Perkins Machine Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 4, 1963

141 N.L.R.B. 98 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Board and adjudication of the courts that an employer is required to bargain in good
faith for at least 1 year after certification with the certified exclusive representative
of its employees and also for a reasonable time following a settlement agreement.
In Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 785, the Board recently held: "We
shall, therefore , in this and in future cases revealing similar inequities , grant the
Union a period of at least 1 year of actual bargaining from the date of the settlement
agreement."
The foregoing conduct of the Respondent affords clear and unmistakable indicia
that throughout its negotiations with the Union it has merely engaged in surface
bargaining with no intention of reaching a reasonable agreement or entering into
a collective-bargaining contract with the representative of its employees except upon
terms dictated by itself. I find , therefore, as alleged in the complaint , that the
Respondent on June 21, 1961, and at all times thereafter to date, has refused to
bargain in good faith with the Union as the certified exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of its employees in the appropriate unit, within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5)
and (1 ) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, which is and has been at all times
material to this case , the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
of Southern Coach & Body Company, Inc., in a unit appropriate for collective bargain-
ing as follows:
All production and maintenance employees at the Employer's Evergreen , Alabama,
plants, including leadmen , layout men, production clerks, plant clerks, and inspectors
exclusive of office clerical employees , professional and technical employees , guards,
watchman , and supervisors as defined in the Act.
2. By refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the certi-
fied exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in such appropriate unit
on June 21 , 1961, and at all times thereafter to date, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1 ) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Perkins Machine Company and Local 223, International Union
of Electrical , Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO . Case No.
1-CA-3814. March 4, 1963
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 25, 1962, Trial Examiner Sydney S. Asher, Jr., issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter-
mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire
141 NLRB No. 11.
PERKINS MACHINE COMPANY 99
record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the
Trial Examiner.
MEMBER RODGERS took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
On May 28, 1962, Local 223, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, Boston, Massachusetts, herein called the Union, filed charges
against Perkins Machine Company, Warren, Massachusetts, herein called the Re-
spondent. On July 11, 1962, the General Counsel I issued a complaint against the
Respondent alleging that since on or about April 19, 1962, the Respondent has failed
and refused to furnish wage rates requested by the Union, although the Union was
then, and is now, the exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent's em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. It is alleged
that this conduct violated Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136), herein called the Act. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed an answer admitting the appropriateness of the unit and the Union's status as
representative of the employees, but denying the commission of any unfair labor
practices. Affirmatively, the answer alleges that "the Union expressly waived any
and all rights it might have had in or to the information mentioned in . the com-
plaint," that any refusal by the Respondent was "the direct result and consequence
of unfair labor practices engaged in by the Union," and that the Union has never
requested arbitration of the grievance involved, nor filed any new grievance with
respect to the Respondent's alleged refusal to furnish data.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Sydney S. Asher, Jr.,
on August 14, 1962, at Worcester, Massachusetts. All parties were represented and
participated fully in the hearing. At the hearing the Respondent amended its answer
to further admit that on or about April 19, 1962, the Union requested the Respondent
to furnish certain wage rates and that at all times thereafter the Respondent has failed
or refused to comply with this request. On September 17, 1962, the General Counsel
and the Respondent filed briefs, which have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is found that the Respondent is,
and at all material times has been, engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act and its operations meet the Board's jurisdictional standards,2 and that the Union
and its International are, and at all material times have been, labor organizations
within the meaning of the Act.
A. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, the Board has found,3 and it is now found
that all production and maintenance employees of the Respondent, excluding office
1 The term "General Counsel" includes the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and his representative at the hearing.
2 The Respondent is a Maine corporation, with its principal office and place of business
in Warren, Massachusetts, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution
of stamping presses and accessories. The Respondent annually receives at its Warren,
Massachusetts, plant directly from sources outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
materials valued at more than $50,000, and annually ships from its Warren, Massachu-
setts, plant directly to destinations outside the Commonwealth products valued at more
than $50,000. The Board has previously exercised jurisdiction over the Respondent.
Perkins Machine Company, Decision and Certification of Representatives issued April 24,
1961 (not published In NLRB volumes).
Perkins Machine Company, supra.
708-006-64-vol. 141-8
100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of the Act.
B. The Union's majority status
On April 24, 1961, the Board certified the Union' s International as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the above-described unit (Case No.
1-RC-6333). It is accordingly found that the Union's International is, and at all
times since on or about April 24, 1961, has been, the exclusive representative of all
employees in the above-described unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment.
C. The Union's demand and the Respondent 's refusal
1. Sequence of events
a. Negotiations
Prior to the certification referred to above, the Respondent had entered into a
collective -bargaining contract with Perkins Machine Company independent Union,
Inc., herein called the Independent . This expired April 30, 1961 . It contained,
among other provisions , the following clause:
ARTICLE XLIl
Rates of Pay
7. Information as to hiring, transfers, layoffs, and discharge cases, shall be
given by the Company to the Union. The Company agrees to furnish the
Union information as to wage rates of all employees within the Bargaining Unit,
including any and all increases given to present and future employees. The
above information shall be given to the President of the Union within twenty-
four (24) hours after their action is instituted.
On or about May 1, 1961, the Union presented its first contract proposal to the
Respondent. This proposal was drafted in correlation with the old contract between
the Respondent and the Independent. Article XIII, paragraph 7, of the Union's
proposal states "Okay," indicating the Union's agreement with the corresponding
provision of the old contract, quoted above. On May 7, 1961, formal negotiations
began. There was no discussion of the wage information provision. On May 15,
1961, the Respondent presented its contract proposal, from which article X;I, Para-
graph 7, was omitted; there was no comparable provision in the proposal under any
number. There was no discussion of the wage information provision.
Further bargaining sessions were held on May 19; June 1, 5, 9, and 12,4 July 6 and
25, and August 1 and 2. The only discussion of old article X,.II related to wage in-
creases, automatic progression, pay of volunteer firemen, and jury pay. There was
no discussion of wage information except a statement by the Respondent's counsel
at the meeting of June 9 that the language in the wage article of the Respondent's
proposal and the Union's proposal were vastly different.
On August 3 the Respondent presented a working document including all items
agreed upon up to that date, the balance being taken from the Respondent's proposal.
There was no discussion of a wage information provision.
Additional negotiating sessions took place on August 8,5 9, and 15. There was
no specific discussion of the wage information provision of article XIII, paragraph 7,
of the old contract, or any other wage information language.
On August 23, the parties reached agreement, effective from August 23, 1961,
to August 22, 1964, and automatically renewable thereafter from year to year in
the absence of 60 days' notice. The contract was typed by the Union and executed
by representatives of both sides. It provided for increased wages but was silent
regarding the Union's right to obtain wage rate data from the Respondent. It also
provided:
4 On June 12 the Respondent submitted a modification of its original proposal
5 On August 8 the Union submitted another proposal beginning: "On all pending con-
tract language we will accept the company proposals where the language is the same as
in the old contract with the following exceptions and or additions." There was no provi-
sion regarding wage data disclosure.
PERKINS NIAC13IN,: CO.IPANY
ARTICLE VUTI-GRIEVANCES
The procedure under this Article is available to either the Company or the
Union for the presentation of grievances and the settlement of disputes.
1. Should differences arise between the Company and the Union as to the
interpretation or application of, or compliance with, the provisions of this Agree-
ment, an earnest effort shall be made to settle toe matter promptly in accordance
with the following procedure:
Step 4
Failing agreement upon the written arguments, the Crievance Committee and
the Management will confer and may refer any grievance, including the interpre-
tation or application of this Agreement, within thiity days to a mutually agreed
upon single Arbitrator or to the American F rbitration Association. The de-
cision reached shall be final and binding upon both parties . . . .
Thereafter, on a date not revealed in the record, the parties executed an undated
document referred to in the record as the "recall agreement." This states that it is to
be "part of and incorporated into the collective bargaining Agreement dated Au-
gust 23, 1961." it provides, among other things, for a general wage increase, but
contains no mention of the Union's right to demand information as to wage rates.
During discussions leading up to the signing of the recall agreement, Ainsworth
Adams, president of the Union, asked Harry McIntyre, an International representa-
tive of the Union: "How about Paragraph 7 [of article XIIIj?" McIntyre replied:
"Well, to heck with it, we'll get this information anyway. We don't have to have that."
The Union was represented at all negotiating meetings, except for the session hold
on August 2, 1961, by either its attorney or one of its international representatives.
During bargaining on and after August 2, 1961, 3. Webster Perkins, president of the
Respondent, frequently advised the Union's representatives that: (1) the Respondent
had a small office staff and wanted to keep the compiling of information "to a mini-
mum"; and (2) everything granted by the Respondent "pertaining to information,
wages, benefits and so forth" would be "in black and white" and that "if it was
not spelled out in the contract, that they were not to get it."
b. Grievance No. 3
On or about March 21, 1962, pursuant to article V:I of the contract , the Union
filed grievance No. 3 alleging that "the Company has violated the contract by not
paying all employees wages in accordance with the contract . We demand that they
be properly paid and made whole, retroactively , for all lost earnings ." On or about
April 19, 1962, a meeting was held to process grievance No. 3 pursuant to
step 4 of article VII. Robert Manning, Esq ., attorney for the Union , stated that the
Union had been informed that certain employees were not being paid the proper
wage rates as provided in the contract . The Union 's representative asked the Re-
spondent 's representatives whether they knew what wage rates were being paid to
employee Kenneth Fales. Perkins responded that he did not know Fales ' wage rate.
The Union 's representative asked whether the Respondent would obtain the wage
rate. Perkins replied that he would obtain the information for the Respondent only.
The Union 's representative asked Perkins to inform Adams as to Fales' wage ;ate;
Perkins refused. The Union 's representative listed the names of nine other em-
ployees and asked for the same wage information , adding that the request was made
in connection with the grievance and the wage data was necessary to process the
grievance . Perkins refused to furnish this information . The Union 's representative
then requested the wage rates paid to each employee in the bargaining unit, stating
that this was necessary in order to process the grievance . Perkins refused to furnish
this information . Finally, Manning requested arbitration of grievance No. 3
but Perkins denied the request . 6 Thereafter, on May 28, 1962 , the Union filed the
charges herein.
2. The waiver issue
The Respondent 's first affirmative defense is that , during negotiations , "the Union
expressly waived any and all rights it might have had" to obtain the information it
sought on April 19, 1962.
O The finding that Manning requested arbitration is based upon Adams' testimony
Perkins denied that any such request had been made with respect to grievance No 3
I credit Adams' version as more accurate than that of Perkins.
102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Perhaps a good place to start an analysis of what constitutes a waiver by a union is
the Jacobs case .? In that proceeding , the details of an existing group insurance plan
had been thoroughly explored during negotiations and the parties had orally agreed
to certain changes. The contract finally executed did not mention the insurance
program, but permitted reopening for wages after 1 year. A year later the union
invoked the reopening clause, demanding both a wage increase and payment by the
company of the entire cost of group insurance. The company refused to discuss the
insurance request. A three-member majority of the Board found no violation of
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act in the company's conduct regarding insurance. One
member of the majority concluded that Section 8(d) of the Act stabilized the rights
of the contracting parties with respect to all bargainable subjects, whether or not
specifically set forth in the contract; 8 another based his concurrence on the fact that
the union had not requested bargaining on insurance independently from that on
wages, and the reopening clause was in his opinion limited to the subject of wages; 9
and the third concurred on the theory that the matter of insurance had been "con-
sciously explored" during negotiations and an agreement reached on this subject,
albeit outside the written contract-he therefore concluded that the agreed upon
insurance changes were part of the contemporaneous bargain made by the parties
which the union could not insist upon reopening in mid-term.10 Bearing in mind
these separate opinions of the. majority, it cannot fairly be said that they all agreed
that the signing of the contract constituted a waiver by the union of its right to de-
mand further bargaining on the subject of insurance for, in the view of one member
of the majority, "the Responcent's willingness to bargain thereon independently was
never put to test." 11
Since its decision in Jacobs the Board has on numerous occasions been called upon
to determine whether, in a particular set of circumstances, the Union has, by execut-
ing a contract, bargained away for the duration of the contract term its statutory
right to make a specific demand. A reading of these cases indicates an underlying
principle that an effective wa.ver will be found to have been given when it appears
in "clear and unmistakable" :anguage, either contained in the contract itself or ex-
pressed at the bargaining table before the contract was signed.12 On the other hand,
a purported waiver will not be lightly inferred in the absence of "clear and unequivo-
cal" language. Even when the parties consciously explore the matter during nego-
tiations and the contract fails to touch upon it, something more is required before
the union will be held to have bargained away its rights, namely, a conscious re-
linquishment by the union, clearly intended and expressed.i3
7 The Jacobs Manufacturing Company, 94 NLRB 1214.
Ibid, opinion of Member Reynolds, pages 1231-1234.
e Ibid, opinion of Member Murdock, pages 1234-1235.
10 Ibid., opinion of Chairman Herzog, pages 1227-1228.
11 The court of appeals left open the question whether "mere previous discussion of a
subject without putting any terms and conditions as to it into the contract" relieves the
parties of the duty to bargain concerning the subject during the contract's life. 196 F 2d
680, 684 (C.A. 2).
