Newberry Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 10, 1963

141 N.L.R.B. 1167 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1167
sible . Immediately , on August 28, 1962 , the Company sent a second teletype to
terminal managers revoking the plan , and it has not been put into effect . Schoolfield
promptly got in touch with the Union and asked for a meeting to discuss the in-
centive plan. The parties soon met and negotiated about the plan and were still
meeting on details of its operation at the time of the hearing in this case. These
negotiations were sought by Schoolfield before any complaint was made by the
Union , and, so far as the record shows, even before the Union heard about the
plan.
I find that any detrimental or obstructive effect on the bargaining process was
overcome and repaired by the Company's speed in revoking its earlier action and
meeting and bargaining with the Union about the wage plan . Respondent did not
violate Section 8(a) (5) of the Act in such circumstances.°
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Motor Freight, Respondent Freight Lines, and Respondent J. V.
$raswell are jointly an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. Respondents did not violate the Act as alleged in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
° Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Bernie Katz, d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736.
Newberry Mills, Inc. and United Textile Workers of America,
Local 120, AFL-CIO . Case No. 11-CA-1887. April 10, 1963
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 28, 1962, Trial Examiner Sidney D. Goldberg issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter-
mediate Report. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommended that those allegations of the complaint
be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board, has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Leedom and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire
record in this case, including the Intermediate Report, the exceptions,
and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
141 NLRB No. 110.
1168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions and.
modifications :
1. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the Re-
spondent refused to bargain in good faith with the certified Union, in
violation of Section 8(a) (5) and (1), by reverting on January 17,
1962, in the course of its negotiations for a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the Union, to its July 26, 1961, proposals, thereby repudiat-
ing the several agreements reached between these two dates,' and by
unilaterally increasing the weavers' wage rate on November 27, 1961.
However, we further find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the
Respondent also refused to bargain in good faith by increasing the
loom fixers' rate and granting an "across-the-board" increase to all
employees.
As found by the Trial Examiner, the Respondent and, the certified
Union began their negotiations for a new contract in July 1961. In
August or September 1961, while the negotiations were in progress, a
delegation of loom fixers requested General Manager Gatlin to raisev
their wage rate to the industry average for South Carolina.' Gatlin
indicated agreement but said he could not raise their wages without
union approval, and he suggested that they get the Union's consent.
Thereafter, the union president and committee met with Gatlin, and
stated that the Union would not agree to a wage increase for the loom
fixers alone. On October 23, Respondent nevertheless increased the
loom fixers' rate. On November 27, 1961, the Respondent unilaterally
raised the wages of the weavers, and on January 17, 1962, it repudiated
the agreements it had reached with the Union as to several other issues.
During the February 15, 1962, bargaining session, Union Representa-
tive Silcox requested a 5-percent "across-the-board" wage increase and
handed Gatlin a letter to this effect. Gatlin answered that such an
increase was pending in the industry and that it was the Respondent's
policy to follow the industry trend in South Carolina. On Febru-
ary 27, Gatlin telephoned Silcox and told him that the Respondent
was prepared to make the 5-percent wage increase. Silcox answered
"that's fine," but suggested that Gatlin meet with him and the union
committee to "get the thing squared away." Gatlin answered that the
Respondent was going to make the increase effective as of the previous
day, and that there was nothing to meet about. Silcox said that he
wanted a meeting so that the effective date of the wage increase and
I We do not, however , agree with the Trial Examiner , that the record establishes that
the Respondent deprived its negotiator of the authority requisite for good - faith bargain-
ing We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent ' s demand that the Union
drop the litigation pending on grievances did not constitute a violation of Section 8(a) (5)
and (1 ), but only on the ground that the Respondent did not persist in this demand
z The prior contract between the Respondent and the Union had provided that the wage
rates established therein "shall remain is effect during the life of this agreement . . _. ex-
cept If there be a general revision in wages . . . in the competitive South Carolina cotton
spinning and weaving mills . the parties shall meet promptly and ,endeavor to reach
an agreement on such issues."
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1169
other matters could be settled, and so that the Union could "get credit"
for the increase. Thereafter, Gatlin, on the same day, posted a notice
informing the employees that it was adjusting wages upward, effec-
tive March 5, 1962, "in conformity with the industrywide wage pat-
tern," and that Silcox had been informed of the increase and had
"suggested that before this could be agreed upon, it would be necessary
to sit down and discuss the matter." The notice then continued :
There is nothing to discuss and nothing to negotiate since we are
following the pattern of the industry. Any delay in this adjust-
ment being made in our plant will rest squarely on the shoulders
of your bargaining representative.
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent did not violate the
Act by this conduct because an impasse had been reached with respect
to the loom fixers' raise, and because the across-the-board increase con-
formed with the Union's request and was provided for in the contract.
We do not agree that the circumstances surrounding the granting of
the loom fixers' raise constituted an impasse of such a nature as to
justify the Respondent's unilateral action.' Moreover, as to the across-
the-board increase, the contract did not provide for an automatic ad-
justment of wages to conform with the industry standard, but pro-
vided that "the parties shall meet promptly and endeavor to reach an
agreement on such issues." As the Respondent refused to meet, and
refused to negotiate with regard to the effective date of the increase,,
its conduct cannot be said to have conformed with the Union's request,
or to have been provided for in the contract. The Respondent's con-
duct must be viewed in the overall context in which it occurred. Thus,
within a period of 4 months while the Respondent and the Union were
engaged in negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement, the Re-
spondent raised the wages of the loom fixers, over the protest of the
Union against a raise for this group alone, and then raised the wages
of the weavers, without notifying the Union. Finally, the Respondent
raised the wages of all the employees, after refusing to negotiate as to
the effective date, and publicized its action to the employees in such a
manner as to discredit the Union. Under these circumstances, we find
that the normal, expected effect of the Respondent's conduct in grant-
ing these wage increases, while engaged in collective bargaining with
the certified representative of its employees, was to divide the em-
ployees and undermine progressively their loyalty to their bargaining
representative, and constituted a disparagement of the Union and the
collective-bargaining process. By such conduct, the Respondent failed
and refused to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a) (5)
and (1) of the Act 4
8 See, e g., W. W. Cross and Company, Inc., 77 NLRB 1162
6 Accord, Tranity Valley Iron and Steel Company, a Division of C C. Griffin Manu-
faoturing Company, Inc., 127 NLRB 417; Dinion Coil Co., Inc., 110 NLRB 196.
1170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that Supervisors
Campbell and Ellisor solicited employees to withdraw their member-
ship in the Union, and to cease having their union dues deducted, and,,
in the context of the circumstances present here, that the Respondent
thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1).1
ORDER
The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial
Examiner with the following modifications :
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a) :
Soliciting its employees to withdraw from membership in and
revoke their checkoff authorizations for United Textile Workers
of America, Local 120, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, or in any other similar or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Substitute the following for the last full paragraph :
It is further ordered that the complaint herein, insofar as it
alleges the commission of unfair labor practices not found in this
Decision and Order, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
a Hemton Furniture Company , 111 NLRB 342; The Red Rock Company, etc, 84 NLRB
521, 524, enfd. as modified 187 F. 2d 276 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 341 U S. 950. However,
in the context herein, we do not agree with the Trial Examiner, nor do we adopt his
finding, that such solicitation of a member of the Union's negotiating committee and of
an officer of the Union during contract negotiations also violated Section 8(a)(5).
Kohler Co., 128 NLRB 1062 at 1091, footnote 50, enfd in part and remanded In part
300 F. 2d 699 (C.A.D.C.).
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (29
U.S.C. Sec 151 et seq.; herein called the Act), was commenced by a complaint'
alleging that Respondent, by acts and omissions therein stated and in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, had failed to bargain in good faith with the
Charging Party (herein called the Union) as the collective-bargaining representative
of its employees.
Respondent answered, admitting that it was engaged in commerce and that the
Charging Party, a labor organization, was the collective-bargaining representative
of its employees in an appropriate unit but denying the commission of the unfair labor
practice charged and setting forth affirmative defenses, including an allegation that
it was the Union which had failed to bargain in good faith. The issues raised by
the pleadings came on for hearing before Sidney D. Goldberg, duly designated
as Trial Examiner, and were heard in Columbia, South Carolina, on July 24, 25,
and 26, 1962. All parties were represented and afforded full opportunity to examine
and cross-examine witnesses and to argue on the law and evidence. Briefs were
filed by the General Counsel and by counsel for the Respondent.
As set forth in detail below, I find that certain of Respondent's acts and conduct
constituted a failure to bargain in good faith and an unfair labor practice in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
1 Issued March 23 , 1962 , on a charge filed January 26, 1962, and amended charges filed
February 20 and March 21, 1962.
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1171
Upon consideration of the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. RESPONDENT 'S BUSINESS
Respondent is, and at the times material herein was, a South Carolina corporation
engaged in the business of printing cloth, operating a plant at Newberry, South
Carolina. During the 12 months prior to the issuance of the complaint, a representa-
tive period, Respondent received goods and materials valued at more than $500,000
from points outside the State of South Carolina and shipped finished products valued
at more than $500,000 to points outside the State. The answer admits, and I find, that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce.
II. THE UNION
The Charging Party is a labor organization.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The relationship between Respondent and the Union goes back at least to 1945
when the Union was first certified at Newberry Mills. For the purposes of this
report, however, their joint history begins August 8, 1959, when they signed a 2-year
collective-bargaining contract. This contract, a printed booklet of 38 pages, is both
detailed and comprehensive. Two of the many subjects covered by it, arbitration
and checkoff, were the principal areas of disagreement in the negotiations at issue
herein. Section III, entitled "Grievance and Arbitration Procedure," provides for
the adjustment of-
Grievances arising out of the operation and interpretation of this agreement
involving wages (other than general wage increase or decrease proposals as
provided for in Section X), hours, or other conditions of employment. . . .
culminating, upon demand of either party, in arbitration. Several other provisions
of the contract specifically refer to the grievance procedure or to arbitration,2 but
the breadth of the quoted coverage appears to include almost any possible dispute
between Respondent and its employees growing out of their employment and the
record indicates that, in general , both parties concurred in a broad construction
thereof.
With respect to at least 15 grievances, however, they appear to have differed
sharply: Respondent denying that the problems involved were subject to the arbitra-
tion procedure and the Union contending either that the disputes were subject to the
procedure or that the question of their arbitrability was itself subject to arbitration.
In conformity with its contention the Union had, in connection with these 15 griev-
ances, instituted an action in the United States District Court and Respondent had
interposed a counterclaim for $56,000 damages. These grievances, and the Union's
maintenance of legal proceedings thereon, constituted an element in the bargaining
relationship between the parties during the period material herein.
The contract also provided that employees might "voluntarily" authorize checkoff
of their union dues. Such authorization was revocable, however, only during the
10 days immediately preceding the anniversary date of the contract.
Apparently in preparation for the termination of the contract on August 8, 1961,
in May of that year Respondent filed a representation petition (11-RM-83) and
a consent election was held on June 22. There were 601 eligible voters and 593
of them voted: 311 votes were for representation by the Union, 267 were against
and 15 ballots were challenged. Accordingly, the Union was again certified as the
collective-bargaining representative of Respondent 's production and maintenance
2 Section V-Work Assignment Charges ; Section VII-Seniority ; Section VIII-Leaves
of Absence; Section X-Wages (general wage rates made not subject to arbitration)
Section XIII-Union Membership (arbitration of disputes concerning discrimination)
Section XIV-Shop Rules ; Section XVIII-Good Faith (objectionable company rules sub-
ject to grievance procedure and arbitration).
708-006-64-vol. 141-75
1172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees,3 a unit admittedly appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining
under the Act.
B. Contract negotiations
1. Introductory
On June 22, 1961, the Union opened negotiations for a new collective-bargaining
contract by submitting proposed amendments to the then current contract and re-
questing a meeting within a certain period. In accordance with the Union's request,
the first meeting was held July 18, 1961, and the Union's proposals were examined
in the light of the expiring contract. Between that date and June 4, 1962, there
were 18 additional negotiating sessions, including 3 after the issuance of the com-
plaint herein, but no contract was signed. Although I have examined all of the
evidence concerning these meetings and have charted the ebb and flow of the nego-
tiations as reflected in the record,4 a detailed account thereof would add nothing to
this report except length. Adequate discussion of the issues, however, requires
a statement of the opening proposals of the parties, a description of certain meetings
at which important positions were taken by them and a tracing of the principal points
of disagreement, including arbitration and checkoff, through the course of the nego-
tiations. Fortunately, although each of the parties presented its position forcefully
at the hearing and cross-examination was vigorously conducted, examination of the
record on the major issues discloses few disputes on the material facts.5
2. The Union's proposals
With respect to 11 of the 21 sections of the contract, the Union proposed no
changes but it proposed that 3 other sections 6 be deleted. Its proposed changes in
the section concerning the grievance and arbitration procedure appear to be designed
to make clear in the new agreement the Union's contention concerning the old, that
is, that the scope of arbitration was itself arbitrable. This it proposed to accomplish
by giving the arbitrator "jurisdiction or authority to interpret and apply the provisions
of this agreement " Only a minor change was proposed in the checkoff provision;
that the Company provide the Union with "information" not otherwise defined.
Other proposals would have added July 4 and Labor Day as "paid holidays" and
would have broadened the company-paid insurance plan to cover dependents of
employees.
I The actual unit is: all production and maintenance employees employed at the New-
berry, South Carolina, plant, excluding supervisory, clerical, watchmen, gatemen, supply
room men, and standards department personnel.
4 This ebb and flow is complicated by the fact that the union negotiators were led by
three different officials, each of whom announced, as he opened negotiations, that he was
starting with a "clean slate " Radford Cope, an International representative and director
of South Carolina, appears to have been the regularly assigned professional representative
of Local 120 and, with a committee of the officials of that local to assist him, acted for
the Union at the initial sequence of meetings on July 18, 21, 26, and 31; at the meetings
held August 25 and 31, 1961, and at the final meetings-after the issuance of the com-
plaint-on May 15, 23, and June 4, 1962. Roy S. Whitmire, southern director of the
United Textile Workers, acted as the Union's spokesman at the meetings of August 3, 23,
and September 20, 1961. William Silcox, International vice president in charge of North
Carolina, took over on October 25 and also acted for the Union at the meetings of Novem-
ber 7, 17, and 28, 1961, January 17, February 8 and 15, 1962, after which the complaint
herein was issued and, as stated , Cope returned.
5 This observation does not apply to the issue raised by the allegation that certain super-
visors solicited employees to revoke their checkoff authorizations and terminate their mem-
bership in the Union.
O Those entitled "Union Membership," "Shop Rules," and "Good Faith." These section
titles, unfortunately, represent an approximation of their contents that is frequently mis-
leading For example, the section entitled "Union Membership" stipulates that the Union
will not coerce employees into becoming members of the Union, that the Company will
not discriminate against employees because of their membership in the Union, that neither
"Union" nor "Non-Union" activities shall take place on company time or premises except
as authorized and that disputes in this area shall be submitted to arbitration While the
title "Shop Rules" is fairly descriptive, the section entitled "Good Faith" provides both
for the disciplining of any employee violating the contract and for the submission to
arbitration of any company rule claimed to work "undue hardship" on the employees
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1173
Meetings were held on July 18 and 21 at which the Union's proposals were studied
and at which Cope first made the statement-concededly repeated by union represent-
atives throughout the negotiations-that no contract would be complete or acceptable
without provisions for arbitration and checkoff. At these meetings there was also
considerable discussion of the 15 "unprocessed" grievances, concerning which Cope
said-at the very least-that if they were "processed" there would be "a much
easier time reaching agreement on the contract." At the July 21 meeting General
Manager Gatlin pointed out that to comply with the Union's insurance proposal
would cost Respondent $76,000.
3. Respondent's proposal
At the meeting of July 26, 1961, Respondent submitted its proposals-also on
the basis of amendments to the expiring contract. In handing them to the Union's
negotiators General Manager Gatlin, Respondent's principal negotiator, stated
"I know this proposal is rough but we have got some room to bargain on." The union
negotiators, after glancing briefly at the proposal, dropped it on the table saying
"It really is hot."
Respondent's proposal called for no changes in nine sections-six of them being
sections in which the Union had also proposed no changes-and one-"good faith"-
which the Union had suggested deleting. It also proposed to delete the checkoff pro-
vision and, most important, would have inserted a phrase in the section on grievance
and arbitration procedure making arbitration of grievances conditional upon "mutual
consent." 7 Where the Union had sought additional benefits in paid holidays and
insurance coverage, Respondent offered no change. Moreover, Respondent proposed
a general tightening of time limits for various applications and procedures under
the contract, a new requirement that a doctor's certificate be submitted in support of
any request for leave of absence due to illness and a provision for physical examina-
tion by the company doctor prior to resumption of duties after "extended" leave due
to illness.
4. Negotiations during 1961
After receipt of the Company 's proposal , 10 bargaining sessions were held during
the balance of 1961. At some of these meetings the positions of the parties appeared
to harden, but negotiations were never broken off and, at subsequent meetings bar-
gaining was resumed. At the completion of this series of meetings, Respondent had
changed its position on arbitration to the point where it was willing to have the con-
tract provide for "demand" arbitration in connection with discharges, workloads
and changes in work assignments. The Union, however, adhered to its insistence upon
"demand" arbitration on all matters subject to the grievance procedures At this
point it had also been agreed that the arbitrator would be a permanent one, although
subject to removal.
Respondent's proposal that approval by the Company's doctor be required for re-
sumption of duties after illness had been settled by agreement on approval by a
"bona fide" physician and agreement had been reached in principle , if not in specific
terms, on several other points . Respondent had offered a provision for revocable
checkoff which the Union appears to have tentatively, but not seriously, rejected
and the negotiators appear to have shared the impression that, upon agreement on the
major problems, a checkoff provision would follow as a matter of course. The Union
had dropped its demand for "reporting pay."
5. The meeting of January 17, 1962
At the last two meetings of the 1961 series, described above, Silcox alone rep-
resented the Union and Whitehead, Respondent's personnel manager, was accom-
7 As used by the parties and in this report, the term "demand arbitration " applies to a
provision for arbitration, upon demand by either party, after exhaustion of the grievance
procedure. The provision in the 1959-61 contract between the parties was of this type.
"Consent arbitration ," in contrast , authorizes arbitration only on mutual consent in each
instance
'To the extent that the testimony of Silcox concerning the meeting of November 28,
1961, suggests that Respondent, through Whitehead, agreed that the "scope of arbitra-
tion" would cover the "entire contract," it is rejected Other testimony by Silcox, as
well as all the evidence in this case, convinces me, and I find , that Respondent did not
agree to a contract provision for overall "demand" arbitration ( See footnote 10 )
1174 DECISIONS OT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
panied only by minor mill officials whose assistance he appeared to require. White-
head's connection with Respondent thereafter terminated at the end of 1961 for purely
personal reasons
General Manager Gatlin testified that he made no new proposals at the meeting of
January 17, 1962, because Silcox had informed him "that he felt he and Mr. White-
head had already come fairly close to arriving at a contract " 9 However, most of the
morning session was occupied by the efforts of Silcox, from his notes, and Gatlin,
from Whitehead's notes, to determine what agreements had been reached during
those negotiations and where areas of disagreement still remained.10
Toward the end of the morning session, Gatlin brought up the subject of arbitra-
tion and read to the negotiators, according to Silcox-
. . some letter from an ex-professor of Duke University, downing all arbitra-
tors as being unreasonable and not understanding, long-haired professors,1' and
that sort of thing.
Gatlin, restating Respondent's determination to grant only consent arbitration, then
said he was "sorry" but negotiations would have to go back to Respondent's original
proposal of July 26 in its entirety and that, moreover, it would have to be a "package
deal" requiring the Union's withdrawal of the pending litigation.12 Silcox protested
that this did not constitute bargaining in good faith. Gatlin said. "That's the way it
stands," and the negotiators then recessed for lunch.
After lunch, according to the credited testimony of Silcox, the union negotiators
asked Gatlin
If the Union accepts your July 26, 1961, proposals, will you then withdraw the
I requirement of] dropping of the court cases pending')
and Gatlin answered:
I cannot make a firm proposal, the company officials have given me a package
deal to hand to you, and that's as far as I can go.
To the Union's protest that this position canceled all the progress that had been
made and all the agreements that had been reached, Gatlin answered that he had
given them the Company's "final offer." Little more occurred after this exchange
and the meeting recessed.
6. The meeting of February 15
After a brief meeting on February 8 at which the Union proposed renewal of the
expired contract and Gatlin repeated Respondent's refusal to make any offer other
than the one it had made on January 17, the parties again met on February 15, 1962
At this meeting Respondent appeared to have changed its position on the pending
litigation, Gatlin saying that since the matter was before the court that is where
it should remain. Silcox then presented a document setting forth the Union's posi-
tion with respect to the Company's offer; i.e., the July 26 proposal; 14 sections
were accepted; 4 sections were accepted with the changes offered by Respondent
during the post-July 26 negotiations; and 1 section was accepted with minor language
changes. However, the bone of contention between the parties remained just that:
the Union insisted upon demand arbitration and Respondent refused to consider
anything more than consent arbitration. The Union's proposal also included a
voluntary checkoff, to which Gatlin said : "Checkoff is out."
o Respondent conceded that Whitehead "had full authority to bind the company as far
as contract negotiations were concerned."
10 On cross-examination , Silcox testified as follows:
Q At this January 17 meeting, you all reviewed what you had an agreement on,
and where the areas of disagreement were, didn't you, sir'1
A I tried to get into it, but Mr. Gatlin would not entertain it.
This answer of Silcox, to the extent that it showed that there were areas of agreement
and disagreement, is credited However, his own testimony concerning his dispute with
Gatlin over the accuracy of Whitehead's notes shows that such review did occur and his
answer as a whole cannot be accepted From this exchange, as well as from all the other
evidence in this case, I find that the parties never reached agreement on the scope of
arbitration
"A term of opprobrium applied to a person, perhaps otherwise intelligent, in dis-
agreement with the speaker. Also known, despite his location at the opposite end of the
hirsute yardstick used, as an "egghead "
19 Gatlin's testimony confirms that of Silcox on this point.
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1175
7. The May and June meetings
Subsequent to the issuance of the complaint herein on March 23, 1962, the parties
met on May 15 and 23, and on June 4. Cope again represented the Union and stated,
at the first of these meetings, that he would forget that there had ever been any
negotiations, but would try to work out a contract "from the beginning." Gatlin
pointed out that they were apart on only two things: arbitration and checkoff. Cope
said that "there were probably 100 different methods of arbitration" and that, while
the Union was not insisting on any particular method, it "had to have a binding
arbitration section." To this Gatlin said that Respondent "just didn't see how they
could operate a plant, being told what to do by long-haired professors and radicals."
Gatlin also said that Respondent would not concede any type of checkoff. The
other two meetings produced no change in position although, Gatlin, at the meeting
on May 23, said that his "people" were coming down from New York and that he
would talk to them about the two items in dispute-but he also said that he would
not ask them to relent. The June 4 meeting was the last between the parties
and the current operation of the mill is based on the expired contract.13
8. Conclusions concerning the contract negotiations
Three subparagraphs of the complaint deal with conduct of the Respondent in
the contract negotiations alleged to constitute refusals to bargain in good faith.
Subparagraph 10(a) deals with the totality of Respondent's conduct, charging that
it "negotiated . . . in bad faith and with no intention of entering into any final
or binding collective-bargaining agreement"; 10(g) charges a lack of good-faith
bargaining in that Respondent "on January 17 and thereafter, insisted that as a
condition precedent to the execution of a collective-bargaining contract, the Union
withdraw the processing of certain grievances then pending" and 10(h) charges
a similar lack of good faith in that Respondent "on January 17, 1962, and thereafter,
reverted back to its initial proposals . . . submitted . . . on July 26, 1961, despite
agreement in the interim period . . . on a number of subjects."
The record is clear that the principal difference between Respondent and the Union
concerned "demand" arbitration. After 2 years under a contract providing that
either party could demand arbitration in the processing of any grievance " arising
out of the operation and interpretation of this agreement," Respondent appears to
have been determined to change the arbitration provision. Under the explicit
provisions of Section 8(d), a determination such as this could not, in itself, con-
stitute a refusal to bargain in good faith. Moreover, prior to January 17, 1962,
notwithstanding its strong views on the subject, Respondent had made concessions
to the Union in this area by offering it "demand" arbitration on a number of matters.
Despite the conduct of Respondent, hereafter discussed, not directly related to
the contract negotiations but charged as violations of the statutory duty to bargain
these negotiations were not accompanied by the "off-stage" antiunion activities that
so often accompany inconclusive bargaining.14 There is, in short, nothing in the
record concerning Respondent's conduct prior to January 17, 1961, either in or out
of the bargaining sessions, that would justify the conclusion that it was merely
going "through the motions of negotiation as an elaborate pretense with no sincere
desire to reach an agreement if possible" 15 and dismissal of the complaint to this
extent will be recommended.
On January 17, however, when Respondent, ignoring all that had occurred since
the previous July 26, reverted to the admittedly "rough" initial proposal which it
had submitted on that date, and added a demand that the Union drop the pending
litigation, it brought itself well within the classic description of employer misconduct
in N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 205 F. 2d 131, 139 (C.A. 1) :
It is difficult to believe that the Company with a straight face and in good faith
would have supposed that this proposal had the slightest chance of acceptance
by a self-respecting union, or even that it might advance the negotiations by
affording a basis of discussion; rather, it looks more like a stalling tactic by a
party bent upon maintaining a pretense of bargaining.
"The record does not show whether the disputed sections of the expired contract are
being observed
14 See Herman Sausage Co , Inc, 122 NLRB 168, enfd 275 F 2d 229 (CA 5) : Altex
Manufacturing Co, Inc., etc, 134 NLRB 614, enfd 307 F 2d 872 (CA 4)
Raleigh Water Heater Mfg. Co , Inc., 136 NLRB 76
15 N L R B v Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company , 205 F. 2d 131 , 134
Compare:
(C A. 1),
enfg 96 NLRB 850.
1176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
There was nothing in the bargaining prior to January 17, that would explain, much
less justify, Respondent's sudden reversion to its original proposals 16 nor does it
appear that the agreements thus repudiated were connected with elements of the
contract still in dispute. Respondent's lack of good faith at this point is further
evidenced by General Manager Gatlin's statement that: ". . . the company officials
have given me a package deal to hand to you, and that's as far as I can go," clearly
disclosing that Respondent-on January 17 at least-deprived its negotiator of the
authority requisite for good-faith bargaining.17
The Union's effort on February 15, 1962, to negotiate on the basis of the position
of the parties just prior to January 17, was rejected by Respondent. Although on
May 23, Galtin said that they were apart on two points-arbitration and checkoff-
no progress was made and the negotiations lapsed.
Accordingly, I find that on January 17, 1962, Respondent by reverting to its July 26
proposals and repudiating the several agreements reached between July 26, 1961, and
that date and by depriving its agent of the necessary authority has, since January 17,
1962, failed and refused to bargain in good faith and has thereby violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
Respondent's accompanying demand that the Union drop the litigation pending
on grievances under the expired contract did not in itself constitute, in my opinion, a
refusal to bargain in good faith.18 While the scope of a contract provision for arbitra-
tion of grievances is a matter related to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment" and one, therefore, concerning which an employer is required to
bargain,19 it is by no means certain, on this record, that the litigation between these
parties growing out of past grievances must be similarly regarded. Unlike the situation
in Bethlehem Steel Company,20 where the employer made unilateral changes in the
general procedure for handling grievances, the litigation under discussion by these
parties appears to affect only past incidents involving specific sets of "frozen" facts
and relationships. While it could be said that the determination of such litigation
might provide interpretations of the arbitration provision that could aid the parties in
disposing of grievances arising in the future-if the facts should be similar and the con-
tract provision idential-this argument appears too attenuated for acceptance. More-
over, Respondent neither refused to meet and negotiate unless the litigation were
dropped,21 nor did it adamantly persist in its demand, since at the meeting of
February 15 it expressly receded from its position on this matter 22 It will be recom-
mended therefore, that this portion of the complaint be dismissed.
C. Interference with union membership
1. Activities of Campbell
Paragraph 10 of the complaint alleges that Respondent refused to bargain in good
faith in that:
(b) . through its supervisors and agents A. A. Whitehead, Wallace L.
Campbell, Tallmedge Ellison and N. Tiller, between August 1 and 8, 1961,
solicited employees to cease having their union dues deducted and to withdraw
their membership in the Union.
Respondent's answer admits the agency and supervisory status of the individuals
named but alleges that it
. . . did no more in connection with the check-off than conform to its re-
sponsibilities under the Act.
16 Rice Lake Creamery Company, 131 NLRB 1270, 1295, enfd. 302 F. 2d 908 (C.A.D C.) ,
National Shoes, Inc, etc., 103 NLRB 439, 449, enfd. 208 F. 2d 688 (C.A. 2). Compare.
Clinton Foods, Inc, 112 NLRB 239, 263.
17 Han-Dee Spring & Mfg. Co., Inc, 132 NLRB 1542; N.L R.B v. Edward Shannon, et at.
d/b/a Shannon & Simpson Casket Co, 208 F. 2d 545 (CA. 9), enfg. 99 NLRB 430.
18 As noted above, 10(g) of the complaint alleges that Respondent made the withdrawal
of the litigation "a condition precedent to the execution of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment " Since it has been found that the parties did not reach the agreement necessarily
precedent to the execution of a contract, this allegation is treated as one charging failure
to bargain In good faith.
19 Bethlehem Steel Company, Shipbuilding Division, 136 NLRB 1500.
20 Id
21 Compare: Jones Furniture Manufacturing Co , Inc., 98 NLRB 1302, enfd 200 F 2d
774 (C.A 8) , E. A. Taormina, et al., d/b/a Taormina Co., 94 NLRB 884, 899, enfd.
207 F. 2d 251, 254 (C.A. 5).
22 See Burns Brick Company, 80 NLRB 389, 396.
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1177
Section IX of the contract , which was in effect until August 8, 1961, provided that.
During . a ten day period prior to any anniversary date . . . any employee
may cancel his authorization to deduct union dues by giving written notice by
mail to the Newberry Mills, Inc. . . . and to the Secretary-Treasurer of the
Local Union No. 120.. .
Marvin Bouknight , an employee of Respondent and a member of the union com-
mittee engaged in the contract negotiations , testified that between August 1 and 8,
1961, Wallace Campbell , a shift foreman , asked him whether he wanted to get out of
the Union . Bouknight answered that he did not but Campbell nevertheless proceeded
to tell him that , if he wanted to get out , all he would have to do would be to go to the
office and sign a card . Bouknight did nothing about it.
Campbell admitted that he had talked with Bouknight during that period but denied
that it was about the Union. Personnel Manager Whitehead testified that all super-
visors had been instructed to give information on this matter upon request only and
that his office did not prepare any such requests for employees.
The testimony of Bouknight impressed me as credible and I reject Campbell's
categorical denial. I find that Respondent , through Campbell, interfered with Bouk-
night's right to remain a member of the Union and that it thereby violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act 23 In view of Bouknight 's position as a member of the Union's
negotiating committee , this interference with his membership in the Union was also
an interference with the bargaining process and a violation of Section 8(a) (5) .24
2. Activities of Ellisor
Dessa Rae Wesson, financial secretary and treasurer of the Union and a mill
employee, testified that Tallmadge Ellisor, her second hand ( foreman ) asked her
when she was "going to learn some sense and get out of the mess" she was in, mean-
ing resign from the Union . She showed uncertainty and Ellisor said that if she wanted
to, she could go to the office "right now ." She did nothing about it.
Ruth Derrick was approached by Ellisor as she was eating her lunch: he asked
whether she was still a union member and , when she said she was, he said she could
get out at this time by going to the personnel office.
Emil Richardson was also approached by Ellisor who told him of the escape period
in the contract and said "if you want out, you can get out." Ellisor also told him that
he could accomplish it by going to the office . Richardson went to the office and
signed some papers which J. N. Tiller gave him
Ellisor denied having talked with Mrs. Wesson or Mrs. Derrick concerning their
union membership but admitted directing Richardson to the office . All three em-
ployees testified that Ellisor approached them on this subject and I credit their testi-
mony. Ellisor's conduct constituted interference with the employees ' rights in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. His aggressive solicitation of Mrs. Wesson, an
officer of the Union , to resign during contract negotiations also violated Section
8(a) (5) of the Act.
There is no evidence of similar conduct by Respondent through Personnel Manager
Whitehead or Overseer Tiller and it will be recommended that the complaint be
dismissed to the extent that it so alleges.
D. Unilateral wage changes
1. The loom fixers
In August or September 1961 , a delegation of loom fixers pointed out to General
Manager Gatlin that their $ 1.76 per hour wage rate was behind the $1.88 average
for South Carolina and they requested a raise. Gatlin conceded that they were below
the average rate but said he could not raise their wages without union approval. He
suggested that the loom fixers get the Union's consent and that he would then adjust
the rate. The union president and a committee subsequently met with Gatlin on
this subject and stated that the Union would not agree to a wage increase for the
loom fixers alone. Both sides agreed that the Union was "on the spot" and no agree-
ment was reached . Respondent , as of October 23, 1961, increased the loom fixers'
wage rate to $1.88.
Respondent did not bypass the Union in connection with the loom fixers ' request
but bargained , I find, to the extent possible under the circumstances . An impasse
23 Paragraph 11 of the complaint alleges that Respondent 's conduct set forth in para-
graph 10 was in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act
24 See Laabs , Inc, 128 NLRB 374, 375.
1178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
having been reached, and the overall contract negotiations still proceeding in good
faith,25 Respondent's conduct in raising the loom fixers' rate does not constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and dismissal of the complaint to this extent will be
recommended.
2. The weavers
Sometime after the increase in the wage rate of the loom fixers, the weavers found
that they, too, lagged behind the South Carolina average. A delegation visited Gat-
lin who agreed that their wage rate was 6 cents below the average. Gatlin's
testimony-practically the only testimony on this issue-is somewhat unclear on
whether he told the weavers that they should take the matter up with the Union or
whether he told them of the Union's refusal to approve a raise for the loom fixers.
In either event it is clear, and I find, that Respondent did not consult the Union
but that on November 27, 1961, it gave the weavers the increase they had requested.
Respondent, in its answer, alleges that, having been "notified" that the Union
would not agree to wage changes (but not specifying the groups involved) it believed
itself "under no duty to perform a useless act" by consulting the Union about such
adjustments and put them into effect.
Respondent's "belief" is a mistaken one: as stated by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Armstrong Cork Company v. N.L.R.B., 211 F. 2d 843, at page 848:
. nor can we accept [the employer's] excuse that the union would have re-
jected a similarly offered wage increase as inadequate. The statutory require-
ment of good faith bargaining . . . may not be satisfied by speculative assump-
tions as to acceptance or refusal of an offer based on a party's attitude in prior
negotiations.
Nor is there anything in the record to support a conclusion that this was an "auto-
matic" increase concerning which bargaining was not required since it might be
considered merely a continuation of the "status quo." 26
3. The "across-the-board" increase
As the negotiators were recessing their meeting of February 15, 1962, Silcox said
to Gatlin: "We have a request for a 5-percent wage increase across-the-board," and
handed him a brief letter stating that the Union "hereby requests a general across-the-
board wage increase of five (5%) percent." Gatlin answered that he knew the in-
crease was pending in the industry and that it had already been discussed in the
Company. Gatlin also stated that it was the policy of Respondent to follow the
trend of the industry in South Carolina on general wage increases.
On February 27, Gatlin telephoned Silcox, told him that Respondent was ready
to put in a 5-percent wage increase and said, according to Silcox, that he wanted
to make it retroactive to the previous day. Silcox answered- "that's fine" and sug-
gested that Gatlin meet with him and the union committee and "get it squared away"
by signing an agreement setting forth the effective date of the increase. Gatlin
protested that he was busy and saw nothing to meet about, saying: "you requested a
wage increase and we granted it." Silcox then said, according to Gatlin, that the
union committee wanted a meeting so that it could "get credit" for the wage in-
crease The same day Gatlin posted a notice informing the employees that it
was adjusting wages upward, effective March 5, 1962, "in conformity with the in-
dustrywide wage pattern." The notice also stated that Silcox had been informed
of the increase and had "suggested that before this matter could be agreed upon,
it would be necessary to sit down and discuss the matter " The notice then
continued :
There is nothing to discuss and nothing to negotiate since we are following
the pattern of the industry. Any delay in this adjustment being made in our
plant will rest squarely on the shoulders of your bargaining representative.
It appears that this increase , unlike that of the loom fixers, was part of the ac-
cepted pattern for fixing wage rates. This view is supported by the provision in
the expired contract that the wage rates set as provided therein
shall remain in effect during the life of this agreement . except if there be
a general revision in wages . in the competitive South Carolina cotton
spinning and weaving mills . . the parties shall meet promptly and endeavor
to reach an agreement on such issues.
25 Compare: The Perry Rubber Company, 133 NLRB 225, 227
26 N L R B. v. Benno Katz at al d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Co, 369 U S
736, 746.
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1179
Periodic statewide revisions of wage rates were therefore , familiar to Respondent's
employees and expected by them as routine adjustments . Moreover , the Union's
request was unequivocal and Respondent 's grant was as broad as the request. It
is understandable that the union committee wanted to take credit for the increase
and it is similarly understandable that Respondent could not resist the opportunity
that Silcox gave it for a "dig" at the Union, but the facts do not justify a conclu-
sion either that this adjustment was a unilateral change in wages or that Respondent
had refused to bargain with the Union on the matter.27
E. The Union 's request for information
On October 11, 1961 , Whitmire, then the Union 's leading negotiator , wrote a letter
to General Manager Gatlin requesting a copy of Respondent 's "wage scale , showing
the various job classifications , and the rate of pay for each job." The letter also
requested "a copy of the current seniority roster, with the names of each employee
and their hiring dates ." Whitmire , Silcox, and Cope all testified that they never
received the information thus requested. At the bargaining session of February 15,
1962, Silcox asked Gatlin why Respondent had never answered Whitmire 's letter of
October 11 , 1961 , and Gatlin said that the Union had the information and Respond-
ent did not wish to supply it again.
It appears that Respondent , on March 8 , 1960, prepared a complete list of
job classifications with the wage rates and piece rates applicable to each, and that
it sent this list to James Smith , then president of the Union . During the period from
March 28 , 1960, to July 24, 1961 , there were 24 notifications of changes therein sent
either to Mr. Smith or to Claude Wicker, who succeeded him as president. On one
other occasion , April 11, 1960, an extension of a trial period for such change was
evidenced by a written agreement signed by President Smith of the Union and Re-
spondent 's personnel manager, Whitehead . While no notices of this nature were
sent to the Union when revisions were made in the wage rates for the loom fixers
and weavers , as set forth above, Whitehead testified that these were the only changes
made from July 24, 1961 , until he left at the end of the year . On March 3, 1962, a list
of additional changes was sent to the Union.
Under the seniority provision of the expired contract , Respondent was required to
post and maintain on the bulletin board in each department the seniority roster
for that department , showing the current seniority standing of each employee, and
. . . correct these rosters at least every six (6 ) months.
On March 1 and September 1, 1961 , copies of the entire seniority roster were
sent, through the internal communications system of the mill, to the incumbent
presidents of the Union . Toward the end of March 1962, Walter Hiller, who was
then president of the Union , asked Gatlin for a copy of the seniority list. On
March 29 , 1962, Gatlin sent him, by certified mail, the list as of March 1, 1962, toge-
ther with the changes in job classification rates referred to above. Hiller testified
that neither Mrs. Wesson , secretary to the Union during both his and Wicker's terms
of office , nor Wicker himself turned any union files over to him
From the foregoing , I find that Respondent had supplied the Union with a list of
the job classifications and wage rates in the mill and had kept the list current by
notifications of changes therein I also find that Respondent supplied the Union
with revised seniority lists on March 1 and September 1, 1961 , and with the seniority
list as of March 1, 1962, on March 29, 1962. Whitmire 's request for the information
was contained in a letter sent from his office-not at a meeting between the union
committee and Respondent-and there is no evidence that he checked with the officials
of the local before making the request Moreover, it does not appear, either from
the record as a whole or from the testimony concerning the contract negotiations,
that the lack of this information in any degree affected the Union's ability to negotiate
and it was not until the February 15 session that any reference was made to Respond-
ent's failure to supply the information.
There is no doubt that information concerning seniority and job classifications
could be necessary for intelligent bargaining and that the Union would be justified
in requesting it for that purpose. Here, however , the request appears to have been a
causal one, with no showing that the information was needed or that the request
was pressed . Moreover , at the time Whitmire requested the information, the
local officials had in their possession current information on job classifications and
a seniority list only 40 days old. I find that Respondent did not refuse to fulfill its
r See Derby Coal & Oil Co, Inc, 139 NLRB 1485.
1180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
duty to furnish the information necessary for bargaining 28 and shall recommend
that the complaint be dismissed to the extent that it so alleges.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent , set forth in section III, above , occurring in con-
nection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above , have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative
of Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act , I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act. Although I have found that Respondent , by reverting on January 17, 1962,
to its July 26, 1961 , proposals , failed to bargain in good faith with the Union, the
lapse of almost a year since the commission of the unfair labor practice makes
questionable the propriety of recommending that Respondent cease and desist from
reopening any of the matters upon which agreement had been subsequently reached.
Accordingly , I shall recommend that Respondent cease and desist from failing to
bargain in good faith with the Union . With respect to unilateral changes in wages
or working conditions of the type herein found to have been unfair labor practices,
however, no intervening circumstances could make a repetition thereof any less an
unfair labor practice and I shall recommend that Respondent cease and desist from any
repetition thereof. I shall also recommend that Respondent cease and desist from
interfering with the rights of its employees to become or remain members of the
Charging Union or any other labor organization.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this
case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. United Textile Workers ot America, Local 120, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5 ) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent employed at its
Newberry , South Carolina, plant, excluding supervisory , clerical , watchmen, gate-
men, supply room men, and standards department personnel , constitute a unit appro-
priate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
4. United Textile Workers of America, Local 120, AFL -CIO, has been at all times
since June 22, 1961 , and now is the exclusive representative of all employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. By its solicitation of employees , between August 1 and 8, 1961, to cease having
their union dues deducted and to withdraw their membership in the Union , Respond-
ent interfered with , restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and thereby committed an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
6. By changing , on November 27, 1961, the wage rates of its weavers-employees
in the unit for which the Union was the certified collective-bargaining representa-
tive-without consultation with the Union , Respondent refused to bargain in good
faith and thereby engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act.
7. By reverting , on January 17, 1962, in all respects to its July 26, 1961, proposals
for a collective-bargaining agreement , despite agreement in the interim period with
the Union on a number of subjects , Respondent , since January 17 , 1962, has engaged
and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1 ) of the Act.
8 The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act.
9. Respondent has not engaged in the other unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint.
28 See The Cincinnati Steel Castings Co , 86 NLRB 592; Old Line Life Insu,once Cont-
pany of America, 96 NLRB 499, 502-503
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC. 1181
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, it is recommended that Newberry Mills, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages , hours of
employment , and other conditions of employment with the said Union as the ex-
clusive collective -bargaining representative of its employees in the following unit:
All production and maintenance employees of Respondent employed at its New-
berry, South Carolina, plant, excluding supervisory , clerical, watchmen , gatemen,
supply room men, and standards department personnel.
(c) Unilaterally changing wages, rates of pay, or any other term or condition of
employment , or in any similar or related manner refusing to bargain collectively
with United Textile Workers of America, Local 120, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
collective -bargaining representative of its employees in the above-described unit.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with United Textile Workers of America,
Local 120, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the afore-
said unit and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post in conspicuous places at its place of business in Newberry, South Carolina,
including all places where notices to employees customarily are posted , copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix A." 29 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, shall , after being duly signed by
the Respondent's representative , be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter . Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify said Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the receipt of
this Intermediate Report what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.30
It is further recommended that the complaint , insofar as it alleges the commission
of unfair labor practices not found in the Intermediate Report , be dismissed.
21 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "A
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order "
30 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with United Textile Workers of
America, Local 120, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement:
All production and maintenance employees employed at our Newberry,
South Carolina, plant, excluding supervisory, clerical, watchmen, gatemen,
supply room men, and standards department personnel.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change wages, rates of pay, or any other term or
condition of employment of any employee in the above-described unit, and we
will not in any similar or related manner, refuse to bargain collectively with
United Textile Workers of America, Local 120, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of our employees in the said unit.
1182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT by soliciting employees to revoke their checkoff authorizations
or withdraw from membership in United Textile Workers of America, Local
120, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , or in any other similar or
related manner , interfere with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain , or refrain from becoming or
remaining , members of the above -named union or any other labor organization.
NEWBERRY MILLS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 1831
Nissen Building , 310 West Fourth Street , Winston -Salem, North Carolina, Tele-
phone No. 724-8356 , if they have any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions.
Edward Fields, Incorporated and Amalgamated Union Local 55,
affiliated with District 5. Ca.Se No. 2-CA-8705. April 10, 1963
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 21, 1963, Trial Examiner Robert E. Mullin issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter-
mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a motion for re-
hearing, the General Counsel opposed this motion and the General
Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report with supporting briefs.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire
record in this case,2 including the Intermediate Report and the excep-
tions and briefs,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
1 We deny the Respondent's motion for rehearing based on new evidence bearing on
alleged bias of witness Richard Miller . As the Trial Examiner considered the possibility
of bias or prejudice in connection with Miller 's testimony we find additional evidence on
this point to be cumulative.
The Respondent 's request for oral argument Is hereby denied as , in our opinion, the
record, including the Respondent 's exceptions and brief , adequately presents the issues
and positions of the parties.
2 The Intermediate Report shows the following error : On page 1190, "June 5" should be
changed to read "June 15." We hereby correct this inadvertent error.
8 The Respondent 's exceptions are directed to the status of Amalgamated Union Local 55,
affiliated with District 5, herein called Local 55, and to the credibility resolutions of the
141 NLRB No. 106.