Leeding Sales Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 12, 1965

155 N.L.R.B. 755 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

LEEDING SALES CO., INC. 755
Among the reasons supporting the adoption of this rule is to give a certified
union "ample time for carrying out its mandate" and to prevent an employer
from knowing that, "if he dillydallies or subtly undermines union strength" he
may erode that strength and relieve himself of his duty to bargain. [Citations
omitted.]
In the case before us the employer has bargained with a certified union for
only 6 months. It has, largely through its refusal to bargain, taken from the
Union a substantial part of the period when Unions are generally at their
greatest strength-the 1-year period immediately following the certification.
Thus to permit the Employer now to obtain an election would be to allow it
to take advantage of its own failure to carry out its statutory obligation, con-
trary to the very reasons for the establishment of the rule that a certification
requires bargaining for at least 1 year. We shall, therefore, in this and in
future cases revealing similar inequities, grant the Union a period of at least
1 year of actual bargaining from the date of the settlement agreement.
The rule thus stated by the Board is the rule adopted by the Board following a
settlement with an employer at the Board level. Obviously the Board has the right
to create its own rules regarding its own settlement orders. But the cited case is
inapposite in regard to court decrees such as we are involved with here.
The court opinion and judgment here requires "the Respondent to bargain col-
lectively in good faith until it is clear that a contract can be agreed upon or that a
true impasse has occurred." It is clear that neither of these contingencies had
occurred when these negotiations blew up just 4 days less than 1 year from the date
of the court's opinion and judgment-and some 3 months prior to the entry of the
court's decree. The court might well consider that its order had been treated
contemptuously.
On the other hand there is no showing in this record to explain the Union's almost
4-month delay in requesting Respondent to bargain with it in accordance with the
court's opinion and judgment of July 26, 1963.
Because of this unexplained delay, I am constrained to find that, despite the fact
that the negotiations blew up only 361 days after the court's opinion and judgment,
the parties have bargained for "a reasonable period of time" as generally required
by the courts. I still feel that this is a question which should be determined by the
court involved, and accordingly will recommend that this complaint be dismissed
in toto.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
I hereby recommend that the Board issue an order dismissing this complaint in
its entirety.
Leeding Sales Co., Inc. and District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and
epartment Store Union , AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-10420.
November 12, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 21, 1965, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, funding that the Respond-
ent had engaged i.n and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, and reconunending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. He also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain
other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dismissal of
these allegations of the complaint. Thereafter, the General Counsel
and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
and supporting briefs.
155 NLRB No. 70.
212-809-66-vol. 155-49
756 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as anmended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Brown, Fanning, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, except as modified herein.2
The General Counsel excepts to the Trial Examiner's finding that
William Madero who had been discriminatorily discharged at the
close of business on November 30, 1964, not be awarded backpay.3 The
record shows the following facts:
After Madero was discharged on November 30, he returned to the
plant on the morning of December 1 to meet Union Representative
Daniel Bloom for the purpose of settling his job status. While wait-
ing for Bloom, Respondent's secretary, Lee Diskind, came up to him
and asked him what he was doing around the plant. She then asked
Madero if he wanted to go back to work. He replied he did not want
to work because he did not feel well. The Trial Examiner found that
Lee Diskind's inquiry of Madero did not constitute an unconditional
offer of reinstatement, because it amounted to no more than a question
and could not reasonably be interpreted as a categorical invitation
to return to work. Nevertheless, the Trial Examiner concluded that
'The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Exam-
iner. It Is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner ' s resolutions
with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products , Inc , 91
NLRB 544 , enfd . 188 F. 2d 362 ( C.A. 3). We find no such basis for disturbing the Trial
Examiner 's credibility findings in this case.
In light of the unfair labor practices found by the Trial Examiner and adopted herein,
including the discriminatory discharge of William Madero and Martin Espinosa, who
comprised the entire appropriate unit, after the Respondent 's refusal to recognize and
bargain with the Union herein found to be the lawful majority representative of such
employees, and after a proper demand had been made , we do not agree with the Trial
Examiner's conclusion that the Respondent did not engage in systematic and extensive
coercive conduct. See Joy Silk Mills , Inc. v. N.L.R B , 185 F. 2d 732 (C A D.C ), cert
denied 341 U.S. 914, or with the Trial Examiner ' s further conclusion that Respondent's
conduct did not disclose an attitude of general opposition to the legislative intent mani-
fested in the Act. Accordingly, in the circumstances , we find that the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order and notice is too narrow and we shall so broaden it to make the
Remedy coextensive with the threat of future unfair labor practices . (Cf Mooney Air-
craft, Inc., 132 NLRB 1194 , 1195.)
In view of our broadened Order and notice , we find it unnecessary to pass upon the
Trial Examiner 's findings and conclusions that the interrogation by Respondent's Presi-
dent Moe Diskind of Madero , on November 30, was not violative of Section 8(a) (1) of
the Act.
3 Member Jenkins , in agreeing with his colleagues that the Respondent had knowledge
of Madero 's union membership prior to his discharge , does not rely on the smallness of
the Respondent 's plant in making such finding.
LEEDING SALES CO., INC. 757
Madero did not express or demonstrate an interest in returning to
work, and he recommended that no backpay be awarded to Madero.
We do not accept this recommendation.
It is axiomatic that a discriminatee need not make a choice of
employment prior to receiving an unconditional offer of reinstatement.'
Since the facts clearly show that Madero did not receive such an uncon-
ditional offer of reinstatement, he was under no obligation to make
it decision about returning to work. To assume, as it appears the Trial
Examiner has, that Madero would not have accepted a valid offer even
if one had been made is speculative and unwarranted from any evidence
presented in the record. Indeed, not only does the record fail to sup-
port a conclusion that Madero indicated an unequivocal resolve not to
return to work,5 but, to the contrary, it demonstrates that Madero, by
his acts, showed a continuing interest in being reemployed in his former
job. In the circumstances, therefore, we shall, as provided below,
award Madero backpay from the date of his discharge on November 30
to the date reinstatement was unconditionally offered him.6
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and orders that the Respondent, Leeding Sales Co., Inc., New
York, New York, its officers, agents , successors, and assigns , shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as
so modified :
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(c) :
"In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and
Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959."
4 See , e g, Lock Joint Tube Company, 127 NLRB 1146, 1151 ; East Texas Steel Castings
Company, Inc., 116 NLRB 1336, 1344.
5 Cf. Arista Service, Inc., 127 NLRB 499 , 500; Pacific American Shipowners Associattost.,
et W, 98 NLRB 582, 603.
6 The records shows that Madero was unconditionally offered reinstatement on Febru-
ary 15, 1965, but because of illness did not return to work until March 1, 1965.
758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b) :
"Make whole William Madero and Martin Espinosa for any loss of
pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on any amount
due."
The notice is hereby modified by deleting the third and fourth
indented paragraphs and substituting therefor the following:
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organiza-
tion, to form labor organizations, to join or assist District 65,
Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities,
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959.
WE WILL make whole William Madero and Martin Espinosa for
any loss of pay incurred as a result of their discharge, with inter-
est thereon at 6 percent per annum on any amount due.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an unfair labor practice case. It was initiated by a complaint issued on
March 18, 1965, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
through the Regional Director for Region 2 (New York, New York), against Leeding
Sales Co.. Inc., the Respondent herein. That complaint is based upon a charge
filed on December 4, 1964, by District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, the Charging Party, herein. In substance the complaint, as
amended at the hearing, alleges that Respondent engaged in conduct violating Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5), and that such conduct affects commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7), of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the
Act. Respondent has answered admitting some facts but denying that any unfair
labor practices were committed.
Pursuant to due notice, this case came on to be heard and was tried before Trial
Examiner James V. Constantine at New York, New York, on May 19, 20, and 21,
1965. All parties were represented at and participated in the trial, and were given
full opportunity to offer evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, present
oral argument, and submit briefs. At the close of the hearing Respondent and the
General Counsel argued orally. Briefs have been received from Respondent and
the General Counsel. A motion to dismiss, contained in Respondent's brief, is
disposed of by the findings and conclusions of law below.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. AS TO JURISDICTION
Leeding Sales Co., Inc., herein sometimes called the Company or the Respondent,
a New York corporation, is engaged at New York, New York, in selling and dis-
tributing at wholesale pins, safety pins, elastics, notions, and related products Dur-
ing the year ending October 31, 1964, it purchased goods and materials valued in
LEEDING SALES CO., INC. 759
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of New York . I find that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and ( 7) of the Act , and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act
to assert jurisdiction over Respondent in this proceeding.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union , AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union , or District 65, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 ( 5) of the Act. This is because I find that the Union is an organization in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose of dealing with
employers concerning wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and conditions of employ-
ment. I credit the witness Daniel Bloom , the Union's organizer , on this aspect
of the case.
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This case involves the alleged ( a) discriminatory discharge of two employees,
(b) unlawful interrogation of employees regarding their activities on behalf of,
membership in, and sympathy for, the Union , and (c ) refusal to recognize or bargain
with the Union . The sequence of events relating to these issues follows.
A. Geneial Counsel 's evidence
1. Events prior to the alleged discharges
About November 17, 1964,1 one of the Union 's stewards employed by Lidz
Brothers , another employer located in the same building as the Company , telephoned
Daniel Bloom , the Union 's organizer , that "he had a few people 2 who had signed
up with the Union." Bloom directed him to come to the union office with them,
a "normal procedure ." They complied the same evening . At the office Bloom ques-
tioned them , among other things, regarding their work , wages, and the number
of employees working for Respondent . During this interview Bloom ascertained that,
besides Mr . and Mrs. Diskind, the "employers ," Jean Katz, a sister of Mrs. Diskind,
and two other employees , William Madero and Martin Espinosa ( the latter two
being then present with Bloom) composed the entire working force . After telling
his visitors ( Madero and Espinosa ) that they would have to pay "an additional $5
for their union membership book ," Bloom dismissed them with a request to return
on November 24 "to discuss the terms and conditions of an agreement that we
would present to the employer."
When Madero and Espinosa came to the union hall on November 17 they handed
signed cards (which are applications for membership ) to Bloom which he turned
over to the Union. They then became entitled to a union book , for which they
must pay $5 at the next membership meeting of the Union. This $5 may be made
in installments as low as 50 cents a week . Both Madero and Espinosa have paid
their $5 (both on November 24) and have received their books However, pursuant
to union policy they will not be required to pay dues until either a contract is signed
by Respondent or they are dispatched by the Union to another job. Until such $5
is paid, the signer of a card continues to be an applicant for membership. Espinosa
and Madero were employed as stock and delivery boys by Respondent.
Madero and Espinosa returned to Bloom's office on November 24 Bloom then
discussed with them the terms and conditions to be incorporated in a document
which would be presented to the Company as the basis for negotiations . Finally he
told them that he would communicate further with them through the steward as to
when he would come to Respondent 's premises "to discuss an agreement." At a
later date Bloom instructed the steward to inform Madero and Espinosa that he,
Bloom, would come to Respondent 's place on Monday , November 30.
About 11 a .m. on November 30, Bloom came to the front of Respondent 's building.
As he arrived Bloom observed Madero and Espinosa proceeding toward the freight
entrance with handtrucks loaded with merchandise . When Bloom told Madero that
he was on his way up to see the Employer , Madero replied that the Employer was
at that time behind them. Bloom then told Madero that he would return in about
10 or 15 minutes after calling on another employer in the vicinity.
About 11:15 a.m. Bloom returned as promised . A woman receptionist (who
turned out to be Mrs . Diskind ) at a closed door with "an iron grating . . to look
through" spoke to him. Although Bloom asked for Mr. Diskind he was told that
1 All dates mentioned hereafter refer to 1964 except where otherwise noted.
2 Madero and Espinosa , in fact , were the only ones
760 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Diskind was not in Informing Mrs Diskind that he came from the Union represent-
ing the Company's employees to discuss a contract with Mr. Diskind, Bloom gave
the lady his name, union, and telephone number, and asked that Mr. Diskind be
requested to call him. She replied that she would give Bloom's message to Mr.
Diskind. But Mr. Diskind did not at any time thereafter communicate with Bloom
or the Union.
After Bloom left Madero on November 30, President Moe Diskind came to Madero
and asked, "Who was that man?" Madero did not answer As Diskind and Madero
rode up on the elevator Diskind reiterated the same question. (Respondent occupies
the ninth floor), Madero replied that he did not know. When the two got off the
elevator and entered the Company's quarters, Diskind again asked this same ques-
tion. Madero persisted in expressing his ignorance Then Diskind said, "Don't lie
to me," and stated that he knew "the man downstairs" was from the Union. There-
upon Madero "told him [Diskind] the truth" and stated that "we joined a union,
Local 65."
2. The alleged discharge of William Madero
William Madero worked several years on and off for the Company. He was last
hired by the Company in September 1964, as a delivery boy. About November 17,
shortly after finishing work, he signed an application card for membership in Dis-
trict 65. See General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2. About 20 minutes later employee
Espinosa signed a similar card. That evening the two proceeded to the union hall
where they met Daniel Bloom, a District 65 organizer.
On November 30, shortly alter President Moe Diskind asked Madero about "the
man downstairs," Moe Diskind caused Madero and Espinosa to assemble in the
backroom. Mrs. Lee Diskind also attended. The two employees were first asked
"Why do you do this here foi9" Then Moe Diskind said "Maybe have to let one
of them go or let the two of them go." As Madero started to walk out he was
called back and instructed to finish the rest of the day
At closing time on November 30 Madero was handed his check and was told he
was "let go because what you did to me." Thereupon Madero left Soon Espinosa
joined Madero outside the building, and the two went to the union hall to see
Bloom Since Bloom was not there, they spoke to Johnny Oliva, another organizer
for District 65. Oliva telephoned Bloom that Madero and Espinosa had been dis-
charged and were waiting for Bloom at the union hall. Bloom requested Oliva to
direct Madero and Espinosa to meet Bloom in front of the Company's premises the
next morning Oliva did so. When Bloom arrived on the morning of December 1
neither Madero nor Espinosa was present Thereupon Bloom went into the building
where he again encountered the same lady he spoke to the day before, i e., Mis
Diskind. Asking her if Mr. Diskind was in she replied, "My husband is not in now."
Telling Mrs Diskind that he had heard "that people had been fired from the place,"
he insisted that they be rehired immediately and that the Company sit down and
negotiate a contract Mrs. Diskind replied she had no authority to do anything
about it.
Leaving Mrs Diskind, Bloom proceeded to the union hall where he found Madero
and Espinosa awaiting him. Accompanied by these two, Bloom returned to call
on Mrs. Diskind. Again asking for Mr. Diskind, Bloom was informed by Mrs.
Diskind that he was not in. Then Bloom spoke to Mrs Diskind about taking back
Madero and Espinosa and "sitting down with Mr. Diskind and negotiating an agree-
ment." Mrs. Diskind reasserted that she lacked the power to take back Madero
and Espinosa.
Shortly thereafter Bloom requested the State mediation board to arrange a meeting
the next day between Respondent and the Union. Although the board did so, and
Bloom showed up, Respondent called up about the time Bloom arrived to state that
it would not appear through a representative
As noted above Madero and Espinosa were to meet Bloom at Respondent's place
of business on December 1 in the morning On December 1, Madero awaited Bloom
outside Respondent's building. While doing so Mrs. Diskind came by. When she
asked Madero what he was doing there, he replied, "Nothing." Then she asked him
if he wanted to return to woik, but he declined claiming he "didn't feel so good."
Soon Espinosa arrived Madero and Espinosa then went to the union hall where
they met Organizer Bloom The three then returned to the Company's premises.
While in the Company's office Bloom spoke to Mrs. Diskind but Madero was unable
to hear anything because he was pushed outside and shoved by someone other than
Mrs. Diskind.
On March 1, 1965, Madero returned to work for Respondent, although he was
offered reinstatement on February 15, 1965. Illness prevented his acceptance sooner.
LEEDING SALES CO., INC. 761
Madero, who is illiterate, testified that he signed the card 3 in September of an
undisclosed year. But he also testified that it "could have been" November and
that he went to the union hall on the same day after he signed the card and that
such latter date was November 17, 1964. He further testified that he signed because
he wanted to join the Union, but insisted at first that no one read the card to him
or informed him of its contents. Further, he testified that he received it from one
of the boys working around the neighborhood and retained it a long time before
signing it. Finally, he testified that Bloom explained the "whole story" to him
and "what it was all about" on November 17.
Madero at one time testified that he did not feel so good on November 30, and
that is the reason he left on that day. He also testified that he left because he felt
he could get more money some place elsewheie. Madero further testified that his
health was not good and that he often had to stay out of work for long periods of
time However, he usually worked 6 months in a year, as this was the minimum
period necessary to collect unemployment compensation insurance. In fact, Madero
collected such compensation for the week ending June 14, 1964, while he was
actually employed by Respondent and collected wages for the same period. On other
occasions Madero received unemployment compensation by claiming he had been
laid off when in fact he became idle because his health was bad
When Madero applied for unemployment compensation insurance on December 1,
he asserted that he had been laid off for lack of work. He was thereafter granted
compensation. In a reconsideration of his case by the State of New York Division
of Employment, it was determined that he was ineligible for the period beginning
December 1, 1964, on the ground that he "quit your job without good cause. You
left to get a better job and because of repeated nose bleeds ... ," and he "wilfully
misrepresented" that he "was fired due to `no work.' "
3. The alleged discharge of Martin Espinosa
Jose Sanchez is employed as a shipping clerk by Lidz Brothers, who are located
in the same building as the Respondent. He joined the Union in about 1961 and is
a union steward. Sometime before November 17, 1964, he obtained application
cards from the Union and gave them to Madero and Espinosa, at the same time
soliciting their membership. Madero refused to sign unless he knew "what the card
means." Thereupon Sanchez explained it to him Espinosa, however, did state that
he desired his brother to explain the card. Both Espinosa's brother and Sanchez did
explain it. Neither Madero nor Espinosa signed in the presence of Sanchez. On
November 17, Sanchez brought Madero and Espinosa to the union hall where he
introduced them to Organizer Bloom, as recited above.
Martin Espinosa, who speaks Spanish only, started working for Respondent in
August 1964, as a delivery boy. He does not understand English. On November 17
he signed a union application card. Blank spaces were filled in by Sanchez On
November 30, after Organizer Bloom left, Espinosa went upstairs to Respondent's
place of business Mrs. Diskind, Respondent's secretary, then (in Spanish, which
is Espinosa's native tongue) asked him why he wanted to loin the Union. Espinosa
remained silent.
At closing time on November 30, Mrs. Diskind told Espinosa that she had no
more work for him because he wanted to loin the Union. Then she handed him two
checks Shortly thereafter Espinosa met Madero, and the two together went to the
union hall. Events occurring thereafter on that day and on December 1, are noted
above. On February 16, 1965, Respondent, in writing, unconditionally offered to
reemploy Espinosa in his former position. Espinosa, in Novembei 1964, told Mrs
Diskind he wanted to go to Florida because he suffered in New York's cold weather
About May 1965, Espinosa signed an affidavit before a notary public in Brooklyn
but he destroyed it before the hearing of this case. In it he "had in mind to with-
draw this case " He showed it to Mrs Diskind. Later he burned it because he
"decided to continue with the case."
B. Respondent's evidence
About 5 p in., which is closing time, on November 30, Madero and Espinosa
asked to have their pay for the day. This was in addition to their regular weekly
paycheck, which is distributed every Monday at the end of work. Madero also
stated, "I don't want to work anymore I don't feel well I can get a job with
better pay." Then Mrs. Diskind asked Espinosa in Spanish, "How about you?"
'The "boy" who gave him the card filled in the remaining spaces
762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
To this Espinosa answered, "I go with Willy [Madero]." Thereupon each boy was
given his regular weekly check and another check for the day. During some part of
this conversation Mrs. Katz and Rubin Alkower, a customer of the Respondent,
were present.
About 10 a.m. on December 1, Union Organizer Bloom, accompanied by Madero
and Espinosa, came to Respondent's plant. Mrs. Diskind then said to Madero,
"Willy, didn't you say you don't want to work anymore?" Madero replied, "Yes
Ma'am, that's right." Immediately thereafter Bloom told Madero, "you shut up.
I'm speaking for you."
C. Concluding findings and discussion
1. As to unlawful interrogation
In the complaint it is alleged that on November 30 President Moe Diskind inter-
rogated his employees concerning their membership in, activities on behalf of, and
sympathy in and for District 65. Moe Diskind did not testify or attend the hearing.
Respondent adduced a doctor's certificate, which was received in evidence, that Moe
Diskind "is presently suffering from severe chest pains with severe tension and
anxiety. He is a diabetic and is presently in a run down condition. He must, under
no circumstances have any aggravation whatsoever. Any aggravation of the slightest
kind would have a severe bearing on Mr. Diskind's present condition " Although I
ruled at the hearing that this certificate, under all the circumstances, did not warrant
the granting of Respondent's request for a continuance of the hearing, I nevertheless
find that it adequately explains the absence of Moe Diskind from this trial Hence
I have not taken into consideration Moe Diskmd's failure to appear or testify in
assessing the record and arriving at findings of fact. Respondent's request that I
accept Moe's affidavit in evidence is denied.
On this issue I find that on November 30, after Union Organizer Bloom left the
front of the Respondent's building, Moe Diskind asked employees Madero to identify
the man who had just spoken to Madero. Since Madero did not answer, Moe twice
repeated the same question on the elevator, but each time Madero denied knowledge
as to who it was. Finally, when Moe insisted that Madero should not lie to him
and stated that Moe knew that the man in question was from the Union, Madero
"told the truth" to Moe and volunteered the statement that "we joined a union,
Local 65."
On these facts, I find that Moe Diskind did not engage in coercive interrogation
proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Patently the questions propounded seek
only to ascertain the person speaking to Madero and cannot reasonably be construed
as inquiries intended to elicit informative replies relating to union membership,
activities, or desires and sympathies of Madero This conclusion flows from the
entire record and the circumstances surrounding the incident, including the absence
of any other coercive conduct or statements by Moe. The Ohio Rubber Company,
a Division of the Eagle-Picher Company, 152 NLRB 112.
However, even if Moe's questions may be thought to educe informative replies as
to union activities, I find that the evidence is insufficient to show that the questions
put to Madero were infected with coercive implications. Moe's remark about his
knowledge of the identity of the man who spoke to Madero could not reasonably
have implanted upon Madero a feeling that the employer was spying on employees
to learn about their union activities. Cf. Bauer Aluminum Company, 152 NLRB
1360. And I further find that mere interrogation about the name of a man who
is said to be from the Union is insufficient to demonstrate coercion. This is isolated
and innocuous. Something more than this must be shown. N.L.R B v The Lorben
Corp., 345 F. 2d 346 (CA. 2). Accordingly, upon the entire record I find that
paragraph 9 of the complaint has not been established. I shall therefore recommend
that this division of the complaint be dismissed.
2. As to the discharge of William Madero
Madero is illiterate, his capacity to understand is limited, and he is slow to appre-
hend. As a consequence it was not difficult for either side to incline and perhaps
bend Madero's will to its point of view and thereby to obtain a favorable reply to
questions while he testified. Thus Madero sometimes gave one side one answer to
a question and a contradictory answer to the other side on the identical question.
Hence I have relied heavily on Madero's demeanor on the stand in evaluating his
credibility. As will appear below I have credited him in part only. It is elementary
that I need not accept or reject his testimony, or that of any other witness, in its
entirety, and that it is within my province to accept or reject, in whole or in part,
LEEDING SALES CO., INC. 763
the oral testimony of a witness. Commonwealth v. Holiday, 206 N.E. 2d 691, 693
(Mass.); Maiquandt V. Y W C.A., 282 Mass. 28, 184 N E. 287; cf. N.L K.B. v. Pitts-
buigh S S. Company, 337 U.S. 656, 659, N.L.R.B v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Com-
pany, Inc., 161 F. 2d 798, 800 (C.A. 5).
Initially, I find that Madero became a member of the Union on November 24,
when he paid $5 for his book. Further, I find that he signed the union card on
November 17, that its contents were made known to him by Sanchez, and that no
misrepresentation, undue influence, coercion, or other misconduct has been shown
which would taint the validity of that card. Cf. Mid-West Towel and Linen Service,
Inc., 339 F. 2d 958 (C.A. 7); N.L.R B. v Edro Corporation, 345 F. 2d 264 (C A 2).
Additionally, I find that prior to closing time on November 30 Respondent had
knowledge that Madero joined the Union, not only because of the smallness of
Respondent's plant (American Grinding & Machine Co., 150 NLRB 1357; Angwell
Curtain Company, Inc. v. N L.R B., 192 F. 2d 899, 903 (C.A. 7) ), but also because
Organizer Bloom told Respondent's secretary earlier that day that the Union repre-
sented all its employees, and Madero informed Moe Diskind on November 30 that
"we" (meaning Madero and Espinosa) had joined the Union. I credit Bloom and
Madero in this respect, and reject Respondent's evidence to the extent that it is
inconsistent therewith.
It is my opinion, and I find, that Madero was discharged for joining the Union,
and that he did not quit, as contended by Respondent This is because I credit
Madero that at closing time on November 30 he was " let go because what you did
to me." Further, I find that the words uttered refer to Madero's signing a union
card. Respondent's contrary evidence, i.e. that Madero quit, is not credited
Although I have, in large part, resolved the credibility issues pertaining thereto on
demeanor of the witness, I have also relied on the finding that Madero went to the
union hall immediately after closing time on November 30 to protest his discharge
If Madero had quit, as Respondent urges, then Madero's conduct immediately there-
after in going to the Union to complain of a discharge, and his asking for his job
back on December 1, become meaningless acts.
Moreover, I find that Lee Diskind's inquiry of Madero on December 1 does not
constitute an unconditional offer of reinstatement, because it amounted to no more
than a question and did not attain the stature of a categorical invitation to return
to work. Hence it is not necessary to determine whether Lee Diskind's uncom-
municated mental reservation that she did not want Madero back destroyed the
unequivocal essence of a supposed offer.
But the record shows, and I find, that Madero sometimes collected unemployment
compensation when he was unable to work because of illness and once when he
was actually employed by Respondent. Such conduct in my opinion detracts from
the equities which prompt the Board to award backpay. In fact it is not clear that
Madero would have returned even if offered reemployment, because he either
preferred unemployment compensation, or could not return because of illness.4 or
both. Hence I find he had no manifest interest in returning to work "It would be
inequitable, therefoie, to require backpay for such [an] employee absent evidence
[he] was available and did in fact attempt to secure employment at [Respondent]."
Druwhit Metal Products Company, et al., 153 NLRB 346. Accordingly, I shall
recommend that no backpay be awarded to Madero Reinstatement is not required
since Madero was taken back on March 1, 1965.
3. As to the discharge of Martin Espinosa
Espinosa signed a union card on November 17 and became a union member on
November 24 when he paid $5 and thereupon received a union book. For the
reasons set forth in connection with the finding that Respondent had knowledge of
Madero's union membership, and for the following additional reason, I find that
Respondent, on November 30, was cognizant of Espinosa's union affiliation. Respond-
ent's secretary, Lee Diskind, indicated to Espinosa twice on November 30 that she
was aware of Espinosa's union membership. Further, although Espinosa did not
speak, read, or write English, I find that the contents of the union card he signed on
November 17 were explained to him by his brother and by Union Steward Sanchez,
both of whom knew English, that he desired to join the Union when he signed, and
that no misrepresentation, undue influence, coercion, or other misconduct was prac-
ticed on him to induce him to subscribe the card Accordingly, I find that the record
fails to support Respondent's argument that Espinosa's card is invalid or that he
never intended to join the Union.
4 Madero testified that he did not want to work on December 1 because he did not
feel so well.
764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent stresses that, even if Espinosa's card was properly obtained, his con-
tinued membership in the Union is doubtful because he later (in May 1965) signed
an affidavit before a notary in which he "had in mind to withdraw this case." But
there is no merit to this, although I find that he signed such affidavit. In the first
place, a desire to "withdraw this case" does not retroactively establish that Espinosa
did not belong to the Union on November 30, the crucial date. Then, again, an
attempt to abandon a case is not laden with significance unless the facts generating
such action are disclosed. In such a situation declarations against interest become
relevant. But no such facts appear in the record. Finally, lack of continued mem-
bership is not fatal,5 for if Espinosa was a union member at all material times-and
I have found that he was-it is of no legal import that he later changed his mind and
deserted the Union.6 Cf. Ray Brooks v N L.R B., 348 U S. 96. In my opinion
N L R.B. v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc, 346 F. 2d 936 (C A. 5),
is distinguishable.
Finally, I find that Espinosa was discharged at closing time on November 30, and
that he did not voluntarily quit. On this issue I credit Espinosa and reject that part
of Respondent's evidence which is not consonant with this conclusion. In this con-
nection, I have resolved credibility, when the evidence was conflicting, not only on
demeanor of the witnesses but also on the fact, which I find, that Espinosa went to
the union hall immediately following his discharge to obtain help in being restored
to his job. This action is quite inconsistent with a voluntary quit; rather it does
manifest an objective criterion supporting the finding that Espinosa was discharged.
And I find that he was discharged for belonging to the Union, for I credit his testi-
mony that Secretary Lee Diskind told Espinosa that she had no more work for him
because he wanted to join the Union.
In arriving at the above findings, I have not overlooked Respondent's evidence,
which I credit to this extent, that Espinosa suffered from the harshness of New York
winters and that he yearned to work in Florida, where the weather was milder. But
I expressly find that he did not quit on November 30 to get away from New York's
weather and to seek employment in Florida's moderate climes.
Accordingly, I shall recommend that Espinosa be awarded backpay from the date
of his discharge to February 15, 1965, when reinstatement was admittedly uncondi-
tionally offered to him.
4. As to the refusal to bargain
A statutory obligation is imposed on an employer by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
to recognize and bargain with an uncertified collective-bargaining agent representing
an uncoerced majority of his employees in an appropriate unit 7 But it is a defense
to an accusation under Section 8(a)(5) that the unit is inappropriate, or that the
majority is obtained by misrepresentation, coercion, undue influence, or other repre-
hensible conduct, or that the employer entertains a bona fide doubt of the Union's
majority. Mid-West Towel and Linen Service, 143 NLRB 744, 752. affd 339 F. 2d
958 (C.A. 7); Skyline Homes, Inc v. N.L.RB, 323 F 2d 642, 647-648 (C.A. 5).
The question is whether any one or more of the foregoing defense are tenable on the
record in this case.
Initially, I find appropriate a unit composed of all stock and delivery employees of
Respondent, excluding office clerical employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors
as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. This is because Respondent's work comple-
ment consists only of two stock and delivery boys and one office clerical (Mrs. Katz,
the sister of Mrs. Diskind). Since the Board does not include office clericals in a
unit of production and maintenance employees, and since I find that the duties of the
stock and delivery boys in essence are in the nature of production, it follows that an
appropriate unit embraces stock and delivery boys but eliminates office clericals.
Secondly, I find that the Union asked for recognition and requested bargaining
negotiations through Organizer Bloom on November 30 and again on December 1,
5 Revocations must be unequivocal and communicated to the Union. Tinley Park Dairy
Co., d/b /a Country Lane Food Store, 142 NLRB 683, 686. I find that, under this test,
Espinosa had not resigned from the Union at any times material Moore's Seafood Prod-
ucts , Inc, 152 NLRB 683, points to this result
6 "An employee's thoughts (or afterthoughts) as to why he signed a union card
cannot negative the overt action of having signed a card designating a union as bargaining
agent " The Colson Corp . v. N.L R.B., 347 F 2d 128 (C A. 8).
7 N.L R B. v. Elliott-Williams Co., Inc., 345 F 2d 460 (C A 7).
LEEDING SALES CO., INC. 765
and that no representative of Respondent ever communicated with the Union atter
this The fact that these requests were made to Mrs. Lee Diskind, Respondent's
secretary, who claimed that she lacked authority to recognize or bargain with the
Union, does not supply Respondent with a defense. Since Mrs. Diskind is an officer
of Respondent, notice to her is notice to the Respondent. Therefore, following such
notice, Respondent was subjected to a statutory obligation to respond to the knowledge
acquired by such notice. Peiinacold Industries, Inc., 147 NLRB 885. Included in
such knowledge are Bloom's name, union, telephone number, and a request that Moe
Diskind call Bloom. Failure to reply under these circumstances constitutes a refusal
to recognize and bargain unless it can be justified by a showing that the Union had
not attained an uncoerced majority or that Respondent held a good-faith doubt that
the Union enjoyed a majority.
On the evidence before me I find that the Union, when it requested recognition and
bargaining negotiations on November 30 and December 1, had signed up Madero and
Espinosa as members, that these two employees constituted the entire unit, and that
no improper means were used to induce them to join the Union. It follows, and I
find, that on November 30 and December 1 the Union represented an uncoerced
majority of the employees in the unit heretofore found to be appropriate. See
N.L.R.B. v. S.N.C. Manufacturing Co., Inc., 352 F. 2d 361 (C.A.D.C.). Cumber-
land Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268-69. As found above, both Espinosa and
Madero, on November 17, signed union cards knowing their contents 8 and intending
thereby to apply for membership in the Union, and became members on November 24
when they paid $5 and received their union books. I find that no illegal, improper, or
beguiling methods were used to obtain such signatures. Nor does the tact that Madero
and Espinosa weie relieved from paying dues until a contract was executed with their
employer require a different conclusion; i.e., that the majority was improperly
obtained. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. N L.R.B. 345
F. 2d 264, 268 (C.A. 2). And the subsequent thoughts of Espinosa in 1965, assuming
they amount to a desire to withdraw from the Union, cannot detract from the Union's
majority on November 30 or December 1, 1964. Joy Silk Mills v. N.L R.B, 185 F. 2d
732, 743 (C.A.D.C.); N.L.R.B. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc, 341 F. 2d 750, 755
(C.A. 6).
Finally, I find that the record does not justify a finding that Respondent, on Novem-
ber 30 and December 1, entertained a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority As
stated in N.L.R.B. v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 298 F. 2d 176, 179 (C.A. 2), cert.
denied 370 U.S. 919:
The act imposes a duty to bargain in good faith upon request whenever a labor
organization has been designated by a majority of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit. The employer must recognize and bargain with such an organi-
zation whether or not it has been certified by the Labor Board. United Mine
Workers of America v Arkansas Oak Flooring Co , 351 U S. 62 [76 S. Ct.
559, 100 L. Ed. 941] (1956); N.L.R.B. v. Sunrise Lumber & Timm Corp, 241
F. 2d 620 ... (2 Cir 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S 818 ... [78 S Ct 22, 2 L Ed
2d 341 (1957).
On the evidence before me I am of the opinion, and find, that no reasonable basis
has been revealed by the record justifying a bona fide doubt of the Union's majority
status .9 In fact, Madero put Respondent on notice of a majority by his statement to
President Moe Diskind in the forenoon of November 30 that the stockboys had joined
the Union. Nothing transpired on that or the next day which would cause Moe to
question this fact. And Mrs. Lee Diskind had acquired no knowledge on Novem-
ber 30 or December 1 which reasonably can be considered to impugn the Union's
majority status. Indeed Mrs. Diskind at no time informed the Union that she doubted
its majority. While not decisive, this latter fact has probative value in ascertaining
whether Respondent was justified in good faith 10 to be uncertain about the Union's
8 The cards also expressly on their face authorize the Union to act as bargaining agent
of the employees.
8 Mrs. Diskind's asking Espinosa why he wanted to join the Union is too isolated to
warrant an inference of lack of good faith N.L.R.B. v The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Company, Inc, 346 F. 2d 936 (C A 5) Hence I have disregarded this incident in finding
lack of good faith
10 To establish reasonable doubt "there must be some manifestation of doubt to the
Union " Skyline Homes v. N.L.R B , satpra
766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
standing as a collective-bargaining agent. Skyline Homes, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 323 F. 2d
642, 648 (C.A. 5).11 And the genuineness of a doubt is to be ascertained as of the
time the employer refused to recognize the Union; i.e., November 30. Fred Snow,
et at., d/b/a Snow & Sons v. N.L R.B , 308 F 2d 687, 694 (C.A. 9). Nor is it
determinative that Respondent did not engage in systematic and extensive coercive
conduct. Snow & Sons, supra, 693.
Accordingly, I find that at all times since November 30 Respondent unlawfully
refused to recognize or bargain with the Union as the exclusive and majority
collective-bargaining representative of the stock and delivery boys, and that at these
times the Union was the lawful majority representative in an appropriate unit
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UPON COMMERCE
Those activities of Respondent found to constitute unfair labor practices, as set
forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in
section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce
V. THE REMEDY
Having been found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices
prohibited by Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom, and that it take specific affirmative action, as set forth
below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As I am not persuaded that
Respondent's conduct discloses an attitude of general opposition to the legislative
intent manifested in the Act, I shall recommend only that Respondent cease and
desist from engaging in the violations found herein. This is consonant with Board
practice. Cf. Sully-Miller Contracting Company, 152 NLRB 1623.
Although I have found that Respondent discriminated with respect to the tenure
of employment of Martin Espinosa and William Madero, no relief by way of rein-
statement will be recommended for either of them since they have been restored to
their former positions As set forth above, I have found that a balancing of the
equities warrants a denial of backpay to Madero because he had not expressed or
demonstrated interest in returning to work prior to the date he received an offer of
reinstatement. Hence the Recommended Order herein will not provide that Madero
be awarded backpay. However, Espinosa stands on a different footing, the policies
of the Act will best be effectuated by granting him relief for loss of earnings caused
by Respondent's discrimination against him. Accordingly, the Recommended Order
herein will require that Respondent make Espinosa whole for any loss of earnings
suffered by reason of the discrimination against him In making Espinosa whole,
Respondent shall pay to him a sum of money equal to that which he would have
earned as wages from the date of such discrimination to the date of reinstatement or
a proper offer of reinstatement, as the case may be, less his net earnings during such
period. The backpay is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established
by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at
6 percent per annum pursuant to the formula adopted in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co,
138 NLRB 716. It will also be recommended that Respondent preserve and make
available to the Board or its agents, upon reasonable request, all pertinent iecords and
data necessary to analyze and calculate the amount, if any, of backpay due
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and on the entire record in this
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2 Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
"No issue is presented as to a good-faith doubt of the bargaining unit. If, however,
this is an issue, I find on the record that Respondent did not labor under a good-faith
doubt as to the unit, especially since this was not mentioned to the Union. N.L.R.B. v.
Philamon Laboratories, 298 F. 2d 176, 180 (C.A. 2).
LEEDING SALES CO., INC. 767
3. All stock and delivery employees of Respondent, excluding office clerical
employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in Section 201) of the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Sections 9(b) and 8(a) (5) of the Act
4. On November 30, 1964, and at all times thereafter, District 65 represented a
majority, and was the exclusive bargaining representative, of all the employees in
the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(b) of the Act; and Respondent was on that
date, and has been since, legally obligated to recognize and bargain with District 65
as such representative because Respondent made a proper request for recognition and
bargaining negotiations.
5. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment of William Madero
and Martin Espinosa, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
6. By refusing to recognize or bargain with District 65 in an appropriate unit on
and since November 30, 1964, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices comprehended by Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
7. The above-described unfair labor practices are unfair practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. Respondent has not committed any other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the
entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, it is recommended that Respondent, Leeding Sales Co., Inc.,
New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from.
(a) Discouraging membership in District 65, or any other labor organization, by
discharging employees or otherwise discriminating in any manner in respect to their
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Refusing to recognize or bargain with District 65 as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees in the unit found above to be appropriate.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist District 65 or any other labor organization, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with District 65 as the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in the aforesaid unit and , if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement.
(b) Make whole Martin Espinosa for any loss of pay he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum.
(c) Preserve and, upon reasonable request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary
to analyze and ascertain the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recom-
mended Order.
(d) Post at its place of business in New York, New York, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
'a If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words, "a Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words, "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Director for Region 2, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized representative
of Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.13
It is further recommended that unless Respondent shall within the prescribed period
notify the said Regional Director that it will comply, the Board issue an Order requir-
ing Respondent to take the aforesaid action.
"If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified
to read. "Notify said Regional Director, In writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order , of the steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and
Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by
discharging any of our employees, or in any other manner discriminating against
them in regard to their tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or bargain collectively with said District 65
as the exclusive representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit
mentioned below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist District 65 or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL make whole Martin Espinosa for any loss of pay incurred as a result
of his discharge , with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with said District 65 as the exclu-
sive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody
such understanding in a written, signed contract. The bargaining unit is:
All our stock and delivery employees, excluding clerical employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remain-
ing, members of said District 65 or any other labor organization.
LEEDING SALES CO., INC.,
Employer.
Dated-- ----------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fifth Floor,
Squibb Building, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, Telephone No. 751-5500.