Mrs. United States National Pageant, Inc.v.Melvin A. Richardson and Mary C. Richardson

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 5, 2009

No. 91165290 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2009)

Mailed: March 5, 2009
PTH

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Mrs. United States National Pageant, Inc.

v.

Melvin A. Richardson and Mary C. Richardson
_____

Opposition No. 91165290
to application Serial No. 76503247
filed on March 26, 2003
_____

Peter Georges of Breneman & Georges for Mrs. United States
National Pageant, Inc.

James W. Hiney of The Technology Law Offices of Virginia for
Melvin A. Richardson and Mary C. Richardson.
______

Before Hairston, Drost and Taylor, Administrative Trademark
Judges.

Opinion by Hairston, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Melvin A. Richardson and Mary C. Richardson
(applicants) filed an intent-to-use application to register
the mark MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL for services ultimately
identified as “promoting the goods and services of others
through the medium of pageants and contests conducted on a
national and regional basis” in International Class 35.1

1 Serial No. 76503247, filed March 26, 2003.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Opposition No. 91165290
2
Registration has been opposed by Mrs. United States
National Pageant (opposer) under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act. Opposer alleges that since prior to the
filing date of applicants’ application, it has continuously
used the registered marks MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL
PAGEANT2 (standard character form) and MRS. UNITED STATES3
(stylized) in connection with “entertainment services in the
nature of beauty and talent pageants;” and that applicants’
mark MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL, if used in connection with
applicants’ services, so resembles opposer’s previously used
and registered marks as to be likely to cause confusion.
Applicants, in their answer, denied the salient
allegations of the notice of opposition.4
Preliminary Matters
Before turning to the record and merits of the case, we
must discuss several preliminary matters.
The first matter we consider is “Applicants’ Motion To
Strike Deposition Testimony And Objection To Conduct Of
Opposer’s Counsel During Rebuttal Testimony Deposition,

2 Registration No. 1851722, issued August 30, 1994; renewed. The
words UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT are disclaimed apart from
the mark.
3 Registration No. 2083350, issued July 29, 1997; renewed. The
words UNITED STATES are disclaimed apart from the mark.
4 Applicants also asserted the affirmative defense of laches,
alleging that opposer failed to object to prior use of the mark
MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL by applicants’ predecessor-in-interest.
In a decision issued February 27, 2007 in connection with the
parties’ motions for summary judgment, the Board advised
applicants that they had no basis for a laches defense. In view
thereof, we have given no further consideration to this defense.
Opposition No. 91165290
3
filed October 2, 2007.” By way of this motion, applicants
seek to strike the rebuttal testimony depositions of
opposer’s witnesses Isabella Ilacqua and Sheila Strassburg
in view of alleged misconduct by opposer’s attorney.
Applicants alternatively request that the Board treat the
motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the opposition. In
addition, applicants request an award of attorneys’ fees in
connection with filing the motion. On October 17, 2007
opposer filed a brief in opposition to the motion; action on
the motion was subsequently deferred until final hearing.
In its main brief on the case, opposer states that
“since the undersigned new counsel for the Opposer has not
relied upon any of the rebuttal testimony, the Applicants’
Motion is believed moot.” (Brief, pp. 19-20). Applicants,
in their brief, state that the motion to strike is still
pending as is the request that the motion to strike be
treated also as a motion to dismiss the opposition. We
construe the statement in opposer’s brief that it has not
relied upon the rebuttal testimony as a concession of
applicants’ motion to strike. Thus, the Ilacqua and
Strassburg rebuttal testimony depositions do not form part
of the record in this case and have not been considered.
Under the circumstances, applicants’ alternative request
that we treat the motion to strike also as a motion to
dismiss the opposition is denied as moot. Moreover, insofar
Opposition No. 91165290
4
as applicants’ allegations concerning misconduct by
opposer’s prior counsel are concerned, applicants are
advised that the Board will not hold any person in contempt.
See Trademark Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP) §502.05 (2d
ed. rev. 2004). Conduct that is in violation of USPTO
Canons and Disciplinary Rules may be referred to the Office
of Enrollment and Discipline for appropriate action. See 37
CFR §§10.20, et. seq. Furthermore, applicants request for
attorneys’ fees is denied as the Board does not award
attorneys’ fees. See TBMP §502.05.
Both parties submitted notices of reliance on materials
that are not proper subject matter for a notice of reliance.
Although the parties did not file a motion or stipulation
agreeing to the introduction of such materials by way of a
notice of reliance, we note that neither party objected to
the notices of reliance and they have treated all materials
submitted by the notices of reliance as being of record.
Under the circumstances, we deem the parties to have
stipulated to the introduction of all materials through the
notices of reliance.
Opposer, in its brief on the case, argues that
applicants’ mark is deceptively misdescriptive of
applicants’ services. This issue was not pleaded in the
notice of opposition, and it cannot be deemed to have been
placed in issue and tried by the parties by express or
Opposition No. 91165290
5
implied consent, as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). In
view thereof, opposer’s arguments in this regard have not
been considered.
Attached to applicants’ brief on the case are Exhibits
1-5 which applicants maintain show that they are currently
using the applied-for mark and related marks. Exhibits
attached to a party’s brief on the case can be given no
consideration unless they were properly made of record
during the time for taking testimony. In this case, the
exhibits were not introduced during applicants’ testimony
period and, therefore, the exhibits have not been
considered.
The Record
The record consists of the pleadings and the file of
the involved application. Opposer submitted a notice of
reliance on, inter alia, certified copies of its pleaded
registrations, website printouts, souvenir program booklets,
newspaper articles, letters, and responses to discovery
requests; and the testimony depositions (with exhibits) of
opposer’s president, Ms. Isabella Ilacqua, and opposer’s New
York State Executive Director, Sheila M. Srassburg.
Applicants submitted the discovery deposition of opposer’s
president Ms. Ilacqua; the testimony depositions of
applicants Mary Richardson and Melvin Richardson, the
director of the Arkansas state Mrs. International Pageant,
Opposition No. 91165290
6
Bernee Thurow, and a prior winner of the Mrs. International
pageant, Virginia Thornton. Applicants also submitted a
notice of reliance on, inter alia, a third-party
registration, print and Internet web advertisements,
newsletters, souvenir programs, emails, correspondence, and
discovery responses.
The opposition has been fully briefed.
Standing and Priority
Because opposer has made of record certified copies
showing status and title of its pleaded registrations, and
because its likelihood of confusion claim is not without
merit, we find that opposer has established its standing to
oppose registration of applicants’ mark. Lipton Industries,
Inc. v. Ralston Purina Company, 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185
(CCPA 1982). Further, because opposer has made its pleaded
registrations of record, priority is not an issue in this
case with respect to the marks and services identified
therein. King Candy Co., Inc. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen,
Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974).
Likelihood of Confusion
Our likelihood of confusion determination under Section
2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the facts in evidence
that are relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set
forth in In re E. I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). In any likelihood of
Opposition No. 91165290
7
confusion analysis, however, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods and/or services. Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort
Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976).
The Parties
Opposer’s president, Isabella Ilacqua, first became
involved in the pageantry business in 1985. In 1990 opposer
began using the mark MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT to
identify its beauty pageant and the mark MRS. UNITED STATES
to identify the winner of the pageant. Since 1990 opposer
has continuously used these marks in connection with its
beauty pageant.
Applicants Melvin A. Richardson and Mary C. Richardson
are husband and wife. They entered the beauty pageant
business in 2000 after purchasing the assets of the “Mrs.
International” pageant from Dennis and Sue Holland, owners
of that pageant. Among the assets applicants purchased from
the Hollands included the applied-for mark MRS. U.S.
INTERNATIONAL.
Fame
The first duPont factor we consider is fame, because
this factor plays a dominant role in cases featuring a
famous mark. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products Inc., 293
F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Recot Inc. v.
M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894 (Fed. Cir. 200);
Opposition No. 91165290
8
and Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.,
963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Fame for
likelihood of confusion purposes arises “as long as a
significant portion of the relevant consuming public …
recognizes the mark as a source indicator.” Palm Bay
Imports, Inc. v. Vueve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1722, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
In this case, the relevant consumers would be potential
beauty pageant contestants and pageant spectators.
Fame may be measured indirectly by the volume of sales
and advertising expenditures of the goods and services at
issue, by the length of time the mark has been in use,
widespread critical assessments and notice by independent
sources of the goods and services identified by the mark, as
well as the general reputation of the goods and services.
Bose Corp. v. Audio Products Inc., 63 USPQ2d at 1305-06.
Opposer contends that its registered marks are famous.
The evidence of record shows that opposer has used its MRS.
UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS. UNITED STATES marks
for over 18 years. In addition, the evidence shows that
since 1997 opposer has maintained a website where interested
women can obtain information about its beauty pageant and
since the same date opposer has advertised its beauty
pageant in Pageantry Magazine. Ms. Ilacqua testified that
she has received positive feedback from contestants in
Opposition No. 91165290
9
opposer’s pageant. The Las Vegas Sun newspaper, in an
article dated August 1, 1997, described opposer’s pageant as
“the premier event of its kind.” Ms. Strassburg, the
executive director of the Mrs. New York State Pageant for
the MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT testified that “MRS.
UNITED STATES is a very well-respected pageant … it’s
considered among the top two for married women in the United
States.” (Dep. at 23).
This evidence is insufficient to support a finding that
opposer’s marks are famous. Although opposer has used its
MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS. UNITED STATES
marks for over 18 years, opposer has offered no evidence
regarding its profits and advertising expenditures.
Moreover, the testimony of opposer’s witnesses Mrs. Ilacqua
and Mrs. Strassburg with respect to the reputation of
opposer’s beauty pageant is self-serving, and a single news
article describing opposer’s pageant as “the premier event
of its kind” is hardly evidence of widespread critical
assessments.
In view of the extreme deference that we accord a
famous mark in terms of the wide latitude of legal
protection it receives, and the dominant role fame plays in
the likelihood of confusion analysis, it is the duty of the
party asserting that its mark is famous to prove it.
Leading Jewelers Guild Inc. v. LJOW Holdings LLC, 82 USPQ2d
Opposition No. 91165290
10
1901, 1904 (TTAB 2007). We do not find on this record that
opposer’s MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS.
UNITED STATES marks are famous for purposes of our
likelihood of confusion determination.
The Services
We consider next the respective services of the parties
and, in connection therewith, the trade channels and
purchasers. The question of likelihood of confusion must be
determined based on an analysis of the services recited in
the involved application vis-à-vis the services recited in
opposer’s registrations, rather than what the services are
asserted or shown to actually be. See Canadian Imperial
Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1815
(Fed. Cir. 1987). See also, Octocom Systems, Inc. v.
Houston Computer Services, Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d
1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and The Chicago Corp. v. North
American Chicago Corp., 20 USPQ2d 1715 (TTAB 1991).
Further, it is a general rule that the services need not be
identical or even competitive in order to support a finding
of likelihood of confusion. Rather, it is enough that the
respective services are related in some manner, or the
circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they
would be likely to be seen by the same persons under
circumstances which could give rise, because of the marks
used therewith, to a mistaken belief that they originate
Opposition No. 91165290
11
from or are in some way associated with the same producer or
that there is an association between the producers of each
party’s services. In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386
(TTAB 1991) and cases cited therein.
Opposer’s services are identified in its two
registrations as “entertainment services in the nature of
beauty and talent pageants.” Applicants’ services are
identified in their application as “promoting the goods and
services of others through the medium of pageants and
contests conducted on a national and regional basis.”
In the absence of any limitations in applicants’ recitation
of services, it must be presumed that the recited pageants
include beauty and talent pageants. Therefore, there is no
question that the parties’ services are related, if not
virtually identical, to the extent that they involve beauty
and talent pageants. The only distinction is that, as
recited, the primary purpose of applicants’ pageant is to
promote the sale of goods and services of others (i.e., the
pageant sponsors) whereas opposer’s pageant is presented
primarily as entertainment for the general public. This is
a distinction without a difference in the context of our
likelihood of confusion analysis. In other words, the
parties’ services are not rendered different because
applicants’ pageant will have sponsors whereas opposer’s
pageant may not.
Opposition No. 91165290
12
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by applicants’
argument that the services are different because applicants
“provide a higher class of service” in terms of “control of
content and quality of contestants” and “approach.” (Brief,
pp. 28-29). Applicants’ recitation of services is not
limited to “high class” pageants, and even if it were,
opposer’s recitation of services is broad enough to
encompass “high class” pageants.
With respect to the trade channels and purchasers,
applicants argue that the respective trade channels are
different because applicants conduct their pageant in an
“upscale venue” in Skokie, Illinois whereas opposer conducts
its pageant in an “off the main strip” Las Vegas motel.
However, neither party’s recitation of services is
restricted as to the geographic scope of services, channels
of trade or classes of purchasers; thus we must presume that
the services would be offered in all ordinary trade channels
for these services and to all normal classes of purchasers
for the services identified. See Canadian Imperial Bank, 1
USPQ2d at 1815. In other words, we conclude that the
channels of trade and class of purchasers of the parties’
services, at the very least, overlap.

Opposition No. 91165290
13
Actual Confusion
The next duPont factor we consider is that of actual
confusion. Opposer points to several incidents of what it
contends is actual confusion with the use of MRS. U.S.
INTERNATIONAL by applicants’ predecessor-in-interest.
Specifically, opposer’s president Ms. Ilacqua testified that
she had received three or four telephone calls inquiring
whether the MRS. UNITED STATES PAGEANT was part of the MRS.
U.S. INTERNATIONAL pageant. Also, Ms. Strassburg testified
as follows with respect to actual confusion:
Q. … During the time that you were employed were
any New York contestants actually confused into
thinking that if they won the Mrs. United States
National Pageant, they would be going onto (sic)
compete in the Mrs. US International pageant?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. And, can you give me a percentage of
contestants that were actually confused?

A. Yeah. You know, honestly, I would say about
between 16 to 20 percent depending on the year.
….

Q. Now, at the national pageant finals in Las
Vegas for the Mrs. United States National Pageant,
did you have discussions with other state
directors about actual confusion among the
contestants?

A. Absolutely. There was (sic) discussions.

Q. And what did they say about the percentage of
their contestants -- or did they say anything
about the percentage?

A. No. They didn’t say anything about their
percentage. But they took issue in the national
director’s meeting with Isabella.
Opposition No. 91165290
14

Q. Did they confirm that there was some
confusion?

A. Absolutely, yes. That was a great topic of
discussion for a few years, actually.

(Dep. at 7-9).
In addition, opposer introduced a page from the September
21, 1994 edition of The Sentinel News which includes a
picture of a woman wearing a crown and a sash bearing the
title MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL with a caption that reads
“Suzanne Burger of Adairsville, the new Mrs. United States
International …” (underlining added).
The telephone calls related by Ms. Ilacqua show, at
most, that inquiries were made as to the relationship, if
any, between opposer’s pageant and the pageant of
applicants’ predecessor-in-interest. It is not clear,
however, that the persons were, in fact, confused. Insofar
as the newspaper page is concerned, this is hardly evidence
of actual confusion between applicants’ mark and opposer’s
marks since neither of opposer’s specific marks appears on
this page. The fact that the newspaper used the designation
“United States” in a caption rather than the abbreviated
equivalent “U.S.” shown in the photograph is not evidence of
actual confusion between the marks involved in this case.
Furthermore, Mrs. Strassburg’s testimony that pageant
directors in other states reported confusion among their
pageant contestants is hearsay. With respect to Mrs.
Opposition No. 91165290
15
Strassburg’s testimony concerning alleged confusion among
contestants in her New York pageant, there is no specific
information directly from any contestants as to why they
believed if they won opposer’s MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL
PAGEANT, they would go on to compete in the MRS. U. S.
INTERNATIONAL PAGEANT. In the absence of such information,
Mrs. Strassburg’s testimony is of little probative value.
See Corporate Fitness Programs Inc. v. Weider Health and
Fitness Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1682, 1690-91 (TTAB 1987) [testimony
of others is of little probative value in the absence of
testimony from the persons allegedly confused as to whether
they were confused and, if so, what caused their confusion].
In short, we find opposer’s proffered evidence of
actual confusion too vague to constitute persuasive evidence
of actual confusion.
Bad faith adoption
Opposer argues that applicants have acted in bad faith
and with the intention of trading on opposer’s goodwill in
its MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS. UNITED
STATES marks. Evidence of bad faith adoption is a relevant
factor in a likelihood of confusion analysis. However, in
this case, applicants purchased rights in the MRS. U.S.
INTERNATIONAL mark from a predecessor-in-interest, and
although applicants knew of opposer’s marks, an applicant’s
mere knowledge of an opposer’s mark does not establish that
Opposition No. 91165290
16
the applicant adopted its mark in bad faith. In short, we
are not persuaded that applicants acted in bad faith or that
applicants intended to trade on opposer’s goodwill in its
MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS. UNITED STATES
marks.
The Marks
We next consider whether applicants’ mark, MRS. U.S.
INTERNATIONAL and opposer’s marks, MRS. UNITED STATES
NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS. UNITED STATES in the stylized form
shown below,

are similar or dissimilar. Opposer contends that the marks
are similar:
Both the Opposer and the Applicants use the first
term, Mrs. Potential beauty pageant contestants and
members of the general public often abbreviate the
second term “United States” as “U.S.” which the
Applicants intend to use.
Since the Applicants intend to use “International”
as a part of their marks, potential beauty pageant
contestants and members of the general public are
also likely to think that the Applicants’
“International” Pageant is an umbrella pageant which
is held at least one level above the Opposer’s
“National Pageant.”
(Brief, p. 23)

Applicants, on the other hand, contend that the marks
are dissimilar; that the term “MRS.” in the parties’ marks
denotes the classification of women who compete in the
Opposition No. 91165290
17
respective pageants; and the term “PAGEANT” in opposer’s
MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT simply informs the
public of the nature of the services. With respect to
opposer’s contention that contestants and members of the
general public are likely to think that applicants’ pageant
is an umbrella pageant which is one level above opposer’s
pageant, applicants maintain that such argument is
unsupported.
To determine whether the marks are similar for purposes
of our likelihood of confusion analysis, we must compare the
marks in terms of appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression. In addition, it is well-settled
that, in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on
the issue of likelihood of confusion, while the marks are
compared in their entireties, including any descriptive or
disclaimed portions thereof, “there is nothing improper in
stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has
been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided that
the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks
in their entireties. Indeed this type of analysis appears
to be unavoidable.” In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d
1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Furthermore, we
must consider the recollection of the average purchaser who
normally retains a general, rather than specific impression
of trademarks. See Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190
Opposition No. 91165290
18
USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975). Finally, in making this
determination, we must keep in mind that “[w]hen marks would
appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree
of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely
confusion declines.” Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
Applying these principles to the marks in this case, we
find that applicants’ MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL mark and
opposer’s MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS.
UNITED STATES marks are more similar than dissimilar in
terms of appearance, sound, meaning and commercial
impression. Opposer’s marks and applicants’ mark share a
similar structure in that the marks are comprised of the
identical title “MRS.” followed by the national designation
“UNITED STATES” or its abbreviated equivalent “U.S.” The
stylization of opposer’s MRS. UNITED STATES mark does not
serve to distinguish the appearance of this mark from
applicants’ mark in any meaningful way. Also, we find that
the different words, NATIONAL and INTERNATIONAL, in
opposer’s MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT mark and
applicants’ MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL mark do not serve to
distinguish the respective marks. Rather, these words are
likely to be perceived by the relevant consumers as
indicating beauty pageant services from the same source
Opposition No. 91165290
19
covering different geographical regions. Insofar as the
word PAGEANT in opposer’s mark is concerned, this word is
obviously generic for opposer’s services and, therefore, has
no source-identifying significance. We find, therefore,
that the marks’ similarities in appearance, sound, meaning
and commercial impression overcome any differences. See
Palm Bay, 73 USPQ2d at 1694.
Although applicants argue that there is no support for
opposer’s contention that the relevant consumers are likely
to believe that applicants’ MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL pageant
is an umbrella pageant which is held at one level above
opposer’s MRS. UNITED STATES and MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL
PAGEANT, we disagree. The following third-party
advertisements of record are evidence that pageants are
structured like pyramids, with pageants at the state,
national and international levels, and that such pageants
may be conducted by or affiliated with the same entity:
“Halo Productions – Call for info on State and National
Pageants;” “Renaissance – Renaissance World and Renaissance
U.S.A. pageants;” “Mrs. US Globe – The national preliminary
to the international Mrs. Globe;” “Miss Universe, Miss USA,
TEEN USA – Trump Pageants Productions;” and “Miss
Massachusetts Teen All American – Official State Preliminary
to the Miss Teen All American Pageant.” In addition, the
record shows that there are thirty-two state pageants
Opposition No. 91165290
20
affiliated with opposer (e.g., “Mrs. New York United
States,” “Mrs. Michigan United States”) with the winners
thereof going on to compete in opposer’s MRS. UNITED STATES
and MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT. We find,
therefore, that it is quite plausible that potential beauty
pageant contestants and pageant spectators who encounter
applicants’ MRS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL pageant would view it as
the next level of competition for the winner of opposer’s
MRS. UNITED STATES and MRS. UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT,
and that the respective pageants are affiliated with or
sponsored by the same entity.
Number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
services
Applicants submitted third-party advertisements for
beauty pageants named “Mrs. U.S. Globe,” “Ms. U.S.
Continental Pageant,” “Ms. America,” “Ms. United States of
America,” “Ms. American United States Pageant,” “U.S. Beauty
National Pageant,” “U.S. United Pageant,” and “U.S. National
Pageant.” In addition, applicants introduced a third-party
registration, namely, Registration No. 3039884 for the mark
MRS. U.S. CONTINENTAL PAGEANT for “entertainment in the
nature of beauty pageants; television show production in the
nature of beauty pageants.”
It is well settled that third-party registrations are
not evidence of use of the marks shown therein, or that
Opposition No. 91165290
21
consumers have been exposed to them. AMF Inc. v. American
Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 177 USPQ 268 (CCPA
1973). Also, insofar as the advertisements are concerned,
there is no evidence bearing on the extent of such third-
party use. Nonetheless, we find the advertisements and
registration to be probative evidence that titles such as
“Ms.” and “Mrs.” are highly suggestive of the marital status
of pageant contestants, and that the designations “U.S.” and
“United States” are descriptive of the geographic coverage
of the pageants. Under the circumstances, and in view of
opposer’s disclaimer of the words UNITED STATES NATIONAL
PAGEANT and UNITED STATES in its respective marks MRS.
UNITED STATES NATIONAL PAGEANT and MRS. UNITED STATES, we
find that such marks are weak. Nonetheless, “even weak
marks are entitled to protection against registration of
similar marks, especially identical ones, for related goods
and services.” In re Colonial Stores, 216 USPQ 793, 795
(TTAB 1982); In re The Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 198 USPQ
337, 341 (CCPA 1978) [ERASE for a laundry soil and stain
remover held confusingly similar to STAIN ERASER, registered
on the Supplemental Register, for a stain remover]. Here,
notwithstanding any weakness in opposer’s marks, they are
still very similar to applicants’ mark, and the parties’
services are virtually identical.
Opposition No. 91165290
22
In sum, although we have discounted opposer’s evidence
of actual confusion and notwithstanding any weakness in
opposer’s marks, we find that in view of the similarity of
the parties’ marks, the virtual identity of the parties’
services, and the overlap in the parties’ trade channels and
purchasers, a likelihood of confusion exists. To the extent
that any doubts as to this conclusion might exist, such
doubts must be resolved against applicants. See In re Hyper
Shoppes (Ohio) Inc., 837 F.2d 840, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1988); and In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748
F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Decision: The opposition is sustained.