Johnson Controls Technology Company

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 30, 2022

2021005365 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/379,652 04/09/2019 Siddharth Goyal 19-0101-US2 (116048-0708) 5992 146598 7590 03/30/2022 Foley & Lardner LLP 3000 K Street N.W. Suite 600 Washington, DC 20007-5109 EXAMINER OGG, DAVID EARL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2119 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/30/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdocketing@foley.com uspatents@jci.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte SIDDHARTH GOYAL ___________________ Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 Appellant2 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of Claims 1-20. Appeal Br. 20-25 (Claims Appendix). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed June 21, 2021 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief filed September 15, 2021 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed July 15, 2021 (“Ans.”); the Final Action mailed January 8, 2021 (“Final Act.”), the Advisory Action mailed March 19, 2021 (Adv. Act.”); and the Specification filed April 9, 2019 (“Spec.”). 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appeal Brief identifies Johnson Controls Technology Company, as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE INVENTION. The claims relate to a building system for implementing user-defined logic. See Abstr. Claims 1, 13, and 19 are independent. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1, which is reproduced below: 1. A building system for implementing user defined logic, the building system comprising one or more memory devices configured to store instructions thereon, that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to: receive user input from a user device, the user input providing a natural language description of a building logic application for a piece of building equipment; retrieve a semantic logic application comprising a semantic description of the building logic application including one or more generic descriptions of the building logic application based on the natural language description and a semantic building model comprising a semantic building description of the piece of building equipment including one or more physical point descriptions of the piece of building equipment; generate a custom logic application based on the semantic logic application, the natural language description, and the semantic building model by interpreting the one or more generic descriptions of the building logic application with the one or more physical point descriptions of the piece of building equipment; and operate the custom logic application. Appeal Br. 20 (Claims App.). Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 3 Prior Art Name3 Reference Date Lewis US 5,812,394 Sep. 22, 1998 MacKay US 2012/0022698 A1 Jan. 26, 2012 Hubauer US 2017/0293276 A1 Oct. 12, 2017 Zhang US 2015/0331895 A1 Nov. 19, 2015 REJECTIONS4 AT ISSUE 1. Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Hubauer, and Lewis. Final Act. 3-6. 2. Claims 1 and 3-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Hubauer, Lewis, and MacKay. Final Act. 6-21. 3. Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Hubauer, Lewis, MacKay, and Zhang. Final Act. 21-23. ANALYSIS We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential), cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”). We have considered in this decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in 3 All citations herein to the references are by reference to the first named inventor/author only. 4 The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA. Final Act. 2. Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 4 the Briefs are deemed to be forfeit. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019). After considering the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s arguments, we are not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error. Thus, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections. We add the following primarily for emphasis. Appellant argues the claims in four groups: Group I- Claims 1, 3-6, and 8-18; Group II - Claim 7; Group III - Claim 2; and Group IV - Claims 19 and 20. See Appeal Br. 6. CLAIMS 1 AND 3-18: OBVIOUSNESS OVER HUBAUER, LEWIS, AND MACKAY. Group I: Claims 1,3-6, and 8-18. Appellant argues the Group I claims as a group in view of the limitations of Claim 1. See Appeal Br. 14 (“Independent claim 13 recites features similar to those recited in claim 1, and is allowable over Hubauer, Mackay, and Lewis for at least the same reasons as claim 1. Claims 3-6, 8- 12, and 14-18 depend variously from independent claims 1 and 13, and are allowable over Hubauer, Mackay, and Lewis for at least the same reasons as claims 1 and 13.”). Therefore, we decide the appeal of the § 103 rejections on the basis of representative Claim 1 and refer to the rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A semantic building model. Claim 1 recites, inter alia: “a semantic building model comprising a semantic building description of the piece of building equipment including one or more physical point descriptions of the piece of building equipment.” The Examiner finds the claim recitation “physical point descriptions of the piece of building equipment” is not defined in the Specification and, Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 5 therefore, the Examiner interprets the phrase to mean a description of physical connection points of a piece of hardware, and cites Lewis as teaching a definition of the physical equipment that is used and how the equipment is physically connected and operated. Adv. Act. (citing Lewis, col. 15, ll. 13-21). The Examiner finds the combination of Hubauer and MacKay fails to teach this limitation. Final Act. 8. However, the Examiner finds Lewis teaches generic descriptions of a building logic application, by teaching object-oriented repository, i.e., “building logic application” device symbols and object “generic descriptions.” Id. (citing Lewis, col. 12, ll. 33- 60). “Appellant does not concede the propriety of [the Examiner’s] interpretation of the recited physical point descriptions,” but argues “even under such an interpretation, Lewis does not teach or suggest the recited features.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant contends the disclosure of Figure 5 and Paragraph 217 provides the required definition. Appeal Br. 8. With reference to Figure 5, Appellant argues the: semantic building model 420 provides various physical points for a fan device, e.g., a pressure setpoint 516 and a supply duct pressure 524. Depending on the system or device being semantically described by the semantic building model, various other types of physical points could be included within the model. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant further argues: [t]he semantic building model 420 is shown to include nodes indicating a building 522, a fan 514, a pressure setpoint 516, a supply duct 518, a return duct 520, a supply duct pressure 524, and a return duct pressure 524. The semantic building model 420 can indicate that the fan 514 is operated based on a pressure setpoint 516. The fan 514 can operate a supply duct 518 which has a particular supply duct pressure 524. Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 6 Id. (quoting Spec., ¶ 217). Appellant’s reply substantially re-iterates this argument. See Reply Br. 3-6. Appellant quotes the passage of Lewis, cited by the Examiner, the: UCOS allows a control engineer to literally glance at a device diagram and understand both the definition of the physical facility, i.e., what equipment is present and how it is connected, and the logical definition of control instructions which operates this interconnected equipment. Lewis, col. 15, ll. 13-21. Appellant argues: Lewis does not teach or suggest "physical connection points" as alleged by the Examiner, instead, Lewis only indicates that the device diagram shows "what equipment is present and how it is connected." Lewis only generally relates to showing how equipment is connected, not physical connection points of equipment. Appeal Br. 11. The Examiner again finds the Specification does not define the term “physical point description.” Ans. 23. The Examiner again interprets the phrase as relating to a description of a physical attribute such as a physical location and/or point of physical connection with other pieces of equipment. Id. The Examiner finds Hubauer, Mackay, and Lewis all disclose software programmed processer-based control systems, and finds the programming of Lewis provides a definition of the physical equipment that is used and how it is physically connected and operated, which a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to combine with the software programming of Hubauer and Mackay. Id. Appellant’s attempts to distinguish the Specification disclosure of Figure 5 from, for example, that of Lewis Figure 2 are unpersuasive. Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 7 Appellant argues: “Lewis only generally relates to showing how equipment is connected, not physical connection points of equipment.” Appeal Br. 11. However, each of Specification Figure 5 and Lewis Figure 2, is a schematic diagram and Appellant fails to impress upon us the alleged distinction. Moreover, Appellant fails to persuade us the argument is commensurate in scope with the claims. The claims recite “physical point descriptions,” not “physical connection points.” We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. Interpreting generic descriptions of the building logic application. Claim 1 recites, inter alia: “interpreting the one or more generic descriptions of the building logic application with the one or more physical point descriptions of the piece of building equipment.” Appellant contends Claim 1 requires the system, itself, to design and generate a custom logic application by interpreting “one or more generic descriptions of the building logic application with the one or more physical point descriptions of the piece of building equipment.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues that Lewis relies on user input and thus, does not teach any interpretation by the system. Id. The Examiner finds: The arts of Hubauer, Mackay, and Lewis all disclose software programmed processer-based control systems, and the programming of Lewis . . . describes a definition of the physical equipment that is used and how it is physically connected and operated, which a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to combine with the software programming of Hubauer and Mackay. Ans. 23. Appellant contends Lewis fails to teach interpreting. Reply Br. 6-7. Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 8 However, the Examiner has relied upon the combination of the arts of Hubauer, Mackay, and Lewis. Ans. 23. “[O]ne cannot show non- obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed.Cir.1986) (Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.). We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. Motivation. Appellant contends: Hubauer relates to the automatic generation of control and monitoring applications while Lewis relates to manual generation of control applications. If Lewis were combined with Hubauer as suggested by the Office Action, the principle of operation of Hubauer would be changed from an automatic process to a manual process and Hubauer would not achieve its intended purpose of automating these types of processes. Appeal Br. 13. We are not persuaded. It is well settled that where, as here, merely providing an automatic means to replace manual activity to accomplish the same result is an obvious improvement. See In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (CCPA 1958). Nor has Appellant shown that automatically performing these functions in lieu of at least some manual interaction would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinarily skilled artisans. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 9 In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of Claims 1, 3-6, and 8-18. CLAIM 7: OBVIOUSNESS OVER HUBAUER, LEWIS, AND MACKAY. Appellant contends Claim 7 requires the generation of a second custom logic application based on a second semantic logic application, second user input, and an indication of the custom logic application of the semantic building model. Appeal Br. 14. Appellant argues Huber fails to disclose such a second application. Id. at 14-15 (citing Hubauer, ¶ 66) (cited by the Examiner). The Examiner finds Hubauer teaches “an adapted software component/’second custom logic application’ read from a generated executable software component/’custom logic application’ fulfilling the user input requirements.” Ans. 26. Appellant does not reply to this ground. See Reply Brief. We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. CLAIMS 19 AND 20: OBVIOUSNESS OVER HUBAUER, AND LEWIS. Appellant contends: “Claim 19 is patentable over Hubauer and Lewis for at least the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1. Claim 20 depends from independent claim 19, and is allowable for at least the same reasons as claim 19.” Appeal Br. 18. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of Claims 19 and 20. CLAIM 2: OBVIOUS OVER HUBAUER, LEWIS, MACKAY, AND ZHANG. Claim 2 recites, inter alia: identify a conflict between the custom logic application and a second logic application occurring when the custom logic application and the second logic application operate; generate a resolution operation to resolve the conflict. Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 10 Claim 2. Appeal Br. 20. The Examiner finds this recitation is not taught by the combination of Hubauer, Mackay, and Lewis, but is taught by Zhang. Final Act. 22 (citing Zhang, ¶¶ 28-29). Appellant contends unlike Claim 2, in “Zhang, no resolution operation is ever generated,” because “the system makes no attempt to resolve a conflict but instead, ‘[i]f there is a conflict, the potential conflict searcher 122 reports the conflict to the user.’” Appeal Br. 17 (quoting Zhang, ¶ 28). The Examiner finds Zhang discloses a potential conflict searcher that performs a resolution operation by rejecting the current control logic if there is a conflict detected, and if no conflict is detected, the potential conflict searcher searches a database to see if the current control logic can be merged with the previous control logic. Ans. 26 (citing Zhang, ¶¶ 28-29). The Examiner further finds Zhang teaches where the potential conflict searcher cannot merge the current control logic with the previous control logic, then the current control instructions are sent to the control center. Id. Appellant’s Reply Brief does not traverse the Answer’s finding respecting Zhang. We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 19, 20 103 Hubauer, Lewis 19, 20 Appeal 2021-005365 Application 16/379,652 11 1, 3-6, 8- 18 103 Hubauer, Lewis, MacKay 1, 3-6, 8-18 7 103 Hubauer, Lewis, MacKay 7 2 103 Hubauer, Lewis, MacKay, Zhang 2 Overall Outcome 1-20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED