Local Union No. 282, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 17, 1965

155 N.L.R.B. 973 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 973
2. The Board's current standard for the assertion of jurisdiction
over retail enterprises within its statutory jurisdiction is an annual
gross voltune of business of at least $500,000. Carolina Supplies and
Cement Co., 122 NLRB 88, 89. The Petitioner's annual gross volume
of business is less than $500,000 and therefore does not meet the mone-
tary test for invoking the Board's discretionary standard for the
assertion of jurisdiction over retail enterprises.'
Alccordingly, the parties are advised, under Section 102.103 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, that, on the
basis of the allegations submitted herein, the Board would not assert
jurisdiction over the Petitioner's operations.
' Joseph Makula , et at. d / b/a The Mill Cafe, 104 NLRB 1746.
Local Union No. 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America [ F. Mas-
cali & Sons, Inc.; Triboro Asphalt Company ; Certified Indus-
tries, Inc.; Amfar Asphalt Company ; Tully & Di Napoli, Inc.;
Columbia Asphalt Corporation ; M. Parisi & Son , Inc.] and Bus-
ter Holmes d/b/a Holmes Trucking Corp .; Mario Boccasini;
Nicholas Boccasini ; James De Masi ; Vito Boccasini ; Ben Al-
locco ; Sal Fili d/b/a Patio Transit Mix ; Sebastian D'Agos-
tino d/b/a Dee's Trucking Co.; Long Island Truck Owners'
Association
Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America [Lizza & Sons, Inc.]
and Walter Michalowski and Joseph Iocca
Local Union No. 282 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America and George
Negri, Inc.
Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America; Transit Mix Concrete
Corp.; Colonial Sand & Stone Corporation ; Ryan Redi-Mix
Co.; M. F. Hickey Company ; Principe-Danna, Inc. and George
Negri, Inc. Cases Nos. 29-CC-7-1, 09-CC-7-0, 29-CC-7-3, 29-
CC-7-4, 29-CC-7-5, 29-CC-7-7, 29-CC-7-8, 29-CC-7-10, 29-
CC-7-12, 29-CC-10, 29-CE-1, 29-CC-9, 29-CC-9-2, 29-CC-9-3,
and 29-CE-2. November 17, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 22, 1.965, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
155 NLRB No. 102.
974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam-
iner's Decision. He also found that the Respondents had not. engaged
in certain other alleged unfair labor practices, And recommended that
the allegations of the complaints pertaining thereto be dismissed.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondent lTnion filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
The Charging Parties Joined in the exceptions and hi.ief of the General
Counsel, and requested an opportunity for oral argument.
The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of
the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial
error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board
has considered the entire record in these cases, including the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the briefs,' and hereby
adopts the findings,22 conclusions.,' and recommendations 4 of the Trial.
Examiner, except as modified herein.
'The request of the Charging Parties for oral argument before the Board is hereby
denied as the record , the exceptions , and the briefs adequately present the issues and the
positions of the parties.
3 The Trial Examiner found that the threatened work stoppage at the Whitestone Park-
way project of Tully & DI Napoli in May 1963 was a violation of Section 8(b) (4). We do
not agree . The first charges in these cases were filed on March 11, 1964 , approximately
10 months after the incident in question . We find , therefore , that the incident occurred
outside the 10(b) limitations period , and that the Trial Examiner erred in finding this
event to be a violation . Local Lodge No. 1404, International Association of Machinists,
AFL-C10; et al. (Bryan Mann!a.ctnring Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411. Moreover, we note
that the complaint herein did not allege the Whitestone Parkway incident as a violation,
and the record discloses the General Counsel merely introduced evidence thereof as "back-
ground" to show a pattern of conduct.
The General Counsel excepts to the Trial Examiner's failure to find that the Union vio-
lated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) in forcing Transit-Mix Concrete Corp, Colonial Sand & Stone
Corp., Ryan Redi-Mix Co., and M. F. Hickey Company to cease doing business with George
Negri, Inc. The Trial Examiner did find a violation in this regard with respect to Principe-
Danna. Examination of the record indicates that all of the above-mentioned employers
supplied Negri with construction materials until the Union threatened them with a strike
action. Therefore, we find merit to this exception of the General Counsel, and we find
that the Union violated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) by causing the above employers to cease
doing business with George Negri, Inc.
3 We do not adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the Union's letters of May 8,
1964, and the statements of Union President O'Rourke to the assembled employers on
May 28, 1964, demanding that the employers discontinue the practice of using owner-
operators, constitute a violation of Section S(b) (4) (ii) (A) of the Act. As we find, in
agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the Union's basic dispute over the utilization of
owner-operators by the signatory employers is a lawful primary dispute, the letters and
statements directed to these employers, in furtherance of the lawful objective, do not war-
rant finding of a violation. Meat and Highway Drivers, Dockmen., Helpers and Miscel-
laneous Truck Terminal Employees, Local Union No. 710, Teamsters (Wilson & Co.) v.
N.L.R.B., 335 F. 2d 709 (C.A.D.C.).
4 The Trial Examiner recommended that the clauses in the ready-mix and the excavating
contracts, respectively, containing provisions restricting allocation of overflow work to
employers hiring union members or to employers who are signatory to union contracts be
stricken and that the Respondent Employers and the Respondent Union cease giving
effect thereto. The Union excepts to the Trial Examiner's recommendation in this regard
as it invalidates more of each contract than is found unlawful. We find merit in the
Union's contention . The provisions in each agreement require the employers to make
maximum use of their own employees and equipment before hiring outside equipment. As
LOCAL 252, 1NT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , ETC. 975
ORDER
Pursuant to ,ectloii 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as
its Order the Reconunended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modi-
fied herein, and orders that Respondents Transit-Mix Concrete Corp.,
Colonial Sand & Stone Corporation, Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey
Co., and Yriiicipe-Danna, Inc., all of New York, New York, their
officers, a entsi. successors, and assigns, and Local union No. 242,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Ilelpers of _ merica, New York, New York, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Exam-
iner's Recommended Order, as so modified.
1. Delete the elate 1933 wherever it appears in the Trial Examiner's
Recoluniended Order and Appendixes A and B, attached to the Trial
Examiner's Decision, and substitute therfor the date 1963.
2. Delete the first sentence of the indented paragraph of A, 1, (a)
of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order beginning : "For the
purpose of providing maximum employment...."
The notice narked "Appendix A," attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, is hereby amended by deleting the first sentence of the para-
graph beginning : "For the purpose of providing maximum
employment. .. .
3. Delete the last sentence of the indented paragraph of A, 1, (b)
of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, beginning: "Additional
equipment alas be hired only...."
The notice marked "Appendix A," attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, is herelly amended by deleting the last sentence of the second
indented paragraph, beginning: "Additional equipment may be hired
only...."
-t. Delete the last sentence of the indented paragraph of B, 1, (a)
of the Trial E auliner's Recommended Order, beginning: "Addi-
tional equipment nay be hired only...
The notice marked "Appendix B," attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, is hereby amended by deleting the last sentence of the
indented paragraph, beginning: "Additional equipment may be hired
only....
such, they are valid work-protection provisions and are severable and separate from the
provisions unlawfully limiting the choice of outside employers. Meat and Highway
Drivers, etc., Local 710 v. N.L.R.B., supra. Accordingly, we hereby modify the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order and attached notice to strike only that portion of each
clause in the ready- uiv and excavating contracts which restricts overflow work to union
signatory enployers or to employers hiring union members.
We note that the Recommended Order and notice recite 1933 as the date the excavating
and ready-mix contracts were entered into by the parties instead of 1963 as disclosed by
the record heroin. we hereby correct these inadvertent typographical errors.
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. Delete from .A, 1, (d) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order the terms "Tally & Di Napoli, Inc., or any other employers,"
substituting therefor "or any other employer."
The notice marked "Appendix A," attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, is llerehy amended by deleting the name "Tully & Di Napoli,
Inc." from the last indented paragraph.
6. Add the following names after the name Principe-Dana, Inc., in
A, 1, (d) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order: Transit-Mix
Concrete Corp.. Colonial Sand & Stone Corporation, Ryan Redi-Mix
Co., and M. F. lliclcey Company.
The notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision marked
"Appendix A" is hereby amended to add the above names following
the name of Principe-Danna, Inc., in the last indented paragraph.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a number of charges filed, three separate complaints were issued by the Gen-
eral Counsel in this consolidated proceeding. Each complaint, in turn, rests upon
a consolidation of cases, or charges; the first complaint (Case No. 29-CC-7, et al.),
as amended on September 29, 1964, names as Respondent Local Union 282, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, herein called Local 282, the Union, or the Union Respondent. The sec-
ond complaint (Case No. 29-CC-10, et al.), issued on September 1, 1964, names
the same union as Respondent. The last complaint (Case No. 29-CC-9, et al.),
dated September 9. 1964, was issued against several Respondents: Local 282, and
five employers, Transit Mix Concrete Corp., Colonial Sand & Stone Corporation,
Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey Company, and Principe-Danna, Inc., here collec-
tively called the Company Respondents. The complaints variously charge the
Union with having violated Section 8(b)(4) (i) and (ii) (A) and (B), and Section
8(e) of the Act. The complaint in Case No. 29-CC-9 et al. further alleges a
violation of Section 8(e) against the Company Respondents. Answers, denying the
commission of illegal acts, were filed by the Union and by three Company Respond-
ents : Transit Mix, Colonial Sand & Stone, and Ryan Redi-Mix. The remaining
two Company Respondents filed no answers and did not participate in the proceeding.
A hearing on all the complaints was held on November 9, 18, 19, and 20, 1964,
and January 22. 1965, at New York City before Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci.
No briefs have been filed by any of the parties.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:'
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS
This is a secondary boycott case. To satisfy the necessary predicate for proper
exercise of jurisdiction by the Board, therefore, it is appropriate to consider the
commerce of the various employers affected by the activities of the Respondents
allegedly constituting unfair labor practices, including both the business of com-
panies normally called primary employers and those called secondary, or neutral
ones. Amfar Asphalt Company, engaged in the manufacture and sale of asphalt
and other products in New York State, annually purchases goods and materials val-
ued in excess of $50.000 delivered to it directly from out-of-State sources. F. Mas-
cali & Sons, Inc., and Triboro Asphalt Co., contractor and asphalt producer, respec-
I Seven witnesses, all called by the General Counsel, testified before me. In addition,
all parties stipulated that the transcript of testimony given in two separate injunction
proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
together with certain exhibits received in those hearings, should be received here and made
part of this record with the same force and effect as though the witnesses who testified in
that court had given the same testimony before me.
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 977
tively, are a single integrated business enterprise in New York State, and annually
receives goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from out-of-State
sources. Tully & Di Napoli, Inc., and Columbia Asphalt Corp., contractor and
asphalt producer respectively, are a single integrated business in New York State
and annually receive goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
out-of-State sources. Certified Industries, Inc., Lizza & Sons, Inc., Transit Mix
Concrete Corp., Colonial Sand & Stone Corp., Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey
Company, and Principe-Danna, Inc., all are asphalt and concrete producers operat-
ing in New York State, and each annually receives goods and materials directly from
out-of-State sources valued in excess of $50,000.
I find that each of the above Companies is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to exercise
jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local No 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America , is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The nature and scope of the dispute underlying the activities
All witnesses were called by the General Counsel and their testimony was offered
as supporting the complaints; none of the Respondents offered any evidence. There
is therefore no substantial or significant issue as to what was said and done. The
defense, primarily by the Union, and somewhat by the three Company Respondents
who appeared, is only argument that whatever facts were shown do not prove the
commission of any unfair labor practices. However, cross-examination of witnesses,
many statements on the record by various counsels, and the imprecise words of the
original actors, obscure the ultimate conclusions of fact which the witnesses, as well
as the General Counsel, sought to establish. For true understanding of what hap-
pened and what merit there may be in the ultimate conflicting contentions, it is nec-
essary to set out a clear exposition of the basic problem which motivated the Union's
activities. The following explanation rests upon all the testimony and the record
in its entirety
In one branch of the construction industry in New York City there are certain
contractors called excavators, or paving companies; they lay asphalt streets, park-
ing lots, building approaches, highways, etc. There are other contractors called
asphalt or concrete suppliers, who produce asphalt and mixed concrete for their
own construction jobs and for resale to others engaged in the same type of heavy
exacavation and paving projects. An interlaced element of all this work is the trans-
portation of construction materials from its source to the jobsites; this is accom-
plished with trucks, largely plain dump trucks, but also with what are called ready-
mix trucks, vehicles carrying large revolving drums in which measured ingredients
are poured and then mixed, either in transit or at delivery points. Some contractors
have their own trucks, operated by drivers in their direct employ; some have no
trucks, but hire them by the day; and there are others which operate both ways,
using their own trucks but supplementing the supply when needed, and as their
varying requirements change.
To satisfy this need of certain contractors for extra trucks there exists, or there
used to exist before the events of 1963 and 1964, a large group of truckdrivers each
of whom owns his own truck and hires himself out by the day. A few own two, or
maybe three, trucks, operating one themselves and hiring a driver or drivers for their
extra vehicles. An occasional owner may not drive at all, but pays a chauffeur
instead. One trucker in the group-Negri-owns a considerable fleet and deals in
asphalt or concrete as a commodity, buying it from suppliers and reselling it to his
own customers.
For the most part the contractors who own trucks and hire drivers do so under
contract with Respondent Local 282; at least it is clear that all those such contrac-
tors who were approached by the Union in this case had such agreements. Their
drivers are union members pursuant to proper union-security provisions, with con-
tract wages at about $4 to $4.50 per hour. In addition the contracts call for, and
the contractors pay, substantial amounts for welfaie (medical and hospitalization
insurance) and pension benefits enjoyed by their employees, these payments average
a little in excess of 50 cents per hour worked.
The individual truckowners who hire themselves out with their trucks are also,
with rare exception, members of Local 282. In contrast, however, they ale not,
except in unusual instances, covered by contract with the Union. Most are simply,
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
drivers in business for themselves with a single truck; those who have only one
employee, usually on a second truck, have no union contract coverage, the employee
nevertheless always a member of the Union. One or two, especially those who
operated in this fashion with four or five trucks, did for some years have Local 282
contracts, which with time expired.
The men who work in this fashion are called owner-operators, or independent
drivers, or even "gypsies." The nickname derives from the fact they are never sure
where they will work tomorrow. The system of hiring used by the contractors is
to appraise their needs at the end of each workday, fix the number of extra trucks
they will need the next, and call owner-drivers about 5 o'clock each afternoon.
While there are occasions when the owner-drivers work steadily-perhaps for weeks
at a time-for the same contractor on a particular project, their actual hinng for
each day is still always made final in each instance the night befoie. In turn, the
owner-operators shop around at the end of each day by themselves telephoning vari-
ous contractors to inquire which has need, and thus assure the next day's hire.
When the owner-operator, or his second man, arrives at the jobsite, he works his
truck in exactly the same fashion as do the truckdrivers employed directly by the
contractors. The contractor's dispatcher or weighmaster tells him what to load,
where to go, and what to do. He functions as an integral part of the contractor's
regular operation.
As a general going rate, owner-operators are paid $9.50 per hour for an 8-hour day
for use of each truck and driver, the trucker billing the contractor weekly or monthly.
The contractor in no sense influences or concerns himself with the employment terms
and conditions of a second driver's relationship with the truckowner, who hires and
discharges him at will. The owner-operators are responsible for their trucks in all
respects, including repairs, insurance, operating expenses, etc. They also deduct
income tax withholding, social security, and things of this type, from their drivers'
wages; they pay workmen's compensation, insurance, etc. And, of course, when the
owner has only one truck and drives it himself, what he does with the $9.50 per hour
he receives concerns no one but himself.
In practice many of the owner-operators pay their hired drivers the going rate set
out in the Union's contracts with the various contractors; some pay less. None of
them contributes to the Union's welfare trust fund or the Union's pension trust fund;
in fact, the pension fund is so constituted that there may be no contribution made to
it except when payment is based upon a Local 282 contract covering actual employ-
ment of a particular driver.
By various means-strike, threat of strike, coercion in one form or another-the
Union brought pressure upon a number of contractors, suppliers of asphalt and con-
crete, and other persons engaged in business, most of whom for one reason or another
hired owner-operators, to cease using their services. As in all cases alleging secondary
boycott activities, there emerges from the parties to this proceeding greatly divergent
assertions concerning what the object of the activity was-with much confusing,
ambiguous and evasive talk (not all unintentional) about immediate object, intermedi-
ate object, and ultimate object. The best way to arrive at a fair statement of what
the Union really sought to achieve is to clear the air of those objectives which the
Union did not seek, but which much of the language of the witnesses seemed to
suggest.
Membership in Local 282 by the owner-drivers themselves or by their separate
hired chauffeurs was not an object. Virtually every one of them-well over 300-
was a member in good standing with paid-up books. Officers of a number of the
larger contractors testified, with vigor and pride, that they always make sure no driver
works for them-directly or through this gypsy arrangement-without a paid-up
union book. There is evidence that on a number of occasions when union agents
pressed contractors and others to "knock off" these drivers, their books were checked
and found in order. When, therefore, Local 282 agents spoke of them as "nonunion,"
they meant something other than the usually accepted meaning of the phrase.
More often the witnesses and the union agents they quoted spoke of the owner-
operators as "noncontract" drivers, or "noncontract" trucks. In the sense that the
work performed by owner-operator's was not covered by collective-bargaining agree-
ments with the Union, the phrase was apt; as a clue to what the Union's demand
was, however, it is a misnomer. The Union had no desire, indeed was determined
not to cover these owner-operators or their separate employees, with a union contract.
The evidence shows, beyond question, that a number of them offered to sign agree-
ments covering the owner-operator himself, or other employees of theirs, and were
refused. Some of them made repeated attempts, appealing directly to the Local 282
delegates, and were rebuffed. It was even shown that one independent trucker, who
owned two trucks for years, and who had a regular Local 282 agreement expiring
on June 30, 1963, was denied renewal, although he had lived up to the terms of his
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 979
agreement, including direct welfare and pension payments. Again and again union
agents told the contractors to weed out and "knock off" the "no contract" trucks. This
does not mean, as such language in ordinary union parlance would indicate, that the
strike was of the "no contract-no work" variety. In fact one trucker caught in the
fight was put out of business despite the fact he did at the time have an agreement
in effect.
In their efforts to eliminate independent truckers from the industry, in some
instances union agents referred to them as drivers having "no plant" or trucking
companies having "no plant." The record in its entirety shows clearly, however,
that the use of this descriptive phrase was not to be taken literally, for without
question everyone understood the hundreds of single truck owner-drivers could never
build plants. One trucking company, the largest affected by the Union's broad
program, had years earlier in fact operated out of its own plant before it started to
transport concrete for resale. As will appear below the real objective of the Union,
so far as it affected this one outfit, was no different than the overall purpose.
Increase in the wages of the owner-operators, or of their employee drivers, to the
level of prevailing rates as set out in the union agreements was another conceivable
object, which in this instance Respondent Local was not seeking to achieve. Most
of the independent truckers were paying such rates. Were this its purpose, the
Union would have engaged in a selective, pinpointed pressure, and knocked off only
those who depressed the local wage structure. And of course the refusal to sign
contracts with those truckers who were willing to do so again serves as further
reason to search for a more pervasive and deep-seated object in the Union's overall
plan.
Similarly, the fact that for the work performed by owner-operators no payments
were being made to the union welfare and pension funds cannot be isolated as the
particular working condition which the Union wished to correct. At least with
respect to those owners who did no driving themselves and who were willing to sign
up with Local 282 this objection could have been achieved simply by signing a
contract.
There were occasions when the union agents suggested perhaps the contractors
calling owner-operators to work were not at that moment making full use of their
own trucks and drivers. More than once counsel for the Union insinuated to employer
representatives at the hearing that use of company-owned trucks had recently declined,
and owner-operated trucks were being substituted in their place. Again, however,
it cannot be said, viewing the record as a whole, that the Union was reacting to
any move by employers to contract away work being performed by employees within
a bargaining unit, or represented by the Union. There were many situations where
the practice of using both man and truck was longstanding, indeed going back many
years. Further, the union agents frequently knew that the employer they were
pressing at the moment was in fact making maximum use of his own equipment.
There is only one fair answer to the question why did the Union carry out the
consistent, coherent, and interrelated campaign reflected in this record. Its object
was to force a change in the method of transporting this type of construction mate-
rials by the total elimination of the practice of using self-employed drivers. Its
purpose was to compel all contractors to transport asphalt, sand, gravel, concrete
and other such materials, including' debris and refuse, in trucks owned by the con-
tractors themselves and driven by employees in their direct employ. Those owner-
drivers, or gypsies, who testified that the Union was determined to, and in fact had,
"put them out of business," were not wrong. Tully, one of the larger contractors,
said at the hearing that Bai, a union agent, told him to "buy forty trucks" and burn
them if necessary when he no longer needed them. It would, of course, follow, if
Local 282 once succeeded in winning this objective, that all truck chauffeurs would
be members of the Union, that all drivers at work transporting materials in the
industry would be paid the wages established by contract, that for each hour thus
worked payments for welfare and pension would be made to the various funds, and
that all trucks would be "contract" trucks. These, however, must be viewed as
the extended ultimate goals of the Union's objective in the activities here appraised,
for it is clear that no methods for achieving them other than complete extinction of
the owner-operator system of transportation would have satisfied the Union.
B. Activities of Respondent Local
Incident No. 1
Amfar Asphalt Company and Amfar Contracting Company are integrated com-
panies with the same owners; the first produces asphalt and the second carries on
212-808-66-vol. 155-63
980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
construction work, with the producer supplying both its contracting arm and other
contractors in the industry. The asphalt company employs laborers and office help,
but has no drivers in its direct employ. Amfar Contracting owns trucks of various
kinds and hires drivers. It has two contracts with Local 282, one for the excavating
industry and one for the asphalt industry. The trucks and drivers of the contracting
company transport asphalt from the plant to the various jobsites of the contracting
part of the operation, and also to customer-purchasers.
Thomas Rosati, Inc., is a contractor who paves roads and parking lots. In
December 1963 he had a project at Houpogue, Long Island, and for this purpose was
purchasing asphalt from Amfar. In part, at least, he accepted delivery at the plant
of the Asphalt Company, sending both his own trucks and drivers, as well as owner-
operated trucks, or gypsy drivers. Arthur Koenig was an owner-operator used by
Rosati. One day that month when Koenig arrived at the Asphalt plant James Nuzzi,
an employee of Amfar and the Local 282 shop steward there, said to him, "I should
knock you off, the Union says that only union contract trucks could haul out."
In March 1964 Rosati did a parking lot job at Setauket; he had two regular and
one part-time drivers, who were in his direct employ and who ran his trucks and
were covered by contract with Local 282. Again Rosati hired Koenig as an owner-
operator on a day-to-day basis, to transport asphalt from the Amfar plant to the
project. To this job deliveries of materials purchased by Rosati were also being
made by Amfar, which used its own trucks and drivers for this purpose. On March 30,
as Koenig was loading at the Amfar scale, Union Steward Nuzzi said to him,
"What are you doing?" On the road to the Setauket project, Koenig was accosted
by Biggs, an Amfar driver, who told him, "Nuzzi said to tell you and Tommy
[Thomas Rosati, owner of the Rosati Company] not to come back tomorrow because
we are not going to load you." That evening Koenig telephoned Nuzzi, whom he
knew as of old, and asked was he really going to be knocked off. The steward said,
"That's right, the Union told me no trucks without union contracts to work out of
the plant." Koenig returned to the Asphalt plant the next day, and again Steward
Nuzzi told him, in the yard," ... you are not [going to work]. We are not going to
load you." They entered the office to discuss the matter with Jack Farino, the
secretary of Amfar, where other employees were present. Farino asked by whose
orders was Koenig being prevented from loading, and Nuzzi replied, in the presence
of all: "Local 282 ... they wouldn't work along with Koenig . . . Koenig had no
contract with 282 and that he couldn't work."
Steward Nuzzi also spoke to Rosati at the Setauket jobsite, and told Rosati
.. not to engage Mr. Koenig the following day, and if I did so he wasn't going to
permit him." Rosati told the union steward he would first use his own or the Amfar
trucks before engaging Koenig again, but the steward repeated Koenig would not be
loaded because he ". . . didn't have a contract ... he [Nuzzi] had instructions not to
permit any noncontract drivers to load." Rosati discontinued using Koenig after
these events.
Incident No. 2
Certified Industries produces and sells ready-mix concrete; among other locations
it maintains a yard at Bellmore. Part of its product is sold and delivered in its own
trucks, and part is sold to customers who come to the Bellmore yard in their trucks
and cart it away. In addition to its own vehicles, Certified hires owner-operated
trucks by the day. Salvatore Fili, operating under the name Patio Ready-Mix, owns
a ready-mix concrete truck of his own. He once used to hire his truck out to
Certified by the day; the last time he was so used was in March 1963. In addition to
hiring out himself and his truck Fili buys asphalt from various producers and resells
it to his own customers.
Fili appeared at the Certified yard in mid-October 1963 to purchase a load he
was buying for a customer. The dispatcher refused to load his truck, and when
asked the reason, deferred to Steve Cominskey, a Certified employee who was the
union steward. The steward explained: "We are not loading noncontract drivers";
he had previously told Stahl, a Certified laborer, he [Stahl] was "not allowed to load
Patio Transit Mix because they don't have a legal contract or something." From
the yard office, with all present, Fili then telephoned Certified's head dispatcher,
Zoerner, who confirmed the development, saying . they weren't loading any
noncontract drivers." Zoerner recalled that Steward Cominskey also spoke to him
on the telephone at the time, and instructed the head dispatcher "not to load Patio
Transit-Mix because he did not have a contract . . . if we loaded his truck that his
[Cominskey's] men would probably not go to work."
Zoerner gave orders to exclude Fili from the Certified asphalt plant, and Fili never
again loaded there, either as a hired truck or as an independent buyer for resale.
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 981
Incident No. 3
Triboro Asphalt Company and Frank Mascali & Sons, Inc., are also integrated
businesses , one manufacturing and selling asphalt, the other engaged in road con-
struction; they occupy adjoining yards in Flushing, New York. Triboro has no
trucks or drivers, but Mascali owns its own trucks and hires its own drivers, all
covered by the asphalt contract with Local 282. The asphalt produced by Triboro
is used largely in the Mascali operations; a substantial amount is also sold to other
contractors in the industry. Among Triboro's customers is Pave-Rite Construction
Corporation, a street and parking lot contractor, who customarily purchases its
paving materials at the Flushing yard. In October 1963, Local 282 called a strike
at the World Fair site in Queens; on October 8 Mascali's drivers at its Flushing yard
refused to work. George Robke, vice president of both Triboro and Mascali, went
to the plant to inquire and met William McKee, a regular delegate and business agent
of Local 282. (McKee's power to act as agent for the Respondent Union was con-
ceded at the hearing.) He asked McKee what the strike was all about and the
delegate answered there was a "problem at the Fair." When Robke said his com-
pany had nothing to do with the Fair, none of his employees went there, the delegate
replied ". . . unfortunately ... all the trucks are going to be down all over the city ...
that the gypsies were running material from the Island [Long Island] to the Fair ...
because of all of this, the drivers, the Local 282 drivers, were not going to work...."
Emil Testa, supervisor in charge of all equipment, heard McKee say to Triboro's
employees "not to go out of the plant, not to load up the trucks, not to go out .. .
he was having problems with the chauffeurs, with the gypsies, and he didn't want
any of the trucks to get loaded."
One of the many owner-operators involved in this case is Mario Boccasini. For
some years Boccasini owned two trucks, and hired employees for each of them; he
himself did not drive. Following the strike, and apparently in consequence of it,
he started to drive one of his own trucks, using a hired chauffeur for his second
vehicle. He was engaged by Triboro as an independent trucker on a day-to-day basis
to transport asphalt for that company. In early November 1963, while Boccasini
was still hiring his trucks out to Triboro, he heard Union Delegate McKee say to
Wroblewski, the Triboro dispatcher, not to load Boccasini because his were non-
contract trucks, and explained "they had to have a union contract which provides
them benefits and fringes of the Union." Boccasini then asked McKee for a renewal
of his expired union contract, but the delegate said it was not handy at the moment;
Boccasini never succeeded in obtaining a renewed contract for his trucks.
Later that month Boccasini hired out both his trucks to Pave-Rite Construction
Co., a heavy construction contractor, to transport asphalt from the Triboro plant to
Pave-Rite's building project. On November 18, when he was at the asphalt plant,
he again met Delegate McKee and one Anthony Bai, identified on the record
variously as a union committeeman or representative. Bai told the dispatcher
"Not to load any more of [Boccasini's] trucks in the future"; and when Boccasini
asked on whose orders this was, Bai replied, "Local 282." Boccasini's second truck
was not loaded, and the driver, a Local 282 member, protested to McKee, who
said "there was nothing he could do for him, that that was the way it had to be."
Boccasini's trucks were scheduled to work the next day, but they never again loaded
at the Triboro plant. McKee also telephoned Emil Testa, the Triboro supervisor,
and told him "not to load any of Boccasini's trucks on account they are in arrears
in their welfare and union dues."
Robke, the Triboro vice president, testified that when this happened his dispatcher
telephoned to tell him about it, and that, at Robke's request, McKee came to the
telephone. McKee said, "Because of this owner driver, Boccasini, who was not
supposed to be coming into the plant, that he would be forced to shut the plant
down because his drivers the 282 drivers would not go to work for us, and
therefore I would have no other choice than to shut down the plant operations."
McKee and Bai then proceeded to Robke's office and repeated the same things to
him. When Robke protested, McKee agreed to permit Boccasini to finish the day.
As instructed, Robke told Boccasini he would no longer be used. Robke also heard
McKee say he understood, in these conversations, that at that time Boccasini was
driving for Pave-Rite and transporting asphalt from Triboro to a Pave-Rite project
as a direct employee of the contractor purchaser.
Incident No. 4
Francis Principe is president of Principe-Danna, Inc., which sells concrete and other
building materials. His company owns 18 ready-mix concrete trucks and 2 straight
dump trucks, for all of which it hires drivers directly; all are covered with regular
982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 282 contracts. At least until January 1964 the Company regularly hired
owner-operators on a day-to-day basis to help make its deliveries; Principe said that
he normally hired such day-to-day truckers only after all of his own were at work.
The question of utilizing owner-operators, and even selling concrete to individual
truck operators for resale, was discussed, according to Principe, between his com-
pany and others in the business, on the one hand, and representatives of Local 282,
on the other, as far back as 1961, during certain contract negotiations. At that time
union agents, including specifically one Boggia, a committee member, raised the
question that the Union was opposed to such practices. No resolution was reached
then, and the various employers agreed with the Union to set up a committee to
discuss and study the matter for future consideration.
On April 21, 1964, a group of contractors and materials suppliers met in the
Commodore Hotel in New York with union representatives. Present for Local 282
were O'Rourke, its president, and a number of other officers and business agents.
O'Rourke acted as chairman and then turned the meeting over to Boggia, who
explained the purpose of the meeting as a desire by the Union that the suppliers
stop using owner-operators. He reminded the employers of the understanding 3
years earlier that a committee would study the problem, and again added the con-
viction of the Union that the practice was detrimental to the interests of union
members and the truckdrivers generally, and that the Union was seeking "the
preservation of employment." The record shows only that no definitive resolution
was reached and that the matter was postponed for later consideration.
On May 8, 1964, the Union distributed a form letter to all employers, including
the contractors and asphalt and concrete suppliers in this area. The letter reads as
follows:
New York May 8, 1964
TO ALL EMPLOYERS
Gentlemen : The Union has been informed by many of its members employed
in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry that unless immediate steps are taken to
protect their jobs from destruction by peddlers and by other abusive practices
they will take matters in their own hands.
As you know, some employers are evading the terms of their collective bar-
gaining agreements by having Ready-Mix Concrete delivered by other means
than by their employees . As the result of these abuses , our members fear that
the labor standards established in this Industry will be destroyed , that their
jobs will be destroyed.
In order to protect the interests of its members, the Union hereby calls upon
each and every employer to have all Ready-Mix Concrete it sells delivered by
its own employees under the collective bargaining agreement , and not to allow
its products to be delivered through peddlers or engage in other delivery schemes.
The Union believes that this is essential in order to protect the labor standards
in the Industry.
If this problem is not solved within two weeks, we shall not be responsible
for any wildcat stoppage that may occur . This is not intended to be a threat;
rather it is a frank acknowledgment that our members are in such a state of
unrest concerning their jobs that the Union will be powerless to control them
any longer.
Very truly yours,
LOCAL #282, I.B. of T.
(S) John O'Rourke
JOHN O'RouRKE
President.
A second meeting of employers was held in the Hotel New Yorker on May 28.
The Union sent telegrams to a great number of employers, including contractors and
asphalt suppliers; apparently there were present other persons engaged in the con-
struction industry in New York. The same representatives of the Union generally
were present and again its President O'Rourke presented Boggia, who repeated essen-
tially the same complaints that had been voiced the month before.
At one point O'Rourke asked all persons not engaged in the ready-mix concrete
business to leave and then spoke to the remaining employers. He referred to the
owner-operators and said that the problem "tended to create disruption in the
industry, and that the rank-and-file were disturbed about it . . . that a great many
men were out of work, that their jobs were being done by owner-drivers; that other
employees in the Union were going home, and that this created a situation which
undermined jobs and undermined the industry." O'Rourke then told the men that
"materials from a company's bin should be delivered by its own employees, in that
company's equipment."
LOCAL 2 8 2, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 983
Before the meeting ended O'Rourke also spoke of "the risk and threats of wildcat
action ... if this thing isn't cleaned up in a couple of weeks something seriously can
be expected to take place in the industry ... the Union was having a problem dealing
with it and should not be held responsible for anything that would happen." O'Rourke
closed with "After June 15 he wanted the suppliers to stop loading outside people."
Incident No. 5
George Negri, Inc., has for many years been engaged in the business of supplying
concrete and related products to construction contractors. Years ago Negri owned
and operated its own concrete and materials plant or yard, where it filled its transit-
mix trucks for delivery to customers. Since 1941 it has operated a substantial number
of such trucks by purchasing concrete or its components from other asphalt and
concrete supply companies, including the five employer Respondents in this proceed-
ing. Negri's employee-drivers have always been covered by contract with Local 282.
On June 5, 1964, Acramone, superintendent of Colonial Sand and Stone Corpora-
tion, one of the Respondent companies , called George Negri to say that he could no
longer buy concrete materials from Colonial Sand. Negri said he had heard the cut-
off date to be June 15, but Acramone spoke of a meeting of employers where
O'Rourke, the Local 282 president, had said deliveries to Negri must cease else the
entire industry would be struck. The next week Mr. Tollon, of Transit-Mix Concrete
Corporation, another Respondent, refused Negri's requests for concrete, saying he
could not load any "gypsy" who had no plant because O'Rourke had so ordered him.
Negri attempted to purchase concrete from Ryan Redi-Mix Company, Principe-
Danna, and M. F. Hickey Co., the other Respondents, but all refused to do business
with him any further. The Negri company was out of business for 1 month, and
then it built its own concrete supply plant, and resumed delivery to its customers
from that location. Although the record does not show to what extent, Negri testi-
fied that at times Colonial Sand, at least, hired his trucks to make deliveries to
Colonial Sand's own customers.
As a device to avoid the strictures of the Union's insistence that Negri not be
loaded, Francis Principe, of the Principe-Danna company, conceived the notion of
placing Negri's drivers on his own payroll, and thus continue to accomplish deliveries
to Negri's customers. When Boggia, the Local 282 committeeman, learned that
Negri's trucks were still being loaded on Monday, June 15, he asked Principe what
he was doing, and Principe told him: "I was hiring Mr. Negri's trucks to augment
my own fleet." Principe said at the hearing that he had often honestly hired
Negri's trucks like gypsies, and that in fact during that very week some of them
were making deliveries for him to Principe-Danna's true customers. He did not
reveal to Boggia that any of Negri's drivers were then working as direct employees
of his, assuming his passing statement to that effect from the stand was correct.
Principe continued to relate that Tuesday, June 16, he continued to service both
his and Negri's customers with Negri trucks. On Wednesday Boggia, accompanied
by the union steward from Colonial Sand, appeared at the plant with about 50 drivers,
all members of Local 282. They congregated across the road and Boggia and the
other steward crossed the highway to talk to Principe. Apparently the union agents
had learned where the trucks were going, for Boggia told Principe he must service
Negri's customers with Principe's and not Negri's trucks. Principe agreed and Boggia
then reported back to the crowd across the street, and they dispersed . Boggia
returned that same afternoon, now accompanied also by another union steward, and
repeated to Principe that he must stop "hiring Negri's trucks," and avoid "further
cause for industry wide disruption." The Principe-Danna company ceased loading
Negri's trucks in any capacity.
Incident No. 6
Lizza & Sons, Inc., manufactures, sells, and distributes asphalt and related prod-
ucts; one of its plants is located at Selden, Long Island. Overall the Company owns
a number of trucks, including the usual dump truck type, and hires drivers directly,
all covered by contract with the Union. The Company also regularly engages owner-
operated or gypsy trucks, using as many as 5 to 15 or more each day, whenever its
own direct complement of trucks and direct employees does not suffice for the work
at hand. Joseph locca and Walter Michalowski are owner -operators who long
worked for Lizza. On May 7, 1964, Cody, a Local 282 delegate ( union agency status
conceded), visited Pascucci, manager of the Selden plant, and in the presence of
George Grala, union steward among Lizza's employees, said the Company must
stop using "noncontract" trucks, ". . . those fellows don't have no union contract
and we are not to employ them any more." As the trucks filed by in the loading
area of the yard, Cody pointed successively to those which he thought to be " contract"
'984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
trucks, and those which were not. He also checked Pascucci's list of trucks, and
singled out locca's and Michalowski's as noncontract vehicles which must be
excluded. To one of the drivers, who asked was it true he could not work without
a contract, Cody said: "I'm not telling you that you can't work without a contract
... I'm telling you that the men would not work along with you if you didn't have
a contract."
locca had been renting his truck to Lizza for some time before May, but did not
drive it himself. His chauffeur, Peter Zwick, was "knocked off" on May 7, in conse-
quence of Cody's demands upon Lizza, and locca then went to Pascucci for aid.
Pascucci said he wanted no "trouble," because "Cody had been there, and he would
have to lay off all the hired equipment without contracts."
Michalowski does not own his truck; his wife does. He only drives it. He met
Cody on May 7 at the Lizza yard, when the delegate went into Pascucci's office and
checked the list of trucks. At the end of that day Michalowski was told not to report
for further work. The same day he spoke to Steward Grala, who said the truck-
owner could no longer work because he had no contract.
Both locca and Michalowski testified they tried to obtain contracts with Local 282
after these May events, but were refused. Accordingly to locca, Union Delegate Cody
first told him he must have three or four trucks, and form a corporation, before he
could have a contract. locca then offered to pay the welfare and pension benefits
to Local 282 for his one driver, but Cody refused the offer. Cody rejected a like
request by Michalowski, saying simply the man could not drive his wife's truck.
Both the men later appealed to Business Agent McElligott, who told Michalowski
the Union was "not issuing contracts to independent truckers." locca even wrote to
Union President O'Rourke, but never received a reply.
Neither Michalowski's nor locca's trucks were ever used by the Lizza company
again.
Incident No. 7
M. Parisi & Sons, Inc., a heavy construction contractor, was doing water repair,
drainage, cleanup, and site-leveling work in the fall of 1963 at the New York World
Fair. It has a contract with the Union for what drivers it employs, but owns no
dump trucks; it regularly operates with owner-operators instead, using as many as
10 to 15 or 25 such trucks daily, as the work mounts and ebbs.
The Union struck the World Fair site in October 1963. During the picketing,
Union Delegate McKee, Phil Sack (by stipulation an authorized agent of Respondent
Union), and Anthony Bai appeared at the site and spoke to Carbone, the general
superintendent of Parisi. They told Carbone the Company "couldn't have any
more of these owner-driver trucks. Otherwise my entire job would he stopped
throughout the city." They returned at a later date and repeated to Carbone he
must discontinue using noncontract drivers else "they would picket the Fair again."
Carbone complied with the demand. He called David Bent, the controller, whose
duty it was at the end of each workday to communicate with individual owner-
operators and instruct them to report for work the next day, and told him not to
send any more of them. Among the many owner-operators Parisi customarily used
Vito Boccasini, Mario Boccasini, Nicholas Boccasini, James De Masi, and Ben
Allocco, all Charging Parties here. Bent forthwith stopped calling any of them.
Bai and other committeemen returned to the Fair in March 1964. Now Bai told
Carbone he was still using Vito Boccasini, and that if the Company persisted the
Union "would have pickets out again." And again Carbone reported to Bent and
asked him to verify whether Boccasini was really "straightened out" with the Union.
In April Bai appeared at the Company's main office and said he wanted to see for
himself whether the trucks and drivers being used were or were not "contract"
trucks. Bent had all the men report on a Sunday afternoon for Bai's inspection. Bai
looked at their union books and then told Bent some of these men were not "contract"
truckers, and if Parisi continued to engage them "the union trucks would not work
with them."
'A number of witnesses called Bat a union committeeman, or representative. During
several incidents in which he was involved he equivocated when asked whether he spoke
with authority for the Union, sometimes referring to himself as "a public spirited citizen."
A number of times he acted in concert with positive union spokesmen, and more than once
the admtted official's directly and inferentially supported his strike threats and induce-
ments to strike in the presence of employees and employers . There is no question but that
the Union is responsible in this proceeding for all Bat's activities.
LOCAL 282 , INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 985
Incident No. 8
Tully & Di Napoli, Inc., and Columbia Asphalt Corporation are also associated
companies, the first doing heavy construction and the second producing and selling
asphalt. Each has contracts with Local 282 for such drivers as it employs, but only
the second company owns dump trucks in its own name and hires chauffeurs directly.
Both have for many years used owner-operators for deliveries and for regular con-
struction operations.
In May 1963, this company had a project at the Whitestone Parkway in Queens,
where it engaged a trucking company called L. F. Barilli to supply and deliver fill.
Barilli was a broker, or independent contractor, who agreed to supply Tully &
Di Napoli some of the materials needed on the project; he had no contract with the
Union but used owner-operators. One day Bai, of the Union, called Francis Tully
to ask why he hired "trucks that were of a foreign nature to the Union." He
threatened to tie up the company operations in some fashion and argued that pension
and welfare payments were not being made for those drivers. The two men reached
a heated discussion, and, as Tully testified:
He told me that I should buy trucks, like number-he gave me a number, 40, I
should buy 40 trucks and put all union men on them under my own contract.
I said, "What am I going to do with 40 trucks?" And he said, "Burn them."
With the threat of strike pending, Tully went to the jobsite where he spoke to both
Bai and the Tully & Di Napoli union steward, Harry Hoplitz. Tully protested he
should not be bothered because all the drivers-including Barrilli's owner-operators-
were members of the Union. Bai then painstakingly explained the difference between
a union truck, where the driver was a member, and a no-contract truck, where the
man, truck, and work were not covered by union contract. He made clear it was
not employee membership in the Union that concerned him at all.
Bai called Tully a number of times between May and November, always threaten-
ing strike unless he "knocked off" the gypsies, saying they were not covered by
welfare and pension payments. There were stoppages by Tully's men because of Bai's
activities , and Tully repeatedly called the Union's main office to verify which trucks
were "contract" and which were not.
Finally, the union agents called the employees of Tully's Columbia Asphalt plant
out on strike in November. The Company was then running asphalt and stone to
the World Fair. Harry Baker, Columbia's union steward employee, reported Bai
had ordered the plant closed, and that men were standing idle. Tully hastened to
the company dock, whence materials were being trucked to the World Fair, and
there be found Bai, McKee (the union delegate), and his own union steward,
Hoplitz. A number of the men had already ceased work on union orders. H.oplitz
kept asking Bai was he or was he not speaking for the Union, with Bai avoiding direct
answer, all this in the presence of the entire group and Tully's employees. Finally
McKee said, "Bai's actions were recognized by the Union"; with that the steward
announced : "OK, we are on strike," and everybody quit. Much was said; Tully
could not understand why with all drivers members of the Union this should happen.
He asked to be declared in violation of his contract, but the union agents answered:
"They couldn't officially or legally because they would be in trouble."
In order to end the strike Tully then agreed with the demands of Union Delegate
Stack that Steward Hoplitz be permitted for a week to rove wherever the Company's
operations might be, to follow trucks on the highways, and to check whether any
men were "noncontract." This was done and Tully's employees resumed working.
In its operations Tully was using 19 dump trucks of his own; he hired, as he had
done since World War II, a large number of owner-operators. Among them was Ben
Allocco, D'Agostino, Buster Holmes, all Charging Parties here. This Company, for
all the record shows, has since then discontinued the practice of using gypsies entirely.
Ben Allocco, owner-operator, tried to obtain work after November 1963 from
Colonial Sand, Parisi, and again Tully & Di Napoli; all refused to use him. When
be was removed from work at the Kennedy Airport by a union steward, he tried to
communicate with a union delegate, hoping to obtain a contract for his second truck
and second man; he was unsuccessful.
Vito Boccasini had two trucks, one driven by his son. He was refused hire by
Tully, Triboro, and Parisi. He sold his trucks.
Mario Boccasini also had two trucks; he did no driving himself but hired chauf-
feurs, for whom he had a regular contract with the Union for some years; the agree-
ment expired on June 30, 1963. This Boccasini was cut off from work while engaged
by Triboro in November because he was "no contract." He asked for a new agree-
ment , but the delegate said "they do not issue contracts to individuals," "you have to
986 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
own more than three trucks." Boccasini was removed again while engaged by
Pave-Rite Construction Company. Again at the Triboro plant, where he was picking
up asphalt for Pave-Rite the union delegate rejected Boccasini's request for a new
agreement.
Mario Boccasini also recalled how for 17 years he had worked practically full time
as a hiring boss for Triboro Asphalt Company. Each day the Company's needs for
owner-operators-as many as 20 each day-were relayed to him, and he got busy
on the telephone calling gypsies and directing them to the various locations where
Triboro needed them. During the day, Boccasini toured the roads and projects to
check on these men and see that they were delivering the work and service expected
of them.
C. Analysis and conclusions
The heart theory of the complaints is that the employers who were struck or "hit"
by the Union were innocent bystanders, neutral to whatever challenge was being
hurled at the construction industry in New York in 1963. They are portrayed as
innocuous observers, as it were, when the Union punched a wallop into its policy,
ringsiders buffeted by the left hand as the right went about its proper business. The
prosecution calls this a secondary boycott case to remove it from the area of
legitimate union conduct, normally described as primary pressure upon employers, or
activity resting upon a just concern of labor organizations seeking to enhance the
fortunes of their members or of workmen generally. The defense, shorn of distract-
ing, emotional accusations of ulterior purpose imputed to the big operators in the
industry, argues essentially that the employers are deeply involved in the basic dis-
putes, and therefore may not seek refuge behind the protective shield of a statute
designed to insulate only truly unconcerned businessmen.
Of the several predicates requisite for violations of Section 8(b) (4) (A) or (B),
two are not seriously disputed and directly established. The actors bearing the union
label were agents of their principal as the statute conceives that status. Clearly Stack,
McKee, O'Rourke, Boggia, whatever their official designation, spoke for the Union.
The various stewards-Nuzzi, Cominsky, Hoplitz, Barry, Grala, Baker-all parrot-
ing the monotonous refrain set by their superiors, their actions consonant with the
broad program, have been held to speak for their organizations as of old. One or
two-like the public-spirited citizen Bai-affected coy modesty; they illuded no one.
Whatever happened was the Respondent's doing.
The Union struck the World Fair, Tully & Di Napoli, Triboro. It "induced and
encouraged . . individuals employed" to cease working in concert; it threatened,
coerced, and restrained persons engaged in commerce. Whether the testimonial
evidence suffices to prove such conduct at each and every affray which the witnesses
recalled-not all detailed in this report-is of no consequence, for the pattern of
events is clear and the illustrative incidents beyond question. The dispute was
broad, the campaign wide, and the record long. The Union concedes coherent rela-
tionship unifying its attacks; the Government joined lengthy separate complaints
into a single trial expressly because proof under any allegation goes to the merits of
all. The basic question a single and pervasive problem, it matters not how many or
which of the appeals to employers were in themselves illegal. Great detail befogs
an issue. It is a fact the Union brought the proscribed kind of pressure to bear upon
construction contractors, materials producers and suppliers, and persons as defined
in the law.
The third essential component for any conclusion of illegality is an "object," in
the union's aim, outlawed by the statute. In this instance the object is not unequiv-
ocally exposed but lurks half-hidden beneath the exterior of words and deeds. The
inner purpose in human behavior is a state of mind, in the nature of things revealed
tangentially. When stated directly, intelligibly, and unequivocally, no question arises.
When, instead, the evidentiary articulations of many spokesmen referring to a com-
mon purpose appear confused, inconsistent, absurd, fair inquiry into the why of
organized action compels consideration of any and all relevant factors. Particularly
must the broad picture be appraised where the very assertion of illegal object rests
upon a long record as a whole.
. requiring any employer ... to cease doing business with any other person ..
are the cardinal statutory words which define the proscribed object. At oral argu-
ment, after all testimony had been taken, counsel for the General Counsel fitted the
evidence neatly and succinctly into that phrase. The argument starts with a conten-
tion that an owner-operator is in business for himself, an assertion based upon certain
Board holdings in situations not quite apposite if the full stories were told. In the
sense that an owner-operator could close his books after a week's work with more
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 987
money in his pocket if he managed with less expensive equipment, more careful
maintenance of his vehicle, noninsured operation, or methods of that kind, he was a
businessman. And, of course, in those instances where an owner-operator had a
second truck with a driver on it, or did no driving himself but hired a chauffeur, he
could pay less for labor, as some did, and increase his profit. The Union demanded
that the contractors and materials suppliers discontinue this arrangement. With
superficial logic the General Counsel's argument then proceeds to a quick conclusion:
the contractors are employers, the owner-operators are businessmen, the Union
wanted the contractors to terminate their dealings with these truckmen; ergo, the
Union's object was to "require" the contractors "to cease doing business" with the
owner-operators. With nothing more he requests a finding of illegal secondary strike
wherever union agents accosted as employer.
This approach is too cavalier a solution for a complex and difficult problem, for
it was held in the beginning that Section 8(b)(4) of this statute is not to be taken
too literally. Not every set of facts on which, regardless of all else, the pat words of
the statute can be superimposed requires a finding of illegal conduct. There hardly
ever was a strike in which at least "an object" of the picketing was not to force the
employer to "cease doing business" with his customers, whoever they might be. That
broad and all-inclusive construction was scotched when the Supreme Court first looked
at Section 8(b)(4).3 It follows that no complaint can stand absent some added
proof of the proscribed object. That something more could well be the mere absence
of any other explanation. Had all the union agents, in all the incidents related,
limited their remarks to requesting elimination of owner-drivers because they were
"noncontract" truckers, the object perforce could not be described otherwise in this
judgment. The General Counsel's straightfaced proposal that only that phrase be
lifted from the record and lead to immediate conclusion of wrongdoing, requires an
unprecedented out-of-context reading of the record. Even so with any others of the
diversified and seemingly unrelated reasons offered in extenuation at the time by
the different stewards and officials. No one phrase, no single argument between
union spokesman and resentful employer can in this case alone fix the nature of the
Union's real object fairly defined.
The Union's object was to compel every employer who, in the normal, conven-
tional conduct of his business operations, requires labor for transporting concrete,
asphalt, sand, gravel, etc., from point of supply to construction destination, to have
that work performed by drivers in his own employ, drivers enjoying the generally
accepted and direct employer-employee relationship with which this statute is con-
cerned. Extended philosophical, economic, or even sociological analysis could lead
to discourse on why the Union set this aim for itself. No doubt contractually assured
and enforceable union membership was also desired, as must have been welfare and
pension contributions accruing for today's and tomorrow's security of all who drive
trucks. Large company collective-bargaining agreements also bring predictability
and stability in the very hiring arrangements for all truckdrivers, in contrast to the
day-to-day uncertainty ever present in the lives of the gypsies; this benefit too would
flow from achievement,of the Union's object. None of these many advantages
attaching to the revised system of hiring sought can be selected out of the many and
alone called "the object" so as to dictate a final holding for the entire case. The
tail cannot wag the dog, especially one having so many tails.
As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia once said in a comparable
situation: "The answer to the problem . . . cannot be reached by the use of any
legalistic word or phrase, such as `coemployer', or `independent contractor'. . . .
It cannot be solved by the strict application of the technicalities which adhere to
such legal terms. The problem is . whether the facts and circumstances are
such ..." as to justify an illegal secondary boycott conclusion .4 To define the object
here as a desire that the contractors hire drivers directly is not to paraphrase, and
thereby cloak an intent to sever the business relationship between contractors and
truck owner-operators. To view the latter as the substance of the strike objective
makes the entire union campaign pointless and absurd. Counsel for the owner-
operators conceded, in argument, that if only certain phrases used by the union agents
be considered, their actions could appear irrational; he argued "there is no reason
for the Board to ascribe to the Union a logical or rational motivation at all." I must
reject this view.
8 N.L.R. B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council (Gould & Preianer), 341
U.S. 675.
4Local No. 24 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (A.C.E. Transportation)
v. N.L.R. B., 266 F. 2d 675.
988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. What is primary and what is secondary
Ascertainment of the strike object leads to the legal question of whether what the
Union did violated the statute. It struck out in all directions; for purpose of dis-
tinguishing between primary and secondary action, the diversified situations where
strike action was taken or threatened can be slotted into three distinct categories.
(1) In some instances pressure was exerted directly upon those employers who
engaged owner-operators, where the work these drivers did was required by that
company itself; indeed in these cases the particular employer usually satisfied his
labor requirements both ways-with drivers on its continuing payroll and gypsies
called each evening to report next day with their own trucks.
Direct pressure occurred when Union Delegate Cody compelled Lizza & Sons to
cease using Iocca and Michalowski at its Selden asphalt-producing plant. To dis-
tribute its product from here to the customers Lizza utilized both its own trucks and
drivers as well as owner-operators. The Union demanded that Lizza instead should
hire more chauffeurs, like these two men themselves. May a union representing
employees under contract concern itself with such indirect use of labor by the
employer, to the extent of resorting to strike action to compel orderly and con-
sistent use of "employees" in the conventional sense?
(2) The second situation, repeated a number of times, is where to achieve the
same end the Union struck not the company it was seeking to persuade but another,.
one which had no power of decision over the owner-operators involved, because
those drivers were not performing the work of the struck employer but rather were
supplying indirect labor to others. This was the situation late in November when
Mario Boccasini, owner-operator of two trucks, hired himself out to Pave-Rite Con-
struction Co., which sent him to pick up asphalt at the Triboro producing plant and
to deliver it to a Pave-Rite Construction project. To stop Boccasini from working
for Pave-Rite, Union Delegate McKee told the Triboro vice president that the union
members then working for him would cease work unless Triboro discontinued load-
ing Boccasini's truck. Here the pressure to force Pave-Rite to mend its ways was
not directly upon the one who chose to hire gypsies, but indirectly upon Triboro,
who had no say in how Pave-Rite chose to operate.
A clearer example of this indirect pressure appears in Union President O'Rourke's
ultimatum to a number of contractors, at the hotel meeting late in May, in which he
expressly included the transit-mix trucks of Negri as among those which the suppliers
must no longer load. It was common knowledge that Negri simply bought and sold'
concrete in his own name. He was purely a customer of the asphalt producers, none
of whom concerned themselves with or even cared how he hired his labor, directly
or indirectly. It was not shown that the Union ever approached the Negri company
itself.
(3) The third situation is where at the moment of strike inducement the Union
brought both direct and indirect pressure upon the same employer, where there were
present both owner-operators hired by the employer then subject to the Union's
tourniquet and gypsies working for companies located elsewhere and whose hiring
practices were beyond the province of the struck employer to control. Such was the
case at the Certified Asphalt Company plant, where Owner-Operator Salvatore Fili
sometimes appeared as a gypsy working for Certified and sometimes buying concrete
for resale in his own name. Amfar Asphalt also used both direct employees and
owner-operators to make its own deliveries. When the Union in March 1964 brought
pressure upon Amfar to stop loading gypsies Arthur Koening was there, but he was-
not then engaged by Amfar. He was working instead for Rosati, a paving con-
tractor which, at the moment at least, was the primary employer. As to Koenig,.
Amfar was a neutral or secondary company.
2. Protected primary activity
Realistically viewed, and in the context of the facts of this case as a whole, it
must be ruled that the Union's basic dispute with the contractors and building mate-
rials producers-over whether needed truckdrivers should be hired as regular employ-
ees on an hourly basis or together with their individual trucks at an hourly price
including the cost of both labor and vehicle-fell within the area of the Union's proper
concern with conditions of employment. However the question be phrased-in terms
of neutrality or primary versus secondary role-it cannot be said that the con-
tractors were not directly affected by and involved in the Union's demands. The
principal line of decisions urged as supporting the complaints in their entirety are
those dealing with independent contractors. But those decisions are not authority
for the flat proposition urged here that the governing criterion is the legal tech-
nicality of separate ownership and control of the truck or of its incidental upkeep,.
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 989
nor the fact that the truckowner records and pays for such items as social security,
insurance, and income tax matters for the driver. Because it is work and compensa-
tion for work that is at the heart of the concern of this statute, repeatedly the Board
has said it is control over the "manner and means" by which the work is accomplished
that more reliably points to the true employer in this statutory sense.
The clearest fact shown in this somewhat confused record is that when an owner-
operator or the driver on his second truck answers the call to report as instructed on
a given morning, he is indistinguishable from any other driver employed by that
company. For all drivers, owner or chauffeur, supervision is the same, assignments
are in orderly sequence, performance is uniform, location and transport are exactly
alike. The General Counsel emphasizes the fact that Tully and Di Napoli trucks
are painted a certain color and display the company legend, while each of the many
Boccasinis places his own name of his truck and paints it to suit his fancy. But
these are incidentals bearing no relationship to the substance of the work. Witnesses
told of trucks in line waiting to load up at a concrete materials hopper, some owned
by the asphalt company and some not, with the dispatcher neither knowing nor caring
which was which. He loads them and checks each one to its destination. A company
car patrols the streets to see that they do not dawdle; if it catches one asleep there
will be discipline and maybe discharge. If an owner-operator driver has stopped for
a haircut-as one did-the report goes to his gypsy boss and the discharge comes
from there. In reality there is no difference; all of them must work to the satisfaction
of the "employer" contractor. This is what is meant by control over the manner
and means for accomplishing the work.
Whatever the extent and however detailed the daily instructions for work per-
formance, they are all established, conveyed, and enforced by the contractors. The
gypsies are literally hired on a daily basis. There is no fixed-period agreement, bulk
contract price for a project, or any of the usual indicia of business relationships. It
is not easy to say that Walter Michalowski is a truckdriver employed by his wife,
who owns a truck and counts the Colonial Sand & Stone Corporation among the
customers with whom she does business. Michalowski as well as all the Boccasini
brothers look more like day workmen in the construction industry who scrounge for
short-term employment wherever they can find it.
The intimate relationship between the owner-operators and the "employer" who
engages him was conceded, at least in the early stages of the litigation flowing from
all these charges, by the office of the General Counsel. After issuance of the first
of three complaints later joined for single hearing before the Board, the Government
petitioned for injunction in the district court. To the judge there the General Counsel
expressly argued a direct "employer-employee" relationship between owner-operators,
with their occasional drivers, and the contractor who retains their services, and that
it was precisely for such reason that strike action against any other employer was
secondary and illegal. He even specified that the dispute between the Union and
Rosati (who took on Koenig, a gypsy) was that Rosati "might not be paying the
proper pension and welfare contribution."
The work of these drivers is simple and requires no detailed manual of procedures,
as is often found in prior cases involving so-called independent contractors. The
need they satisfy is not a collateral incidental aspect of the contractor's. operations;
it is of the very essence of their business. Nor should undue emphasis be placed
upon the fact that occasional owner-operators also have a second truck and "hire" a
man. The gypsies formed an association said to have close to 500 members, and
the tenor of the whole record is that by far the vast majority own and operate only
a single. truck. This fact to is very pertinent here, for in the Local 24, Teamster's
case, supra, where the Board found a violation of Section 8(b) (4) later reversed by
the court of appeals, it distinguished National Van Lines on the very ground that the
latter dealt basically with drivers who drive their own trucks.
But the essential question is not whether the relationship between owner-operators
and the contractors is the same as that between employees and employers. Legality
or illegality here turns on whether the contractors stood in such relationship to the
men as to be entitled to the protection against strike intended by Congress to be
afforded to neutrals, or persons "wholly unconcerned" with the primary dispute which
is the background of a charge of Section 8(b)(4)(A) and (B) violations. This case
falls in a zone of dispute where pat words like "independent contractors" or "employer-
employee" relationships are too rigid.
5Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., '88 NLRB 75, enfd. 189 F. 2d 756 (C.A. 3), cert. denied 342
U.S. 919. See also National Van Dines, 117 NLRB 1213, where the Board spoke of "the
common law right of control test."
990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As it saw the light , at bottom the Union 's interest was to further the welfare of
all the drivers, including both the gypsies and regular employees of contractors in
the industry. The occasional owner-operators who hired a man instead of driving,
or owned a second truck , did not all pay the going union wage; a sure way of pro-
tecting the established rates was to place them all under regular, stable agreements.
For virtually none of the gypsies were payments being made to the welfare and
pension funds. That this matter was related to working conditions needs no discus-
sion . The usual pay for truck and man was $9.50 per hour. Did this amount guar-
antee that enough remained , after truck cost and expense , to leave the owner the
desired pay for his labor? Who could be sure? Maybe the Union lacks faith;
maybe it knows . Whether economic demands by a union are reasonable or not has
never been the test of its right to act collectively, so long as what it seeks to reach
in some fashion relates to working conditions and rates of pay. Can it be said
that the employers who chose to satisfy their labor needs thus indirectly were indif-
ferent , or neutral , to this proper concern of Local 282? I think not.
In the total circumstances revealed by this record I find that those employers who
made a practice of engaging owner-operators instead of direct chauffeur employees
were not neutrals to, or persons having only a secondary concern with, the Union's
underlying quarrel with the way they went about obtaining the labor necessary to
transport building materials from place to place in the usual conduct of their business.
There is fundamental support for this view in the Supreme Court decision in Local 24,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, AFL-CIO v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, where a collective -bargaining agreement
in effect "regulate[d] the minimum rental and certain other terms of leases when a
motor vehicle is leased to a carrier by an owner who drives his vehicle in the car-
rier's service ." Decision turned on whether such a provision was a proper subject for
collective bargaining in the circumstances , and the Court held in the affirmative. In
rejecting a State court ruling that the provision was a "remote and indirect approach
to the subject of wages," the Court called it "a direct frontal attack upon a problem
thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the
collective -bargaining contract."
But if a union may bargain with the employer concerning conditions under which
the service of truck and driver are engaged, if it may without illegality embody the
results of such negotiations in an agreement , and if it may then with impunity strike
to enforce the agreement , it must follow it may also strike to enforce its demands
in that area after a request for change upon the employer goes unheeded. Again
the extent of the Union's economic demands, if economic it is, to rearrange the
method of payment , be it to increase or decrease the amount or cancel the arrange-
ment entirely , can never be of concern to this Board.
In conclusion I find that the Union did not violate the statute during the following
incidents : ( 1) Union Delegate McKee's orders to Wroblewski, dispatcher for Tri-
boro Asphalt Company, in early November 1963 not to load Mario Boccasini 's truck.
Boccasini was at this time hiring his truck by the day to Triboro to make deliveries
for that supplier . ( 2) Union Delegate Cody's statements , in the presence of com-
pany employees , to Pascucci , manager of the asphalt plant of Lizza & Sons, on
May 7, 1964, that the Company must stop loading owner -operator locca and
Michalowski and that the employees otherwise would not work. locca and Michalow-
ski were then working by the day for Lizza & Sons. (3) The threats by McKee and
by Union Delegate Stack to Carbone, general superintendent of M. Parisi & Sons, in
October 1963, that the Company's entire job would be stopped if it did not cease
using owner-operators . At that time Parisi was using Vito Boccasini, Mario Bocca-
sini , Nicholas Boccasini , James De Masi, and Ben Allocco, all owner-operators and
Charging Parties in this proceeding . (4) The Union's strike at the dock of Tully &
Di Napoli in November 1964, where the demand was that the Company cease using
Allocco, D'Agostino , and Holmes , among other owner-operators , to deliver company
products, and where the settlement permitted supervision by the union steward to
assure that Tully & Di Napoli kept its promise not to continue the practice in the
future.
3. Illegal secondary activity
As shown, the Union also applied pressure upon contractors and suppliers as an
oblique lever to curtail the use of owner -operators by other "employers." Here there
was no element of control over working conditions which the struck companies could
exercise to satisfy the Union 's demands . No intimate community of interest, no
quasi -employer-employee relationship existed between Triboro Asphalt, for example,
and whatever gypsies were carrying asphalt to the World Fair in October of 1963,
when McKee told Vice President Robka that all his operations must cease despite the
fact this company had nothing to do with anything going on at the Fair. When
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC . 991
Union President O'Rourke told the assembled suppliers there was "the risk of threats
of a wildcat strike," that "something seriously can be expected to take place" in the
industry if they did not stop "loading outside people," he was speaking as much of
purchasers who sent owner-operators to make pickups as of gypsies' the suppliers
might themselves hire. His letter of a few weeks earlier called such purchasers
"peddlers," and left no doubt he wanted them all off the streets. This was a threat
of a secondary strike upon neutrals pure and simple. There were other such
incidents.
To dilute the secondary aspects of this conduct the Union asserts that the entire
industry should be viewed as a single employer, that the individual and separate con-
tracts signed by each company involved require a finding of single multiemployer
unit, that the integrated nature of heavy construction and concrete and asphalt pro-
duction prove an intimacy binding all concerned. From all these broad words the
Union proposes an ultimate conclusion that all the contractors, all the suppliers, even
all the owner-operators were "primary" parties to its basic dissatisfaction with what
had long been going on in the industry.
There is no merit in any of these defenses. The evidence does not warrant a
finding that the various contractors and asphalt producers bargained jointly so as to
bring into existence a single multiemployer unit. Therefore, even assuming, a con-
clusion which I do not reach, that in a multiemployer bargaining unit no single
employer included can be neutral to a dispute between any one of their number and
the Union, this defense must fall. As to the contention that because two employers
are in the same type of business, or even have need of one another to carry on their
separate enterprises, both must be deemed primarily involved in any labor dispute
affecting either one, the statement is too broad a construction of Section 8(b) (4) of
the Act. As very recently repeated, "... [T]he integration of [one company] and
[another company] operations on a merely functional plane is an improper basis for
concluding that both have primary employer status under the secondary boycott
provisions. . . . [T]he Labor Act's prohibitions would be nullified if a union were
allowed to claim that the very business relationship it seeks to end makes both
parties `primary' employers." N.L.R.B. v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local
Union No. 584, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Old Dutch Farms,
Inc.), 341 F. 2d 29 (C.A. 2).
Restated: In this second category of incidents the only avenue open to the struck
employers for ridding themselves of the Union's pressure was to cease doing business
with the customers or other employers who themselves engaged owner-operators.
There was no other way they could assist the Union to achieve the strike "object"
already defined. Any theory making the gypsies working for customers also the
employees of asphalt producers and vendors requires extension of the direct employer-
employee relationship to the point of a virtual repeal of Section 8(b)(4).
Accordingly, I find that by each of the following acts the Respondent Union
violated the proscriptions of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act: (1) The Union's strike
at the Flushing yard of Triboro Asphalt plant, where McKee, with knowledge that
the company had no dealings with activities at the World Fair, nevertheless kept the
employees from work to combat the use of owner-operators by other employers at
the Fair; (2) McKee's statement in late November 1963 to Robke of Triboro, that
his drivers would not work so long as Triboro continued to load Mario Boccasini's
truck, at the Triboro plant, although McKee admitted he knew Boccasini was then
working for Pave-Rite, a construction contractor which had sent him to pick up
materials; (3) O'Rourke' s statements to the assembled asphalt and concrete sup-
pliers on May 28, 1964, and his letter of May 8 distributed to "all employers," that
they must cease dealing with "peddlers" and permit materials to leave their yards
only when "delivered by its own employees, in that company's equipment"; (4) and
Union Agent Bai's threat to tie up the Whitestone Parkway project of Tully &
Di Napoli because the L. F. Barilli Company, an independent contractor itself, hired
owner-operators for its contract obligations.
The equally left-handed, secondary, and completely successful attack upon the
operations of the Negri Company does not fit clearly into the otherwise consistent
and logical pattern of the Union's activities. Negri was itself an owner-operator;
it owned a large fleet of ready-mix transit trucks and directly employed an equal
number of chauffeurs. Unlike the other gypsies, however, these trucks were covered
by contract with Local 282; to these drivers proper standard wages were paid: for
them regular contributions to the Union's welfare and pension funds were being
made. Whatever the Union may have meant in referring to Negri's trucks as "no
plant" trucks, it is clear the Union wanted them, too, absolutely out of action in the
industry wherever they appeared.
992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is at this point that the Union's failure, or calculated refusal to call any wit-
nesses, leave a void in the record. In eloquent argument counsel for the Union
explained its purpose, with general references to "the health of the industry," "com-
petitive equality among employers," "a method of competition that would ultimately
result in the derogation of the jobs." Apart from their elusive generality, these are
only unsupported assertions; from the, mouth of a lawyer who chose to offer no
evidence or proof whatever, they add nothing to the record. It may be inferred, how-
ever, that, once having decided that its broad objective could only be achieved by
eliminating all persons whose interests were limited to driving trucks-such as Fili,
owner of one transit-mix truck who sometimes worked as an owner-operator and
sometimes bought and sold a load of concrete-the Union simply lumped all inde-
pendent truckers together and hit at all with one broad stroke. But this is an
assumption-the only plausible explanation warranted-for in all other respects
Negri should have been perfectly respectable and acceptable to the Union.
Whatever the reason may have been-and it must remain shrouded in the- Union's
silence-the fact remains that the Union wanted him out of business and attacked
not him but the suppliers from whom he bought materials for resale. It follows that
when Union Committeeman Boggia appeared at the asphalt plant of the Principe-
Danna Company with 50 men, massed them near the premises, and, with other union
stewards, told Francis Principe to stop having anything to do with Negri's trucks and
avoid "further cause for industry-wide destruction," the Union restrained and coerced
this company with an object of forcing it to cease doing business with Negri, all in
violation of Section 8(b) (4){B), and I so find.
4. Further findings of illegal secondary activity by the Union
There remain those situations where, when union agents went into their act, there
were in fact at the yard or plant in question owner-operators working for the materials
supplier doing business at that location and other owner-operators working for cus-
tomers who had sent them to make pickups, or where a superficial look could not
clearly reveal for which of the companies the gypsies worked-the primary or the
secondary ones. The very fact that owner-operators function as roving truckers, com-
parable to construction craftsmen in a pool of labor available for the industry as a
whole; created uncertainty at times and will continue to do so in the future.
It is argued that because of such fluid arrangements the Union must be permitted
to picket or strike at any location at any time. And it is true that with concrete some-
times sold f.o.b. the materials plant and sometimes f.o.b. the customer's construction
project site, and with the owner-operators not quickly identifiable in terms of who
their employer of the moment might be, it would be difficult for union agents to
remain honest, assuming that were their intent, and engage only in primary activity.
Whatever the difficulties may be in keeping strike action and restraint and coercion
within the bounds of legitimate conduct, they may not serve as license to ignore the
statutory rules of conduct. Especially is this true where the Union had no intention
of limiting its strike and coercion to primary employers.
In this proceeding it must be found that whenever union agents threatened strike,
or otherwise coerced employers and other persons to interfere with the loading of
owner-operator trucks and in fact among the trucks involved there were some working
for other companies, it violated the statutory secondary boycott ban. In addition to
the numerous incidents related in detail by the witness, the record contains many
references to other instances of similar action taken to implement the industrywide
attack waged by the Union. It is admitted that the Union intended to draw no line
between direct and indirect pressure upon all persons doing business in this area. To
permit evasion now because at the time of a particular threat the Union did not have
direct knowledge of the immediate status of one or another owner-operator it was
attempting to keep from working, would violate the most elementary concepts of
justice and fairness. Here the Union is virtually asking that it not be held to an intent
which it admits it had.
Precise determination of which of the many incidents shown on this record con-
stituted separate violations of the Act is not of paramount significance. Give or take
a few the illegal course of action is clear and the injunctive order thus determined.
Of greater importance is clear understanding of where the line must be drawn between
what the Union may do tomorrow to win a legitimate object in its proper role, and
where it must stop. The same sense of fairness justifying construction of the statutory
language so as to permit activities necessary for a labor organization's adequate repre-
sentation.of employees, must also be applied to assure that the substantive purposes of
legal proscriptions be safeguarded. It is not unreasonable to rule that a respondent
treading so close to the borderline of transgression be held strictly accountable for
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 993
every trespass . The Union has the right to pressure an employer itself utilizing serv-
ices of owner-operators; every employer has no less a right to be free of coercion
aimed at other companies or at owner-operators engaged by others.
Accordingly, compliance with the injunctive order set out below will require the
Union to refrain from restraiinng or coercing employees in any situation where there
is ambiguity as to the particular owner-operators it seeks to exclude (working for
primary or working for secondary employers), or where its express demands upon
the employer immediately affected by the Union's action are not clearly and unequivo-
cally articulated as directed only to that employer's owner-operators. As always the
commission of unfair labor practices must be affirmatively established by the General
Counsel, and this is equally true of any future attempts to prove contempt violations
of this injunctive order. In the total situation prevailing throughout the New York
industry in this case, and in view of the breadth of the unfair labor practices com-
mitted by the Union, it will suffice to prove illegal conduct wherever it is shown that
there in fact were, at the site of the union strike or threat, owner-operators not work-
ing for the employer involved. Restated: It will not be adequate defense for the
Union to plead ignorance of the true facts where there is confusion or uncertainty.
In keeping with the foregoing I find that in each of the following incidents the
Union violated Section 8(b)(4) of the Act: (1) Union Steward Comminskey' s state-
ment to an employee of Certified's asphalt plant in mid-October 1963 not to load
Salvatore Fili's truck and his threat to Certified's head dispatcher, Zoerner, that the
men would not work if Certified continued to load Fili. Fili sometimes hired himself
and his truck by the day as an owner-operator to Certified, and sometimes bought and
sold concrete as an independent retailer like Negri. On this occasion he was doing
business for himself, and it is not clear whether the Union knew this for a fact.
(2) The activities of Union Steward Nuzzi in March 1964 directed to the employees
of the Amfar Asphalt plant to prevent Arthur Koenig, an owner-operator, from load-
ing at the premises. Koenig at the time had been engaged by Rosati, a contractor
doing a job elsewhere and purchasing asphalt from Amfar. But Amfar was also
delivering concrete to Rosati's project with its own trucks. Conceivably the Union
might be said to have intended to curb the Amfar practices of hiring owner-operators
itself, but this was not shown on the record.
The foregoing analysis of the basic issues of the case, as well as of the principal
contentions of the parties, disposes of the substance of the litigation. The multiple
complaints, however, set out repetitive and often overlapping conclusions of illegality
under various separate clauses of the statute, often alleging separate violations based
on the same single act or statement by union agents. For example, when the Union
called employees out on strike, it is said to have induced them in violation of Section
8(b)(4)(B). Because their employer then yielded to the union pressure the com-
plaint goes on to allege further that the Union also violated Section 8(b)(4)(A) on
the ground that that particular company "agreed" to an agreement violative of Section
8(e). Likewise the same individual are sometimes called "persons," and sometimes
"employers," with multiple complaint allegations of illegality. These distinctions,
most of them no doubt in keeping with the literal language of the Act, add nothing
meaningful to the real questions in dispute. The bulk of the testimony was given
before a district judge in injunction proceedings, and received here as exhibits without
opportunity by me to inquire apace exactly which incidents are said to fall under
which clauses of Section 8(b) (4). Again at oral argument, held separately at the
close of the hearing, the General Counsel limited himself to the basic questions of
law; he did not bother to explain what acts proved should be considered under what
statutory language. He filed no brief.
In these circumstances no useful purpose would be served by painstakingly pin-
pointing precisely which threat or act of inducement by the many Union agents at the
various locations involved could have run afoul of any special phrase of the law.
Administrative judgment dictates, rather, early resolution of the real issue and
restoration of a lawful atmosphere throughout the industry affected by the Respond-
ent Union 's widespread misconduct.
5. Violations of Section 8(e) of the Act
The Union's contractual relationship with the great number of operators in the
industry goes back many years. The agreements in effect during the events related
here were effective July 1, 1963, and by their terms extended to June 30, 1966. The
contracts are uniform: one for heavy construction or excavating contractors, called
the excavating contract, and another for concrete, asphalt, and materials suppliers,
994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
called the redi-mix , concrete , sand , gravel , and asphalt contract . The complaints
allege that each of these agreements contains a specific provision proscribed by Sec-
tion 8 ( e) of the statute . In the excavating contract there is the following clause:
For the purpose of providing maximum employment for his own employees
working under this contract, the Employer shall not hire outside trucks or equip-
ment unless all his useable trucks and equipment are in use. Thereafter outside
trucks and equipment shall be hired only from employers who have signed con-
tracts with Local 282 containing identical terms and conditions with this con-
tract, so long as such trucks and equipment are available.
In the redi-mix contract there is the following provision:
In the event the employer hires additional equipment, preference shall be given
to such equipment as is operated by Union men. Additional equipment may be
hired only if all of the Employer's own equipment of the same type which is
available for use is being operated by the employees of the Employer.
In pertinent part Section 8(e) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or an employer to enter into any contract "whereby such employer ...
agrees to ... cease doing business with any other person ...." 8 In their totality the
complaints specify that the Union violated this section of the Act in its execution of
the excavating contract with Lizza & Sons, M. Parisi & Son, Inc., "and other persons";
and in its execution of the redi-mix contract with Lizza & Sons, Transit Mix Concrete
Corp., Colonial Sand & Stone Corp., Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey Company,
and Principe-Danna, Inc., "and other persons." Despite these specific charges against
the Union, the allegations of illegal conduct charged against employers are limited
to the five employers named in Case No. 29-CE-2, each of which is party to the redi-
mix contract with the Union.
The Board has held, with court approval, that a contract provision binding the
employer to contract only with companies whose employees are union members or
covered by union contract violates Section 8(e).7 Counsel for the Union here
virtually conceded on the record that each of the clauses set out above, one requiring
preference for "equipment as is operated by union men," and the other requiring hire
of equipment "only from employers who have signed contracts with Local 282," fall
within the proscriptive holding of that line of decisions.
Accordingly I find that by maintaining and giving effect to the clause set out above
in the excavating contract in its agreements with Lizza & Sons, Inc., and M . Parisi &
Sons, Inc., the Union Respondent violated Section 8(e) of the Act. I also find that
by maintaining and giving effect of the clauses set out above in their redi-mix con-
tract, the Union Respondent and Transit Mix Concrete Corp., Colonial Sand & Stone
Corporation, Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey Company, and Principe -Danna, Inc.,
violated Section 8(e) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connec-
tion with the operations described in section 1, above, have a close , intimate , and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States, and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Union and the Respondent Employers have
engaged in certain unfair labor practices I shall recommend that they be ordered to
cease and desist from such conduct and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. The Employer Respondents have been parties to
E At oral argument counsel for the Respondent Union argued that neither of the con-
tracts in question here can be deemed illegal because they are exempted from the above
language by the proviso to Section 8(e), which speaks of agreements " in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of
the construction , alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work."
The work covered by these contracts being substantially limited to transportation of ma-
terials , there is no merit in this defense. International Brotherlcood of Teamsters, etc.,
Local 594 [ Island Dock Lumber, Inc.], 145 NLRB 484.
7 Meat and Highway Drivers, Dockmen, Helpers and Miscellaneous Truck Terminal Em-
ployees , Local Union No. 710 , Teamsters ( Wilson & Co., Inc.; at al .), 143 NLRB 1221,
enfd . in pertinent part 335 F. 2d 709 (C.A.D.C.), and cases cited therein.
LOCAL 282, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 995
the ready-mix contracts containing provisions in violation of Section 8(e); they shall
therefore be ordered to strike those provisions from their contracts and to cease giving
effect to them.
The Respondent Union must also be ordered to cease giving effect to the provisions
found illegal in its contracts with the employers named Respondents here and with
Lizza & Sons and M. Parisi & Sons Company. As the record clearly shows that the
Union is party to like contracts with many other employers, with respect to both the
excavating contract and redi-mix contract, and in view of the industrywide practice
of maintaining such illegal agreements by the Union, it must also be required to cease
giving effect to any like contractual provisions it has in effect with any other employers
within its territorial jurisdiction.8 Similarly, and again because of the unquestioned
pattern of its proscribed secondary activities, both in maintaining illegal contract pro-
visions and in otherwise violating Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Act, the Union
shall be ordered to cease and desist from hereafter entering into any collective-
bargaining agreements in any way violative of Section 8(e) of the contract.
It has also been found that apart from the illegal agreements, the Union has
illegally induced and encouraged employees to strike with a prohibited object, and
has restrained and coerced employers and other persons, all in violation of the
secondary boycott ban. The extent of the Union's disregard for these statutory rules
requires that it be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct not only with respect
to those employers, or persons shown on this record directly to have been affected,
but also with respect to any other employers, or the employees of any other employers
within the Union's territorial jurisdiction.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Amfar Asphalt Corp., F. Mascali & Sons, Inc., Triboro Asphalt Co., Certified
Industries, Inc., Lizza & Sons, Inc., Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., Colonial Sand &
Stone Corp., Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey Company, and Principe-Danna, Inc.,
are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. The quoted clauses set out in this Decision, extracted from the excavating con-
tract 1963-66 and from the redi-mix concrete, sand, gravel and asphalt 1963-66
contract between the Union and the various employers, are agreements which are
prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act.
4. By maintaining and giving effect to those clauses in its agreements with Lizza &
Sons, Inc., and with M. Parisi & Son, Inc., the Union has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.
5. By maintaining and giving effect to the pertinent clause in the redi-mix con-
crete, sand, gravel and asphalt 1963-66 contract the Union and Colonial Sand &
Stone Corp., Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., Ryan Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey Com-
pany, and Principe-Danna, Inc., have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(e) of the Act.
6. By its strike at the Triboro Asphalt plant in Flushing with an object of forcing
it to cease doing business with any of its customers, the Union has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
7. By its threat of strike to Triboro Asphalt Co. with an object of forcing it to
cease doing business with Pave-Rite Construction Co., by its strike of and threat of
strike to Tully & Di Napoli, Inc., with an object of forcing it to cease doing business
with L. F. Barilli Co., and by its threat of strike and picketing of Principe-Danna,
Inc., by Union Committeeman Boggia accompanied by 50 massed members of the
Union, with an object of forcing that company to cease doing business with George
Negri, Inc., the Union has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act.
8. By Union President O'Rourke's statement to assembled employers on May 28,
1964, and by his letter to them dated May 8, 1964, that they must cease doing busi-
ness with any employers using owner-operators, the Union has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the Act.
9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
s Compliance with the order to cease giving effect to these Illegal hot cargo provisions
calls only for "removal of the offending clause" from each agreement, and not recission of
the entire contracts. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Van Trans-
port Lines, Inc.), 131 NLRB 242, enfd. 298 F. 2d 105 (C.A. 2).
212-809-66-voL 155-64
996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law , and upon
the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, I recommend that:
A. Local Union No. 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America , New York City , its officers , business agents,
and representatives , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Maintaining , enforcing , or giving effect to the excavating contract entered
into in 1933 by and between the Union and Lizza & Sons, Inc., M . Parisi & Son,
Inc., and other employers , insofar as said agreement provides:
For the purpose of providing maximum employment for his own employees
working under this contract, the Employer shall not hire outside trucks or
equipment unless all his usable trucks and equipment are in use. Thereafter
outside trucks and equipment shall be hired only from employers who have
signed contracts with Local 282 containing identical terms and conditions with
this contract , so long as such trucks and equipment are available.
(b) Maintaining , enforcing , or giving effect to the redi-mix concrete, sand,
gravel and asphalt contract entered into in 1933 by and between the Union and
Lizza & Sons, Inc., Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., Colonial Sand & Stone Corp., Ryan
Redi-Mix Co., M. F. Hickey Company, Principe-Danna, Inc., and other employers,
insofar as said agreement provides:
In the event the employer hires additional equipment, preference shall be given
to such equipment as is operated by Union men. Additional equipment may be
hired only if all the Employer 's own equipment of the same type which is
available for use is being operated by the employees of the Employer.
(c) Entering into , actively maintaining , giving effect to, or enforcing any other
contract or agreement , express or implied , whereby the employers named above in
(a) and (b), or any other employers, cease or refrain , or agree to cease or refrain,
fom handling , using , selling , transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products
of any other employer , or from doing business with any other employer.
(d) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging individuals employed by Triboro
Asphalt Co ., Tully & Di Napoli , Inc., or any other employers , to engage in, a strike,
or threatening, coercing , or restraining those employers , Principe-Danna, Inc., or
any other employers , by picketing or otherwise , where in either case an object thereof
is to force or require the aforesaid employers to cease doing business with any other
employer.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of
the Act:
(a) Post in conspicuous places in the Union's business offices, meeting hall, and
places where notices to members are customarily posted , copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix A." 9 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for Region 29, shall, after being duly signed by an official repre-
sentative of the Union, be posted by the Union immediately upon receipt thereof
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter . Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Union to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Additional copies of said notice , to be furnished by the said Regional Direc-
tor, shall , after being duly signed by the Union's representative , be returned to the
Regional Director for posting at all premises of Lizza & Sons, Inc., M . Parisi & Son,
Inc., Triboro Asphalt Co., Tully & Di Napoli, Inc., Principe-Danna, Inc., and all
other companies party with the Union to an agreement which includes the provisions
set forth above in 1 (a ) and (b ) above, if those companies are willing , for 60 con-
secutive days, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" In the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
LOCAL 2S2, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 997
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from receipt
of this Decision, what steps the Respondent Union has taken to comply herewith.'0
B. Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., Colonial Sand & Stone Corp., Ryan Redi-Mix Co.,
M. F. Hickey Co., and Principe-Danna, Inc., all of New York, New York, their
officers, agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Maintaining , enforcing , or giving effect to the redi-mix concrete , sand , gravel
and asphalt contract entered into in 1933 between them and the Union , insofar as
said agreement provides:
In the event the employer hires additional equipment, preference shall be given
to such equipment as is operated by Union men. Additional equipment may
be hired only if all the Employer's own equipment of the same type which is
available for use is being operated by the employees of the Employer.
(b) Entering into, actively maintaining, giving effect to, or enforcing any other
contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby they cease or refrain, or agree
to cease or refrain, from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise-dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or from doing business with any other
employer.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of
the Act:
(a) Post at their offices, and at each of their permanent places of business, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix B." 11 Copies of said notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for Region 29, shall, after being duly signed by the
respective representatives of the Employer Respondents, be posted by each of them
immediately after receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for a period of 60
consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by these Respondents
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days after receipt of
this Decision, what steps the Respondent Employers have taken to comply herewith.12
10 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, In writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
11 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a
decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL OUR MEMBERS AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF LIZZA & SONS, INC., M.
PARISI & SON, INC., COLONIAL SAND & STONE CORP., TRANSIT MIX CONCRETE CORP.,
RYAN REDI-MIX CO., M. F. HICKEY COMPANY, PRINCIPE-DANNA, INC., AND OTHER
EMPLOYERS
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby give note that:
WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or give effect to the excavating contract
entered into in 1933 between this union and Lizza & Sons, Inc., M. Parisi & Son,
Inc., and other employers, insofar as said contract provides:
For the purpose of providing maximum employment for his own employ-
ees working under this contract, the Employer shall not hire outside trucks
or equipment unless all his usable trucks and equipment are in use. There-
after outside trucks and equipment shall be hired only from employers who
have signed contracts with Local 282 containing identical terms and condi-
tions with this contract, so long as such trucks and equipment are available.
998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
WE WILL NOT maintain , enforce, or give effect to the redi-mix concrete, sand,
gravel and asphalt contract entered into in 1933 between this Union and Lizza &
Sons , Inc., Transit-Mix Concrete Corp ., Colonial Sand & Stone Corp., Ryan
Redi-Mix Co ., M. F. Hickey Company, Principe -Danna Corp., and other
employers , insofar as said contract provides:
In the event the employer hires additional equipment , preference shal
be given to such equipment as is operated by Union men. Additional
equipment may be hired only if all the Employer 's own equipment of the
same type which is available for use is being operated by the employees of
the Employer.
WE WILL NOT enter into , actively maintain , give effect to, or enforce any
other contract or agreement , express or implied , whereby the employers named
above, or any other employers, cease or refrain , or agree to cease or refrain,
from handling, using, selling, transporting , or otherwise dealing in any of the
products of any other employer, or from doing business with any other employer.
WE WILL NOT engage in , or induce or encourage individuals employed by
Tri-Boro Asphalt Co ., Tully & Di Napoli , Inc., or any other employer, to
engage in a strike , or threaten , coerce , or restrain those employers , Principe-
Danna, Inc., or any other employers , where in either case an object thereof is
to force or require the aforesaid employers to cease doing business with any
other employer.
LOCAL UNION No. 282 , INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM-
STERS, CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------- ------ By------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 16 Court
Street , Brooklyn , New York, Telephone No. 596-5386, if they have any question
concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT maintain , enforce , or give effect to the redi-mix concrete, sand,
gravel and asphalt contract entered into in 1933 between this company and
Local Union No. 282 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America , insofar as said contract provides:
In the event the employer hires additional equipment, preference shall
be given to such equipment as is operated by Union men . Additional
equipment may be hired only if all the Employer's own equipment of the
same type which is available for use is being operated by the employees of
the Employer.
WE WILL NOT enter into, actively maintain , give effect to , or enforce any
contract or agreement , express or implied , whereby we cease or refrain, or
agree to cease or refrain, from handling , using , selling , transporting , or other-
wise dealing in the products of any other employer, or from doing business with
any other employer.
(NAME),
Employer.
Dated-------- ----------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,.
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office , 16 Court
Street , Brooklyn , New York, Telephone No. 596-5386, if they have any question:
concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.