Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, Etc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJun 4, 1965

152 N.L.R.B. 1136 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

1136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Board , while not speaking in terms of a union 's jurisdictional claims, has frequently given consideration to such related matters as the history of bargaining in a given unit , whether any union seeks to include a particular group or class of employees in the basic unit it purports to represent , and whether any other union seeks to represent that group in a separate unit.e The fact that the Laundry Workers Union was not seeking to include the six salaried drivers, or any of the other drivers , in the production and maintenance unit it purported to represent and that the Drivers Union was seeking to represent all the drivers , including the six salaried drivers, in a separate unit should , in my view , have a significant bearing upon the unit placement determination . I do not believe that the interest of the Drivers Union in representing all the drivers should be ignored merely because it was apparently unable to enlist the support of a majority of them, for it was cur- rently available for them if they desired representation. My conclusion that the 6 salaried drivers here in issue more appropriately belong in a unit with the 17 commission drivers than in the unit with the production and maintenance laundry and drycleaning employees is, moreover , fortified by the cir- cumstance that none of the parties had themselves treated the salaried drivers as different from the commission drivers for unit placement purposes prior to the Board's telegraphic order of July 17, 1961, directing that the salaried drivers be permitted to vote under challenge and that their unit placement be later determined if necessary . In this connection , I note that it was a commission driver, Bill Car- man, not a salaried driver, whom the Company had present at the representation hearing for the purpose of having him testify concerning his desires as to unit placement. III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION For all of the foregoing reasons in addition to those heretofore stated by the Regional Director and the Board , I find, as the Board has heretofore found, that the following employees constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act : All laundry and dry- cleaning, production and maintenance employees at the Employer 's Denver, Colo- rado, plant , excluding all office clerical employees , drivers, guards , and supervisors as defined in the Act . The employees in that unit having selected the Union as their bargaining representative in the July 19, 1961 , election, and the Company having concededly refused to bargain with the Union as such representative, it is recom- mended that the Board reaffirm its bargaining order of February 25, 1963. 6 See , e g, The Sheffield Corporation, 134 NLRB 1101 , 1103-1105 ; Dewey Portland Cement Company, division of Martin -Marietta Corporation, 137 NLRB 944 , 046, 949; and 142 NLRB 951 , enfd 336 F . 2d 117 (C.A 10) ; D. H. Koester Bakery Co ., Inc, 136 NLRB 1006, 1011 ; Ballentine Packing Company , Inc., 132 NLRB 923, 924-925 ; The Family Laundry, Inc., et al, 121 NLRB 1619 ; Gunzenhauser Bakery, Inc ., 137 NLRB 1613, 1616; D. V. Display Corp , et al , 134 NLRB 568 ; The Valley of Virginia Cooperative Milk Producers Association, 127 NLRB 785. Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48, AFL-CIO (Tri- County Chapter, Painting & Decorating Contractors of Amer- ica, Inc. ) and Ivan Kaufman Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48, AFL-CIO and Ivan Kaufman . Cases Nos. 21-CB-2212 and 21-CC-679. June 4, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On March 5, 1965, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain 152 NLRB No. 116. ORANGE BELT DIST. COUNCIL OF PAINTERS NO. 48, ETC. 1137 affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion . He further found that the Respondent had not engaged in cer- tain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom- mended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and supporting briefs, and the Charging Party filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chair- man McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications 2 The Trial Examiner found that section 1-9 3 of the Respondent's contract fell within the scope of the prohibition of Section 8 (e) of the Act and was not saved by the construction industry proviso thereto' The Trial Examiner based his conclusion on the fact that the restric- tion on subcontracting contained therein was not specifically limited to construction site work. However, in Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council (Fowler-Kenworthy Electric Co., et al.), 151 NLRB 770, the Board held that, in examining contractual pro- i As no exceptions were filed with respect to the Trial Examiner 's findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(b) (1) (B) and 8 ( b) (4) (1) and ( ii) (B), and his further finding that Section IV-2 of Respondent 's contract was not unlawful , we adopt these findings pro forma. 2 Although we affirm the Trial Examiner 's conclusion that Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(3), we do not thereby rely on the language set forth in footnote 4 of the Trial Examiner 's Decision. 8 That section reads as follows: The Employer parties to this Agreement hereby agree that they will not contract to perform work for a Painting or Drywall Contractor who is not signatory to an Agree- ment with Orange Belt District Council of Painters , No. 48, or to sub-let any work coming under the jurisdiction of the Brotherhood of Painters , Decorators and Paper- hangers of America, to any Contractor who is not a signatory to an Agreement with Orange Belt District Council of Painters, No 48. * To the extent material here , Section 8( e) provides as follows It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement , express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling , using, selling , trans- porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person , and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction , alteration , painting , or repair of a building, structure, or other work: . . . 789-730-66-vol. 152-73 1138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD visions which are alleged to violate Section 8(e), it would consider the language used, the nature of the provisions, and the intent of the par- ties, including their interpretation and administration of the agree- ment. There, as here, the contractual provision challenged under Sec- tion 8 (e) did not specifically state that it related only to onsite work. In the absence of any showing that the clause was intended to apply, or had in fact been applied, to offsite work, the Board refused to find the provision unlawful. The record herein reveals that section 1-9 appears only in construc- tion agreements to which the Respondent is a party, and its mainte- nance agreements pertaining to work other than construction contain no such clause. The record further reveals that the clause was intended to apply, and has been applied, only to work performed on construc- tion sites, and that all contractors signatory to Respondent's master construction contract perform work only on such jobsites. In view of this evidence and our holding in Fowler-Kenworthy Electric, we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's finding that the mere failure of this clause specifically to limit its coverage to construction site work removes the provision from the protection of the construction industry proviso to Section 8 (e). The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that section I-10 a of Respondent's contract is unlawful under Section 8(e). Our finding of illegality is based, however, on considerations different from those expressed by the Trial Examiner. In Muskegon Bricklayers Union #5, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, (Greater Muskegon General Contractors Association), 152 NLRB 360, the Board, with Member Fanning dissenting, held that a similar clause, which provided for the right of individual employees to refuse to work on a job where any work was being per- formed at wages or working conditions less favorable than those pro- vided in the contract of the appropriate Building Trades local union, was the equivalent of an agreement by an employer not to do business with other employers within the scope of the prohibition of Section 8(e). The Board further held that the clause was not saved by the construction industry proviso to Section 8(e), as it sanctioned eco- nomic action by the employees to enforce the agreement. Thus, a con- tractual right to such economic self-help was held to exceed the pre- scribed bounds of the proviso. We think the same reasoning applies to section I-10, in that it, too, sanctions economic self-help by employees whenever a job has been declared "unfair" by the local Building Trades 5 Section 1-10 reads as follows The Employer parties hereto expressly agree that they shall not work nor will it be a breach of this Agreement for employees to refuse to work on any fob that has been declared unfair by the Building and Construction Trades Council in the locality where the work is being performed. ORANGE BELT DIST. COUNCIL OF PAINTERS NO. 48, ETC. 1139 Council. Accordingly, we find that section I-10 is unlawful and that, by threatening to picket and by picketing in the manner described by the Trial Examiner, in order to require Kaufman to enter into an "interim" agreement containing such clause, Respondent violated 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (A) of the Act.6 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom- mei7ided by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. O For the reasons expressed in his dissent in the Muskegon Contractors case, supra, Member Fanning would find that section 1-10 falls within the protection of the build- ing and construction industry exemption to Section 8(e) of the Act and that Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(A) by its actions to obtain that provision TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon the amended consolidated complaint 1 of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, this matter was tried before Trial Examiner Wal- lace E Royster in Los Angeles , California , on December 2, 1964. At issue is whether Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48, AFL-CIO, herein the Respondent , has engaged in unfair labor practices within the compass of Section 8(b)(1)(B ), 8(b)(3), and 8(b)(4)(i ) and (ii ) (A) and (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , herein the Act. Upon the entire record in the case, from my observation of the witnesses, and upon consideration of the briefs filed, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS ENTITIES Ivan Kaufman, the Charging Party, is engaged in Pomona, California, as a dry- wall and painting contractor in the building and construction industry. Kaufman is, and at all times material herein has been, a member of Tri-County Chapter, Paint- ing & Decorating Contractors of America, Inc., herein called Tri-County. Tri-County is an organization of building and construction contractors which negotiates collective-bargaining agreements with labor organizations, including the Respondent, in the Southern California area. In the operation of their several busi- nesses, employer members of Tri-County annually perform services outside the State of California valued in excess of $50,000 and annually purchase and receive goods, materials, and supplies which are shipped directly to them or directly to their California suppliers from points outside the State of California, valued in excess of $50,000. K. E. Peterson, Inc., herein called Peterson, is engaged at San Bernardino, Cali- fornia, and vicinity, as a general contractor in the building and construction indus- try. In the fall of 1963, Peterson was the general contractor in the construction of a bank building in Indio, California. In connection with this construction, Peterson subcontracted portions of the work to Kaufman and to Carl W. Reinhardt, herein called Reinhardt. Reinhardt as well as Kaufman is engaged in the building and construction industry. Members of Tri-County, including Kaufman, are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The foregoing findings are based upon admissions in Respondent's answer. No jurisdictional issue is presented. 1Issued February 5, 1964, and amended February 10, 1964. Charges filed Octo- ber 30, 1963. 1140 DECISIONS Or NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the painters and decorators employed by Tri-County members, including those of Kaufman, con- stitute a unit appropriate for purposes of bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act and that at all times material the Respondent has been and now is the exclusive bargaining representative of all such employees within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. A collective-bargaining contract between the Respondent and Tri-County, nego- tiated in 1960, expired at the end of July 1963. Upon this happening, the Respond- ent began a strike against Tri-County members which continued until the signing of a new agreement in March 1964. In October 1963, Kaufman held a contract from Peterson under which Kaufman was to perform certain painting work on a building under construction in Indio, California. Peterson was the general contractor on this job. On October 22, 1963, Kaufman was at the jobsite and had 3 of his employees at work there. Andrew Wallace. a business representative of the Respondent, approached him and asked that Kaufman sign an "interim" agreement with the Respondent. Wallace went on to say that Kaufman would have to resign from Tri- County and that if he failed to accept the agreement offered to him pickets would be placed at the construction site. On the same date Wallace telephoned Peterson to complain that Kaufman was nonunion. Wallace said that everything would be all right if Kaufman would sign an agreement and asked that Peterson try to persuade Kaufman to do so. A few hours later Wallace again telephoned Peterson saying that Kaufman was proving to be stubborn and suggesting that Peterson get another painting contractor. Wal- lace gave Peterson the name of a contractor who would be acceptable to the Respondent . Wallace threatened that if Kaufman was continued on the job it would be picketed. On the following Sunday, October 27, Wallace informed Peterson that pickets would be posted the next morning and they were. On October 22, Wallace told Fred Moody , who was working for Kaufman at the site , that Kaufman had not signed the agreement; that if Moody continued at work he would be fined $300. On October 29 Wallace told two employees of C. W. Reinhardt, a subcontractor on the job , that he desired them not to work as long as picketing continued. Peterson capitulated , canceled Kaufman 's contract and made other arrangements to complete the painting work. The picketing then ceased.2 It is contended by counsel for the General Counsel that the events described above demonstrate that the Respondent has engaged in a variety of unfair labor practices . An explication of his position and my conclusions follow. The "interim" agreement offered to Kaufman and the signing of which was the price demanded by the Respondent for permission for Kaufman , unhindered by picketing , to perform his contract with Peterson contained , by reference to the expired agreement with Tri -County, the following provisions: SECTION 1 EMPLOYERS 9. CONTRACTS: The Employer parties to this Agreement hereby agree that they will not contract to perform work for a Painting or Drywall Contractor who is not signatory to an Agreement with Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48, or to sub-let any work coming under the jurisdiction of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, to any Contractor who is not a signatory to an Agreement with Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48. 10. The Employer parties hereto expressly agree that they shall not work nor will it be a breach of this Agreement for employees to refuse to work on any job that has been declared unfair by the Building and Construction Trades Council in the locality where the work is being performed. SECTION IV UNIONS AND JOURNEYMEN 2. PICKET LINES: It shall not be considered a violation of this Agreement for employees covered by this agreement to refuse to pass through or to work behind a legitimate picket line. 2 The facts as found are not controverted by other evidence. ORANGE BELT DIST. COUNCIL OF PAINTERS NO. 48, ETC. 1141 Respondent's executive secretary, Jack E. Cox, testified that the Respondent had contracts only with those employers who performed all of their work at the con- struction site and that thus, the contract language could not affect offsite work. However, the contract remains as it reads and its provisions are not restricted to construction site operations. Subparagraph 10 of the contract requires any signing employer to refrain from working on any "unfair" job. Such an agreement would readily bring about a situation , as no doubt it was intended to, where an employer would be forced by its terms to cease doing business with another contractor to oust an "unfair" employer from the job. I find that section I, subparagraph 9 and 10 of Respondent's contract are within the scope of the prohibitions in Section 8(e) of the Act .3 Section IV, subparagraph 2, falls, I think, in a different category. It provides that a refusal by employees to pass through or work behind a "legitimate" picket line shall not constitute a breach of agreement. "Legitimate" is not a word of art and it has some variety of connotation but in the usual sense it means lawful and I think that the Respondent is entitled to the presumption that it was used here in that sense. The Respondent may at sometime characterize as legitimate a picket line which cannot accurately be so described. Such an event must be awaited. I find nothing violative of the Act in section IV, 2. Of course no contract was reached with Kaufman but by the threat of picketing and the picketing the Respondent threatened, coerced, and restrained Kaufman with an object of forcing or requiring him to enter into an agreement prohibited by Sec- tion 8(e). With the same object, the Respondent induced and encouraged Kauf- man's employees to cease work. The Respondent thus engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(1) and (ii) (A) of the Act. By the picketing and by asking employees to observe the picket line, the Respond- ent induced and encouraged the employees of Reinhardt to engage in a strike or a refusal to perform services for their employer and by the same conduct threatened, coerced, and restrained Reinhardt with an object of forcing or requiring Reinhardt to cease doing business with Peterson until Kaufman was removed from the job. The same picketing had the complementary object of forcing and requiring Peterson to cease his business relation with Kaufman and this object was sought and attained by threats, coercion, and restraint upon Peterson. Thus the Respondent engaged in the commission of unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(1) and (ii) (B) of the Act. It is alleged that by attempting to force a contract containing illegal provisions upon Kaufman, the Respondent refused to bargain with Kaufman in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. I have found that the proffered agreement does not meet the test of Section 8(e) of the Act and for that reason the Respondent could not lawfully insist upon its acceptance. However, I am unable to subscribe to the theory that the Respondent failed in any bargaining duty owed to Kaufman.4 There was none. The Respondent upon this record was bound to negotiate with Tri-County for any agree- ment affecting Kaufman or his employees. Attempting to deal directly with Kaufman rather obviously was inconsistent with the duty to bargain with Tri-County but that is not the thrust of the complaint. It owed no bargaining duty to Kaufman (other than as a member of Tri-County) and thus could not have failed to honor a non- existent obligation. The contract offered to Kaufman contained a requirement that Kaufman obtain a performance bond. I am supplied with much authority to the effect that an employer is not required to bargain about such a bond but the authority is irrelevant to the question here. It still remains the fact that the Respondent had no duty to bargain with Kaufman, indeed, it seems to have had a duty not to do so. The insistence upon a performance bond thus has no relevance to the 8(b)(3) allegation. Kaufman had a right to choose his own representative for bargaining purposes and had done so. By restraining and coercing Kaufman by means of threats to picket and by picketing to abandon Tri-County as his bargaining representative, the Respond- ent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (B) of the Act. The settlement of the strike was accompanied by the adoption of a new contract. As a member of Tri-County, Kaufman is bound by its terms. Arguing that as to Kaufman, the contract was obtained by the commission of unfair labor practices, I am asked to excise from it those portions which I have found to be prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act. I think that this cannot be done. The complaint does not S Southern California District Council of Hod Carriers and Laborers and Gunite Work- ers Local No . 345, et al. ( Swimming Pool Gunite Contractors Group , et al ), 144 NLRB 978. The permissive language of Section 8(b) of the Act does not impose a bargaining duty. 1142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD attack the new contract and if it had, Tri-County was not named as a party.5 Further- more, there is no allegation that Kaufman or Tri-County entered into any agreement with the Respondent under the coercion of unfair labor practices. With the signing of the new contract, Tri-County agreed for itself and its members to dismiss all actions then pending in any forum against the Respondent . Kaufman made no move to dismiss this proceeding and Tri-County 's request for that action by the Board 's Regional Office was not successful . I conclude that the agreement between the Respondent and Tri -County does not require the dismissal of the com- plaint . The motion to dismiss is denied. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con- nection with the operations of the several employers described in section I, above, have a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to and have led to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Members of Tri-County , including Kaufman, Peterson , and Reinhardt, are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act and are persons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) of the Act. 2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Tri-County has been the representative of its members including Kaufman for purposes of collective bargaining at all times material to the issues in this proceeding in respect to a bargaining unit consisting of all painters and decorators employed by members of Tri-County in the geographical area of Orange, Riverside, San Diego, Imperial, and San Bernardino Counties , and the eastern portion of Los Angeles County. Excluding all other employees and supervisors , this unit is one appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all material times the Respondent has been the representative for purposes of collective bargaining of employees in the unit described immediately above and now is the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By inducing and encouraging an individual employed by Kaufman to cease work for an object proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) of the Act, as found above, and by threatening Kaufman with picketing at the Indio construction site in an attempt to gain contract provisions prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act , the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) (A) of the Act. 6. By inducing and encouraging employees of Reinhardt to refuse to perform serv- ices for their employer for objects proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) of the Act, as found above, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act. 7. By such inducement and encouragement and by picketing the project where Peterson and Reinhardt were engaged in construction work for the object of forcing or requiring Reinhardt to cease doing business with Peterson , and sequentially forcing or requiring Peterson to cease doing business with Kaufman, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act. 8. By coercing and restraining Kaufman in the selection of his representative for purposes of collective bargaining , the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (B ) of the Act. 9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act. 6 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. N.L R.B., 305 U S. 197, 232-236. ORANGE BELT DIST. COUNCIL OF PAINTERS NO. 48, ETC. 1143 RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law I recom- mend that Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Inducing or encouraging employees of Kaufman to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of employment to perform services for Kaufman with an object to force or require Kaufman to sign an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act. (b) Inducing or encouraging any individual employed by Reinhardt or any other employer to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of employment to perform any services, or threatening, coercing, or restraining Reinhardt or Peterson or any other employer by a strike or picketing where in either case an object thereof is to force or require Reinhardt to cease doing business with Peterson, or Peterson to cease doing business with Kaufman. (c) Restraining or coercing Kaufman in the selection of his representative for purposes of collective bargaining. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its separate business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice as an Appendix.6 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Di- rector for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and mail copies of the said notice to the Regional Director for Region 21 for posting by Peterson and Reinhardt, they being willing, and by Kaufman, at all locations where notices to their employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Recommended Order, what steps have been taken in compliance.? e In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words " the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board ' s Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words, "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 7 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF ORANGE BELT DISTRICT COUNCIL OF PAINTERS No. 48, AFL-CIO Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce Ivan Kaufman in the selection of his repre- sentative for purposes of collective bargaining. WE WILL NOT induce or encourage any employee of Ivan Kaufman or of any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce who is at work within our territorial jurisdiction to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of employment to perform any services, or threaten, coerce, or restrain Ivan Kaufman or any other person as described above where in either case an object thereof is to force or require Ivan Kaufman to enter into an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act. WE WILL NOT induce or encourage any individual employed by Carl W. Rein- hardt, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce who is at work within our territorial jurisdiction to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of employment to perform any services , or threaten, coerce, or restrain Carl W. Reinhardt or any other person as described above 1144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD where in either case an object thereof is to force or require Carl W. Reinhardt or any other person as defined herein to cease doing business with K. E. Peterson, Inc. WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain K. E. Peterson, Inc., or its subcon- tractors, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce who is at work within our territorial jurisdiction where an object thereof is to force or require K. E. Peterson, Inc., or any other person as described above to cease doing business with Ivan Kaufman. ORANGE BELT DISTRICT COUNCIL OF PAINTERS No. 48, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional office, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone No. 688-5204. Big Run Coal & Clay Company and United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-3225. June 4,1965 DECISION AND ORDER On March 12, 1965, Trial Examiner Herbert Silberman issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, and recom- mending it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. There- after, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The rul- ings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Exam- iner's Decision, the exceptions, brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent, Big Run Coal & Clay Company, Lexington, Ken- tucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. 152 NLRB No. 120.