Laystrom Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 8, 1965

151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

1482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Without exception these witnesses exhibited an undisguised vindictiveness toward
the Company. In my judgment , no prudent man could accept the testimony of these
witnesses , and upon it base any decision of importance. The testimony of these
ex-employees set forth above, demonstrates the propriety of this finding . In this
category of disgruntled ex-employees, whose testimony I deem unreliable are Marolf,
Crowe, Connelly, and Cochran. I reject the entire testimony of these individuals.
Furthermore, this phase of the case presented by the General Counsel appears to be
fashioned from bits and pieces of half-remembered or slanted testimony from par-
tisan witnesses , who were smarting from the disappointment of an election which
had been lost.
On the other hand the supervisors and officials of the Company who were presented
as witnesses testified in a matter-of-fact, convincing manner. I credit the testimony
of Williams, Rupe, and Townsend.
It is also found that the Company did not commit unfair labor practices by the
issuance of the questionnaire to its supervisors . Surveillance and interrogation have
been deemed restraint , coercion , and interference on the practical theory that if
employees know of these things they are automatically put in fear of reprisal by the
employer. Here, there could be no fear of such conduct for the employees did not
know of it. As I view this questionnaire , it was a wholly management affair, equiva-
lent to a verbal discussion concerning the election , after the balloting was concluded.
I know of no case which holds such conduct as violative of the Act.
The second questionnaire answered by the employees presents a closer question.
Here, the employees were made aware of the employer's interest in the election, but
is that coercive? The General Counsel takes the position that the questionnaire
probs an area beyond "the legitimate concern" of the Company, and is therefore an
unfair labor practice . I do not agree that the Act proscribes such conduct. It is
conceded by all that under Section 8 (c) of the Act employers have the right to express
"any views, arguments, or opinion " if "such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit." Under the right conferred by this section, employers
by the use of "free speech" engage in campaigns to bring their views on unionization
to their employees . In my judgment this section also permits an employer to try
to estimate the effectiveness of his "views, arguments or opinion ," as long as his con-
duct does not contain a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit ." No such
threat or promise has been proven here.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I shall recommend that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to the issues in this pro-
ceeding, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. The evidence fails to establish that Respondent discharged or refused to reinstate
Sidney E. Whittington because he engaged in union or concerted activities thereby
violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, or engaged in the other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The complaint should be, and hereby is , dismissed.
Laystrom Manufacturing Co. and Tool and Die Makers Lodge
No. 113 , International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO.
Case No. 13-CA-6305. April 8, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 26, 1964, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
151 NLRB No. 144.
LAYSTROM MANUFACTURING CO. 1483
had not engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and
recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. There-
after, only the General Counsel and the Union filed exceptions to
the Decision, and briefs in support thereof. The Respondent filed
an anwering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and
Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire
record in this case, and finds that the exceptions of the General
Counsel and the Union have merit. The Board therefore adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner
only to the extent consistent herewith.
In April 1960 the Union was certified as the collective-bargaining
representative of Respondent's toolroom employees. Thereafter the
parties entered into two successive 1-year contracts. In March 1962,
at the expiration of the second contract, Respondent petitioned for
an election under Section 9(c) (1) (B) of the Act.' The Union was
again certified and shortly thereafter a 2-year contract, running until
June 2, 1964, was signed.
On March 16, 1964, the Union by letter requested bargaining on a
new contract. On the same day Respondent again filed a petition
for an election,2 and by letter informed the Union that it believed
that the Union no longer represented a majority of the employees.
Accordingly, Respondent refused to grant the Union's request to
bargain. The issue is whether or not this refusal was unlawful.
Absent unusual circumstances, there is an irrebuttable presump-
tion that the majority status of a certified union continues for 1
year from the date of certification3 After the first year the certifi-
cate still creates a presumption of majority status, but the presump-
tion is normally rebuttable by an affirmative showing that the union
no longer commands a majority.4 Moreover , where the certificate is
a year or more old an employer may withhold further bargaining
1 Case No. 13-RM-624.
2 Case No 13-RM-733.
8 See, e.g , Ray Brooks v N.L.R B. , 348 U.S. 96; Celanese Corporation of America, 95
NLRB 664, 672
4 Frito-Lay, Inc., 151 NLRB 28, Cf. Celanese Corporation of Amertea , supra.
1484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
without violating the Act and insist that the union reestablish its
statutory representative status if, but only if, he in good faith has a,
reasonable doubt of the union's continuing majority.,
A showing of such doubt, however, requires more than an em-
ployer's mere assertion of it and more than proof of the employer's
subjective frame of mind. The assertion must be supported by
objective considerations. The applicable test, as defined in the
Celanese case, is whether or not the objective facts furnish a "reason-
able basis" for the asserted doubt, or, put another way, whether or
not there are "some reasonable grounds for believing the Union
has lost its majority status since its certification." 6
In the instant case, the Trial Examiner found, in effect, that
Respondent had a subjective good-faith doubt of the certified Union's
majority in March 1964. On that basis, and because Respondent
engaged in no independent unfair labor practices, he sustained
Respondent's principal defense and ruled that Respondent had not
engaged in the refusal-to-bargain violation which the complaint
alleged.
Measuring Respondent's claimed doubt of majority status by the
standards set out above, however, we must disagree with the Trial
Examiner's ultimate conclusion. The Respondent in our opinion did
not show reasonable grounds for believing that the Union had lost
its majority prior to March 16, 1964. It showed only that the tally
in the prior election was 17 to 13 and that of the employees eligible
to vote 16 had terminated their employment and 8 were newly
hired since the last election. As proof of its good faith in enter-
taining such doubt Respondent points to the fact that it had filed
a petition for and was willing to abide by a Board election; that
there was no history of union animosity on its part; and that on
May 22, 1964, more than 2 months after the refusal to bargain,
it offered to negotiate a contract which would be subject to new proof
of the Union's majority.
Employee turnover standing alone does not provide a reasonable
basis for believing that the Union had lost its majority since the
prior election. The Board has long held that new employees will be
presumed to support a union in the same ratio as those whom they
have replaced.7 There is no rebuttal of that presumption here, and
no independent evidence from which the inference may be drawn
that the new group of employees replaced union adherents or that
8 See, e g., The Richard W. Kaase Company, 141 NLRB 245 ; Mitchell Standard Corpo-
ration, 140 NLRB 496; The Randall Company, at at., 133 NLRB 289; Celanese Corpora-
tion of America, supra, footnote 4, at 672.
6 Celanese Corporation of America , supra, footnote 4, at 673.
7John S. Swift Company, Inc ., 133 NLRB 185, enfd. 302 F. 2d 342 ( C.A. 7) ; National
Plastic Products Company, 78 NLRB 699, 706 affd. 175 F. 2d 755 (C.A. 4). Cf. Small
Tube Products, Inc., 134 NLRB 867, affd. 319 F. 2d 561 (C.A. 3).
LAYSTROM MANUFACTURING CO. 1485
they supported the Union less strongly than the old group. Indeed,
the Respondent adduced no competent and probative evidence to
establish that any employees, new or old, no longer wished to be
represented by the Union.8 Nor do the other factors presented by
Respondent aid its case on this point. The absence of union
animosity or of independent unfair labor practices, although con-
sistent with a subjective good-faith belief that the Union had lost
its majority, does not establish that the Respondent had a "reasonable
basis" or "reasonable grounds" for so believing. As for Respondent's
actions in filing a petition for an election, and its willingness-first
expressed 2 months after its refusal to bargain-to meet with the
Union for the limited purpose of trying to seek a conditional con-
tract contingent on the outcome of the election, it need only be noted
that these are self-serving assertions which do not provide any objec-
tive basis for doubting the Union's continuing majority.
The present circumstances differ substantially from the situation
in the recent Frito-Lay, Inc., case (151 NLRB 28), and we find,
in sum, that Respondent has not met the test for establishing a good-
faith doubt which is sufficient to override its statutory bargaining
obligation. We therefore conclude, contrary to the Trial Examiner,
that: The certified Union continued to represent a majority of the
employees in the appropriate unit; Respondent, in March 1964, had
no reasonable basis for believing otherwise; and Respondent there-
fore violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) by refusing to bargain with
the Union.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that
the Respondent, Laystrom Manufacturing Co., Chicago, Illinois, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment with Tool and Die Makers
Lodge No. 113, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the following
appropriate unit: All toolroom employees of the Respondent's
Chicago, Illinois, plant, excluding all other employees, guards, and
supervisors, as defined in the Act.
8 Respondent attempted to show that various employees had indicated to it they were
dissatisfied with the Union . The Trial Examiner correctly refused to admit this evidence
because Respondent would not name the employees and thus the General Counsel would
have no opportunity to meet the testimony . We note, moreover , that the Respondent
did not avail itself of the opportunity provided by the Board 's Rules and Regulations,
Series 8, as amended , to file exceptions to this ruling.
1486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) In any like manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, including the above-named
Union, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities, except as provided by Section
8(a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named
Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appro-
priate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its plant in Chicago, Illinois, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for Region 13, shall, after being duly-
signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to its employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respond-
ent has taken to comply herewith.
9In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a_
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT, by refusing to bargain collectively or in any
like manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist Tool and Die Makers Lodge No_
113, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives' of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
LAYSTROM MANUFACTURING CO. 1487
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities, except as provided by Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL bargain in good faith, upon request, with the above
Union as the exclusive representative of all our employees in
the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All toolroom employees of our Chicago, Illinois, plant,
excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors, as
defined in the Act.
LAYSTROM MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 176 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois, Telephone No. Cen-
tral 6-9660, if they have any question concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed by the above-named labor organization on March 23, 1964, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board on May 14, 1964, issued his
complaint and notice of hearing . On June 2, 1964, General Counsel issued an amend-
ment to the complaint . Both to the original complaint and its amendment the
Respondent duly filed answers , dated May 22 and June 12, 1964, respectively. The
complaint as amended alleges and the answers deny that the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)( I) and (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Pursuant to notice a hearing was
held before Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore in Chicago, Illinois, on June 17, 1964.
At the hearing all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to
present evidence pertinent to the issues , to argue orally, and to file briefs . Briefs
have been received from General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the record thus made, and from my observation of the one witness called,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Laystrom Manufacturing Co. is an Illinois corporation with its place of business
in Chicago, Illinois, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
tools, dies, metal stampings, and related products.
During the year preceding issuance of the complaint it sold and shipped directly to
points outside the State of Illinois products valued at more than $50,000.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and it is here found that the Respondent
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
1488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE CHARGING UNION
Tool and Die Makers Lodge No. 113, International Association of Machinists,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the
Respondent.
M. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Setting and chief issue
The amended complaint contends that since March 16 and May 22, 1964, the
Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Charging Union although at
all times since June 1, 1962, this labor organization has been the exclusive bargaining
representative of all employees in an appropriate unit. The Respondent denies that
it has unlawfully refused to bargain and affirmatively claims that during the material
period it has had and has manifested by appropriate action a genuine doubt as to the
Charging Union's majority status.
B. Relevant facts
Almost all the facts material to the issues were placed in evidence by stipulation of
the parties. There being no conflict in testimony to be resolved by me, the stipu-
lated facts are summarized, chronologically, as follows:
(1) Only the Respondent's toolroom employees, numbering 27 at the time of the
hearing, are involved.
(2) The Union was first certified by the Board on April 27, 1960, following an
election in Case No. 13-RC-7096.
(3) Negotiations following certification led to a 1-year contract, covering a period
from June 1, 1960, to June 1, 1961.
(4) This first contract was duly reopened and another 1-year agreement was
executed as of June 1, 1961.
(5) On March 15, 1962, prior to the expiration of that agreement, the Respondent
filed a petition for an election in Case No. 13-RC-624. An election was held June 1,
1962. Tally of ballots showed 17 for the Union, 13 against, and 2 challenged ballots.
The Union was again certified June 11, 1962.
(6) As of June 4, 1962, the parties entered into a 2-year agreement, with expira-
tion date set at June 2, 1964. This contract contained a legal union-shop clause,
requiring as a condition of employment membership in the Union.
(7) On March 16, 1964, the Respondent filed with the Board a petition for election
in Case No. 13-RM-733, and on the same date and by registered letter notified the
Union both of the filing of this petition and of its intent to terminate the existing
agreement at its expiration date.
(8) Also on March 16 and by registered letter the Union gave the Respondent its
60-day notice in accordance with the contract's termination clause and offered to meet
to negotiate a new agreement.
(9) On March 23, 1964, as noted heretofore, the Union filed its charge in these
proceedings.
(10) The Regional Director deferred action on the RM petition, pending disposi-
tion of the Union's charge. The parties, however, were not formally notified of such
deferment , and consequently the Respondent filed no appeal , since no ruling had been
made to be appealed.
(11) On May 7, 1964, the Respondent addressed to the employees in the unit a
long letter which is in evidence but which, in my opinion, need not be quoted here in
full. In substance the employer explained his position in asking for an election,
reciting the history of its contractual relationship with the Union, and urging employ-
ees that if they had any question as to his asserted facts they consult with the Union
or with a Board representative.
(12) On May 14, as noted, General Counsel issued his complaint.
(13) On May 22 the Respondent, by letter to the Union, offered to resume negotia-
tions at once looking toward a new contract but with the understanding that such
agreement not be formally executed until, by secret ballot, it had established its
majority status.
(14) By letter of May 29 the Union , in effect, declined to negotiate under the con-
ditions proposed by the Respondent.
C. Conclusions
General Counsel 's position , in substance , is that because of the majority status
established by the election in 1962 the presumption of continuing majority must be
LAYSTROM MANUFACTURING CO. 1489
found to be valid at the expiration of the contract in 1964, absent a preponderance
of evidence introduced by the Respondent to rebut that presumption. It is his further
contention that the Respondent failed to meet its burden in coming forward with such
evidence. He cites a number of Board cases in support of his argument.
It cannot be said that the Respondent stood mute in meeting the burden of proving
its good-faith doubt as to the majority status. The close vote in the 1962 election,
the stipulated fact that 16 of the 35 employees eligible to vote in that election had in
the interim left their employment, and the union-shop provision are factors which,
while perhaps not determinative, must be considered relevant and accorded due
weight.
Through its counsel the Respondent also made an extended and detailed offer of
proof as to other reasons why, in good faith, it asked that an election be held before
signing a new agreement. This offer of proof, in essence, covered testimony of
management witnesses which, had it been received, would have shown that various
employees had approached them expressing dissatisfaction with the Union and their
desire to have the employer ask for an election, as had been done 2 years earlier.
Such testimony was not received by me, upon assurance by the Respondent's counsel
that the management witnesses would decline to identify the employees who had
come to them with complaints.' The one witness actually called by the Respondent
stated that he would not reveal the names since the employees had asked him not to.
Counsel for the Respondent urges that the facts of this case be considered in the
light of the stipulation that at no time during the contractual relationship between
the parties, and until the charge in this proceeding, has any charge of unfair labor
practices been filed by the Union. So far as the record shows, no serious dispute
between the parties has, until this proceeding, arisen and there is no evidence or
claim that the Respondent has ever interfered with or coerced employees in the exer-
cise of their right to select their own bargaining representative.
On the other hand, General Counsel points to the fact that no decertification peti-
tion has been filed by any of the employees in the unit which might support the
Respondent's claim of doubt.
Good-faith doubt is, of course, a subjective matter. It's existence in the mind is
not proven by mere assertion. Doubt in the mind of a claimant cannot be seen, heard,
or felt by the trier of facts. A finding that it exists can only be inferred from material
circumstances, past or present-events which themselves are capable of more tangible
proof.
Plainly the circumstances here described are not those which reasonably lead to
the inference of "bad faith." Stipulations noted above show that the parties have
negotiated, executed, and presumably have administered three bargaining agreements,
with no claim of bad faith in any respect. After the first two yearly contracts the
Respondent asked for an election. There is no evidence that the Union objected to
proving its majority status again, and it did so, although by a narrow margin. A
2-year contract was then executed-one which required membership as a condition
of employment
Toward the expiration date of the latest agreement the employer again asked for
an election. This time the Union declined, apparently, and chose to stand fast on the
union-shop requirement as proof that it was, and is, the lawful agent of all employees
in the unit.
I discern nothing in the long relationship of the parties that may be construed
as "bad faith" on the part of the Respondent. The past, then, lacks circumstances
from which an inference of "bad faith" in this action may be drawn-or even, in
my opinion, an inference of lack of good faith, a distinction which it would seem
General Counsel claims.
Only this legal business of a "rebuttable presumption" and the shifting burden of
proof is raised by General Counsel as a barrier across the avenue of common sense.
Technically he may be quite right in insisting that once claiming good-faith doubt
the employer must prove its existence. But common sense seems to suggest that if
this is so a union , once obtaining a union-shop provision in a contract , may retain its
agency in perpetuity unless and until a sufficiently large number of employees have
the temerity to come forward and record themselves publicly as opposed to the Union.
Two unanswered questions arise from this record: (1) Why the Respondent
declined to name employees who had expressed dissatisfaction with the Union as their
1 The ruling was based upon the obvious fact that the only way General Counsel could
meet such testimony would be to subpena and interrogate each of the 27 employees in
the unit
733-133--G G-vol 1 a 1 93
1490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
agent and asked to have an election ; and (2 ) why the Union has declined to go to an
election but has chosen , instead, to have the past prove the present. Any answer or
answers to either question must be speculative . But realities of life in a putty factory
or any industry suggest that not all employees who have been required to join a union
will voluntarily come forward , at a public hearing-or sign their names to a decertifi-
cation petition-to register their desire for another or no bargaining agent. And it is
equally reasonable to speculate that a union may prefer to let the Board handle its
hot chestnuts with tongs of technicalities instead of going to an election. A suspicion
is not alien in the setting described above that perhaps the Union doubts that it could
win an election today.
In any event, I believe and conclude that the circumstances of this case , including
the expressed willingness of the Respondent to negotiate a renewal of a contract, its
execution subject only to proof at a Board election , sufficiently establish a "good faith"
doubt to warrant a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed and that the
employees themselves-whose rights the Act was designed to protect-be given an
opportunity to express themselves at a secret election.
In short , I conclude and find that the Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)( I)
and (5 ) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions , and upon the entire record in the
case , I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Locel Union'
No. 11., AFL-CIO [General Telephone Company of California]
and Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
No. 11, AFL-CIO and General Telephone Company of Cali-
fornia.' Cases Nos. 21-CC-612. 21-CC-613, and 21-CC-741.
April 8, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 30, 1964, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respond-
ent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. General
Telephone Company of California filed cross-exceptions and a brief
in answer to the Respondent's exceptions.
Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members
Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
entire record in the case, including the Trial Examiner's Decision,
1 Referred to herein as the Company.
151 NLRB No. 145.