InVue Security Products Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 3, 2021

2022000417 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/829,332 12/01/2017 Jonathon D. Phillips P1206D/US/C 7468
88320 7590 12/03/2021
Trent A. Kirk
InVue Security Products Inc.
9201 Baybrook Lane
Charlotte, NC 28277
EXAMINER
AFRIFA-KYEI, ANTHONY D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/03/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
laurenmartin@invue.com
trentkirk@invue.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JONATHON D. PHILLIPS, ANTONIOS L. KARAGIANNIS,
MARK D. REEVES, MATTHEW T. KERLEY, JOHN A. BUCHANAN,
DANIEL C. SYMONS, DARIN J. SHAW, JOSHUA ABDOLLAHZADEH,
SCOTT M. SPECK, ERIK L. VAN BERGEN, and LARRY T. McKINNEY
Appeal 2022-000417
Application 15/829,332
Technology Center 2600

Before JASON V. MORGAN, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21–35 and 37–43, all of the claims
under consideration.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a).
Appellant identifies the real party in interest as InVue Security Products Inc.
Appeal Brief filed May 21, 2021 (“Appeal Br.”) at 3.
2 Claims 1–20 and 36 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 9, 10.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Summary
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to theft prevention of a
tablet computer used as a kiosk in a retail store. Spec. ¶¶ 3–4.3 According to
Appellant, a shroud envelops the tablet and engages to a dock via
engagement members such that the shroud and the tablet are locked to the
dock. Id. ¶ 7. “The shroud includes a wireless communications interface that
is configured to communicate and be paired with the [tablet].” Id. ¶ 12. An
unlock command from the tablet disengages the shroud from the dock. Id.
¶ 66.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 21 and 37 are independent. Claims 21, 23, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39,
42, and 43, reproduced below, exemplify the claimed subject matter:
21. An anti-theft device for securing a portable
electronic device from unauthorized removal or theft, the anti-
theft device comprising:
a shroud coupled to a portable electronic device and
comprising an engagement member, the shroud configured to
be paired with the portable electronic device for communication
therewith; and
a dock comprising an engagement member configured to
releasably engage the engagement member of the shroud for
establishing electrical communication between the dock and the
portable electronic device, the engagement member of the dock
configured to engage the engagement member of the shroud in

3 In addition to the Appeal Brief noted above, we refer to: (1) the originally
filed Specification filed December 1, 2017 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office
Action mailed May 29, 2020 (“Final Act.”); and (3) the Examiner’s Answer
mailed August 30, 2021 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed November 1,
2021 (“Reply Br.”).
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a locked configuration so as to prevent removal of the shroud
and the portable electronic device from the dock and to
disengage the engagement member of the shroud in an
unlocked configuration so as to allow the shroud and the
portable electronic device to be removed from the dock,
wherein the engagement member of the dock is
configured to disengage the engagement member of the shroud
in response to receiving an unlock command initiated at the
portable electronic device via a software application on the
portable electronic device.
23. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the
shroud comprises a wireless communications interface
configured to communicate and be paired with the portable
electronic device.
33. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the
dock is configured to disengage the shroud in response to
communication with an electronic key.
34. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the
dock comprises an alarm configured to be activated in response
to unauthorized removal of the portable electronic device and/or
the shroud from the dock.
35. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the
dock comprises an alarm configured to be activated in response
to unauthorized removal of the dock from a support surface.
37. A method for securing a portable electronic device
from unauthorized removal or theft, the method comprising:
coupling a portable electronic device to a shroud, the
shroud comprising an engagement member, the shroud
configured to be paired with the portable electronic device for
communication therewith;
positioning the shroud and the portable electronic device
on a dock such that an engagement member of the dock
engages the engagement member of the shroud and the shroud
and the portable electronic device are locked to the dock for
establishing electrical communication between the dock and the
portable electronic device; and
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initiating an unlock command at the portable electronic
device via a software application on the portable electronic
device to cause the dock to unlock the shroud from the dock.
39. The method of Claim 37, further comprising
wirelessly pairing the shroud with the portable electronic
device.
42. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the
shroud is configured to at least partially enclose the portable
electronic device.
43. The anti-theft device of Claim 42, wherein the
shroud is configured to communicate with the dock for
disengaging the shroud from the dock.
