MYINE ELECTRONICS, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 2, 2020

2019006733 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/063,044 03/07/2016 Joey Ray GROVER 83598608 2179
28395 7590 06/02/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
CASILLAS, ROLAND J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2141
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOEY RAY GROVER, JUSTIN DICKOW, SCOTT SMEREKA,
JOEL J. FISCHER, JOHN BYRNE, and COREY MAYLONE

Appeal 2019-006733
Application 15/063,044
Technology Center 2100

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20.1 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Livia, Inc., as the real party in
interest, which “is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Company.”
Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-006733
Application 15/063,044

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention allows a mobile device to access a vehicle
computing system via another mobile device. Spec. ¶ 16. In one
embodiment:
Each connected device may send messages directly to the
primary device to control connected applications executed by
the primary device. For instance, a back seat passenger having
a mobile device may connect to the primary device using the
same communication protocol as the primary device uses to
connect to the vehicle computing system. Thus, the back seat
passenger’s mobile device may allow the back seat passenger to
control the one or more applications being executed at the
primary device.
Id. Claim 1, reproduced below (emphasis added), is representative of the
subject matter argued on appeal.
1. A system comprising:
a primary brought-in mobile device programmed to:
advertise an application human-machine interface
(HMI) service responsive to connection as the
primary mobile device to a computing platform
integrated with a vehicle,
connect to at least one secondary brought-in
mobile device, and
provide a user interface of a connected
application executed by the primary mobile device
to the computing platform and to the at least one
secondary brought-in mobile device, each
secondary mobile device executing the connected
application.
Appeal Br., Claims App. A-1.
Appeal 2019-006733
Application 15/063,044

3
Rejection
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated
by Demeniuk (US 2014/0163771 A1; pub. June 12, 2014). Final Act. 3–11.
OPINION
Appellant argues all claims as a group. Appeal Br. 7. We select
claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the following
reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 1 and
accordingly sustain the rejection of all claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
Appellant contends Demeniuk does not teach the above-emphasized
limitation of claim 1. Appeal Br. 6. In support, Appellant contends
Demeniuk does not teach a mobile device that achieves communication
between a second mobile device and vehicle computing system (VCS) by
providing a user interface to the second mobile device and
VCS. Id. Appellant further contends Demeniuk rather teaches mobile
devices where each one connect to a VCS by merely porting directly to the
VCS, e.g., by directly accessing a USB or Bluetooth port of the
VCS. Id. We are unpersuaded for each of two reasons.
First, the argument is not commensurate with claim 1’s
scope. Appellant’s supporting contentions incorrectly imply that the
claimed primary mobile device is recited as: relaying communications from
the secondary mobile device to the VCS; and transmitting the user interface
directly to the secondary mobile device. Appeal Br. 6. However, the
primary mobile device is recited as merely: connecting to the secondary
mobile device in any respect; and providing the user interface to the
secondary mobile device in any respect. See Ans. 4–5.
Appeal 2019-006733
Application 15/063,044

4
Second, Appellant does not address the Examiner’s finding that
Demeniuk’s shared playlist teaches the emphasized limitation of claim 1,
i.e., constitutes a user interface as claimed. See Reply Br. 1–2; Ans. 6;
Demeniuk ¶¶ 95–96 (disclosure of the playlist cited). For example,
Appellant does not dispute that such sharing of a playlist would permit both
the sharing mobile device and receiving mobile device to execute the same
application, as is claimed. Appellant responds:
The Examiner discusses various aspects of Demeniuk on pages
5-6 of the Answer. Yet, these sections still do not show that “a
primary brought-in mobile device” is programmed to “advertise
an application human-machine interface (HMI) service
responsive to connection as the primary mobile device to a
computing platform integrated with a vehicle.” []Moreover,
these sections still do not show that the “a primary brought-in
mobile device” (and not the communications manager of the
vehicle) is programmed to “provide a user interface of a
connected application executed by the primary mobile device to
the computing platform and to the at least one secondary
brought-in mobile device, each secondary mobile device
executing the connected application.” These recitations are
simply not taught.
Reply Br. 2. These statements are not responsive to the Examiner’s reliance
on Demeniuk’s shared playlist. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming because appellant “merely argued that the claims
differed from [the prior art], and chose not to proffer a serious explanation of
this difference”). Further, the first quoted “advertise” limitation is newly
raised in the Reply Brief without an accompanying show of good cause. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (permitted contents of a Reply Brief).
Thus, for the reasons indicated above, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 120.
Appeal 2019-006733
Application 15/063,044

5

DECISION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–20 102(a)(1) Demeniuk 1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED