union during the
1991 to 1992 contract negotiations.
9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
1081QUAZITE CORP.
1 Under New Horizons, interest is computed at the ‘‘short term
Federal Rate’’ for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986
amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621.
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
THE REMEDY
As I have found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act, including the
posting of an appropriate notice. I shall also recommend that
Respondent be ordered to furnish the attendance records of
bargaining unit employees and Thomas Lawson’s attendance
record as found herein to have been unlawfully denied as re-
quested by the Union after the removal of personal data other
than relating to the absences from the record of employee
Sharon Vinroe as I find that the testimony of Richard
Hammat and of Thomas Lawson himself demonstrated that
Vinroe has been the subject of personal harassment by
Thomas Lawson and that she has expressed her opposition
to the suppling of personal information to Thomas Lawson,
the president of the Union. The aforesaid information shall
be furnished to the Union within 10 days of its written re-
quest therefore. I also recommend that Respondent imme-
diately inform the Union in writing that it will disregard the
petitions received from a majority of its employees stating
that they no longer desire to be recognized by the Union, re-
scind its withdrawal of recognition, inform the Union that it
recognizes it as the legitimate certified exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees in the appropriate
unit and it will upon written request bargain with the Union
for 1 year from the outset of bargaining and if an under-
standing is reached, embody it in a signed agreement. It is
further recommended that copies of the aforesaid letter shall
be sent to each bargaining unit employee. I also recommend
that upon the Union’s request, Respondent immediately proc-
ess the grievance of employees Anthony Johnson and Daniel
Meadows and inform the employees and the Union in writing
that it will do so. I also recommend that Respondent make
the assembly employees whole for any loss of grinding in-
centive pay they may have sustained by reason of the unfair
labor practice as computed in the manner prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as pre-
scribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987)1
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Quazite Corporation, Lenoir City, Ten-
nessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Denying employees’ request for union representation
during investigatory meetings which could lead to discipline.
(b) Promising its employees benefits if they resign from
the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union,
AFL–CIO, Local 3-987.
(c) Promising its employees that disciplinary warnings
issued to them would be removed from their files if they re-
sign from the Union.
(d) Promising its employees that they would receive
money if they resign from the Union.
(e) Threatening its employees with reprisals if they return
to work after having engaged in a strike.
(f) Refusing to furnish the attendance records of nonunion
employees to the Union necessary and relevant to the
Union’s obligations as collective-bargaining representative of
its employees in the appropriate unit.
(g) Refusing to allow the Union’s representative, Union
President Thomas Lawson to view his own attendance
records.
(h) Bypassing the Union and holding grievance meetings
directly with bargaining unit employees and refusing the
Union’s request to further process the grievances.
(i) Unilaterally instituting changes in its past practice by
eliminating grinding incentive pay to assemblers performing
grinding work without bargaining that change with the
Union.
(j) Withdrawing recognition from the Union with
unremedied unfair labor practices outstanding.
(k) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Immediately rescind its withdrawal of recognition from
the Union and notify the Union in writing of this and send
a copy of this notification to each employee in the bargaining
unit.
(b) Within 10 days of the written request by the Union
furnish the Union’s representative with the attendance
records of its nonunion employees after first removing any
personal data from the attendance record of employee Sharon
Vinroe other than relating to her attendance.
(c) On request, immediately permit Thomas Lawson to
view his attendance records and furnish him with a copy
thereof upon his request.
(d) On request, immediately process the grievance of em-
ployees Anthony Johnson and Daniel Meadows and inform
the employees and the Union in writing that it will do so.
(e) On written request, bargain with the Union as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees
in the above-described appropriate unit with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment for 1 year from the outset of such bargaining and,
if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
(f) Make whole with interest the assembly employees for
loss of incentive pay for grinding work.
(g) Post at its Lenoir City, Tennessee facility copies of the
attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’3 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
1082 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(h) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT deny our employees’ request for union rep-
resentation during investigatory meetings which could lead to
discipline.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees benefits if they re-
sign from the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO, Local 3-987.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees that we will remove
disciplinary warnings issued to them from their files if they
resign from the Union.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees that they will re-
ceive money if they resign from the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with reprisals if
they return to work after having engaged in a strike.
WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish the Union the attendance
records of nonunion members in the bargaining unit informa-
tion necessary and relevant to the Union’s obligations as col-
lective-bargaining representative of the employees in the ap-
propriate unit as follows:
All production and maintenance employees employed at
the Respondent’s Lenoir City, Tennessee, plant, but ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, professional em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT bypass the Union by holding grievance
meetings directly with bargaining unit employees and refuse
the Union’s request to further process the grievances.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally eliminate incentive pay for
grinding employees.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Union with
unremedied unfair labor practices outstanding.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL immediately rescind our withdrawal of recogni-
tion from the Union and notify the Union in writing of this
and will send a copy of the notification to each employee in
the bargaining unit.
WE WILL within 10 days upon written request by the
Union furnish the Union’s representatives the attendance
records of its nonunion employees in the bargaining unit,
after first removing any personal data from the attendance
record of employee Sharon Vinroe other than relating to her
attendance.
WE WILL immediately on request permit Thomas Lawson
to review his attendance record and will on his request im-
mediately furnish him with a copy.
WE WILL, on written request, bargain with the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our em-
ployees in the above described appropriate unit with respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment for 1 year from the outset of such bargaining
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understand-
ing in a signed agreement.
WE WILL make the assembly employees whole for loss of
earnings sustained by them by the elimination of grinding in-
centive pay with interest.
Our employees have the right to join and support Oil,
Chemical, & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL–
CIO, Local 3-987 or to refrain from doing so.
QUAZITE CORPORATION