Appeal Br. 9–11 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art references:4
Name Reference Date
Cohen US 8,602,304 B2 Dec. 10, 2013
Milojicic US 2003/0218383 A1 Nov. 27, 2003
Keller US 2013/0013490 A1 Jan. 10, 2013
Hoefgen US 2014/0366164 A1 Dec. 11, 2014
Roberts US 2016/0205800 A1 July 14, 2016
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects the claims as shown below:
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References
Final Act.
21, 23–25,
31–35, 37, 41,
42, 43
103 Cohen, Roberts,
Milojicic, Hoefgen
2

4 All citations to the references use the first-named inventor or author only.
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Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References
Final Act.
22, 26–30,
38–40
103 Cohen, Roberts,
Milojicic, Hoefgen,
Keller
7
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2020).
Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner errs, and we adopt as our
own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner to the extent
consistent with our analysis herein. Final Act. 2–9; Ans. 3–8. We add the
following primarily for emphasis.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 21
The Examiner finds Cohen teaches or suggests most of the limitations
of claim 21 including “a cover/holding component that acts as a shroud and
is configured to receive and engage a portable electronic device” and “a
dock-like component.” Final Act. 2–3 (citing Cohen 1:51–65, 2:42–60,
4:35–44).
The Examiner notes “Cohen fails to disclose the dock component
configured to releasably engage the shroud to prevent removal of shroud and
the portable electronic device from the dock and to disengage the shroud in
response to receiving a command at the portable electronic device”; but
finds Roberts “discloses dock component configured to releasably engage a
cover/shroud component to prevent the removal of the cover/shroud as well
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as the portable electronic device from the dock.” Id. at 3 (citing Roberts
¶¶ 86, 87).
The Examiner notes “Cohen modified [by Roberts] further fails to
disclose the dock configured to disengage the shroud in response to
receiving a command at the portable electronic device”; but finds Milojicic
“discloses an electrical locking and unlocking means for a docking station to
a portable electronic device, wherein the unlock configuration may be
activated via receiving a control demand at the locking configuration at the
dock which in turn is located within the electronic device.” Id. at 3 (citing
Roberts ¶¶ 31, 33).
The Examiner notes “Cohen modified [by Roberts and Milojicic] fails
to disclose an engagement member that electrically communicates between
the dock and the portable electronic device and further engagement member
of the shroud in a locked configuration”; but finds Hoefgen “teaches an
engagement member that electrically communicates between the dock and
the portable electronic device and may enact locking or charging functions.”
Id. at 3 (citing Hoefgen ¶ 60, Fig. 8). The Examiner further finds Hoefgen
teaches “wherein the shroud may further configured to be paired with the
portable electronic device for communication to further administering
locking and unlocking of the portable device attachment to the said shroud.”
Id. (citing Hoefgen ¶ 57, Figs. 6, 7). The Examiner determines there was
sufficient motivation to combine the teachings of the references. Id. at 3–4.
Referring now to the first limitation argued by Appellant, the
Examiner finds Roberts teaches a dock comprising an engagement member
configured to releasably engage the engagement member of the shroud, as
recited in claim 21. Final Act. 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 86, 87).
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Appellant “disagrees that Roberts teaches or suggests a dock
configured to releasably engage a shroud.” Appeal Br. 3. According to
Appellant, “Roberts discloses that electronic devices are placed on shelves –
there is simply no disclosure that the shelf engages a shroud coupled to the
electronic device.” Id.
The Examiner responds by noting that the definition of “a shroud is a
thing that envelops or obscures something” and finds Roberts teaches “a
shroud/cover for portable electronic devices capable of releasably engage
with a docking station.” Ans. 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 86, 87 and Figs. 4, 5).
We agree with the Examiner’s findings. Roberts discloses a storage
and charging station system, for portable electronic devices such as tablets
or laptop computers, and having multiple shelves 130. Roberts ¶ 86 and
Figs. 4, 5. The Examiner finds the shelves, which are designed to each hold
a device, each teach a dock. Ans. 4. Roberts further discloses a top sidewall
151, to limit access and/or removal of an electronic device stored in the top
shelf. Roberts Fig. 8. In view of the Examiner’s undisputed interpretation of
a shroud as “a thing that envelops or obscures something” (Ans. 3), we agree
with the Examiner’s finding (Ans. 4) that Roberts’ top sidewall 151 teaches
the claimed shroud because it serves to at least partially obscure the device
placed on the shelf 130 directly below the top sidewall 151 (Roberts Fig. 8).
Appellant’s argument that “Roberts discloses that electronic devices are
placed on shelves” is unpersuasive because it does not specifically address
the Examiner’s finding that top sidewall 151 teaches the claimed shroud.
Appeal Br. 3. Appellant further argues, “it is unclear how Roberts teaches or
suggests a shroud coupled to a portable electronic device that is releasably
engaged with a dock.” Id. This argument is not commensurate with the
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scope of the limitation at issue. Rather, this argument conflates several
different limitations from claim 21 and therefore is not responsive to the
rejection, which relies on the combined teachings of Cohen, Roberts, and
Hoefgen to teach the paraphrased features. Accordingly, Appellant’s
argument based on Roberts alone is not persuasive of Examiner error.
Claim 21 further recites “wherein the engagement member of the dock
is configured to disengage the engagement member of the shroud in
response to receiving an unlock command initiated at the portable electronic
device via a software application on the portable electronic device.” Appeal
Br. 9.
Appellant argues that Milojicic fails to teach “locking a portable
electronic device on a dock via a control demand as alleged by the
Examiner.” Appeal Br. 4. Rather, “Milojicic discloses that a transmitter 11
located remotely from an electronic device 12 sends a wireless locking
signal that causes the electronic device to ‘virtually’ lock.” Id. at 4 (citing
Milojicic ¶¶ 26, 27). Therefore, according to Appellant, “it is unclear how
Milojicic discloses locking an electronic device on a dock.” Id.
As an initial matter we point out that Appellant’s argument that
Milojicic fails to teach “locking a portable electronic device on a dock via a
control demand,” is based on a limitation that is not recited in claim 21.
Limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied upon for
patentability. In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). Moreover,
assuming that Appellant instead intends to argue the limitation recited
above, the argument is not responsive to the rejection because the Examiner
merely relies on Milojicic to teach electronic lock and unlock commands.
Final Act. 3. In contrast, the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of
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Cohen, Roberts, and Milojicic to teach the limitation above. Accordingly,
Appellant’s argument based on Milojicic alone is not responsive to the
Examiner’s findings, which are based on the combined teachings of the
references. Final Act. 3–4.
Claim 21 further recites “the shroud configured to be paired with the
portable electronic device for communication therewith.” Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant argues that “none of the cited portions of Hoefgen teaches
or suggests a shroud configured to be paired with a portable electronic
device for communication therewith. In fact, a word search for the term
‘pair’ is nowhere to be found in Hoefgen’s entire disclosure.” Id. at 4.
In response, the Examiner points out that the rejection of the
limitation at issue is based on the combined teachings of Cohen, Hoefgen,
and Milojicic. Ans. 5. In particular, the Examiner finds “Milojicic further
discloses controlling the locking and unlocking mechanism of the docking
station of the electronic device via pairing it to the electronic device by way
of Bluetooth (a well-known pairing communication protocol).” Id. (citing
Milojicic ¶ 35).
Appellant’s argument that Hoefgen fails to mention pair or pairing is
not responsive to the rejection, which relies on Milojicic’s disclosure of
Bluetooth to teach or suggest pairing. See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian
Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument
directed at the wrong reference). Moreover, Appellant’s argument that
Hoefgen fails to mention pairing is unpersuasive because “the question
under [35 U.S.C. § 103] is not merely what the references expressly teach
but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time the invention was made.” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d
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804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545
F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)); see also MPEP § 2123. Appellant does not
demonstrate why pairing a shroud and an electronic device would not have
been suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art by Milojicic’s disclosure of
Bluetooth, a well-known pairing protocol.
Appellant next disputes the Examiner’s rationale for combining
Hoefgen’s teachings with those of Cohen. Appeal Br. 4–5. The Examiner
relies on the combined teachings of Hoefgen and Cohen to teach or suggest
certain limitations of claim 21 such as the shroud, dock, engagement
members for locking, and the portable electronic device. Final Act. 3–6. The
Examiner determines that sufficient motivation existed to combine the
teachings of the references. Id. at 6. In particular, the Examiner determines
that “[i]t would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art
before the effective filing date of the invention to combine Hoefgen’s
teaching with Cohen’s modified[] teaching in order to enable an optimized
alternative method to lock and unlock the anti-theft docking component.”
Final Act. 4.
Appellant argues the “Examiner has not provided any convincing
evidence to support the obviousness rejection based on Hoefgen.” Appeal
Br. 5. According to Appellant, “it is unclear what exactly is the ‘optimized
alternative method’ referred to in the Office Action and how this is at all
related to the fact that the shroud and the portable electronic device are
paired with one another.” Id.
The Examiner responds:
Cohen on [sic] teaches a housing apparatus designed to
envelope an electronic device such that safe and secure
transactions may occur whilst the device within the apparatus,
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the apparatus has a locking mechanism that secures the
electronic device to the apparatus (Column 4, lines 35–44).
Combining Hoefgen with Cohen one of ordinary skill in the art
may optimize the security component of Cohen’s apparatus and
system by enabling the locking and unlocking by authorized
individuals, the electronic device during the transaction process.
Ans. 5.
Appellant’s argument that the “Examiner has not provided any
convincing evidence to support the obviousness rejection based on Hoefgen”
is unpersuasive because Appellant fails to provide evidence or reasoning that
specifically addresses the Examiner’s stated motivation. Appeal Br. 5.
Indeed, as the Examiner points out, one of ordinary skill would have been
motivated to combine the teachings of Cohen with Hoefgen to “optimize the
security component of Cohen’s apparatus and system by enabling the
locking and unlocking by authorized individuals, [of] the electronic device
during the transaction process.” Ans. 5. Appellant does not address this
rationale. Appellant further argues insufficient motivation existed because,
“as noted by the Examiner, Cohen already discloses ways to lock the
electronic device within the housing that would require access by authorized
individuals, including fingerprint locks.” Reply Br. 1–2. In essence,
Appellant argues Cohen teaches away from the combination by already
disclosing a means to lock the electronic device.
We are unpersuaded. If a reference discloses a different solution to a
similar problem, it does not teach away from the claimed subject matter
unless the prior art reference also criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages the solution claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). Likewise, a given course of action often has simultaneous
advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate
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motivation to combine. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165
(Fed. Cir. 2006). Appellant’s argument does not demonstrate insufficient
motivation to combine the teachings but merely shows that the locking
mechanisms of Cohen and Hoefgen are different solutions to a similar
problem; arguably having offsetting advantages and disadvantages.
Appellant further argues that “the locking in Cohen does not occur
between the housing and the base but, rather, between the bezel and the
housing to enclose the electronic device.” Reply Br. 2. This argument is
untimely. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (“Any argument raised in the reply
brief which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an
argument raised in the examiner’s answer, . . . will not be considered by the
Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”).
Here, Appellant did not raise the argument in the Appeal Brief. See
generally Appeal Br. 3–5. Nor has Appellant shown good cause for
introducing such a new argument in the Reply Brief. We, therefore, do not
consider this argument.
Accordingly, Appellant does not proffer sufficient evidence or
argument to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining the
teachings of Cohen and Hoefgen.
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant does not persuade us of
error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 21. We,
therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as the
rejection of independent claim 37 and dependent claims 22, 24–32, 37, 38,
40 and 41, which Appellant does not argue separately with particularity.
Appeal Br. 5–7.
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Obviousness Rejection of Claim 23
The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Milojicic, and
Hoefgen teaches or suggests “wherein the shroud comprises a wireless
communications interface configured to communicate and be paired with the
portable electronic device,” as recited in claim 23. Final Act. 4 (citing Cohen
1:51–65, 2:42–60, 4:35–44); Ans. 5 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 57–60, Milojicic
¶ 35). Appellant argues that:
the cited portions of Cohen nowhere teach or suggest that the
housing includes a wireless communications interface
configured to communicate and be paired with the mobile
electronic device. At most, Cohen discloses that the housing
facilitates communication between an accessory device and the
mobile device (see col. 1, lines 51–65) but not between the
housing and the mobile device. In addition, as with Hoefgen,
Cohen also does not disclose the term “pair” at all.
Appeal Br. 5; Reply Br. 2.
Appellant’s argument (Appeal Br. 5) that Cohen nowhere teaches or
suggests that “the housing includes a wireless communications interface,” is
unpersuasive because the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of
Cohen and Hoefgen, rather than Cohen alone, to teach the limitation at issue
(Ans. 5). In addition, Appellant’s argument that neither Cohen nor Hoefgen
“disclose[s] the term ‘pair’ at all,” is unpersuasive because it does not
address the Examiner’s findings that Milojicic’s disclosure of Bluetooth, a
well-known pairing protocol, teaches or suggests the pairing aspect of the
limitation at issue. Ans. 5 (citing Milojicic ¶ 35). Accordingly, Appellant’s
arguments regarding claim 23 are not responsive to the Examiner’s findings.
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Obviousness Rejection of Claim 33
The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic,
and Hoefgen teaches or suggests “wherein the dock is configured to
disengage the shroud in response to communication with an electronic key,”
as recited in claim 33. Final Act. 4; Ans. 6. In particular, the Examiner finds
“Cohen teaches a shroud/cover component that may be removably engaged
or disengaged from a dock like structure to which locking techniques may
comprise an electronic key such as fingerprint reading authentication” and
“Hoefgen teaches remotely configuring the locking and unlocking of the
docking device by way of authorized signals that actuate the locking
mechanisms of the apparatus accordingly (Paragraph 73), i.e. an electronic
key protocol.” Ans. 6 (citing Cohen 4:45–47, Hoefgen ¶ 73).
Appellant argues without evidence that “Cohen nowhere mentions,
much less suggests, an electronic key” and “Hoefgen actually teaches away
from use of keys altogether.” Appeal Br. 5; Reply Br. 2.
Such conclusory arguments, amounting to little more than a
paraphrasing of the claim language and a general denial, are unpersuasive to
rebut the Examiner’s findings. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement
which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an
argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably
interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal
brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that
the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Accordingly,
this argument is unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error and we sustain
the obviousness rejection of dependent claim 33.
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Obviousness Rejection of Claims 34 and 35
The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Hoefgen, and
Milojicic teaches or suggests “wherein the dock comprises an alarm
configured to be activated in response to unauthorized removal of the
portable electronic device and/or the shroud from the dock,” as recited in
claim 34 and “wherein the dock comprises an alarm configured to be
activated in response to unauthorized removal of the dock from a support
surface,” as recited in claim 35. Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 6. In particular, the
Examiner finds “Hoefgen teaches a wide range of anchors that may provide
power to the device and/or include alarm capabilities in the event that the
device is removed from the anchor without authorization” and “Milojicic
teaches to effectively lock an electronic device such that alarm is sent when
the locking mechanism is compromised or when unauthorized removal of
the electronic device [occurs]” Ans. 6 (citing Hoefgen ¶ 13, Milojicic ¶¶ 13,
31, 42).
Appellant first argues that “Cohen nowhere mentions, much less
suggests, an alarm at all” and “Milojicic does not teach or suggest a dock at
all.” Appeal Br. 6; Reply Br. 3.
Appellant’s arguments do not address the actual reasoning of the
Examiner’s rejections. Instead Appellant attacks the references singly for
lacking teachings that the Examiner relies on a combination of references to
show. Our reviewing court requires that references must be read, not in
isolation, but for what they fairly teach in combination with the prior art as a
whole. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

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Appellant next argues that Hoefgen’s “paragraph 13 says nothing
about an alarm.” Reply Br. 3. We are unpersuaded, noting the cited
paragraph discloses in part that “[r]etailers have implemented a wide range
of anchors that may provide power to the device and/or include alarm
capabilities in the event that the device is removed from the anchor without
authorization.” Hoefgen ¶ 13.
Accordingly, these arguments are unpersuasive of reversible
Examiner error and we sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 34 and 35.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 39
The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Hoefgen, and
Milojicic teaches or suggests “wirelessly pairing the shroud with the
portable electronic device,” as recited in claim 39. Final Act. 8; Ans. 7. In
particular, the Examiner finds “Hoefgen teaches software on the electronic
device that pairs the electronic device with the apparatus to further enable
the electronic device to communicate and control the locking mechanism of
the shroud component” and the “pairing and control protocol requires the
input of an authorization code to further enable the control commands.”
Ans. 7 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 57, 58, 80). The Examiner finds “Milojicic further
discloses controlling the locking and unlocking mechanism of the docking
station of the electronic device via pairing it to the electronic device by way
of Bluetooth (a well-known pairing communication protocol).” Ans. 7
(citing Milojicic ¶ 35).
Appellant argues that “Milojicic does not mention the term ‘pair’ at
all or communication between a shroud and portable electronic device.”
Appeal Br. 6; Reply Br. 3.
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Appellant’s argument that Milojicic does not mention communication
between a shroud and portable electronic device is unpersuasive because the
Examiner relies on Hoefgen rather than Milojicic to teach or suggest this
limitation. Ans. 7 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 57, 58, 80). In addition, Appellant’s
argument that “Milojicic does not mention the term ‘pair’” is unpersuasive
because it does not address the Examiner’s findings that Milojicic’s
disclosure of Bluetooth, a well-known pairing protocol, teaches or suggests
the pairing aspect of the limitation at issue. Ans. 7 (citing Milojicic ¶ 35).
Next, Appellant argues that “Milojicic even discloses that virtually
locking is not physically locking the electronic device.” Appeal Br. 6 (citing
Milojicic ¶ 37). The limitation at issue in claim 39, however, recites
“wirelessly pairing the shroud with the portable electronic device.” Appeal
Br. 11. Appellant’s argument that Milojicic does not disclose physically
locking the device relies on a limitation not recited in claim 39 and therefore
is not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
Accordingly, these arguments are unpersuasive of reversible
Examiner error and we sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claim
39.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 42 and 43
The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic,
and Hoefgen teaches or suggests “wherein the shroud is configured to
communicate with the portable electronic device via the software
application,” as recited in claim 42, and “wherein the shroud is configured to
communicate with the dock for disengaging the shroud from the dock,” as
recited in claim 43. Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 9. In particular, the Examiner finds
“Hoefgen teaches a security apparatus such as a cover/shroud that envelopes
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an electronic device which is [then fastened] to a docking station” and the
“electronic device has a locking mechanism that is controlled by software
installed on the electronic device.” Ans. 7–8 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 49, 52–54,
Figs. 5, 6). The Examiner also finds “Hoefgen teaches the shroud/cover
component being configured to communicate with the dock for disengaging
the shroud from the dock.” Id. at 8.
Appellant argues that “neither Cohen nor Roberts teaches or suggests
a shroud communicating with a portable device at all let alone via a software
application on the portable electronic device.” Appeal Br. 7. This argument
is unpersuasive because it does not address the Examiner’s reliance on the
teachings of Hoefgen. Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 7–8.
Appellant further argues that “Hoefgen discloses that an electronic
device communicates with the unlocking mechanism via a software
application rather than with the shroud” and “Hoefgen appear[s] to disclose
mechanical engagement between the hub and the locking mechanism rather
than communication between a shroud and the dock.” Reply Br. 3 (citing
Hoefgen ¶ 49). We are unpersuaded, because Appellant fails to address all
the Examiner’s findings. See Hoefgen ¶¶ 51–54, Figs. 5, 6 (The case 108
also electronically engages the device 102.). For example, Appellant does
not explain why Hoefgen’s electronic device 102 partially enclosed by
case/shroud 108 and electronically communicating with base/dock 104 to
disengage case/shroud 108 by releasing locking arms 124 fails to teach the
limitations at issue here. Hoefgen ¶¶ 51–54, Figs. 5, 6. Furthermore,
Appellant does not persuasively address the Examiner’s finding that Roberts
“discloses dock component configured to releasably engage a cover/shroud
component to prevent the removal of the cover/shroud as well as the
Appeal 2022-000417
Application 15/829,332

19
portable electronic device from the dock.” Final Act. 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 86,
87).
Accordingly, these arguments are unpersuasive of reversible
Examiner error, and we sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 42 and 43.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21–35 and 37–43
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
21, 23–25,
31–35, 37,
41, 42, 43
103 Cohen, Roberts,
Milojicic, Hoefgen
21, 23–25,
31–35, 37,
41, 42, 43

22, 26–30,
38–40
103 Cohen, Roberts,
Milojicic,
Hoefgen, Keller
22, 26–30,
38–40

Overall
Outcome
21–35,
37–43

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED