Laborers Local 578 (Shaw Stone & Webster Construction)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 2008

352 N.L.R.B. 1005 (N.L.R.B. 2008)

LABORERS LOCAL 578 (SHAW STONE & WEBSTER CONSTRUCTION)
352 NLRB No. 118
1005
Laborers International Union of North America, Lo-
cal Union 578 (Shaw Stone and Webster Con-
struction, Inc.) and Sebedeo Lopez. Case 27–
CB–4935
July 31, 2008
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN SCHAUMBER AND MEMBER LIEBMAN
On March 21, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Clif-
ford H. Anderson issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified and set forth in full below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Laborers International Union of North
America, Local Union 578, Pueblo, Colorado, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Shaw Stone and
Webster Construction, Inc. to terminate the employment
of Sebedeo Lopez, or any other employees, for failing to
pay union dues and fees pursuant to a union-security

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
No party excepted to the judge’s dismissal of the allegation that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(b)(2) by attempting to cause the Employer,
Shaw Stone and Webster Construction, to discharge employee Sebedeo
Lopez by means of the November 1, 2006 letter.
2 We shall substitute the Board’s standard language for certain pro-
visions of the judge’s recommended Order and notice.
Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Schaumber and Member Liebman constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
clause without first advising them of the amount of the
dues delinquency (showing the calculation), and afford-
ing them a reasonable opportunity to pay the amount
owed.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, notify
Shaw Stone and Webster Construction, Inc. and Sebedeo
Lopez, in writing, that it withdraws and rescinds its re-
quest for Lopez’ discharge, and that it has no objection to
his reinstatement without any loss of seniority or other
rights and privileges previously enjoyed by him.
(b) Make Sebedeo Lopez whole for any loss of pay
and other benefits resulting from his discharge, with
backpay to be computed in a manner set forth in the rem-
edy section of this decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files, and ask Shaw Stone and Webster Con-
struction, Inc. to remove from its files, any reference to
the unlawful discharge of Sebedeo Lopez. Within 3 days
thereafter, notify Sebedo Lopez in writing that it has
done so and that it will not use the unlawful discharge
against him in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 27, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1006
all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by Shaw Stone and Web-
ster Construction, Inc., if willing, at all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Shaw Stone
and Webster Construction, Inc. to terminate the employ-
ment of Sebedeo Lopez, or any other employee, for fail-
ing to pay union dues and fees pursuant to a union-
security clause without first advising them of the amount
of the dues delinquency (showing the calculation), and
affording them a reasonable opportunity to pay the
amount owed.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of this Order,
notify Shaw Stone and Webster Construction, Inc. and
Sebedeo Lopez, in writing, that we withdraw and rescind
our request for Lopez’ discharge, and that we have no
objection to his reinstatement without any loss of senior-
ity or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed by
him.
WE WILL make Sebedeo Lopez whole for any loss of
pay and other benefits resulting from his discharge, with
interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files, and ask Shaw Stone and Webster
Construction, Inc. to remove from its files, any reference
to the unlawful discharge of Sebedeo Lopez and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that
we have done so and that we will not use the unlawful
discharge against him in any way.
LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH
AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 578
Renée C. Barker, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Terrance A. Johnson, Esq., of Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on January 22,
2008, pursuant to a complaint and notice of hearing issued by
the Regional Director for Region 27 of the National Labor Re-
lations Board (the Board) on May 31, 2007. The complaint is
based on a charge, Case 27–CB–4935 filed by Mr. Sebedeo
Lopez, an individual (the Charging Party), against Laborers
International Union of North America, Local Union 578 (the
Respondent or the Union) on March 28, 2007.
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges, and the
answer as amended at the hearing denies, inter alia, that the
Respondent in November 2006 demanded and on November
14, 2006, wrongfully caused Shaw Stone and Webster Con-
struction, Inc. (the Employer) to discharge its Pueblo, Colorado
based employee, Mr. Sebedeo Lopez, in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act).
FINDINGS OF FACT
On the entire record herein, including helpful briefs from the
Respondent and the General Counsel, I make the following
findings of fact.1
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, Shaw Stone and Webster Construction,
Inc. has been a corporation with an office and place of business
in Stoughton, Massachusetts, engaged in the construction of a
coal-fired power plant in Pueblo, Colorado (the Pueblo, Colo-
rado jobsite). During the 12 months preceding the date of issu-
ance of the complaint, the Employer, in the course and conduct
of its work on the Pueblo, Colorado jobsite, purchased and
received at the Pueblo, Colorado jobsite, goods valued in ex-
cess of $ 50,000 directly from points outside the state of Colo-
rado.
Based on the above, there is no dispute and I find the Em-
ployer is, and has been at all times material, an employer en-

1 As a result of the pleadings, as amended, and the stipulations of
counsel at the trial, there were few disputes of fact regarding collateral
matters. Where not otherwise noted, the findings herein are based on
the pleadings, the stipulations of counsel, or unchallenged credible
evidence.
LABORERS LOCAL 578 (SHAW STONE & WEBSTER CONSTRUCTION) 1007
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The pleadings establish, there is no dispute, and I find the
Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Union represents employees in Colorado. The Union’s
business manager since June 2007, business agent and field
Representative in November 2006, and secretary/treasurer at all
relevant times, was Mr. Eufracio “Rudy” Ortiz. Its main office
secretary/office manager, who was hired in June 2006, was Ms.
Patricia Martinez. The Union’s shop steward at relevant times
at the Pueblo, Colorado jobsite was Mr. Dave Lucero. The
Employer’s Pueblo, Colorado jobsite general forman at relevant
times was Mr. Randy Espinoza.
Since on or around March 3, 2006, by virtue of Section 9(a)
of the Act, the Respondent has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the following employees of the
Employer (the unit):
All laborers, journeymen laborers and apprentice laborers
working for the Employer at its construction project in
Pueblo, Colorado.
At all material times since on or about March 3, 2006, the
Respondent and the Employer have maintained and enforced a
collective-bargaining agreement covering the unit that incorpo-
rates or otherwise adopts the Colorado Statewide Laborers
Heavy Highway Construction Agreement and contains the fol-
lowing provision, called the union-security provision:
All [the] Employer’s employees shall, as a condition of em-
ployment with Employer, become members of [the] Respon-
dent within eight (8) days of the date of the collective bargain-
ing agreement and all employees hired after that date shall, as
a condition of employment with [the] Employer, become
members of [the] Respondent within eight (8) days of the
commencement of their employment.
The Union has its main offices in Colorado Springs, Colo-
rado, and a part-time office in Pueblo, Colorado. It has at all
relevant times operated a dispatch hall in its main office provid-
ing unit employees to requesting signatory employers, includ-
ing the Employer.
Mr. Sebedeo Lopez is a resident of Pueblo, Colorado, and
has registered with the Union’s hiring hall from time-to-time
seeking employment. On June 9, 2005, as part of the registra-
tion process for the hiring hall, Mr. Lopez signed two docu-
ments provided by the Union: a general information sheet for
construction members and a membership application. The
construction member information sheet stated in part [Emphasis
in original].:
CONSTRUCTION MEMBER
INITIATION FEES
The initiation fee is $344.00. $44.00 is paid now for the regis-
tration fee to get on the out-of-work-list. $300 is paid after
employment, in installments of $100.00 per week for 3
weeks. . . . All payments are your responsibility. . . .
QUARTERLY DUES
One month of dues is waived while payments are made for
the initiation fees. Dues are usually paid in quarterly pay-
ments of $87.00 (or $29.00 per month) Suspension will occur
in two months and one day. A $25.00 penalty will be as-
sessed to reinstate.
* * * *
CHANGE OF ADDRESS
You have to keep us informed of your current address and
telephone number. This is for insurance purposes and bene-
fits claims. This will be your responsibility.
The membership application provided designated spaces to
enter the applicant’s name and address as well as his or her
signature. Mr. Lopez filled out, signed, and submitted his ap-
plication on June 9, 2005, providing the same home address he
entered on the March 28, 2007 charge in the instant case. The
application in its printed portion stated in part:
[I] understand that if I am over two (2) months in arrears with
the payment of my monthly membership dues I will be sus-
pended on the first day of the third month without notice. Ini-
tiations not completed within 30 days are to be automatically
cancelled and all monies forfeited.
Mr. Lopez testified that he signed the forms which were
placed in evidence although he did not recall receiving copies
of the forms. He also testified he had been given copies of the
documents to sign other times he registered for dispatch with-
out being given a copy of any document. Mr. Ortiz testified that
at all relevant times the Union has had all nonmember hiring
hall registrants fill out these two forms on each occasion of
their registration on the out-of-work list.
Mr. Lopez received a dispatch from the union hiring hall to a
Unit position at the Employer’s Pueblo, Colorado jobsite. His
dispatch slip is dated July 14, 2006, and bears his signature.
The multicopy form has copies for the employee, the Employer,
the Union, and the trust fund. The form states in part:
I understand that I have the right to be or remain a non-
member of the union, but still must pay a regular fee to the
District Council. I also understand that I have the right to ob-
ject to paying for union activities that are not germane to the
union’s duties as bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in
fees, that I have the right to receive information to enable me
to decide whether to object and to be informed of internal un-
ion procedures for filing objections.
There was no evidence offered nor argument made at the hear-
ing or on brief that Mr. Lopez sought either to remain a non-
member, sought a reduction in union dues or sought informa-
tion relevant to dues reduction.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1008
B. Events
As noted, Mr. Lopez was dispatched by the Union to the
Employer’s Pueblo, Colorado jobsite on July 14, 2006, to
commence work as a unit employee on July 17, 2006. He
started work at the Pueblo, Colorado jobsite on that date as a
unit employee and continued his employment in the normal
course without apparent incident into October 2006. During
that period he had not contacted the Union about, nor submitted
any payments to the Union towards, his union initiation fee or
union membership dues obligation.
In early October 2006, the Union in reviewing its records
discovered that Mr. Lopez had not made any payments on his
union-security obligation. Mr. Ortiz testified that, consistent
with the Union’s regular practice of sending a letter to repre-
sented employees working under contracts with union-security
clauses who were in arrears of their financial obligation to the
Union, the Union sent the following letter to Mr. Lopez at
home at the address he had provided.
The letter stated:
October 12, 2006
Stone & Webster
Dear Madams/Sirs:
In accordance with our collective bargaining agreement as it
pertains to Union Membership, we are requesting the dis-
missal of:
SEBEDO LOPEZ SS# [omitted for privacy purposes]
for failure to comply with the contract. In order to assure
good standings it would require immediate payment to our
office of:
$120.00 (Late Dues)
$ 25.00 (Reinstatement fees)
Mr. Lopez is currently not a member in the Laborers In-
ternational Union.
Mr. Lopez will need a referral from our office to continue on
the job or we can provide a laborer to replace this employee.
May we advise that as provided in our agreement, we are pre-
pared to dispatch to your job a qualified replacement for the
employee to be replaced at the end of the current workday.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Rudy Ortiz
Secretary/Treasurer
Laborers Local #578
Ms. Martinez testified that she prepared and printed the let-
ter, as she did with other represented employees in similar cir-
cumstances, using a template resident in her computer which
she customized as appropriate. She testified she then placed the
letter in an envelope she hand addressed obtaining Mr. Lopez’
address from the Unions records—all consistent with the Un-
ion’s regular practice. She testified that she franked the enve-
lope and sent the letter by post only to Mr. Lopez’ home and
not to the Employer.
The General Counsel however introduced a portion of Ms.
Martinez’ investigative affidavit which states in part:
At that time I called [the Employer], I had no idea that Sebe-
deo Lopez was late on paying his dues. After I got the list I
checked all the members and typed up letters and sent them
out to plenty of Shaw employees who were late. I first faxed
them to the company on or around October 12th. I spoke to
Darlene at Shaw and she said she would disperse. I didn’t
send that batch of letters to the members at home, but my
practice right now is to mail it to their home so they have the
opportunity to make arrangements with Rudy.
Mr. Lopez testified he never received the letter. Ms. Martinez
testified that the letter to Mr. Lopez was never returned by the
USPS to the Union as undeliverable.
Mr. Ortiz testified that the Union notified the Employer’s
jobsite union steward, Dave Lucero, that the letter had been
sent to Mr. Lopez and that “he needed to tell [Mr. Lopez] he
needed to come in and pay dues.” Mr. Lucero did not testify in
the proceeding. Mr. Lopez denied any conversation with Mr.
Lucero at that time concerning his union-security obligation.
When the Union noted in late October that Mr. Lopez had
still not made any payments to the Union nor contacted them
respecting union-security payments, the Union prepared an-
other letter dated November 1, 2006. That letter was given by
the Union to its job steward, Lucero, by Mr. Ortiz for service
on Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Lopez testified that he was at work on November 1,
2006, when he met with Union Secretary Treasurer Rudy Ortiz
and Job Steward Dave Lucero. Mr. Lucero gave Mr. Lopez a
letter on union letterhead which stated [emphasis in original]:
November 1, 2006
Shaw Construction
Dear Madams/Sirs:
In accordance with our collective bargaining agreement as it
pertains to Union Membership, we are requesting the dis-
missal of:
SEBEDO LOPEZ SS# [omitted]
for failure to comply with the contract. In order to assure
good standings it would require immediate payment to our
office of:
$415 (Initiation Fee, and Dues)
Mr. Lopez is currently not a member in the Laborers In-
ternational Union.
Mr. Lopez will need a referral from our office to continue on
the job or we can provide a laborer to replace this employee
right away.
May we advise that as provided in our agreement, we are pre-
pared to dispatch to your job a qualified replacement for the
employee to be replaced at the end of the current workday.
LABORERS LOCAL 578 (SHAW STONE & WEBSTER CONSTRUCTION) 1009
Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Rudy Ortiz
Secretary/Treasurer
Laborers Local #578
The parties stipulated that a copy of the letter was also provided
the Employer on the same date. The Union also asserted that a
copy had been sent to Mr. Lopez’ home.
Mr. Lopez testified respecting the substance of his conversa-
tion with Union Steward Mr. Lucero:
Mr. Lucero advised me that I had to pay this money here and
to go ahead and do it as soon as possible, and if we had any
problems as far as the money, it was quite a bit of money,
[$]415, to call Patty [Martinez, the secretary at the Union of-
fices in Pueblo, Colorado] and make arrangements.
During the conversation, Mr. Lopez testified that Mr. Ortiz did
not say anything and Mr. Lucero said essentially nothing else.
More specifically Mr. Lopez denied Lucero made any state-
ments about the precise amount he owed, the dates he owed the
money for, the method of computation of the amount due, the
deadline to pay the money, or what would happen to him if he
did not pay the money.
Mr. Ortiz did not testify to a person-to-person conversation
with Mr. Lopez that day. Rather he testified that on that day he
spoke with Mr. Lopez by telephone when Mr. Lopez called him
at the Union’s main office on Steward Dave Lucero’s cell
phone. Mr. Ortiz testified:
So you spoke with Mr. Lopez on Dave’s cell phone?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he call you or did you call him?
A. Actually Dave [Lucero] called the hall.
Q. Okay. And then describe that conversation.
A. Okay. And that’s when he explained to him, you
know, you’ve already been—he was there since July, he
hasn’t paid anything. We told him the best we could do is
probably 150 this week, 150 next week. If not, I’ll have to
have you removed. And he said that’s fine and he never
came in and paid anything.
Mr. Ortiz also testified to a slightly different version of events:
[Mr. Lopez] called in, I think it was either on Dave [Lucero]’s
cell phone or [the Employer’s General Forman] Randy
Espinoza’s, and we told him—he says well he was going
through some bad times, but we told him well what we can do
is you pay 150 this week, 150 next week, and then if not then
I’ll have no choice but to have you removed from the job.
The General Counsel placed in evidence a portion of an affi-
davit provided by Mr. Ortiz during the course of the investiga-
tion of the charge in the instant case which asserted that he had
neither talked to nor made an agreement with Mr. Lopez re-
specting a schedule for payment of his arrearages. Mr. Ortiz
testified however, that his affidavit was in error and a post affi-
davit review of the events refreshed his memory of his conver-
sation with Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Lopez denied that the described telephone conversation
ever took place. He further testified however that he tele-
phoned Ms. Martinez from Pueblo sometime between Novem-
ber 1st and 5th and told her he had $200 he was going to send
her and that she said “OK” without there being any more said
between them in the conversation. Mr. Lopez specifically de-
nied that Ms. Martinez made any statements about the precise
amount he owed, the dates he owed the money for, the method
of computation of the amount due, the deadline to pay the
money, or what would happen to him if he did not pay the
money. Ms. Martinez did not testify respecting any conversa-
tions she had or did not have with Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Lopez testified he purchased a money order on Friday,
November 10, 2006, with a face value of $200. The nonnego-
tiable stub of the money order, dated November 10, 2006, was
placed in evidence. He testified he worked at the jobsite for a
half day on Monday, November 13, 2006, at which time, suf-
fering from a cold, he left work and went to the emergency
room in a local health care institution. While there he testified
he called Ms. Martinez at the Union’s main office. He testified:
I told her that I had a money order for $200 and that
once I went out of the emergency room I was going to go
out to [Colorado] Springs to take it.
Q. Was anything else said during the conversation?
A. Yeah. At that point she told me that I didn’t have
to go all the way to Colorado Springs, that Rudy Ortiz was
in the office there in Pueblo, that I could just run down
there and take it to him, and that was the end of that part of
the conversation.
Mr. Lopez again specifically denied that Ms. Martinez made
any statements in this conversation about the precise amount he
owed, the dates he owed the money for, the method of compu-
tation of the amount due, the deadline to pay the money, or
what would happen to him if he did not pay the money. Ms.
Martinez did not testify respecting her conversations with Mr.
Lopez.
Mr. Lopez testified he left the hospital and went to the Un-
ion’s Pueblo office in the early afternoon but found it locked
and apparently unstaffed. He again called Ms. Martinez. He
testified:
So at that point I called Patty again and asked her that
Rudy wasn’t there, and at that point she informed me to go
ahead and fill out the money order and throw it in the slot
in the door, which I did. I filled out the--I asked her at that
time that if I just signed it also on the back, and she said
no but to go ahead put the initials N-I-N-I-P[2] on the
front, and so I did, and I dropped it in the slot.
Q. Did you have any discussion on when you would
pay the rest of the money?
A. Yeah. The discussion that we had made is that I
had asked her to give it till Friday, [November 17, 2006]
and she said no, I’m not going to give it till Friday, you’ve
got to pay Thursday, [November 16, 2006]. So I did pay
the remainder of the money on Thursday.

2 The money order stub in evidence bears the handwritten notation:
INIP.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1010
Mr. Lopez again specifically denied that Ms. Martinez made
any statements in the telephone call about the precise amount
he owed, the dates he owed the money for, the method of com-
putation of the amount due, the deadline to pay the money, or
what would happen to him if he did not pay the money.
Mr. Ortiz testified to his subsequent actions relevant to Mr.
Lopez:
Q. Did you ever make an arrangement to meet
Mr. Lopez at the Pueblo office?
A. On that Friday, I think it was the 10th [of Novem-
ber, 2006], he was supposed to go in. I was going to be
there from three to five. He never showed up. I called
Patty and told him [sic] he’s not here. Come Monday
again I called and I talked to Dave [Lucero] and Randy
Espinoza. And I told Randy, you need to have him come
in tonight. I’ll be here from three to five. If he doesn’t
pay, I’m going hunting and I won’t be here for the rest of
the week. He has to come in and pay or he’ll have to be
walked off the job.
Q. So what—you waited at the Pueblo office on Mon-
day. You got there at three o’clock?
A. Monday [November 13, 2006] I was there from ac-
tually I think I was there about 2:30, because I called Patty
when I got there and I told her, okay I’m here already and
I’ll be here until five o’clock. Again, about five minutes
till five, nobody showed up. I called her and I said hey he
hasn’t sent a payment. So I left. I came back about seven
o’clock, because I had some computer stuff I had to do be-
fore I went on vacation, and just to make sure nothing was
dropped in the mail slot or anything like that, and there
was no mail, no nothing. So, and then I left about eight
o’clock, so I was there about an hour.
Mr. Ortiz’ described conversation with Steward Lucero and
General Foreman Espinoza in which he directed them to “have
[Lopez] come in tonight” was not addressed by either
Mr. Lucero or Mr. Espinoza neither of whom testified. Mr.
Lopez denied he spoke with either or both of them as described.
Thus, there was no direct evidence that either or both did in fact
have contact or a conversation with Mr. Lopez on that occa-
sion.
On Tuesday, November 14, 2006, Mr. Ortiz telephoned the
Employer’s General Forman Espinoza and instructed him to
fire Mr. Lopez. Mr. Lopez went to work that same day but
after a few hours on the job was called into the office. Mr.
Lopez testified:
And Mr. Lucero and Mr. Espinoza were there. And
Mr. Espinoza is the general foreman and he advised me at that
point that he was going to have to walk me off the job be-
cause he had strict orders from Rudy Ortiz to walk me off the
job and because of my union dues.
Mr. Lopez was terminated by the Employer that day, Tuesday,
November 14, 2006.
Mr. Lopez testified that on Thursday, November 16, 2006,
he paid the Union the remainder of his then arrears, i.e. $215,
which was the remainder of the total of the November 1, 2006
letter’s designated sum of $415, from which $200 had been
paid by Mr. Lopez as described in Mr. Lopez’ version of events
on Monday, November 13, 2006. Mr. Ortiz testified to Mr.
Lopez’ subsequent circumstances:
Q. Did—when was Mr. Lopez reinstated to go back to
work, if ever, at Shaw, Stone and Webster?
A. Well, he—once he paid his initiation fee, which
I’m not sure the date of that was.
Q. Just approximate is fine.
A. Probably—well, I was gone for a week, so proba-
bly the next week I’m thinking.
Q. So he went back to work?
A. He went back to work I think three weeks later af-
ter—
Mr. Lopez thereafter returned to work for the Employer in the
unit and as of the time of the hearing was both a unit employee
of the Employer and a member of the Union in good standing.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The General Counsel’s complaint
The essence of the General Counsel’s unfair labor practice
allegations are set forth in paragraphs 63 through 8 of the com-
plaint:
6.
(b) On or about November 1, 2006, Respondent, by
letter to the Employer, demanded the termination of Sabe-
deo Lopez, an employee of the Employer.
(c) On or about November 14, 2006, Respondent, by
its Business Agent Eufracio Ortiz, demanded that the Em-
ployer terminate Sabedeo Lopez, an employee of the Em-
ployer.
(d) By the conduct described in paragraph 6(b), Re-
spondent attempted to cause the Employer to terminate
Sabedeo Lopez, an employee of the Employer.
(e) By the conduct described in paragraphs 6(b)–(c),
Respondent caused the Employer to terminate employee
Sabedeo Lopez, an employee of the Employer.
(f) By virtue of the relationship described in paragraph
5(a), Respondent owed Sabedeo Lopez, an employee of
the Employer, a fiduciary duty in the enforcement of the
Union-Security Provision described in paragraph 5(b).
(g) Respondent engaged in the conduct described in
paragraphs 6(b)–(c) without providing Sabedeo Lopez, an
employee of the Employer, with notice of the following:
i. a statement of the precise amount and corresponding
dates of his arrearage;
ii. the method Respondent used to compute his arrear
age;
iii. a reasonable deadline for payment of his arrearage;
and
iv. the consequences of nonpayment of his arrearage.