12 The following are examples of cases since Jacobs in which such a waiver was found
Avco Manufacturing Corporation (Lycoming Division), 111 NLRB 729 (union had con-
tractually accepted merit system ) ; International News Service Division of The Hearst
Corporation, 113 NLRB 1067 (express oral abandonment of more extensive demand for
information during negotiations and execution of contract providing for only limited in-
formation) ; Speidel Corporation, 120 NLRB 733 (clear oral understanding during bargain-
ing that bonuses would remain "management prerogative") ; and The Berkline Corporation,
123 NLRB 685 (during negotiations union orally agreed that company need not reduce
rules to writing).
"'The following are examples of cases since Jacobs in which no waiver was found:
California Portland Cement Company, 101 NLRB 1436; Otis Elevator Company, 102
NLRB 770, enfd . as mod . 208 F. 2d 176 ( C.A. 2). (Note the language of the court on
page 179 disapproving "the drawing of broad inferences of waiver from [ the parties']
silence" and applying "the general principles of free access to information relevant to
bargainable issues." ) ; Nash-Finch Company, 103 NLRB 1695, enforcement denied because
of court's finding of waiver 211 F . 2d 622 ( C.A. 8) ; Boston Record-American -Advertiser
Division-The Hearst Corporation, 115 NLRB 1095 ; Beacon Piece Dyeing and Finishing
Co., Inc., 121 NLRB 953; The Press Company, Incorporated , 121 NLRB 976 ; Gulf Atlantic
Warehouse Co., 129 NLRB 42, enfd . 291 F. 2d 475 ( C.A 5) ; and The Timken Roller
Bearing Company, 188 NLRB 15 . See also Hekman Furniture Company, 101 NLRB:
631, 632.
PERKINS MACHINE COMPANY 103
The record herein shows that the matter of wage data was not a bone of conten-
tion during negotiations . The only direct mention of the subject was a remark by
one representative of the Union to another that they need not press for retention of
article XIII, paragraph 7, of the "old" contract because "we'll get this information
anyway. We don't have to have that." This bespeaks the Union's opinion that the
current contract , if executed , would not result in a waiver . From the entire history
of the negotiations and from the contract's language, it is clear, and I find, that the
subject of the Union's right to obtain wage data was not consciously explored by
the parties during bargaining nor intentionally relinquished by the Union. I accord-
ingly find no merit in the Respondent 's first affirmative (waiver ) defense.
3. The grievance issue
The Respondent's third and final affirmative defense 14 is that the Union never
sought arbitration of grievance No. 3, or filed any new grievance based upon the
Respondent 's refusal to supply wage data. Relying upon the Board's decision in the
Hercules case,15 the Respondent contends that the Union's failure to request arbitra-
tion "is fatal to the complaint" because the Union did not carry out its "responsibility
to settle the dispute in the manner provided in the contract."
It has been found-contrary to the Respondent's contention-that on April 19,
1962, the Union requested that grievance No. 3 go to arbitration, and that the
Respondent refused this request. Hence, even if a duty to seek arbitration were
imposed upon the Union, such obligation has been fulfilled. In any event, even had
the Union failed to make a request for arbitration, the Respondent's reliance upon
Hercules is misplaced, for the facts of this case are significantly distinguishable
from those in Hercules in at least two major respects : ( 1) the parties in Hercules
were in disagreement regarding the arbitrability of the specific grievance there under
consideration, whereas here, on the contrary, there is no dispute that the alleged
failure of the Respondent to "pay all employees wages in accordance with the con-
tract" is an arbitral matter; and (2) the contract in Hercules made arbitration man-
datory if the union unilaterally requested it after earlier steps of the grievance
procedure produced no agreement, while the instant contract makes arbitration per-
missive only, subject to mutual consent. For these reasons, I conclude that the
principle enunciated in Hercules is inapplicable to the facts confronting us here.
Moreover, the Respondent's argument overlooks the explicit provision of Section
10(a) of the Act that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices "shall not
be affected by any other means of adjustment." Accordingly, this defense likewise
lacks merit.
4. Conclusions
It is well settled that the obligation to bargain in good faith includes the duty of
the employer to furnish to the union relevant data to enable the representative
effectually to bargain for the workers.is This duty does not terminate with the
signing of the collective-bargaining contract, but continues throughout the life of
the agreement, so far as it is necessary to enable the parties to administer the contract
and resolve grievances or disputes.
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear, and I find, that the infor-
mation sought by the Union on April 19, 1962, was relevant to grievance No. 3, and
was necessary in order to enable the Union intelligently to evaluate that grievance
to determine whether it was meritorious, and whether to press for its arbitration.
Nor is there any contention that the data sought was confidential, or that its produc-
tion would be burdensome,17 or that the Union's request was untimely. In refusing
to furnish this information upon request, the Respondent therefore was remiss in
performing its statutory duty. I conclude that, by such conduct, the Respondent
"The Respondent's second affirmative defense is that its refusal to supply the data
was "the direct result and consequence of unfair labor practices engaged in by the Union "
No evidence was elicited to substantiate this defense and it therefore need not be further
discussed
"Hercules Motor Corporation, 136 NLRB 1648 See discussion of this case in The
Timken Roller Bearing Company, 138 NLRB 15, footnote 4; and Sinclair Refining Com-
pany v. N.L R.B., 306 F. 2d 569 (C A. 5), refusing enforcement of 132 NLRB 1660
10 N.L R B v. Truitt Mfg. Co , 351 U.S. 149; and N.L R.B v. F. II'. Woolworth Co.,
235 F 2d 319 (C.A. 9), reversed 352 U S. 938
111 take official notice that at the time of the election of February 28, 1961, there were
approximately 55 eligible voters. See Perkins Machine Company, supra.
104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
since on or about April 19, 1962, has failed to bargain with the Union, in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Furthermore, it thereby interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , and upon the entire record in this
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Perkins Machine Company is, and at all material times has been, an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
2. International Union of Electrical , Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, and
its Local 223 are, and at all material times have been , labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent , excluding
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards , and supervisors as defined
in the Act , constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, was
on April 24, 1961, and at all times since has been, the exclusive representative of
all employees in the above -described unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on and after April 19, 1962, to furnish to International Union of
Electrical , Radio & Machine Workers , AFL-CIO, or its agents , information regard-
ing the wage rates of employees in the above-described unit, thereby refusing to
bargain collectively with the above -named labor organization as the exclusive rep-
resentative of the employees in the above -described unit, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5)
of the Act.
6. By the foregoing conduct, thereby interfering with, restraining , and coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The above-described unfair labor practices tend to lead to labor disputes bur-
dening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce , and constitute
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7)
of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in this case , I make the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
In order to remedy the unfair labor practices found above, it will be recommended
that the Respondent cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union's International by refusing to furnish it or its agents with information regard-
ing the wage rates of any employees in the appropriate unit, which are relevant to a
current grievance or arbitration proceeding. I am convinced, and find, that the sole
reason for the Respondent's refusal to provide the data in question was its good
faith but mistaken belief that it was under no statutory obligation to do so, rather than
any opposition to the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, there would appear to be
no danger of the commission of other unrelated unfair labor practices by the Re-
spondent in the future. It will therefore be recommended that the Respondent
cease and desist only from the unfair labor practices found, and from infringing
upon the rights of its employees in any like or related manner.
Affirmatively it will be recommended that the Respondent furnish to the Union's
International, or its agents, upon timely request in connection with grievance No. 3
or any other current grievance or arbitration proceeding, information regarding
the wage rates of employees in the above-described unit.
It is accordingly recommended that Perkins Machine Company, Warren, Mas-
sachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union of Electrical, Radio
& Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, as the exchusive bargaining representat""e of its em-
ployees in the unit described below by refusing to furnish to it or its agents informa-
tion regarding the wage rates of any employee in the bargaining unit, which are
PERKINS MACHINE COMPANY
relevant to a current grievance or arbitration proceeding . The appropriate bargaining
unit is:
All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent, excluding office
clerical employees , professional employees , guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with , restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act •
(a) Furnish to the above -named labor organization or its agents , upon timely
request in connection with grievance No. 3 or any other current grievance or arbitra-
tion proceeding , information regarding the wage rates of any employee in the above-
described unit.
(b) Post at its plant in Warren , Massachusetts , copies of the attached notice,
marked "Appendix ." 18 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the First Region, shall after being signed by a representative of the
Respondent , be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof , and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter . in conspicuous places , including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director. in writing , within 20 days from the receipt
of this Intermediate Report. what steps it has taken to comply herewith.19
It is further recommended that. unless the Respondent shall, within 20 days
from the receipt of this Intermediate Report. notify the said Regional Director, in
writing, that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations , the Board issue an
Order requiring the Respondent to take such action.
18 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "A Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice If the Boards Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforc-
ing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order."
19 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified
to read "Notify the said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of
this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, you are notified that:
WE WILL furnish to International Union of Electrical , Radio & Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, or its agents , upon timely request in connection with
grievance number three or any other current grievance or arbitration proceeding,
the wage rates of any employee in the following unit:
All our production and maintenance employees , excluding office clerical
employees , professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act
PERKINS MACHINE COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 24 School
Street, Boston 8, Massachusetts . Telephone No. Lafayette 3-8100, if they have any
question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions