MULTIBAND EC, INC.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 21, 2016

363 NLRB No. 100 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

363 NLRB No. 100
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Multiband EC, Inc. and Chauffeurs, Teamsters,
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 135. Case
25–CA–108828
January 21, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND HIROZAWA
Upon a charge filed July 10, 2013, by Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 135, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a complaint and notice of hearing on September
27, 2013, alleging that the Respondent has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a document enti-
tled “Arbitration Agreement” (Agreement), which re-
quires arbitration of employment-related claims and con-
tains a “Class and Collective Action Waiver” provision
specifying that all claims must be pursued on an individ-
ual basis, and by requiring employees to sign the Agree-
ment as a condition of employment.
On April 30, 2014, the Respondent, the Charging Par-
ty, and the General Counsel filed with the Board a joint
motion to waive a hearing and a decision by an adminis-
trative law judge and to transfer this proceeding to the
Board for a decision based on a stipulated record. On
September 12, 2014, the Board granted the parties’ joint
motion. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed with the
Board a brief in support of its position, and the Respond-
ent filed an answering brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.2

1 Both parties filed their briefs prior to the issuance of our decision
in Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf. denied in
relevant part—F.3d—(5th Cir. 2015).
2 In its answer to the complaint, the Respondent raised the following
affirmative defense: “The Complaint is barred because, at all pertinent
times, various officials of the Board involved in the prosecution of the
Complaint were not validly appointed, including the Acting General
Counsel. Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Services, Inc., Case No.
C13–5470 BHS (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2013).” However, the Re-
spondent did not offer any evidence or argument in support of this
affirmative defense at any time in this proceeding, including the par-
ties’ statement of the issue presented, the Respondent’s statement of its
position on the issue set forth in the parties’ joint motion, and the Re-
spondent’s answering brief.
For the reasons set forth below, we find no merit in the Respond-
ents’ assertion that the Acting General Counsel was not validly “ap-
pointed.” At the outset, we note that under the Federal Vacancies Re-
form Act (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345 et seq., a person is not “appoint-
ed” to serve in an acting capacity in a vacant office that otherwise
would be filled by appointment by the President, by and with the advice
On the entire record and submitted briefs, the Board
makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the Respondent has been a cor-
poration with offices and places of business in Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, and Ohio. It engages in the
business of installing receivers for satellite television and
providing related satellite services. In conducting its
operations during the 12-month period ending July 10,
2013, the Respondent purchased and received at its Indi-

and consent of the Senate. Rather, either the first assistant to the vacant
office performs the functions and duties of the office in an acting ca-
pacity by operation of law pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1), or the
President directs another person to perform the functions and duties of
the vacant office in an acting capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
3345(a)(2) or (3). On June 18, 2010, the President directed Lafe Solo-
mon, then-Director of the Board’s Office of Representation Appeals to
serve as Acting General Counsel pursuant to subsection (a)(3)—the
senior agency employee provision. Under the strictures of that provi-
sion, Solomon was eligible to serve as Acting General Counsel at the
time the President directed him to do so. See SW General, Inc. v.
NLRB, 796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Thus, Solomon properly assumed
the duties of Acting General Counsel and we find no merit in the Re-
spondents’ affirmative defense that the Acting General Counsel was
“not validly appointed.”
We acknowledge that the decision in SW General also held that Sol-
omon lost his authority as Acting General Counsel on January 5, 2011,
when the President nominated him to be General Counsel. While that
question is still in litigation, the Respondents have never raised that
argument in this proceeding, and we find that the Respondents thereby
have waived the right to do so.
Finally, on December 2, 2015, General Counsel Richard F. Griffin,
Jr., issued a notice of ratification which states, in relevant part,
I was confirmed as General Counsel on November 4, 2013. After ap-
propriate review and consultation with my staff, I have decided that
the issuance of the complaint in this case and its continued prosecution
are a proper exercise of the General Counsel’s broad and unreviewa-
ble discretion under section 3(d) of the Act.
My action does not reflect an agreement with the appellate court rul-
ing in SW General. Rather, my decision is a practical response aimed
at facilitating the timely resolution of the charges that I have found to
be meritorious while the issues raised by SW General are being re-
solved. Congress provided the option of ratification by expressly ex-
empting “the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board”
from the FVRA provisions that would otherwise preclude the ratifica-
tion of certain actions of other persons found to have served in viola-
tion of the FVRA. (Citation omitted.)
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby ratify the issuance and continued
prosecution of the complaint.
Thus, even assuming that the Respondent had not previously waived
its right to challenge the continued authority of the Acting General
Counsel following his nomination by the President, this ratification
renders moot any argument that SW General precludes further litigation
in this matter.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
ana facilities goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points outside the State of Indiana.
The parties stipulated, and we find, that at all material
times, the Respondent has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Facts
Since about July 1, 2013, the Respondent has main-
tained and required employees to sign the Agreement as
a condition of employment. The Agreement requires
employees to “arbitrate any and all disputes, claims, or
controversies” against the Respondent that could be
brought in a court, including all claims arising out of
their employment. The Agreement explicitly covers, but
is not limited to, “claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; the Fair Labor Standards Act; the Family and
Medical Leave Act; the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990; Section 1981 through 1988 of Title 42 of the
United States Code; any state or local anti-discrimination
laws; or any other federal, state, or local law, ordinance
or regulation.” The Agreement also contains an excep-
tion stating that it “does not prohibit the filing of an ad-
ministrative charge with a federal, state, or local adminis-
trative agency such as the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) or the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).”3
The Agreement also includes the following provision:
Class and Collective Action Waiver
The parties agree all claims must be pursued on an in-
dividual basis only. By signing this Agreement, you
waive your right to commence, or be a party to, any
class or collective claims or to bring jointly any claim
against the Company with any other person, except as
provided in the paragraph below. The arbitrator shall
have no power under this Agreement to consolidate
claims and/or hear a collective or class action.
In addition, nothing herein limits your right and the
rights of others collectively to challenge the enforcea-
bility of this Agreement, including the class/collective
action waiver. While the Company will assert that you
have agreed to pursue all claims individually in the ar-
bitral forum and may ask a court to compel arbitration
of each individual’s claims, to the extent the filing of

3 The Agreement specifies that it does not cover workers’ compen-
sation and unemployment compensation benefit claims and “claims by
law which are not subject to mandatory binding pre-dispute arbitration
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.”
such an action is protected concerted activity under the
National Labor Relations Act, such filing will not result
in threats, discipline or discharge.
The Agreement applies to all of the Respondent’s employ-
ees nationwide, including supervisors.
B. The Parties’ Contentions
The General Counsel contends that the Class and Col-
lective Action Waiver in the Agreement violates Section
8(a)(1) under the Board’s decision in D. R. Horton Inc.,
357 NLRB No. 184 (2012), which protects the right of
employees to join together to pursue workplace griev-
ances, including through litigation. The General Counsel
asserts that the plain language of the Agreement is un-
lawful because it bars employees from collectively pur-
suing employment-related claims in all forums. The Re-
spondent contends that the Agreement is lawful under
recent Supreme Court decisions establishing the broad
preemptive sweep of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
The Respondent asserts that the FAA mandates that arbi-
tration agreements, including those containing class ac-
tion waivers, be enforced according to their terms in the
absence of an express “contrary congressional com-
mand.” The Respondent claims that no such command
exists in the Act. The Respondent also cites D. R. Hor-
ton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), which
denied enforcement of the Board’s D. R. Horton decision
in relevant part, and decisions by other courts of appeals
that found D. R. Horton unpersuasive.4 Moreover, the
Respondent argues that the Agreement does not infringe
upon employees’ Section 7 rights because it expressly
“does not prohibit the filing of an administrative
charge.”5
C. Discussion
In D. R. Horton, the Board found that an employer vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by requiring its employ-
ees, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to
collectively pursue employment-related claims in all fo-
rums, arbitral or judicial. 357 NLRB No. 184, slip op. at
13. The Board explained that it had long held, with uni-
form judicial approval, that the Act protects employees’
substantive right to join together to pursue workplace

4 For example, Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290,
297 fn. 8 (2d Cir. 2013), and Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050,
1055 (8th Cir. 2013).
5 The Respondent also argues that Member Becker’s appointment
expired before the decision in D.R. Horton issued. For the reasons set
forth in Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 2 fn. 16, we reject this argument.
See Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 184, slip op. at 1 fn. 1
(2015); see also Mathew Enterprise, Inc. v. NLRB, 771 F.3d 812, 814
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he President’s recess appointment of Mem-
ber Becker . . . was constitutionally valid.”); Gestamp South Carolina,
LLC v. NLRB, 769 F.3d 254, 257–258 (4th Cir. 2014) (same).
MULTIBAND EC, INC. 3
grievances, including through litigation, and that individ-
ual agreements requiring employees to waive that right
are unlawful. Id., slip op. at 2, 5. The Board noted that
its decision does not conflict with the intent of the FAA,
which was to leave substantive rights under other Federal
laws undisturbed, as evidenced by the savings clause in
Section 2 of the FAA. Id., slip op. at 11. Subsequently,
in Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf.
denied in relevant part—F.3d—(5th Cir. 2015), the
Board reexamined and reaffirmed the rationale of D. R.
Horton. 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2.
For the reasons stated in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil,
we find that the Agreement in this case violates Section
8(a)(1). As in those cases, the Respondent conditions
employment on its employees signing the Agreement and
waiving their right “to commence, or be a party to, any
class or collective claims.” The Agreement requires em-
ployees to arbitrate all employment-related claims that
otherwise could have been brought in court and strips
arbitrators of the power “to consolidate claims and/or
hear a collective or class action.” The Respondent’s con-
tention that the Agreement is lawful under the FAA and
Supreme Court precedent is without merit for the reasons
stated in Murphy Oil.6 Accordingly, we find that the
Agreement unlawfully prohibits employees from con-
certedly pursuing employment-related claims in any fo-
rum.7

6 The Respondent relies on the administrative law judge’s decision
in Chesapeake Energy Corp., 362 NLRB No. 80 (2015), in which the
judge found a mandatory arbitration agreement and class action waiver
lawful. In that case, however, the Board reversed the judge. Id., slip
op. at 1.
The Respondent also argues that the Agreement includes an exemp-
tion allowing employees to file charges with administrative agencies,
including with the Board, and thus does not, as in D. R. Horton, unlaw-
fully prohibit them from collectively pursuing litigation of employment
claims in all forums. We reject the Respondent’s argument for the
reasons set forth in SolarCity Corp., 363 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 2–4
(2015).
7 Our dissenting colleague observes that the Act does not “dictate”
any particular procedures for the litigation of non-NLRA claims, and
“creates no substantive right for employees to insist on class-type
treatment” of such claims. This is all surely correct, as the Board has
previously explained in Murphy Oil, supra, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op.
at 2, and Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2 and fn. 2
(2015). But what our colleague ignores is that the Act “does create a
right to pursue joint, class, or collective claims if and as available,
without the interference of an employer-imposed restraint.” Murphy
Oil, supra, slip op. at 2 (emphasis in original). The Respondent’s
Agreement is just such an unlawful restraint.
Likewise, for the reasons explained in Murphy Oil and Bristol
Farms, there is no merit to our colleague’s view that finding the
Agreement unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right to “refrain
from” engaging in protected concerted activity. See Murphy Oil, 361
NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 18; Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45, slip op.
at 2. Nor is he correct in insisting that Sec. 9(a) of the Act requires the
Board to permit individual employees to prospectively waive their Sec.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Multiband EC, Inc., is an employ-
er within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. By maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
under which employees are required, as a condition of
employment, to waive the right to commence, or be a
party to, any class or collective claims or to bring jointly
any claim with any other person in all forums, whether
arbitral or judicial, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. We shall also order the
Respondent to rescind or revise the Agreement and to
notify employees that it has done so.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Multiband EC, Inc., New Hope, Minnesota,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that requires employees, as a condition of employment,
to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions
in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all
of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms, to make clear
to employees that the arbitration agreement does not con-
stitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-
related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise become bound to the man-
datory arbitration agreement in any form that it has been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
all of its facilities nationwide copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”8 Copies of the notice, on forms

7 right to engage in concerted legal activity. See Murphy Oil, supra,
slip op. at 17–18; Bristol Farms, supra, slip op. at 2.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notices reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily com-
municates with its employees by such means. Reasona-
ble steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. If the Respondent has gone out of busi-
ness or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own ex-
pense, a copy of the notice marked “Appendix” to all
current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at any time since July 1, 2013.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 25 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. January 21, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting in part.1
In this case, my colleagues find that the Respondent’s
Arbitration Agreement (Agreement) violates Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or
NLRA) because the Agreement waives the right to par-
ticipate in class or collective actions regarding non-
NLRA employment claims. I respectfully dissent from
this finding for the reasons explained in my partial dis-
senting opinion in Murphy Oil USA, Inc.2

tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
1 For the reasons stated by my colleagues, I agree that the complaint
is properly before the Board for disposition.
2 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil inval-
idating class-action waiver agreements was recently denied enforce-
I agree that an employee may engage in “concerted”
activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to a
claim asserted under a statute other than NLRA.3 How-
ever, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest authority in
the Board to dictate any particular procedures pertaining
to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does the Act
render unlawful agreements in which employees waive
class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the con-
trary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of
every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “ad-
just” grievances “at any time.”4 This aspect of Section
9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects
each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the
collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I be-
lieve it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive
right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of
non-NLRA claims;5 (ii) a class-waiver agreement per-

ment by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA,
Inc. v. NLRB, No. 14–60800, 2015 WL 6457613 (5th Cir. Oct. 26,
2015).
3 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activi-
ties engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual
aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA
Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 23–25 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of
Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are
pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory
requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an
individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective
action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4–5
(2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
4 Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 30–34 (Member Miscimarra, dis-
senting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or select-
ed for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any indi-
vidual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual
employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his
or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 31–32 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
5 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po-
tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type proce-
dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D. R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class
action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted),
petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014);
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
MULTIBAND EC, INC. 5
taining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any
NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the
overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s
position regarding class waiver agreements;6 and (iii)
enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitra-
tion agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).7 Although questions may arise regard-
ing the enforceability of particular agreements that waive
class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I be-
lieve these questions are exclusively within the province
of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has
jurisdiction over such claims.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. January 21 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.

6 The Fifth Circuit has twice denied enforcement of Board orders
invalidating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class-type
treatment of non-NLRA claims. See Murphy Oil, Inc., USA v. NLRB,
above; D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelming majority
of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise rejected it.
See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 34 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member John-
son, dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Patterson v. Raymours
Furniture Co., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Nanavati v.
Adecco USA, Inc., No. 14–cv–04145–BLF, 2015 WL 1738152 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 13, 2015), motion to certify for interlocutory appeal denied
2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015); Brown v. Citicorp Credit
Services, Inc., No. 1:12–cv–00062–BLW, 2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho
Mar. 25, 2015) (granting reconsideration of prior determination that
class waiver in arbitration agreement violated NLRA).
7 For the reasons expressed in my Murphy Oil partial dissent and
those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson’s dissent in
Murphy Oil, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49–58 (Member
Johnson, dissenting).
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires you, as a condition of employment, to
waive your right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement
in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms, to make
clear to you that the arbitration agreement does not con-
stitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-
related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
mandatory arbitration agreement in any form that it has
been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a
copy of the revised agreement.
MULTIBAND EC, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/25-CA-108828 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.