(h) By the actions described in paragraphs 6(b) and
6(c), without providing the notice described in paragraph

3 Complaint par. 6(a) and the references to that paragraph throughout
the complaint were withdrawn by the General Counsel.
LABORERS LOCAL 578 (SHAW STONE & WEBSTER CONSTRUCTION) 1011
6(g), Respondent breached the fiduciary duty described in
paragraph 6(f).
7.
By the conduct described in [complaint] paragraphs
6(b)–(c), Respondent has been restraining and coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A)[4] of the Act.
8.
By the conduct described in paragraphs 6(b)–(c), Re-
spondent has been attempting to cause and, by the conduct
described in paragraph 6(c) did cause, an employer to dis-
criminate against its employee in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act in violation of Section 8(b)(2)[5] of the
Act.
2. The 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) allegations concerning the No-
vember 14, 2006 union demand of the Employer to discharge
Mr. Lopez and his discharge
a. The basic law of a Union’s duty to represented employees
regarding union security
The law applicable to a Union’s obligations to represented
employees in the context of seeking or obtaining an employee’s
discharge for failure to meet union-security obligations are
longstanding and not under challenge in the instant proceeding.
The Board’s fountainhead case on the issue is Hotel & Res-
taurant Employees Local 568 (Philadelphia Sheraton Corp.),
136 NLRB 888 (1962), enfd. 320 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1963),
holding that a union seeking to enforce a union-security provi-
sion against a represented employee has a fiduciary duty to deal
fairly with the individual.
The Board held in Teamsters Local 150 (Delta Lines), 242
NLRB 454, 454–455 (1979).
The General Counsel alleged that Respondent’s conduct in
securing [the employee]’s discharge violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(b)(2) of the Act because Respondent
did not afford [the employee] a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the contractual union-security provisions, and
did not inform [the employee] of the amount he owed, the
method used to compute the amount, and the manner in which
he could satisfy his obligation before it sought his discharge.3
_________________________

4 Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents—(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, that this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its
own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein; . . . .
5 Sec. 8(b)(2) of the Act states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents—(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or
to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom mem-
bership in such organization has been denied or terminated on
some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership; . . . .
3 The Board has long held that these obligations must be satis-
fied before a discharge may be sought for failing to comply
with the contractual union- security provisions of a collective-
bargaining agreement. See Teamsters Local Union No. 122,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America (August A. Busch & Co. of
Mass., Inc.) , 203 NLRB 1041 (1973).
And, in Coopers NIU (Blue Grass), 299 NLRB 720, 723
(1990), the Board was more specific:
[W]hen a union seeks to enforce the union-security provision
of a contract against unit employees, it has a fiduciary duty to
fully inform the employee of his dues obligation before taking
any action to effect his discharge. Specifically, the Union has
to give the employee, at minimum, reasonable notice of the
delinquency, including a statement of the precise amount and
months for which dues are owed and of the method used to
compute this amount, tell the employee when to make the re-
quired payment, and explain to the employee that failure to
pay will result in discharge.
b. Narrowing the issues
There is no doubt that by November 2006, Mr. Lopez was
obligated by the terms of a valid union-security clause to pay
dues and initiation fees to the Union arising from his dispatch
and employment by the Employer in the unit from July 17,
2006. There is also no doubt that the Union on November 14,
2006, caused the discharge of Mr. Lopez from his employment
with the Employer under a claim of Mr. Lopez’ failure to fulfill
his union-security obligations. The heart of the instant case,
then, is whether or not the Union met its procedural obligations
under the case law precedent to the Union seeking and causing
Mr. Lopez’ discharge.
c. Resolution of conflicting evidence respecting what union
communications Mr. Lopez received and where and when he
paid his arrearages
The record evidence respecting what and when the Union
communicated with Mr. Lopez respecting union-security obli-
gations and where and when he paid his arrears is relatively
short and may be briefly listed and the conflicts considered and
resolved.
First, the Union provided all hiring hall registrants, including
Mr. Lopez in June 2005 and in the spring 2006, with a written
specification of the amount of its initiation fees and monthly
dues: initiation fee payment after employment of $300 and
monthly dues of $29 per month. The notices received also
made it clear that arrearages of dues beyond 2 months may
result in suspensions of membership, forfeiture of prior pay-
ments, and financial penalties.
The October 12, 2006 letter quoted supra was not sent to the
Employer. Mr. Lopez denied he received it. The totality of the
evidence respecting it being sent was the testimony by Mr.
Ortiz and Ms. Martinez who testified that the letter was pre-
pared, placed in a hand addressed and franked business enve-
lope with the Union’s return address on it, picked up by the
USPS, and was not thereafter returned by the USPS to the Un-
ion’s offices. Other letters to represented employees prepared
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1012
and sent in October and December 2006, in the same manner
by the Union, were received by those employees.
As the Respondent notes on brief, union notice to an em-
ployee in this context means actual notice. Local 545, Operat-
ing Engineers (Joseph Saraceno & Sons, Inc.), 161 NLRB
1114, 1121 (1966). Where, as here, the purported receiver of a
first class letter credibly denied its receipt and the only evi-
dence offered in opposition is limited to the preparation of the
letter, the placing of the letter in the envelope, the franking of
the envelope, the fact that the letter was picked up by the
USPS, and its subsequent nonreturn to the sender, proof of
actual notice has not been sustained. I find on this record, in-
cluding my conclusion that Mr. Lopez was honestly attempting
to testify to his recollection of events, that the letter was never
delivered. I also find Ms. Martinez and Mr. Ortiz honestly
testified to their recollection of events. No witness in this pro-
ceeding, in my view, was prevaricating. But here the events in
question offered by the two do not directly contradict Mr. Lo-
pez’ claim of never having received the letter at his home.
Mr. Ortiz testified that at about the time this letter was sent,
“we,” presumably meaning the Union without specific refer-
ence to a particular individual, told jobsite Steward Lucero
“that we sent Mr. Lopez a letter and that Mr. Lucero
needed to tell Mr. Lopez he needed to come in and pay
dues.” Since Mr. Lopez denied talking with Mr. Lucero and
Mr. Lucero did not testify, there is no evidence that such a con-
versation took place. I specifically find that the implied Lopez-
Lucero conversation did not occur.
The November 1, 2006 letter quoted, supra, was indisputably
given by the Union to both the Employer and to Mr. Lopez on
November 1, 2006. The letter by its terms and caption is di-
rected to the Employer and indicates Mr. Lopez’ dismissal is
being sought for a failure to pay a union-security obligation of
“$415 (initiation fee, and dues).” The only evidence of a con-
versation taking place at the time the letter was handed to Mr.
Lopez was the testimony of Mr. Lopez that Steward Lucero
told him he had to pay the money, i.e. the letter’s recited $415,
and to call Ms. Martinez to make arrangements. I find the con-
versation took place as testified to by Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Ortiz testified to a telephonic conversation that same
day, November 1, 2006, with Mr. Lopez, which conversation
Mr. Lopez denies, in which Mr. Ortiz or perhaps Mr. Lucero—
the testimony is not crystal clear—told Lopez: “He was there
since July, he hasn’t paid anything. We told him the best we
could do is probably 150 this week, 150 next week. If not, I’ll
have to have you removed.” Mr. Lopez denied this conversa-
tion ever took place. Since the November 1, 2006 letter seeks
$415, and since Mr. Lopez testified to conversations with
Ms. Martinez, which she did not deny, respecting that larger
amount, I find that the conversation between Mr. Ortiz and Mr.
Lopez did not take place. While Mr. Ortiz seemed to me,
throughout his testimony, to be trying to recall the events in
question, it was clear to me his memory was not crystal clear,6

6 Mr. Ortiz in his testimony often conflated things he may have done
or that other union agents may have done or should have done, some-
times using the generic plural “we” to identify the union actor in a
particular event. This lack of clarity or precision undermined my con-
he had many conversations of this type with employees behind
in their dues obligation during the course of his work. In the
context of these events and given his other testimony, his affi-
davit and the record as a whole, and despite the fact that I found
him to be an honest witness, I find that he was simply mistaken
as to the identity of the person with whom he spoke on that
occasion.
As noted above, Mr. Lopez testified to telephone conversa-
tions with Ms. Martinez in which he initially told her on No-
vember 13, 2006, that he had a money order for $200. Delivery
of the money order was discussed. Subsequently, on the same
day, Ms. Martinez told Mr. Lopez to pay the balance of $215
by Thursday, November 16, 2006—2 days later. Since Ms.
Martinez did not deny these conversations, which had been
testified to Mr. Lopez before Ms. Martinez testified, I find that
they occurred as testified to by Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Ortiz testified that on November 13, 2006, he directed
Steward Lucero and General Foreman Espinoza to have Mr.
Lopez “come in tonight,” but since neither Mr. Lucero nor
Mr. Espinoza testified and since Mr. Lopez testified that no
such conversation with them occurred, there is no direct evi-
dence such a conversation took place. I specifically find that the
implied Lopez-Espinoza-Lucero conversation did not occur.
No other communications between agents of the Union and
Mr. Lopez prior to his termination are evident on this record.
There is confusion and ambiguity in the record respecting
when Mr. Lopez paid his arrearages. Mr. Lopez testified, as set
forth in greater detail, supra, that at the instruction of Ms. Mar-
tinez, he dropped his first payment, a $200 money order, into
the mail slot of the then closed Pueblo union office on the af-
ternoon of November 13, 2006, and paid the remainder of his
obligation—$215—at the union office on November 15, 2006,
within the time limits given him by Ms. Martinez.
This version of events is supported by the fact that Mr. Lo-
pez had the stub of a $200 money order purchased on Novem-
ber 10, 2006, and that the stub was marked with the unusual
lettering he testified Ms. Martinez instructed him to put on the
money order. It is also supported by the fact that Mr. Ortiz
testified that he had conversations with Ms. Martinez respecting
Mr. Lopez’ delivery of funds to the Pueblo office. And, impor-
tantly, Ms. Martinez did not testify respecting the conversations
and actions attributed to her by Mr. Lopez.
Mr. Ortiz testified that Mr. Lopez was to drop off funds on
November 10 and 13, 2006, and that he did not do so at least
before 8 p.m. on November 13, 2006, at which time Mr. Ortiz
left the office. Mr. Ortiz further testified that, although he was
not sure of the date and was in fact guessing, Mr. Lopez did not
finally pay his arrearages until the week of November 27, 2006.
The testimony of Messrs. Ortiz and Lopez concerning
whether or not a money order was dropped into the mail slot of
the Union’s Pueblo offices on November 13, 2006, are at essen-
tial variance. I have found each to have been an honest wit-
ness. How can this variance be reconciled? Initially there is

fidence in his memory of the events. This was particularly true when it
seemed Mr. Ortiz seemingly assumed that Mr. Lucerno and Ms. Marti-
nez said things to or respecting Mr. Lopez and the record contains no
direct evidence that those things occurred.
LABORERS LOCAL 578 (SHAW STONE & WEBSTER CONSTRUCTION) 1013
the possibility that the money order was dropped into the mail
slot by Mr. Lopez and somehow lost or misplaced, i.e. fell out
of sight or simply was not discovered by Mr. Ortiz. It is possi-
ble that the money order was picked up by another or misdeliv-
ered by Mr. Lopez to the wrong building or office. This is all
pure speculation. Mr. Lopez or Mr. Ortiz may simply be wrong.
The matter may not be resolved with certainty on this record.
Given all the above, and on the record as a whole, I find
that the first, directly disputed November 13, 2006, $200
money order payment and the second, indirectly disputed, No-
vember 15, 2006, $215 payment to the Union were made as
testified by Mr. Lopez. I do so for several reasons. The Union
did not produce a computer print out history of Mr. Lopez’
payments to the Union during the relevant period even though
the Union did produce such computer generated payment histo-
ries for several other represented employees payment during
the same period. And, more importantly, Ms. Martinez, who
testified at the hearing, did not testify respecting her conversa-
tions with Mr. Lopez or her handling of payments from him.
These omissions are important and justify an inference, which I
draw, that had the business records of the Union been produced
and/or had Ms. Martinez testified regarding her conversations
with Mr. Lopez or her handling of payments from him, this
evidence would have supported Mr. Lopez version of events.
d. Did the Union provide sufficient information to Mr. Lopez
prior to seeking and obtaining his termination?
Considering the events and findings made above, it is clear
that the Union at no relevant time after Mr. Lopez received the
November 1, 2006 letter provided him an explanation of the
amount set forth in the November 1, 2006 letter as due, i.e.,
“$415 (initiation fee, and dues).” The requirement of the cases
cited, including Coopers NIU (Blue Grass), 299 NLRB 720,
723 (1990):
Specifically, the Union has to give the employee, at mini-
mum, reasonable notice of the delinquency, including a state-
ment of the precise amount and months for which dues are
owed and of the method used to compute this amount. . . .
I find therefore—and this is not dependent on resolution of
conflicting evidence but rather turns on undisputed record evi-
dence—that the Union did not meet the fiduciary requirement
that it provide the necessary explanation of the means of calcu-
lation of Mr. Lopez arrearages beyond the naked sum set forth
in the November 1, 2006 letter simply as owed. The earlier
information provided in the materials given dues applicants and
hiring hall registrants, quoted supra, citing the monthly
amounts of dues and the amount of initiation fees is insufficient
to satisfy this requirement.
The above cited cases, augmented by the General Counsel’s
additional cited authority: Carpenters, Local 296 (Acrom Con-
struction Service, Inc.), 305 NLRB 822 (1991), and Operating
Engineers Local 542C (Ransome Lift), 303 NLRB 1001 (1991),
and others, also require that the represented employee be af-
forded by the Union a reasonable opportunity to pay his or her
arrearages before discharge is sought or obtained.
The resolution of this portion of the Government’s case de-
pends on resolution of the issues of what Mr. Lopez was told
about his payment and when Mr. Lopez made his arrearages
payments. These factual questions have been discussed in detail
in the proceeding sections of this decision. I have found that
Ms. Martinez orally told Mr. Lopez by November 13, 2006,
that he had to pay $200 that day and $215 by November 15,
2006. I have found further that Mr. Lopez in fact did make
payments within Ms. Martinez’ deadline. Therefore I further
find that the Union did not afford Mr. Lopez a reasonable op-
portunity—which I measure on this record as at least the dead-
line Ms. Martinez set forth as described above—to pay his ar-
rearages before the Union sought and obtained his discharge. It
is not reasonable for the Union to set a schedule for an em-
ployee to make required payments and then cause the discharge
of that individual when he has met or is on schedule to meet the
payment timetable given him.
e. Was Mr. Lopez a recalcitrant employee?
Counsel for the Union argues on brief at 4:
While Local 578 does not admit that it failed to meet
the requirements contained in Philadelphia Sheraton, even
if it had not met those requirements:
The protections provided in Philadelphia Sheraton were
never intended to be so rigidly applied as to permit a recalci-
trant employee to profit from his own dereliction in comply-
ing with his obligations through ignorance or inadvertence,
but will do so only as a matter of conscious choice. Produce
Workers Local 630 (Ralph’s Green Grocery), 209 NLRB
117, 124 (1974).
And counsel for the Union further quotes Western Publishing
Co., 263 NLRB 1110, 1113 (1982):
[W]hen it is shown that an employee willfully and deliber-
ately sought to evade his union-security obligations, the Board
will excuse a union’s failure to fully comply with the notice
requirements [footnotes omitted].
The Respondent argues that Mr. Lopez failed to pay his un-
ion-security obligations despite knowing they existed even
before he was dispatched to the workplace. Thus, argues coun-
sel for the Union, Mr. Lopez’ charges and the complaint allega-
tions based on them should be dismissed for that reason irre-
spective of the Union’s conduct herein.
The General Counsel recognizes the Board’s decisional un-
derpinnings creating the Respondent’s “free rider” affirmative
defense to allegations of Union mishandling of a union security
discharge, but argues that the facts of the instant case do not
support its application herein. Counsel for the General Counsel
notes the Board’s admonition in Grassetto USA Construction,
Inc., 313 NLRB 674, 677 (1994):
The Board has held that negligence or inattention on the part
of the employee will not relieve the union of its fiduciary ob-
ligation. The union must show that an employee willfully and
deliberately attempted to avoid union-security obligations be-
fore the Board will excuse the union’s failure to fully comply
with the notice requirements.
The record, even if the details are contradictory and disputed
as to time and the content of the conversations, is clear that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1014
when Mr. Lopez received the November 1, 2006 letter he was
quickly in contact with the Union’s agent to arrange payment.
The Respondent argues that Mr. Lopez took no action to fulfill
his obligations after his receipt of the October 12 letter. On this
record however, I have ruled supra that I cannot find he in fact
received the October 12 letter.
There was a dispute respecting whether or not Mr. Lopez
spoke about paying his arrearages on November 1, to Mr. Ortiz
or rather spoke a few days later to Ms. Martinez. I have found
supra on this record that Mr. Lopez spoke only to Ms. Martinez
and made payments as he was directed. I therefore specifically
find Mr. Lopez may not be considered to have “willfully and
deliberately attempted to avoid his union-security obliga-
tions.”
There was also a dispute respecting when Mr. Lopez made
payments to the Union. I have found supra that Mr. Lopez
dropped off an initial $200 payment at the Union’s Pueblo,
Colorado offices on Monday, November 13, 2006, and paid the
remainder of his obligation—$215—on Thursday, November
16, 2006. Ms. Martinez testified, but did not address his testi-
mony in these regards. This being so, I find Mr. Lopez was not
willfully or deliberately attempting to avoid his union-security
obligations during the events in contest after he received his
first communication from the Union concerning them on No-
vember 1, 2006.
Having found Mr. Lopez at relevant times was not a “free
rider” who was deliberately attempting to avoid his union-
security obligations, I reject the Union’s affirmative defense
that Mr. Lopez claims to relief in consequence of his discharge
must be rejected for that reason.
f. Summary and conclusions regarding the November 14, 2006
union request to discharge Mr. Lopez
I have found supra that the Union on November 14, 2006, at-
tempted to cause and, in fact, caused the Employer to discharge
Mr. Lopez for a failure to fulfill his union-security obligation
and that the Union did so in a manner inconsistent with its fidu-
ciary obligation to represented employees respecting union-
security discharge issues. As discussed above, this conduct is a
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act and I so find,
sustaining the General Counsel’s complaint in this regard.
3. The 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) allegations respecting the
November 1, 2006 letter
The General Counsel alleges in the complaint that the Union
attempted to cause the Employer to discharge Mr. Lopez by
providing the Employer with the November 1, 2006 letter
quoted in its entirety, supra. Given the analysis and conclusion,
supra, that the Union’s November 14, 2006 demand that the
Employer discharge Mr. Lopez violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and
(2) of the Act and given the fact that the November 1, 2006
letter by its terms seeks the immediate discharge of Mr. Lopez,
it would seem that the letter also violates the same provisions of
the Act. However because of the unusual factual context of the
letter, further consideration of the issue is warranted.
The record establishes that the Union as a common practice
provided letters to the Employer of the type at issue here re-
specting union-security obligation arrearages of unit employ-
ees. It seems that the Union did so not, in fact, to obtain the
employees’ immediate discharge but rather sent the letter to
both employee and Employer to stimulate—often success-
fully—represented employee to take immediate action to make
necessary payments of union-security arrearages thus avoiding
what the employee might reasonably fear was the Employer’s
consideration of terminating the employee. The record sug-
gests the Union’s letters were not intended by the Union and,
importantly, apparently not taken by the Employer to be a true
immediate discharge request. Thus, when the Union actually
sought Mr. Lopez’ termination some 2 weeks after the letter
issued, an additional direct request from the Union to the Em-
ployer was made seeking the discharge. And the record con-
tains several such letters sent to the Employer concerning other
employees who were also in arrears and who, like Mr. Lopez,
were not immediately fired. Rather in subsequent days these
other employees paid down their obligations.
These circumstances being so, I find and conclude the Union
was not, by delivering the letter to the Employer, attempting to
cause the discharge of Mr. Lopez. Therefore I further find the
General Counsel has not sustained his complaint allegation that
this conduct violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. Therefore that
portion of the complaint will be dismissed.
When Mr. Lopez got his copy of the letter on November 1,
2006, however, there is no evidence suggesting he did not be-
lieve that the Union was in fact seeking his discharge. It was
quite reasonable for an employee receiving a copy of a letter
sent by his collective-bargaining representative to his Employer
unambiguously seeking his discharge for union-security arrear-
ages to believe the letter was precisely what it appeared to be.
Since the Union had no proper right to seek Mr. Lopez’ dis-
charge on that date,7 the Union’s letters creation of apprehen-
sion on Mr. Lopez’ part that the Union was in fact doing so,
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, which section of the
Act, quoted supra, protects employees from union interference
with their Section 7 rights. Thus, as to the General Counsel’s
complaint allegation that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act by providing Mr. Lopez with the November 1, 2006
letter, I sustain that allegation of the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is, and has been at all times material, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
2. Shaw Stone and Webster Construction, Inc. is, and has
been at all relevant times an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. The Respondent represents the Employer’s employees in
the following unit, which is appropriate for bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9 of the Act:
All laborers, journeymen laborers and apprentice laborers
working for the Employer at its construction project in
Pueblo, Colorado.
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the
Act by seeking the discharge of represented employee Mr. Se-

7 At that time it had not provided Mr. Lopez with any amount of
time at all to pay his arrearages: reasonable or not.
LABORERS LOCAL 578 (SHAW STONE & WEBSTER CONSTRUCTION) 1015
bedeo Lopez for failure to tender to the Respondent Union dues
or initiation fees, without providing to him the means of calcu-
lation of his arrearages including a statement of the precise
amount and months for which dues are owed and of the method
used to compute this amount or adequately advising him of his
obligations or providing a reasonable opportunity to pay his
or her arrearages before his discharge is sought or obtained
and violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by giving Mr. Sebe-
deo Lopez a copy of a letter to the Employer seeking his dis-
charge on November 1, 2006, and creating the impression on
Mr. Lopez part that the Union was seeking his discharge at that
time.
5. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The Respondent did not otherwise violate the Act as al-
leged in the complaint and the complaint allegations not sus-
tained shall be dismissed.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent violated the Act as set
forth above, I shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and
post remedial Board notices. The evidence reflects that follow-
ing the Employer’s discharge of Mr. Lopez at the Union’s
wrongful demand, he came in a few weeks time to be redis-
patched by the Union to his former employment and was at the
time of the hearing herein an employee of the Employer in the
unit and a member in good standing in the Union. This being
so, the directed make-whole order herein will not include ele-
ments relevant to obtaining his reinstatement.
Although I have found an independent violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in the Union’s creating the impression in
the mind of represented-employee Mr. Sebedeo Lopez that it
was seeking his discharge in giving him a copy of a November
1, 2006 letter to the Employer, I find it is not necessary to pro-
vide a separate remedy for that violation of the Act as its rem-
edy is subsumed in the remedy of the other violations directed
herein.
The Union will be directed to make Mr. Lopez whole for any
loss of earnings or other benefits arising out of his loss of em-
ployment, with interest. Included in that amount will be any
costs associated with reobtaining his former position. Loss of
earnings shall be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Interest shall be com-
puted in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]