Local 26, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 19, 1965

152 N.L.R.B. 1 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers and Belsinger Signs, Inc. Case No. 5-CB-579. April 19,
1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 16, 1964, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain af-
firmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a support-
ing brief, the Charging Party filed an answering brief, and the Gen-
eral Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Decision,
the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, Local
Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in
the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
i As there is no evidence of Respondent Union's withdrawal from multiemployer bargain-
ing, we conclude that The Evening News .4ssociatton et al., Cases Nos . 7-CA-4366, 7-CA-
4367, 7-CA-4595, and 7-CA-4596, presently before the Board, have no direct bearing on,
the instant case. Accordingly , we deny Respondent Union's request that decision herein be
stayed pending our decision in the aforesaid cases
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A hearing was held before Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci in the above -entitled
proceeding at Washington , D.C., on August 20, 21 , and 25 , 1964 , on complaint
of the General Counsel against Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of
152 NLRB No. 1. 1
789-730-66-vol. 152-2
2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Electrical Workers, herein called the Respondent or the Union. The issue litigated
was whether the Union had violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. All parties filed
briefs with the Trial Examiner after the close of the hearing.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following findings:
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Belsinger Signs, Inc., herein called the Company or the Charging Party, is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the District of Columbia,
having its office and place of business in the District of Columbia, where it is engaged
in erection and servicing of illuminated signs. During the 12-month period ending
July 31, 1964, a representative period, in the course and conduct of its business this
Company had gross receipts in excess of $190,000. In addition, it received ship-
ments of goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 at its place of business
in the District of Columbia, directly from points located outside the District of
Columbia.
I find that Belsinger Signs, Inc., is, and has been at all times material herein,
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.'
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
For months during 1963 and into early 1964 the Respondent Union bargained
collectively with four electrical sign contractors of the Greater Washington, D.C.,
area. After the last negotiating session it signed identical contracts with each of
three of these companies but, despite a request by the fourth employer-Belsinger
Signs, Inc., herein called Belsinger, which filed the charge in this proceeding-refused
to sign any agreement with it. The complaint alleges that the employees of the
four companies together constitute a single multiemployer bargaining unit, that the
bargaining that took place was based upon such multiemployer unit, that final agree-
ment was reached, and that the Union's refusal to sign the contract with Belsinger
was an illegal refusal to reduce to writing a final settlement regularly negotiated,
and therefore constituted a violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
The Union contends that notwithstanding the joint action of the employer group,
their unanimity of position vis-a-vis the Union, and the unvarying correspondence
and contract language admissions of intent to act jointly as a single employer, in
their minds each company was acting independently of all the others, that the
separate contract documents signed with each of the three companies reflect un-
related agreements reached with single employers, and that no agreement was ever
reached with the Belsinger Company. In defense the Union also advanced one or
two seemingly inconsistent contentions-such as no majority representative status
for Belsinger's employees, or contract violations by Belsinger justifying the Union's
refusal to deal with it. The principal issue presented, however, is whether or not
there did exist a multiemployer bargaining unit, and if such was the case, whether
negotiations had been completed. In that event the Union's refusal to sign with
Belsinger, as it had done with the other members of the group, would appear to be
a clear unfair labor practice.
Evidence of Multiemployer Bargaining
Most of the proof offered by the General Counsel to support the essential asser-
tion that for some time bargaining was on a multiemployer basis consists of uncon-
trovertible documents or undisputed testimony. There is no real issue over anything
of importance that was said and done. There has long been an association of
electrical sign contractors in Washington and vicinity; their work includes manu-
facturing, erecting, servicing, and maintaining electrical signs. From time to time
the name of the group has changed, but, as will appear, the precise words by which
they referred to their group is of no moment to the real issue to be decided.
Of the four association companies which engaged in the bargaining involved,
three have been part of the total picture as association members for some years;
1 The commerce facts set out above are established by stipulation of all parties, and that
stipulation is hereby made part of the record as a Trial Examiner's exhibit.
LOCAL 26, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 3
these are Jack Stone Company, herein called Stone, Service Neon, Inc., here called
Service Neon, and Folks & Miller. In 1959 the Belsinger Company was organized
and started to do business in this area; it bought out a fourth such contractor, called
Royal Neon Signs, Inc., taking Royal's building, trucks, and equipment. Belsinger
also took over and assumed Royal's contract with the Union. From that time
on, and continuing into 1964, in compliance with the terms of the contract Belsinger
contributed weekly to the local employees benefit board, a benefit fund administered
jointly by the IBEW and the employers.
The contract had been signed by Royal, but on its face reads as an agreement
"between the undersigned Electrical Sign Companies of Washington, D.C., and
Local Union No. 26, of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers." The
agreement by its terms ran to May 20, 1960, and provided for automatic annual
renewal thereafter. It also provided for a joint committee of union and employer
representatives to resolve, under a precise grievance procedure, any questions that
might arise. The contract finally contains the following clause:
Should this committee [the joint grievance group] fail to agree, or to adjust
any matter within the 60 calendar days after written notice had been given
it shall be referred to the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical
Industry of the United States and Canada. Its decision shall be final and
binding.
In the spring of 1961 all four of these employers bargained for contract revisions
with the Union. Mr. Donald Belsinger testified in conclusionary phrases that the
negotiations were carried on by the four employer members "jointly." No agree-
ment was reached and the dispute was submitted to the Council of Industrial Rela-
tions for Electrical Industry, in accordance with the agreement still in effect. On
February 20, 1962, that Council issued its decision, which on its face-as received
in evidence-shows the disputants to be "Greater Washington Sign Association
and Local 26, IBEW." Seven days later the Union sent a copy of this decision to
the Belsinger Company, calking attention to the Council's decision that the wage
increase decided in arbitration was to take effect on February 20, and that the
contract was to continue to May 20, 1963. The Union also suggested in its letter
to Belsinger that an amended contract be signed by the union members [contractors]
"at a joint meeting" to be held at the union office. The parties did not bother to
sign new agreements but considered the old one continuing in effect; all of them
did after the conditions of employment to conform with the arbitration decision
of the Council.
On March 20, 1963, the Union advised all of the contractors of its desire to
reopen the contract and negotiate; by this time Donald Belsinger had been chosen
president of the Association. Local 26's letter to him stated that "the employees
covered under the Sign Workers Agreement of Local Union Number 26 and
Greater Sign Association of Washington, D.C.," wished to amend the contract. On
August 9, 1963, the Association sent written proposals for a new agreement to the
Union; the proposals were submitted by Belsinger, signed: "Greater Washington
Sign Association, Donald K. Belsinger, Pres." By letter dated October 10, Local 26
rejected these proposals, received, as the Union's letter stated, from "the Greater
Washington Sign Association," and asked that the dispute be submitted to the
Council pursuant to the "working agreement " Its letter was sent to "The Greater
Washington Sign Association, Donald K. Belsinger, President, G.W.S.A." Again
Belsingei•, in the name of the Association, replied in writing that the group agreed
to have the Council settle the dispute. In support of their economic demands the
four contractors then submitted a single brief to the Council, and signed it "Greater
Washington Sign Association," with each company then adding its own name and
Belsinger's signature appearing as president.
With the dispute pending, and the parties quarreling, there occurred a work
stoppage by the employees of Belsinger and of the Jack Stone Company. A letter
of protest was sent to the Union in consequence, and it was signed by all four of
the contractors under the covering name "Greater Washington Sign Association."
The Council's decision was issued on November 22; it gave a 10-cent per hour
increase generally and modified the holiday provision of the existing agreement.
The Council also directed the parties to continue meeting to resolve final matters,
and to resubmit their dispute to the Council if final resolution was not achieved.
There followed three or four bargaining sessions attended by representatives of
all four companies and by Union officers; the last was on February 25, 1964. Be-
fore this date the employer group submitted a contract draft to the Union, entitled
4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"Agreement between Electrical Sign Companies of Metropolitan Washington, D.C.,
herein called the Employer, and Local Union 26, of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers."
Early in March the Union signed identical and separate contracts with the Stone
Company, Service Neon , and Folks & Miller . Like the earlier contracts , this too
is headed "Agreement entered into March 1 , 1964, between the undersigned Electri-
cal Sign Companies of Metropolitan Washington , D.C., hereinafter called the Em-
ployer, and Local Union No . 26 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, herein called the Union."
When Belsinger learned that the Union had signed up with the other members,
of the Association he asked that a copy of the contract be given to him for signing
also. His request letter of March 23 was ignored . Again on June 5 Belsinger de-
manded that the Union sign the same contract with him. At the hearing the Union
made clear it had no intention of signing that or any contract with this Company.
Analysis and Concluding Findings
There is persuasive proof in the evidence set out above that the bargaining from
1961 to the end of February 1964 proceeded on the basis of a four-company multi-
employer unit basis. There is also strong indication that the bargaining which had
led to execution of the 1959 contract, the one which Belsinger took over from Royal
Signs, was also multiemployer in character, for the agreement literally reads as a
settlement between the Union and the Electrical Sign Companies of Washington, D.C.
For purpose of decision here, however, it suffices that from the time Belsinger joined
the group to date, a period of at least 4 years, the parties dealt with one another
on an association basis. Thus the negotiation meetings that took place, both in
1961 and in 1963-64, had all four employers participating jointly; resort in each
instance to the Electrical Council was pursuant to the specific provisions of the As-
sociation contract; the briefs submitted to the Council by the employers were always
a joint effort by them and so recognized by the Union; the decisions of the arbitration
board recognized the employer party as an association in each instance; and the
very correspondence between the Association and the Union referred to the em-
ployer's side of the table as a single multiemployer group. Indeed it was not until the
very moment when the Union, for reasons only obliquely revealed in this record,
decided to exclude the Belsinger Company from the bargaining relationship, that
there came any individual, single employer activity by the Union. This was when,
at the beginning of March, a matter of a week or so after the last joint negotiation
session , it signed with three companies and refused to do the same with Belsinger.
And finally, that even then the parties intended to continue in existence a multi-
employer unit , albeit with Belsinger excluded , is clearly shown by the fact that each
of the identical contracts signed reads : "Agreement between Electrical Sign Com-
panies of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., hereinafter called the Employer, and Local
Union No. 26 ...:.
In contending that all this did not mean that a broad unit existed , the Respondent
relies primarily upon the fact that there is no evidence of express authorization by
each employer to the association to act as single spokesman for them all. This
argument presuposes that the association must have a separate existence apart from
its component members. The very case cited by the Respondent in support negates.
that argument. The applicable rule of Board law does appear in Francis L. Bennett,
et al. d/b/a Bennett Stone Company, 139 NLRB 1422, where the Board said: "Under
established Board Rules such unit is held to exist only where the evidence establishes
that the several employers expressly conferred upon their joint bargaining agent the
power to bind them by its negotiations or that the Employers have by an established
course of conduct unequivocally manifested a desire to be bound in future collective
bargaining by group rather than individual action ." [Emphasis supplied.]
The truly significant portion of this language, and that which determines the
case at bar, is that which speaks of "an established course of conduct unequivocally
manifest [ing] a decision to be bound . . . ." When the separate employers "ex-
pressly" authorize an association to act for all, such literal authorization is the un-
equivocal conduct which reveals the intent to be bound . But the same intent can•
be revealed by other conduct as well, and it is for this reason that the rule speaks
also of "an established course of conduct." The important question is not how the
employers have shown their intent to bring a multiemployer unit into being, but
whether they have done so.2
See Chicago Metropolitan Home Builders Association , 119 NLRB 1184.
LOCAL 26, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 5
In fact, as the General Counsel correctly points out in his brief, the testimony of
the Respondent's own witnesses, rather than dispel the conclusion dictated by the
objective, documentary proof, strengthens the inference and removes all doubt as to
the intention of the employer group. Jack Stone, officer of one of the companies, said:
"Over a period of years the union members [of the Association] have talked out some
,union difficulties . . it was always done on the part of our group, pretty well
decided as to what the method of attack would be . . Speaking of the briefs
submitted by the employers to the Council in arbitration: "It was something that we
mutually agreed upon and we worked it up together as a group." He agreed that the
Union members of the Association have dealt with the Union "as one body." Asked
to explain what he meant by "one body," he said: "We always feel we have more
strength as a group rather than individually because the Union has a tendency to take
the weakest link in the chain." Richard Luxemberg, of Service Neon Sign, Inc., also
agreed, from the witness stand, that union contractors of the Greater Washington
Sign Association have met "as a body."
Against all this, Mr. Stone, at the hearing, offered the statement that during the
1963-64 negotiations he was bargaining "individually," and Mr. Luxemberg added
that for his company he bargained "personally." Frank Crosby, business representa-
tive of Local 26, was present at all the bargaining meetings. His affidavit to the
Board agent, dated May 1964, reads "At the end of the meeting [the last session
,on February 25] we were in agreement except for Belsinger's objection to the
language in the checkoff clause. The other employers indicated we were silly to argue
over the language but that they stood behind Belsinger because he was president of
their Association."
On the record in its entirety there can be no question but that the entire course
of bargaining, from 1961 through the last meeting of February 25, at which there
was virtual final agreement on the terms of a new contract, the parties were bargain-
ing on the basis of a multiemployer unit of four employers, including the Belsinger
Company, and I so find. In a matter of days the Respondent signed the resultant
agreement with three of the companies; it refused to sign the contract with Belsinger.
Absent any convincing reason to except this situation from the clear rule of law
that the parties to a fully negotiated collective-bargaining agreement must reduce
it to writing and sign it on request, it must be found that by its refusal to sign that
agreement with the Belsinger Company the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3)
of the Act, as alleged in the complaint.3
Apart from taking issue with the complaint assertion of a multiemployer bargain-
ing unit, the Respondent advanced, either during the hearing or in its brief, a num-
ber of defense contentions which are for the most part vague, indefinite, and over-
lapping arguments. At one point it said there never was any employer association;
inconsistently, however, it had one of its witnesses, Mr. Stone, testify that he ceased
being a member 2 years ago. The Respondent then placed into evidence two
letters-one from Stone and the other from Luxemberg, dated April 29 and May 1,
respectively-addressed to Local No. 2 and disavowing Mr. Belsinger; the letter stated
that the two companies were "in full accord with the present agreement," but that
they were no longer members of The Great Washington Sign Association. In the
total circumstances of this case any withdrawal from association membership by
these two companies, after the contract resulting from the final bargaining had been
executed, and after the charges had been filed, can have no meaningful bearing upon
the principal issue .4
In November of 1963 Belsinger advised the officers of Local No. 26 that it planned
to discontinue the manufacturing aspect of its business in the Washington area and
to continue selling, erecting, servicing, and maintaining electrical signs there. Its
letter offered to discuss the matter with the Union. By letter dated February 24,
1964, it told the Union that 4 days later it would in fact cease manufacturing, but
in all other respects continue business as usual. On the effective date of the
change-February 28-there were approximately 12 rank-and-file employees work-
ing for Belsinger, virtually all members of Respondent's Local No. 26. On the
28th five were laid off; the others were kept. The laid-off employees were invited
to remain with the Company if they cared to and if they could qualify for the type
of work which remained. On the evening of that same day agents of the Re-
spondent appeared at the plant and spoke to those of its members who were still at
work. Forthwith all but one or two quit. There came a time a week or so later
when Belsinger sent a newly hired electrician to the Union to request, pursuant to
3H.J.Heinz Coinpanyv.IV LRB,311US 514.
4 Retail Associates , Inc, 120 NLRB 388.
6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the established practice, a transfer card from a Baltimore local of the IBEW Inter-
national. Local No. 26 refused to issue such a permit. By May I there were only
five employees at work, two members of the Baltimore local, and only one produc-
tion worker-a Mr. Long-a member of Local No. 26.
During the hearing counsel for the Respondent said the Union did not represent
a majority of Belsinger's employees; he was careful to avoid stating unequivocally
whether this was the reason why the Union refused to sign any contract with that
company. He repeats this plain statement in his brief, but now the asserted loss
of majority status is made to appear as a consequence of the other three companies
"withdrawing" from the joint bargaining after February 25. There is also a stipula-
tion that the Respondent always represented a majority of the employees of each of
the other three companies.
The ambivalence appearing in the Respondent's statements throughout the record,
the confused reasoning resulting from its vague and elusive positions, suggests that
whatever the real reason may have been for its refusal to deal further with Belsinger
is hidden somewhere behind the evasive testimony of its witnesses.5 This case does
not require a definitive finding as to the underlying motivation which caused the
Respondent, after the perfectly normal bargaining session of February 25, sud-
denly to deny its established representative status for Belsinger's employees. That
question stands apart from the issue of this proceeding, was not litigated, and, indeed,
may bring into play other provisions of the statute. The change of heart apparently
came about between February 25 and the time that the three contracts were signed;
these bear a date of March 1, although Crosby said he brought them to these other
employers for signature the second week in March.
Clearly the Respondent represented a majority, if not all, of the employees of all
four of the companies in the multiemployer unit throughout the bargaining period
of several months and through February 28. In effect negotiations had been suc-
cessfully completed 3 days earlier, and the contracts with the other companies are
dated the very next day. With the five or six employees remaining even after Bel-
singer reduced its operation almost all members of Local No. 26, with their sudden
"resignation" following immediately upon their business agent's visit to the plant
that day, and with the Union's refusal to issue work permits to IBEW electricians
thereafter, it cannot be said that a defense based on a loss of a majority in the
overall bargaining unit, sufficient to defeat this complaint, has been sustained. Both
the conduct of the union agents at the time of the events and the half-spoken, in-
consistent, and elusive arguments advanced now in justification, suggest bad faith,
rather than the honest dealing which the statute commands. At bottom, all cases
of refusal to bargain-including this one-turn on that fundamental question.6
A final argument, inferentially suggested, but not clearly articulated at the hear-
ing, and not repeated in the Union's brief, is that the Respondent was not obligated
to sign any agreement with Belsinger because that company had violated the exist-
ing agreement. Belsinger violated the contract, in the view of the Union, when it
first took positive steps to cease manufacturing signs in Washington. The record
shows that Mr. Belsinger, under some company name or other, also manufactures
signs in the Baltimore area, where he uses electrician members of IBEW Local 250
of that city, and planned to bring those signs to Washington to continue his business
there. It is this fact that appears, between the lines of the record, as the irritant
which caused the Union to refuse to sign the association contract with him. What
is thus called a contract violation by Belsinger, is also advanced, in the Respondent's
brief, as an attempt by that company to bargain with the Union as a single em-
ployer, and thus in effect a withdrawal by Belsinger from the multiemployer bargain-
ing unit. Recognizing that, under Board law, an employer may not appropriately
In an attempt to achieve a better understanding of the Union's true position I asked
Crosby, the union officer, why the separate contracts with each of the three employers
identifies the "employer" as the Electrical Sign Companies of Metropolitan Washington,
D C., if in fact each contract covered only a single employer unit. Crosby replied:
Well, we have always dealt with and basically dealt with each individual company.
When they come up for negotiations, and so forth, we have been dealing individually
with them. They meet, they come down individually, they speak individually, they
have no central spokesman or anybody authorized to speak for them. And this is-
we have been recognizing these certain companies over the past 20 years and that is
why they are named companies There has never been too much change in that
agreement. This is the basic reason.
E N L R B. v. American National Insurance Co, 343 U.S. 395; N.L R.B. v. Insurance
Agent's International Union, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins. Co.), 361 U.S. 477.
LOCAL 26, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 7
separate himself from association bargaining after negotiations have been completed,
the Union then adds that its own separate dealings, on or about March 1, with
the three other companies must be viewed as indirect agreement, by the Union, with
Belsinger's desire to break away from the association. From all this the Respondent
reaches the conclusion that what really happened was that Belsinger and Local 26
mutually agreed to bargain separately from any other employer, an arrangement
that can be of no concern to the Board at all.
No convincing rationale was given, indeed no theory whatever is urged to support
a rule of law excusing an otherwise illegal refusal to bargain in consequence of
contract violations. Moreover, even assuming such a principle, the defense must
fall in this instance because it was not shown that Belsinger's curtailment of the
one aspect of its business in the territorial jurisdiction of Local 26 was in fact a
contract violation. More important, no such reason was ever voiced by the Re-
spondent when it refused to sign any contract with that one company, or even to
talk with its representatives.
The Respondent's complete indifference to all of Belsinger's appeals that it sign
the association contract with that company also, or that it meet with the Com-
pany's officers, precludes any possible finding that the two "agreed" to engage
in separate, single employer bargaining. I find this total defense, however phrased,
unpersuasive.
On the record as a whole I find:
1. All employees employed by Jack Stone Company, Service Neon, Inc, Folks &
Miller, and Belsinger Signs, Inc , all of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., excluding
office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, was
in 1960, and at all times thereafter has been the exclusive representative of all the
employees in the above-described bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By refusing to sign the regularly negotiated association contract, as requested
to do by the Belsinger Company, the Respondent Local 26 violated Section 8(b)(3)
of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, as set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the employer described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
As it has been found that the Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct and to
take certain affirmative action designed to dissipate the effects thereof and to effectuate
the policies of the Act. The Respondent will therefore be ordered to cease and desist
from refusing to bargain with Belsinger Signs, Inc., on the basis of the multiemployer
bargaining unit found appropriate above. It must also be ordered to sign, upon
request of the Belsinger Company, the contract which the Union executed, early in
March of 1964 and bearing date of March 1, with each of the three other companies
included in the bargaining unit.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Belsinger Signs, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of
the Act.
2. Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All employees employed by Jack Stone Company, Service Neon, Inc., Folks &
Miller, and Belsinger Signs, Inc., of Metropolitan Washington, D C., excluding office
clerical employees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9 (b) of the Act.
8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. At all times since 1960 and thereafter Local Union No. 26, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, has been and is the exclusive representative of all
employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions
of employment, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to bargain with Belsinger Signs, Inc., as one employer member of
the appropriate multiemployer bargaining unit , and by refusing to sign and deliver
to that company the contract regularly negotiated for said bargaining unit, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that the Respondent Local Union
No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Washington, D.C., its
officers, agents , and representatives , shall:
1. Cease and desist from refusing, if requested to do so by Belsinger Signs, Inc ,
to sign the agreement reached with the electrical sign companies of Washington, D C.,
and executed on about March 1, 1964, with the other employer members of the
association , and refusing to bargain collectively with the Belsinger Signs, Inc., as a
component member of the employer association.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find would effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) If requested to do so by Belsinger Signs, Inc., forthwith sign the agreement
reached with the electrical sign companies of Washington , D C., and executed on
about March 1, 1964, with the other employer members of the association , and, upon
request , bargain collectively with that company as a component member of the
employer association.
(b) Post at its offices and meeting halls in Washington, D C., copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 5, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representa-
tives, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to members of the Respondent are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 5 signed copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix," for posting at the premises of Belsinger Signs, Inc., the
company willing, for 60 consecutive days, in places where notices to employees are
customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Decision and Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.8
7In the event that this Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order"
shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, En-
forcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
8In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Decision and Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
To ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL UNION No. 26 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , we notify you that:
WE WILL, if requested to do so by Belsinger Signs, Inc , sign and execute the
agreement reached by us with the electrical sign companies of Washington, D.C.,
STRONG ROOFING & INSULATING CO. 9
and executed on or about March 1 , 1964, with all other employer-members of
that association , and we will , upon request, bargain collectively with the afore-
said company as a component member of the employer association.
LOCAL UNION No. 26 , INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 707 North
Calvert Street , Sixth Floor , Baltimore , Maryland, Telephone No. 752-8460 , Extension
2100, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
Joseph T . Strong d/b/a Strong Roofing & Insulating Co. and Roof-
ers Local 36, United Slate , Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp
and Waterproof Workers Association . Case No. 21-CA-5978.
April 19, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 8, 1965, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the Act, and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting
brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial
Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, Strong
Roofing & Insulating Co., its officers, agents, successors , and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
152 NLRB No. 2.