Kenai Packers

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsOct 18, 1963

144 N.L.R.B. 1122 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

1122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Kenai Salmon Packing Company d/b/a Kenai Packers and Alaska Fishermen 's Union affiliated with the Seafarers ' Inter- national Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 19-CA- 2512. October 18, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On June 5, 1963, Trial Examiner Maurice M. Miller issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter- mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers herein to a three- member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner.' 'The Recommended Order is hereby amended by substituting for the first paragraph therein, the following paragraph : Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations' Board hereby orders that Respondent, Kenai Salmon Packing Company d/b/a Kenai Packers, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed and served September 24, 1962, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board caused a complaint and notice of hearing to be issued and served upon Kenai Salmon Packing Company d/b/a Kenai Packers, herein called Respondent. The complaint was issued November 26, 1962; therein Respondent was charged with unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519. Thereafter, with an answer belatedly filed, Respondent noted a general denial with respect to every allegation of the complaint. Pursuant to notice, a hearing with respect to the issues was held at Seattle, Wash- ington, on December 11, 1962, before Trial Examiner Maurice M. Miller. The General Counsel, Respondent, and Charging Party were represented by counsel. Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. Before any testimonial 144 NLRB No. 105. KENAI PACKERS 1123 presentation began, General Counsel's motion to amend the complaint with respect to nomenclature was granted . Thereafter , Respondent 's counsel verbally admitted the correctness of the first four paragraphs of the General Counsel's complaint. When the testimonial presentations were complete , counsel for Respondent and the charging Party suggested their desire to file briefs . These have been received and duly considered. Upon the entire testimonial record, documentary evidence received, and my observation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is an Alaska corporation , with its principal place of business located in Kenai, Alaska ; Kenai is a small community located on Cook Inlet, approximately 63 airline miles from Anchorage , and 156 miles distant by road. There , Respondent is engaged in the business of packing and transporting seafood products . (Testimony reveals that the firm, likewise , maintains a Seattle office, where it transacts company business when summer seasonal operations at Kenai are not in progress .) During the 12-month period prior to the issuance of the complaint , Respondent transported and sold in interstate commerce seafood products with a value in excess of $ 1 million. Upon the complaint's jurisdictional allefiations , which are conceded to be accurate, I find that Respondent is now, and at all times material has been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act , engaged in commerce and business activities which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. With due regard for the jurisdictional standards which the Board presently applies-see Siemons Mailing Service , 122 NLRB 81, and related cases-I find asser- tion of the Board's jurisdiction in this case warranted and necessary to effectuate statutory objectives. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Alaska Fishermen 's Union , affiliated with the Seafarers ' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, designated as the Union in this report, is a labor or- ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, as amended , which admits Respondent 's employees to membership. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts 1. Contract history For many years-since 1951 at least-the Union and Respondent have been privy to collective-bargaining contracts which have governed terms and conditions of employment for Respondent 's employees within a bargaining unit described as follows: Tendermen , (namely, Captains , Engineers , Asst. Engineers, Deckhand-2nd Engineer , Deckhands , Cooks, Combination Mates and Deckhands ) Beachmen, Piledriver Men, Tallymen and Members of the Culinary Department (namely, Cooks, Bakers, Dishwashers , Waiters and Bull Cooks ) except Culinary Workers engaged under the jurisdiction of I.L.W .U., Local #37, including in all cases work on boats, lighters , vessels, in canneries , salteries , fishing stations and in any other capacity on the north and southbound trips, and at or about the cannery or fishing station to which they may be assigned , in accordance with this agreement. These contracts , presumably , have normally been negotiated annually-with respect to their substantive terms-by spokesmen for the Union and Alasko Salmon In- dustry, Inc., the trade association which represents a number of salmon packers for collective-bargaining purposes . When negotiated , such contracts are normally signed by union representatives ; representatives of the association , then, circulate draft copies of the contract for signature by the various packers privy to the negotiations through their A.S.I. membership . The Respondent has never held such membership. With respect to the 1960 and 1961 cannery seasons, however, Respondent 's president, S. H. Daubenspeck , signed the draft contract which the Union representatives had negotiated with association spokesmen. The last of these negotiated agreements proffered for the record , dated April 24, 1961, had been signed by Respondent 's president on May 4 of that year . The contract 72 7-083-64-vol. 144-72 1124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD provided, inter alia, that its effective term would cover the 1961 season subject to automatic renewal for an additional period of 1 year, absent written notice by either party of a desire to "modify, change, or terminate" their agreement, given on or before December 1 of the designated year. Testimony, proffered without contra- diction, reveals that neither the Union nor Respondent gave the requisite written notice on or before the date specified. Subsequent to the 1961 season's close-during a period of several weeks not speci- fied for the record-union representatives negotiated with A.S.I. spokesmen with respect to a new contract for the forthcoming 1962 season. These negotiators decided to renew their prior 1961 agreement without change. They did, however, draft a significantly modified supplemental agreement covering health, welfare, and pension benefits which was subsequently submitted for concurrence by various A.S.I. mem- bers; this supplemental agreement, dated April 16, 1962, provided that it would become effective upon execution, for a term ending December 31, 1964, subject, however, to possible interim adjustment or modification. Within 3 days, on April 19, 1962, Secretary-Treasurer Johansen of the Union dispatched a letter to Respondent. The letter read as follows: Please be advised we have now reached an agreement with the Alaska salmon industry on the General Contract and Health and Welfare Agreement for 1962. We enclose a copy of the General Agreement in order to afford you an oppor- tunity to read the contract, and shall furnish you with a copy of the Health and Welfare Agreement as soon as it is printed. We also expect to have the contract signed before you leave for Alaska. Testimony proffered without contradiction reveals that Respondent made no direct reply with respect to this union communication. 2. Respondent's petition By letter dated April 23, 1962, the Board's Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region advised the Union that Respondent had filed a petition for investigation and certification of representatives, pursuant to Section 9(c) of the statute. Within its petition, docketed as Case No. 19-RM-391, Respondent declared that the Union claimed to represent a substantial number of its employees within a unit described as follows: All crewmembers employed by the Employer on its salmon-carrying vessels; excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined by the Act. Thereafter, on May 2, Respondent was notified by the Board's Regional Director that the Region's investigation had revealed a collective-bargaining agreement "cur- rently in effect" between Respondent and the Union. This agreement was declared to constitute a bar to any investigation of representatives; the Regional Director declared that the firm's petition, therefore, would be dismissed. Upon receiving the Regional Director's communication, Respondent sought to ob- tain Board review of his dismissal action. Its request for such a review was filed pursuant to rule. Shortly thereafter, however-presumably on May 29, approxi- mately-this request for review was withdrawn, for reasons which have not been spread upon the present record. 3. Subsequent developments On June 5, 1962, the Union's secretary-treasurer dispatched a registered-airmail letter to Respondent at its Kenai plant. The letter read as follows: We have been advised by the National Labor Relations Board that you have not appealed within time from the Director's ruling that the contract between us remains in effect. This is to advise you that we expect you to comply with all of the terms of the contract, including the hiring and the union-shop clauses thereof. Please be advised that the contribution for Health & Wealth and Pension for this year has been increased. The new rates are as follows: Health & Welfare- $70.00, Pension-$134 00, a total of $204.00 per person. We respectfully request that you send us a list of the names, addresses, oc- cupations and wage rates of your 1962 employees under our contract. Two days later President Daubenspeck acknowleged receipt of the Union's letter, Secretary-Treasurer Johansen was advised to "get in touch" with the Respondent's Seattle counsel with respect to "any and all" matters. KENAI PACKERS 1125 On June 15, Johansen acknowledged Daubenspeck's reply. He protested Respond- ent's referral of the Union to Seattle counsel, and repeated the Union's demand that Respondent comply fully with the terms of "our 1962 contract" including the hiring and union-shop clauses and health and welfare contributions. Daubenspeck was advised that: We further demand that you promptly send us the information requested in our letter of June 5. We will be glad to accept this information from any representa- tive of yours, including your attorney, but we sincerely doubt your attorney has the information to supply in accordance with our letter. We therefore believe this was merely a scheme for delay on your part. Johansen reiterated the Union's desire for the information requested, regardless of source, insisting only that it be complete, accurate, and in written form. So far as the present record shows, Respondent has never acknowledged or replied to this last union communication; the information requested has never been furnished. (The record does reveal a testimonial suggestion that representatives of the Union and Respondent may have seen each other-during the 1962 cannery season or there- after-while involved in State court appearances connected with certain litigation between them. The precise nature of this litigation was not explicated for the present record. Whatever communication may have taken place, then, between Daubenspeck and union representatives, does not appear to have been relevant to the Union's prior demand for information and contract compliance.) Subsequent to the cannery season, on September 20, 1962, the Union filed its charge in the present case. Respondent was charged with a refusal to bargain in good faith, specifically by virtue of its failure and refusal, despite a written demand, to furnish the Union with written information concerning employees, rates of pay, "and so forth," sufficient to enable the Union to enforce its contract, and to fulfill its statutory bargaining duty. B. Conclusions 1. Basic considerations Within his brief, Respondent's counsel notes, correctly, that employers labor under no statutory duty to bargain or furnish information requested by purported representa- tives of their employees unless they can be found privy to current labor contracts, or unless the majority status of the unions concerned, within a defined employee group appropriate for the purposes of a collective bargain, stands proven through valid Board procedures or some comparable, statutorily sanctioned, test. General Coun- sel's refusal-to-bargain charge, herein, rests, however, upon proof proffered to show that Respondent-throughout the 1962 cannery season-was privy to a valid, current labor contract, with respect to which the firm's statutory duty to furnish information and bargain should presently be confirmed. 2. The appropriate unit Despite a formal denial of General Counsel's contention, within the complaint, regarding the scope of the unit appropriate, herein, for purposes of a collective bar- gain, Respondent has proffered no testimonal challenge with respect to this aspect of the matter. Within the complaint, the appropriate bargaining group is defined as follows: All crew members employed by Kenai Packers on its salmon-carrying vessels, excluding all other employees. This group would appear to be coterminous with that which Respondent declared appropriate for the purposes of a collective bargain, within its previously noted RM petition. Testimony proffered without contradiction reveals that General Counsel's definition, likewise coincides with the more detailed unit description set forth within the Union's 1960-61 contracts with the Respondent. Workers' groups thus limited, confined to employees of single firms, have routinely been considered presumptively appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. With matters in this posture, I find that the group described within General Counsel's complaint constitutes a unit of workers appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the statute. 3. The Union's right to recognition When Respondent signed the Union's proffered contract for the 1961 season, the firm became bound to give that labor organization written notice of its intention to "modify, change, or terminate" the contract before December 1, 1961, or suffer its 1126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD automatic renewal for an additional period of 1 year. Clearly, nothing resembling the requisite notice was given; Respondent has proffered no testimony, herein , calculated to require a contrary determination. Respondent, therefore, remained privy to a contract which would, pursuant to its terms , cover the forthcoming 1962 season; one which could thereafter be noticed for modification, change, or termination no sooner than 1 year subsequent to the designated automatic renewal date. Respondent's brief, substantially, reflects no contrary contention; firm counsel suggests, merely, that-whether or not some "carry-over" contract remained viable- the Union waived or relinquished its right to rely upon such a contract, and never established, thereafter; its right to recognition, without regard to the contract, based upon status as the representative of an employee majority. These contentions derive from certain designated portions of the present record. Respondent's counsel cites Secretary-Treasurer Johansen's April 19 letter, dispatched with a copy of the general agreement for the 1962 cannery season newly negotiated between the Union and various A.S.I. members, which further promised Respondent a copy of the newly negotiated supplemental agreement covering health, welfare, and pension benefits when printed; Respondent contends that Johansen's reference to union expectations that Daubenspeck would "have the contract signed" before his departure for Alaska reflects the secretary-treasurer's tacit concession that Respondent would not be contractually bound, with respect to either of the agreements noted, without its president's signature. Further, company counsel notes certain circum- stances claimed to be revelatory of the Union's belief that Respondent was not really bound by any renewed contract covering the 1962 cannery season: The fact that none of the firm's crew members for the 1962 season held union membership; the failure of any union representative to visit the firm's Kenai plant during that season, though such visits had been routine in prior years; the fact that no union spokesmen made any effort to pursue that body's purported contractual rights beyond submission of the two June letters previously noted;,and the failure of any union representative to press Daubenspeck for some acknowledgment of their purported contract's viability during 1962 courtroom confrontations. Respondent's argument lacks persuasive power. Waivers of right based upon some contract merit recognition only when they are clear; no such waiver can be deduced, legitimately, from Johansen's flat declaration of the Union's expectation that Respond- ent would physically sign "the" contract before his departure from the firm's Kenai plant. The secretary-treasurer's testimony, which I credit, would warrant a con- clusion that his April 19 letter was dispatched merely to secure Respondent 's written commitment with respect to the newly modified supplemental agreement covering health, welfare, and pension benefits specifically. Nothing within the four corners of the letter, certainly, would compel a determination, contrariwise, that Johansen sought Daubenspeck's signature with respect to the copy of the newly negotiated Union-A.S.I. general agreement , forwarded for his perusal. Even were the secretary- treasurer's letter open to such a contstruction, his solicitation of Daubenspeck's pro forma signature for a copy of the redated general agreement could hardly be con- sidered a clear concession that their prior 1961 contract's automatic renewal provi- sion had not already forged Respondent's commitment for the forthcoming cannery season. (This conclusion, however, should not be taken to suggest a determination with respect to Respondent's commitment pursuant to the modified health, welfare, and pension contract for which his signature was clearly requested. Union counsel has conceded that some question might arguably be raised-within a proper context- whether firms bound by some general agreement would be committed to pay greater contributions for health, welfare, and pension purposes pursuant to supplemental agreements subsequently negotiated, without having signed the modified supplemental agreements . Disposition of such questions, however, would be controlled by con- ventional contract law. Judicial resolution of the matter certainly would not affect the continued viability of the basic general contract which the health, welfare, and pension benefit contract, signed or not signed, supplemented.) Further, though Respondent's vessels may have gone north for the 1962 season with nonunion crews, the Union certainly cannot be held responsible for that condition, Respondent's uni- lateral decision to staff its vessels without regard for certain "union-shop" provisions within its renewed contract could hardly be found reflective of some prior union waiver or laches. To the contrary, the Union's determination to press Respondent for concessions regarding its contract status was certainly revealed when the organiza- tion cited the previously renewed general agreement to bar further proceedings con- nected with the Respondent's RM petition. (Respondent, thereby, was clearly put on notice that its determination to hire crews in a manner calculated to impede union enforcement of the renewed contract's union-security requirements would be con- tested.) True, union representatives may not have pressed Respondent vigorously for compliance with their renewed contract; lack of vigor calculated to maintain KENAI PACKERS 1127 a proclaimed position, however, can hardly be considered proof of its waiver of relinquishment. Consideration of the record as a whole, therefore, convinces me that Johansen's request for Daubenspeck's signature reflected no "mere" demand for recognition; that request, rather, seems to have constituted his precautionary effort to secure Re- spondent's guaranteed commitment, specifically, with respect to the prospective pay- ment of company contributions under the newly negotiated modification of their health, welfare, and pension contract. Alternatively, I find, it was nothing more than solicitation of Daubenspeck's pro forma signature for a document which-with con- formed dates-merely set forth their previously renewed general contract for the forth- coming cannery season. (Since the Union's newly negotiated general agreement with A.S.I. representatives, forwarded for Daubenspeck's perusal, merely readopted their previous year's contract without change, except with respect to dates, Daubenpeck's signature on the copy which Johansen sent would merely have confirmed Respondent's commitment to continue compliance with its own union contract, previously negotiated and renewed without change pursuant to its terms ) Consequently, Respondent's present reference to the Union's failure to furnish, together with its purported demand, data probative of its status as a majority representative, cannot be considered relevant. Before Daubenspeck's signature was requested, the Union's right to recognition as the exclusive representative of "crew members" employed on Respondent's "salmon- carrying vessels" had become rested. Since the Union's recognition claim, basically, derived from its contract status, rather than from some mere presumption of con- tinuing majority, union representatives were not obligated to provide proof, when challenged, with respect to the organization's status as a majority representative. Respondent's reliance upon Stoner Rubber Company, Inc, 123 NLRB 1440, to sustain a contrary contention reflects nothing more than a misconception of the Union's contractual position. Union counsel suggests, further, that the Regional Director's dismissal of Re- spondent's RM petition should be considered res judicata with respect to the matter of contractual privity between Respondent and his client throughout the period with which this case is concerned, particularly in view of the firm's final withdrawal of its previously filed appeal from the Regional Director's decision. Cf. Carquinez Lodge No 1492, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO (The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company), 139 NLRB 1477. Since my determination with respect to this matter of contractual privity, however, rests upon the substantive merits of the record made regarding the prior contractual relationship between Respondent and the Union, together with testimony relative to their subsequent conduct, dis- position of this makeweight contention cannot be considered necessary. Upon the entire record, I find that the Union herein-throughout the period with which this case is concerned-was, really, the contractual representative of Respond- ent's employees within the unit previously found appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. Further, I find that, because of the designated organization's contractual status, it was, throughout, entitled to recognition as the exclusive representative of all Respondent's employees within the unit described, for the purposes of collective bargaining relative to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment. 4. The refusal to furnish information The statutory duty of employers to bargain in good faith includes the duty to comply with requests made by the bargaining representative of their workers for wage and other employment information "essential to the intelligent representation" of such workers. While employers may not be required to furnish requested infor- mation at the exact time or in the exact manner requested, such information must be made available in a manner not so burdensome or time consuming as to impede the bargaining process. Peyton Packing Company, Inc, 129 NLRB 1358; Twenty- sixth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, pp. 112-113. Further, proof that a bargaining representative, conceivably, could have secured the requested data from the workers themselves cannot be relied upon to excuse a statutory dere- liction Aluminum Ore Company, 39 NLRB 1286. The Board, within its decision in the cited case, said in part: Even if it were conceded, as the Respondent contends, that the union could actually have secured the wage history of all the jobs in the unit from the em- ployees themselves, such a prospect at the time of the Respondent's refusal of that information must have seemed doubtful and certainly attended with great difficulty and loss of time. 1128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Counsel for the Charging Party cogently notes the quoted statement's aptness within the factual context of the present case, since Respondent conducts Alaskan cannery operations during a busy, short-lived season , some 1,500 miles distant from Seattle, Washington, where the firm's principal office, together with that of the Union con- cerned, remains. The materiality of the information which Johansen requested cannot be doubted. Queried with respect to the purpose of his request, the Union's secretary-treasurer testified that: Well, we wanted to know if the company was living up to their contract. In other words, the contract specified wages, specified conditions under which these people are supposed to work under, and also specifies that union dues, for example, when such is paid is to be sent in with the addresses of the men that is employed by the company, and so forth and so on During a brief oral presentation before the record closed, General Counsel's representative concurred with the Trial Examiner's observation that Johansen's requested data could, conceivably, be considered germane with respect to the matter of dues collection, prospective union enforcement of the renewed contract's wage provision, and union plans to police Respondent's compliance with the newly modified payment schedule of the contract's health, welfare, and pension supplement. Counsel for Respondent and Union counsel did not disagree. (Study of the renewed contract warrants a determination, further, that-without the data requested- union representatives lacked means to check Respondent's observance of certain contractually established employment preferences. Some testimony proffered for the record suggests that Respondent , indeed, might not have observed such pref- erences when selecting crew members for the firm's salmon-carrying vessels. Such a contractual breach by Respondent, however-though it might well be considered revelatory of a refusal to recognize the Union or bargain-has neither been charged nor proven.) Since Johansen's limited request, therefore, clearly called for data fundamental to the viability of the parties' contractual relationship, Board determina- tion would certainly be warranted that such data was necessary to provide some basis for the Union's "intelligent representation" of Respondent's employees. Union counsel, indeed, argues persuasively that-even without some evidentiary demon- stration-data with respect to the names, job classification, and pay of employees should be considered prima facie relevant and necessary for a bargaining representa- tive; since employers have an affirmative statutory duty to supply relevant data, they should be required to bear the burden of persuasion with respect to any claim that such data, when requested, lacks relevancy. The contention possesses merit. N.L.R.B. v. Yawman and Erbe Manufacturing Co., 187 F. 2d 947 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F. 2d 593 (C.A. 4). Respondent, however, has neither claimed, nor tried to demonstrate, that Johansen's request did not call for pertinent information. Respondent's refusal to supply the information requested seems to be conceded. Whatever view may be taken of Daubenspeck's initial referral of Johansen to his firm's Seattle counsel, there can be no doubt that the union secretary-treasurer's reiteration of his request for specific written information, regardless of source, elicited no response. The requested information, certainly, was never provided. With matters in this posture, there can be no doubt that Respondent's course of conduct-specifically, the firm's refusal to provide the Union, upon request, with data relevant and necessary for the proper performance of its functions as the bargaining representative of Respondent's employees, constituted a refusal to bargain, within the meaning of the Act, as amended. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE , The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above-since they occurred in connection with its business operations described in section I, above-have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the States, and, absent correction, would tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct- ing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Since it has been found that Respondent committed and continues to commit an un- fair labor practice, it will be recommended that the Board issue an order requiring that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, including the posting of appropriate notices, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended. Normally, Respondent firms found guilty of some refusal to furnish data, sought by their workers' statutory bargaining representative, have been required to furnish KENAI PACKERS 1129 the specific information which such representatives have been found lawfully privileged to request. The General Counsel, however, presently suggests that-for the purposes of this case-such limited relief would have no significance, since the cannery season with respect to which the requested personnel data was pertinent has now passed. Complete redress, calculated to bring about a restoration of the status quo ante the Respondent's unlawful conduct-so the argument runs-will require, rather, some Board order pursuant to which Respondent will be obligated to resume "meaningful negotiations" with the Union for some further reasonable period. Several recent cases have revealed this Board's readiness to require a firm guilty of conduct which has deprived a certified bargaining representative of the certifica- tion's benefit, for some part of its bargaining year, to bargain with such a rep- resentative beyond its certification year, should that be necessary, for some equivalent period of time. Lamar Hotel, 137 NLRB 1271; Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 785. Though such pronouncements of policy were first set forth in rep- resentation cases, this Agency has held, most recently, that a newly certified union deprived of its opportunity to negotiate a meaningful bargain through an employer's refusal to furnish requested information, should receive the benefit of an order, di- rected to the firm which withheld the data, whereby that firm would be required to "resume bargaining in good faith with the union for the purpose of reaching a collective bargaining agreement" should the union so request. The Electric Furnace Co. and Salem Fabricating & Machine Co., 137 NLRB 1077. General Counsel, herein, suggests, substantially that the Board's remedial order should logically be no different when some firm's refusal to furnish requested information has deprived a contractually recognized bargaining representative of the chance to police, administer, or enforce its contract, effectively, for the balance of that document's term. Thus, the General' Counsel's representative requests that the remedial order for this case should specify Respondent's obligation to deal with the Union, exclusively for a period subsequent to the order's date which would equal that portion of the Union's contract year during which its right to police and enforce its contract was denied. Responden's counsel demurs. The contention is presented that such an order should be found appropriate only where the union concerned continued to represent a majority of the workers; reference is made to the present record's failure to demon- strate that any of Respondent's 1962 crew members ever held union membership. Further, counsel for the firm points out-without contradiction-that Respondent, during November 1962, gave the Union notice "that if it was established there was a contract we [hereby] terminate [it] in accordance with its provisions " Respondent, therefore, notes its objection to any present Board order beyond a direction to produce requested data. With the record in its present posture, General Counsel's suggestion, regarding the type of remedial order which would be required to effectuate the statute's purpose, strikes me as meritorious. Respondent's failure to give any timely notice of contract termination prior to December 1, 1961, clearly renewed the Union's right to claim recognition as the contractual representative of Respondent's fishing vessel crews for another contract year. Nevertheless, the Union's very first effort to police its renewed contract was frustrated at the threshold by Respondent's refusal to submit a list of the names, addresses, occupations, and wage rates of the fishing vessel crewmembers it had engaged for service during the firm's 1962 season. Such a refusal to furnish re- quested data was clearly calculated, I find, to forestall the development of any mean- ingful contractual relationship between the parties for the season in question. Thereby, inter alia, the Union was deprived of a chance to consolidate its status under the contract's union shop clause. Any such deprivation, necessarily, would clearly be calculated to forestall-through a chain reaction-any subsequent union claim regarding its presumptive status as a majority representative, when confronted with Respondent's conceded 1962 notice of contract termination. To redress matters, I find, the Union-consistently with General Counsel's conten- tion-must be given a guaranteed bargaining period, calculated to provide it with ample time within which to carry out its mandate on behalf of its members; Respond- ent's president must be substantially insulated from the temptation of "know[ing] that if he dillydallies, or subtly undermines , union strength may erode and thereby relieve him of his statutory duties" at some later time. Ray Brooks v. N.L R.B., 348 U.S. 96, 100. Thereby the Union would be declared entitled, generally, to represent Respondent's employees within a group found appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes, and to negotiate a new consensus for some reasonable period, following the conceded termination date of its renewed contract for the 1962 cannery season. With due regard for a previously overlooked decisional precedent, however, I find no real' ground for concurrence with that portion of General Counsel's remedial recommenda- tion which would suggest the propriety of some time limitation upon Respondent's duty to bargain. The Mengel Company, Fibre Container Division, 80 NLRB 705, 1130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 706, 724-726; cf. The Electric Furnace Co. and Salem Fabricating & Machine Co., supra. Further, since the present record does suggest that the rights and responsibili- ties of the contract parties throughout the concluded 1962 season may still be a subject of litigation or discussion between them, Respondent's failure to provide the information which the Union requested cannot be considered moot. My recommenda- tion, therefore, will be that the Board order Respondent to provide the data in ques- tion, upon request. In the light of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Kenai Salmon Packing Company d/b/a Kenai Packers, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and business activities which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. 2. Alaska Fishermen's Union, affiliattd with the Seafarers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, as amended, which admits employees of Kenai Packers to membership. 3. All crewmembers employed by Kenai Packers on its salmon-carrying vessels, exclusive of all other employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of a collective bargain within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act, as amended. 4. At all times material herein, subsequent to December 1, 1961, the Union has been entitled to recognition as the exclusive representative of employees of Kenai Packers within the unit -described above, pursuant to the provisions of Section 9(a) of the Act, as amended, for the purpose of a collective bargain in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other conditions of employment. 5. By its refusal to provide the Union, upon request, with a list of names, addresses, occupations, and wage rates of persons employed for the firm's 1962 season within the unit herein found appropriate for the purposes of a collective bargain, Respond- ent refused to bargain with the Union in good faith; thereby, Respondent engaged in and continues to engage in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the Board, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, order that Respondent, Kenai Salmon Pack- ing Company d/b/a Kenai Packers, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall. 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusal to bargain with Alaska Fishermen's Union, affiliated with the Sea- farers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive repre- sentative of all crewmembers employed by Respondent on its salmon-carrying vessels, exclusive of all other employees. (b) Refusal, upon request, to furnish information to which the said labor or- ganization is lawfully entitled. (c) Interference with, restraint, or coercion of employees in any like or related manner, in connection with their exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Alaska Fishermen's Union affiliated with the Seafarers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own fee choice, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with Alaska Fishermen's Union, affiliated with the Seafarers' International Union of North America, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit found appropri- ate herein for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Upon request, furnish the said labor organization with the information to which it is lawfully entitled, including information previously requested to whatever KENAI PACKERS 1131 extent such information may still be relevant and material with respect to both contract administration and negotiations. (c) Post at its offices and places of business in Seattle , Washington , and Kenai, Alaska, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix ." i Copies of the notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of the Respondent , be posted immediately upon receipt thereof , and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees and applicants for employment are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that these notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. (d) File with the Regional Director of the Nineteenth Region , within 20 days of the date of service of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, a written statement setting forth the manner and form in which it has complied with this Recommended Order.2 1 Should the Board adopt this Recommended Order , the words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice Further , should the Board ' s Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "A Decree of the United States 'Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order " in said notice 2 Should the Board adopt this Recommended Order , this provision squill be modified to read ' "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Re- lations Act , as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL bargain , upon request , with Alaska Fishermen's Union affiliated with the Seafarers ' International Union of North America , AFL-CIO, as the ex- clusive representative of all our employees in the bargaining unit described as appropriate in the Trial Examiner 's Intermediate Report on the case, with re- spect to rates of pay , wages, hours of employment , and other conditions of em- ployment, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. WE WILL, upon request, furnish the said labor organization with all of the information it lawfully is entitled to receive, including information previously requested to whatever extent such information may be relevant and material with respect to both contract administration and negotiations. WE WILL NOT , through any course of conduct subject to proscription as a refusal to bargain, interfere with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the exer- cise of their right to self -organization , to form labor organizations , to join or assist Alaska Fishermen 's Union affiliated with the Seafarers' International Union of North America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bar- gain collectively through representatives of their own free choice , and to engage in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activity , except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem- bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment , authorized in Section 8 ( a) (3) of the Act , as amended. All our employees are free to become, remain , or refrain from becoming or re- maining , members of any labor organization , except to the extent that this right may be affected by a lawful agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza- tion as a condition of employment. KENAI SALMON PACKING COMPANY , D/B/A KENAI PACKERS, Employer Dated---- --------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate with the Board 's Regional Office , Room 327, Logan Building , 500 Union Street, Seattle 1, Washington , Telephone No. Mutual 2-3300, Extension 553, if they have any question concerning this notice or com- pliance with its provisions.