Mayes Bros., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJun 17, 1965

153 N.L.R.B. 18 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees concerning their union activities, sympathies, and desires, or threaten our employees with reprisals be- cause of their union activities, or threaten our employees with refusal to bar- gain with their bargaining representative WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce any of our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur- poses of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act or refrain from any or all such activities. All of our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining members of Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local No. 627, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. MEMORIAL CONSULTANTS, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 881 U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, Telephone No. 828-7572, if they have any question concerning this notice or com- pliance with its provisions. Mayes Bros., Incorporated and International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Case No. 23-CA-1923. June 17, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On March 18, 1965, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's De- cision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- 153 NLRB No. 1. MAYES BROS., INCORPORATED 19 aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications. Although we are in agreement with the Trial Examiner's finding that on June 3, 1964, and thereafter, Respondent engaged in bad-faith bargaining in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act, we do not agree that the record supports his further finding that on June 3, 1964, the parties reached agreement on all the substantive terms of a collective- bargaining contract and that nothing further was required but the signatures of the parties. It is clear that as far back as September 1962 the parties had agreed on all collective-bargaining issues save one-the management rights clause. At a bargaining meeting of November 21, 1962, Respondent, in an apparent effort to break the deadlock over this issue, offered a counterproposal containing a substitute management and grievance clause, and proposals bearing upon seniority, wages, and duration. During the course of the meeting, the Union rejected Respondent's counterproposal in tote. At the next bargaining session, on March 30, 1964, the only contractual issue discussed was the wording of the "man- agement clause." This was the last meeting between the parties prior to the crucial bargaining session of June 3, 1964. According to the credited testimony, the first item discussed at the June 3 meeting was the question of wages. Respondent had pre- viously offered a 6-cent-an-hour wage increase, but during the discus- sion over wages, President Mayes stated that he would prefer giving a 25-cent-an-hour wage increase to signing a contract. After some fur- ther discussion, Mayes offered a 12-cent-an-hour wage increase, where- upon Farr, a union representative said, "Well, since we got this 12 cents an hour, this wage increase, the Union will accept the manage- ment clause that we have in this agreement." 1 The duration of the contract, which was also discussed at the meeting, was, according to the credited testimony of Farr, left to the Respondent to decide. The meeting concluded with Respondent's attorney Wilde requesting 3 or 4 days to study what had been discussed. Several days thereafter, Wilde called Farr and said Mayes wasn't ready to sign the agreement at that time, but he (Wilde) would see if he could get Mayes to sign. Thereafter, Farr telephoned Wilde on numerous occasions about Mayes signing the contract, but with no success. At no time during the course of these conversations did Farr or Wilde discuss any unresolved items in the agreement. During the last such call, Wilde asked Farr if the latter could get the membership to accept a "letter of contract" from Mayes. Farr agreed to consider this proposition. With this understanding, Wilde agreed to draft such a letter, present it to Mayes, 'The reference being to the proposed agreement between the parties. 20 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and send Farr a copy. No such letter was ever sent, admittedly be- cause Mayes would not sign it. The Trial Examiner correctly found that prior to the June 3 meet- ing only one issue remained to be resolved between the parties-the management rights clause.2 At the June 3 meeting, however, two issues which had previously been discussed-wages and duration of the contract-were again considered. The parties were unable to agree whether the term of the contract should be for 1 or 2 years. When Mayes offered a 12-cent-an-hour wage increase, the Union told Mayes it would accept whichever term Respondent desired. But the Union conditioned acceptance of the 2-year-contract on the granting of another 12-cent-an-hour wage increase in the second year.' Thus, as the duration of the contract was unresolved at the June 3 meeting and the Union's offer to allow Respondent to choose the term of the contract was conditioned upon a wage increase over and above that which Respondent had offered, it cannot be said that the parties reached agreement on all terms of the contract. Accordingly, we find no contract existed between the parties on June 3 or thereafter. How- ever, we also find that on June 3 and thereafter, Respondent acted in bad faith by misleading the Union into believing that a contract had been agreed upon and by engaging in conduct, detailed in the Trial Examiner's Decision, which had as its object the undermining of the Union's status as bargaining representative. Accordingly, we shall order the Respondent to bargain with the Union, upon request, and if an understanding is reached, to embody such understanding in a signed agreement. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein, and orders that the Respondent Mayes Bros., Incorporated, Houston, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified : 4 1. Delete the following language from paragraph 1(a) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order : (a) . . . "by refusing to sign an agreement embodying provisions agreed upon" ... . 2 Respondent's attorney Wilde admitted that only one issue remained to be resolved as of June 3 In view of this admission, the Trial Examiner's rulings preventing Respond- ent from examining all aspects of the prior bargaining relationship cannot be deemed to be prejudicial. 8 Farr testified that he told Wilde that the Union would accept a 1- or 2-year agreement "doubling the amount of wages for the second year." 4 The telephone number given below the signature of the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision is amended to read: "Telephone No. Capitol 8-0611, Extension 296." MAYES BROS., INCORPORATED 21 2. Delete paragraph 2(a) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order and insert the following as paragraph 2(a) : "(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining rep- resentative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is, reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement." 3. Delete the first indented paragraph of the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and insert in place thereof, the following : WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of our production and maintenance employees, ex- cluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors within the meaning of the Act. WE WILL, if an understanding is reached, embody any such understanding in a signed agreement. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge filed October 8, 1964, by the above-named labor organization, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board on November 13, 1964, issued his complaint and notice of hearing. The above-named Respondent duly filed its answer. The complaint alleges and the answer denies that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Houston, Texas, on January 26, 1965, before Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore. At the hearing all parties except the Charging Union were represented by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to present evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally and to file briefs. Briefs have been received from General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon the record thus made, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPO DENT Mayes Bros., Incorporated, is a Texas corporation, with principal office and place of business in Houston, Texas, where it is engaged in providing pipe coating and wrapping services. During the 12 months before issuance of the complaint it pro- vided goods and services valued at more than $50,000 to customers located outside the State of Texas. During the same period it purchased and had delivered from points outside the State of Texas goods valued at more than $50,000. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is here found that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Internat; nal Chemical Workers Union , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admit- ting to membership employees of the Respondent. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Setting and issues The chief issue raised by the complaint is factual: whether or not since June 3, 1964, the Respondent has refused to execute a written contract with the Charging 22 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union although on that date full understanding as to the contents of an agreement had been reached by the parties. A subsidiary issue is whether certain conduct on the part of the company representatives has been, as urged in General Counsel's able brief, "a rejection of the collective bargaining principle in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act." As relevant background the following summary of certain events is made. On February 7, 1962, the Board certified the Charging Union as the bargaining repre- sentative of the Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit. Late that year and early in 1963 the Union filed 8(a)(5) charges against the Respondent, resulting in the issuance of a complaint and a hearing. In August 1963, Trial Examiner Wel- lington A. Gillis issued his decision dismissing the complaint. On November 23, 1963, the Board adopted his findings and recommendations.' B. The refusal to bargain 1. Relevant negotiations The Board decision previously cited covered negotiating events through Novem- ber 21, 1962. In substance, the chief issue in that case was whether the Respondent unlawfully insisted upon retaining in a management clause certain provisions which would have required the Union to forfeit its statutory duty to represent the employ- ees concerning discipline and discharge. The Board adopted Trial Examiner Gillis' conclusion that General Counsel had not sustained his burden of proving the alleged fact. The present case chiefly involves two meetings of the parties following issuance of the Board decision in the earlier case: meetings that occurred late in March and on June 3, 1964. It is General Counsel's contention that at the June 3 meeting the Union completely capitulated on the one remaining issue, that of the management clause, and that counsel for the Respondent failed to abide by his agreement to draft and submit the final understanding in writing for signature. On the contrary, it is the position of the Respondent that no final agreement or understanding was in fact reached on June 3. In my opinion the preponderance of credible evidence supports General Counsel's contention. Facts leading to this conclusion are: (a) According to the credible testimony of Union Representative Fan, the only contractual issue discussed at the March 30 meeting was the wording of the "man- agement clause." 2 It appears that no agreement was reached. (b) According to the credible testimony of Fan and another union representative, Brewer, the question of wages was first discussed at the June 3 meeting Up to this point the Respondent had offered a 6-cent-an-hour increase. President Mayes declared, according to the union representatives' uncontradicted testimony, that he would prefer to give a 25-cent-an-hour increase to signing a contract. And accord- ing to Attorney Wilde's own testimony, "We were particularly interested and so discussed the fact that the Union had given up at other plants and asked them why they were so persistent at Mayes Bros." [Emphasis supplied.] Mayes finally offered a 12-cent-an-hour increase. Upon this concession, Farr then said, "Well, since we have got this 12 cents an hour, this wage increase in here, the Union will ac- cept the management clause that we have in this [proposed] agreement," which had been submitted to the Union by the Company before the November 1962 meet- ing, and which is in evidence as General Counsel's exhibit. Farr also told Wilde that he would leave the term of the contract up to the Company's wish and .determination. (c) The Union's sudden capitulation upon the one substantive point in issue ap- parently took Wilde by surprise. He asked for a few days to "study" the matter, and said he would call Fan He did call Farr a few days later, and said that al- though he was trying, he was unable to get Mayes to sign the agreement. The Respondent's attorney raised no question with Fan about any terms of the under- standing reached. (d) Farr called Wilde several times thereafter about signing the contract with no success. At the last of such calls, Wilde asked Farr if the latter could get the membership to accept a "letter of contract" from Mayes. Farr agreed to consider 1145 NLRB 181. 9Attorney Wilde, the only management witness to testify concerning this meeting, did not dispute Farr's testimony on this point He said that about 90 percent of the time at this meeting was spent on matters not concerning the contract, but did not specify what subject or subjects were covered during the remaining 10 percent of the period. MAYES BROS., INCORPORATED 23 this proposition. Upon this Wilde agreed to draft such a letter, present it to Mayes, and send him a copy. Wilde has never submitted even a "letter of contract" to the Union .3 2. Conduct following negotiations The following conduct by company officials after the last negotiating meeting, established by credible testimony, significantly supports the conclusion that Mayes has steadfastly refused, and is continuing to refuse, despite whatever efforts his own counsel has made to the contrary, to meet his obligations under the Act. (a) In June Assistant Superintendent Dyess asked employee Davis who was then the head of the employee negotiating committee, to try to get the "boys" out of the Union, because Mayes was not going to sign any contract with it. (b) In October Dyess again told him to talk to the "boys," and that Mayes would sign no contract with them until they voted the Union "out." He further said that he would guarantee that they would get an increase if they did get the Union "out." He added that if he were the owner of the plant, he would fire every s.o.b. there, and some day he might get the chance to do so? (c) In June or July Dyess approached employee Hewitt and said he had heard he wanted to drop the Union and added that he would guarantee a 25-cent increase within 3 days after the "boys" dropped the Union .5 31 am unable to credit Attorney Wilde's testimony where inconsistent with that of the testimony of the union representatives or contrary to the inherent probabilities of the circumstances as described by himself. His testimony was given, at least on direct, in narrative form. He claimed that at the last negotiating meeting in November 1962, no agreement was reached upon five specific counterproposals proffered by the Company that day. Yet his own letter, placed in evidence by himself and accompanying the proposals as given to the union attorney at that meeting, show clearly that these five proposals were being offered as "substitute clauses" for the management clause which the Union had con- sidered "unpalatable " The Union, as above noted, finally accepted the management clause in full, and the "substitute clauses" became immaterial Wilde also claimed that the June 3 meeting "broke up with the understanding that I would call Mr. Farr if the company could make further proposals to settle the dispute." Yet he makes no claim that he there- after in fact did make any further proposals, nor does his testimony indicate any subject upon which he might have made further proposals He contended that "it is my im- pression that the company and the union have not agreed on any contract that can be reduced to writing and signed at this time." Yet lie admitted that he did talk to Parr in mid-June and suggest the "possibility of entering into a letter agreement." He failed to explain at the bearing, and admitted he never informed Farr, as to any provisions that could be included in a unilateral "letter agreement" which could not as appropriately be included in a mutually binding contract. It is Wilde's claim that Parr said he would consider the proposition of a "letter agreement" and let him know, but he never received a reply. He flushed with embarrassment, however, when asked how he expected Parr to submit "letter" proposals to his membership when Wilde neither sent such a letter nor gave Farr any specific information as to what would be contained in it On cross- examination , Wilde admitted that as far back as September 1962, there was but one issue remaining for solution in reaching an agreement, the management clause. Also on cross- examination Wilde at first said that the Union on June 3 agreed to "neither one" of the management clauses (one in the full agreement proposed by him before the November 21, 1962, meeting, and the other in his "substitute" proposals of the same date as described above). He then admitted, however, as follows: "I would say that Mr. Parr indicated that the management rights clause as proposed by the company was palatable to the union." Thus, after much evasive and circumambulatory testimony, he finally conceded precisely what Parr and Brewer claimed: that on June 3 the Union agreed to this controversial clause Finally, also on cross-examination, he admitted that at the conclusion of the June 3 meeting, Farr asked him, "Mr Wilde, will you please see that one [agreement] is prepared so we can sign it 9" It seems quite absurd to believe that had no understand- ing been reached that Farr would have, as he admitted, asked him to draft it in writing so it could be signed * Dyess' partial denials are not credited Not only was lie a far from impressive witness but in effect he admitted the first request made to Davis, but attempted to explain it by saying that he had heard another employee wanted to get out of the Union. And he candidly admitted that he told Davis "I could fire any one of you so-and-so's at any time practically during the day." 5 Dyess admitted that he told Hewitt "that there would be no point in him asking any- body at Mayes Bros for a raise as long as he belonged to the Union, and that until he got of it, that would be the only way." 24 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (d) Also in June or July Dyess told employee Mingo to talk his fellow employees into withdrawing from the Union, and that if they did they would get a raise. He warned that there would be no raise unless they did drop the Union. (e) Somewhat later, after receiving a raise, the same employee met Mayes The latter, according to his own testimony, was "fixing to go home" and asked the em- ployee what the "boys" thought about the raise. Mingo said they appreciated it. According to his own testimony, Mayes then said, "You possibly will get along much better out here by staying with me and let that Union alone." (f) In July or August Dyess asked employee McCord and others in a group to "drop" the Union, and declared that they could "forget" about a contract, because Mayes would not sign one.6 3. Conclusions As observed above, the foregoing statements by both Dyess and Mayes, made after the June 3 negotiating conference, provide further support for the conclusion that the refusal to sign a contract was based upon Mayes' persistent intent not to enter into an agreement with the Union, and further detracts from the validity of the Respondent's claimed position that no agreement was reached. "Good faith" may not reasonably be ascribed to an employer who candidly admits that he tells an employee that he will "get along much better out here by staying with me and let that Union alone." The conduct described also constitutes independent violations of Section 7 rights, in that it interferes with, restrains, and coerces employees in their efforts to seek, through a lawful bargaining agent, a collective-bargaining agreement, and unlawfully discourages membership in and activity on behalf of a labor organization. The Respondent offered no evidence to contest the allegations of the complaint concerning the appropriate unit or the Board certification of the Union. It is there- fore concluded and found that at all times since February 1962 the Charging Union has been the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate unit set forth below for the purposes of collective bargaining: All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Houston plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors, as defined by the Act. Finally, it is concluded and found at all times since June 3, 1964, the Respondent has refused to bargain in good faith with the Charging Union as the exclusive bar- gaining representative of its employees, and thereby has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights accorded them by the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. It will be recommended that, upon request, the Respondent immediately sign and execute the agreement reached on June 3, 1964. If such is not requested by the Charging Union, it is recommended that the Respondent bargain in good faith with the said Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit described herein and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. It is further recommended that, in the event the Union requests that the agreement of June 3, 1964, be executed, retroactive effect be given to said date of all terms of said agreement, including but not limited to provisions relating to wages and other benefits, and that employees be made whole for any losses suffered by reason of the Respondent's refusal to sign said agreement.? 6 Dyess admitted that he told employees he did not believe Mayes would sign a contract 7 See Warrensburg Board cb Paper Corporation, 143 NLRB 398, and Ogle Protection Service, Inc., et ai., 149 NLRB 545. MATES BROS ., INCORPORATED 25 In view of the nature and extent of the Respondent 's unfair labor practices, as described herein, it will be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the employees ' rights as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. On June 3 , 1964, and at all times material since then , the aforesaid Union was, and now is , the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance employ- ees at the Respondent's plant, exclusive of professional employees , guards, watch- men, and supervisors , as defined in the Act , within the meaning of Section 9(a) and (b) of the Act. 3. By refusing to sign a written agreement embodying an understanding reached on June 3, 1964, concerning rates of pay , wages, hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of employment , the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 4. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , I recommend that Respondent , Mayes Bros., Incorpo- rated, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment , or other terms of employ- ment , by refusing to sign an agreement embodying provisions agreed upon , soliciting withdrawal from said labor organization by threats or promises , or informing em- ployees that it will not enter into a contract with said labor organization. (b) In any manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above -named labor organization in the manner set forth above in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Post at its plant in Houston , Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 23, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent , be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any material. (c) Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 20 days from the date of the receipt of the Trial Examiner 's Decision , what steps have been taken to comply herewith.9 s In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words " the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words " a Decision and Order" I In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision shall read "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " 26 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to conduct our labor relations in compliance with the National Labor Relations Act, we notify you that: WE WILL, upon request, execute the June 3 , 1964, agreement reached by us and International Chemical Workers Union , AFL-CIO, the agreement to be effective from that date to at least the next renewal date provided therein follow- ing signature , and give retroactive effect to all the terms of said agreement, in- cluding but not limited to the provisions relating to wages and other benefits and make whole employees for any losses suffered by reason of the Respondent's refusal to execute the agreement , but if no request to execute is made, we will, upon request , bargain collectively with said union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the following unit: All our production and maintenance employees excluding office clerical employees , professional employees , guards, watchmen and supervisors within the meaning of the Act. WE WILL NOT, by threats or promises, try to get you to withdraw from the above-named union , or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT violate any of the rights you have under the National Labor Relations Act, to join a union of your own choice or not to engage in any union activities. MAYES BROS., INCORPORATED, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 6617 Federal Office Building, 515 Rusk Avenue, Houston , Texas, Telephone No. Capitol 8-0611 , Extension 4271, if they have any question concerning this notice or com- pliance with its provisions. May Aluminum , Incorporated and Aluminum Workers Interna- tional Union . Case No. 123-CA-1907. June 17,1965 DECISION AND ORDER On April 7, 1965, Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's De- cision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision and a supporting brief and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The 153 NLRB No. 6.