InVue Security Products Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 3, 20212022000417 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/829,332 12/01/2017 Jonathon D. Phillips P1206D/US/C 7468 88320 7590 12/03/2021 Trent A. Kirk InVue Security Products Inc. 9201 Baybrook Lane Charlotte, NC 28277 EXAMINER AFRIFA-KYEI, ANTHONY D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/03/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): laurenmartin@invue.com trentkirk@invue.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JONATHON D. PHILLIPS, ANTONIOS L. KARAGIANNIS, MARK D. REEVES, MATTHEW T. KERLEY, JOHN A. BUCHANAN, DANIEL C. SYMONS, DARIN J. SHAW, JOSHUA ABDOLLAHZADEH, SCOTT M. SPECK, ERIK L. VAN BERGEN, and LARRY T. McKINNEY Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 Technology Center 2600 Before JASON V. MORGAN, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21–35 and 37–43, all of the claims under consideration.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as InVue Security Products Inc. Appeal Brief filed May 21, 2021 (“Appeal Br.”) at 3. 2 Claims 1–20 and 36 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 9, 10. Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Summary Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to theft prevention of a tablet computer used as a kiosk in a retail store. Spec. ¶¶ 3–4.3 According to Appellant, a shroud envelops the tablet and engages to a dock via engagement members such that the shroud and the tablet are locked to the dock. Id. ¶ 7. “The shroud includes a wireless communications interface that is configured to communicate and be paired with the [tablet].” Id. ¶ 12. An unlock command from the tablet disengages the shroud from the dock. Id. ¶ 66. Exemplary Claims Claims 21 and 37 are independent. Claims 21, 23, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 42, and 43, reproduced below, exemplify the claimed subject matter: 21. An anti-theft device for securing a portable electronic device from unauthorized removal or theft, the anti- theft device comprising: a shroud coupled to a portable electronic device and comprising an engagement member, the shroud configured to be paired with the portable electronic device for communication therewith; and a dock comprising an engagement member configured to releasably engage the engagement member of the shroud for establishing electrical communication between the dock and the portable electronic device, the engagement member of the dock configured to engage the engagement member of the shroud in 3 In addition to the Appeal Brief noted above, we refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed December 1, 2017 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action mailed May 29, 2020 (“Final Act.”); and (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed August 30, 2021 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed November 1, 2021 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 3 a locked configuration so as to prevent removal of the shroud and the portable electronic device from the dock and to disengage the engagement member of the shroud in an unlocked configuration so as to allow the shroud and the portable electronic device to be removed from the dock, wherein the engagement member of the dock is configured to disengage the engagement member of the shroud in response to receiving an unlock command initiated at the portable electronic device via a software application on the portable electronic device. 23. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the shroud comprises a wireless communications interface configured to communicate and be paired with the portable electronic device. 33. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the dock is configured to disengage the shroud in response to communication with an electronic key. 34. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the dock comprises an alarm configured to be activated in response to unauthorized removal of the portable electronic device and/or the shroud from the dock. 35. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the dock comprises an alarm configured to be activated in response to unauthorized removal of the dock from a support surface. 37. A method for securing a portable electronic device from unauthorized removal or theft, the method comprising: coupling a portable electronic device to a shroud, the shroud comprising an engagement member, the shroud configured to be paired with the portable electronic device for communication therewith; positioning the shroud and the portable electronic device on a dock such that an engagement member of the dock engages the engagement member of the shroud and the shroud and the portable electronic device are locked to the dock for establishing electrical communication between the dock and the portable electronic device; and Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 4 initiating an unlock command at the portable electronic device via a software application on the portable electronic device to cause the dock to unlock the shroud from the dock. 39. The method of Claim 37, further comprising wirelessly pairing the shroud with the portable electronic device. 42. The anti-theft device of Claim 21, wherein the shroud is configured to at least partially enclose the portable electronic device. 43. The anti-theft device of Claim 42, wherein the shroud is configured to communicate with the dock for disengaging the shroud from the dock. Appeal Br. 9–11 (Claims Appendix). REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following prior art references:4 Name Reference Date Cohen US 8,602,304 B2 Dec. 10, 2013 Milojicic US 2003/0218383 A1 Nov. 27, 2003 Keller US 2013/0013490 A1 Jan. 10, 2013 Hoefgen US 2014/0366164 A1 Dec. 11, 2014 Roberts US 2016/0205800 A1 July 14, 2016 REJECTIONS The Examiner rejects the claims as shown below: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Final Act. 21, 23–25, 31–35, 37, 41, 42, 43 103 Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic, Hoefgen 2 4 All citations to the references use the first-named inventor or author only. Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 5 Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Final Act. 22, 26–30, 38–40 103 Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic, Hoefgen, Keller 7 OPINION We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2020). Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner errs, and we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner to the extent consistent with our analysis herein. Final Act. 2–9; Ans. 3–8. We add the following primarily for emphasis. Obviousness Rejection of Claim 21 The Examiner finds Cohen teaches or suggests most of the limitations of claim 21 including “a cover/holding component that acts as a shroud and is configured to receive and engage a portable electronic device” and “a dock-like component.” Final Act. 2–3 (citing Cohen 1:51–65, 2:42–60, 4:35–44). The Examiner notes “Cohen fails to disclose the dock component configured to releasably engage the shroud to prevent removal of shroud and the portable electronic device from the dock and to disengage the shroud in response to receiving a command at the portable electronic device”; but finds Roberts “discloses dock component configured to releasably engage a cover/shroud component to prevent the removal of the cover/shroud as well Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 6 as the portable electronic device from the dock.” Id. at 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 86, 87). The Examiner notes “Cohen modified [by Roberts] further fails to disclose the dock configured to disengage the shroud in response to receiving a command at the portable electronic device”; but finds Milojicic “discloses an electrical locking and unlocking means for a docking station to a portable electronic device, wherein the unlock configuration may be activated via receiving a control demand at the locking configuration at the dock which in turn is located within the electronic device.” Id. at 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 31, 33). The Examiner notes “Cohen modified [by Roberts and Milojicic] fails to disclose an engagement member that electrically communicates between the dock and the portable electronic device and further engagement member of the shroud in a locked configuration”; but finds Hoefgen “teaches an engagement member that electrically communicates between the dock and the portable electronic device and may enact locking or charging functions.” Id. at 3 (citing Hoefgen ¶ 60, Fig. 8). The Examiner further finds Hoefgen teaches “wherein the shroud may further configured to be paired with the portable electronic device for communication to further administering locking and unlocking of the portable device attachment to the said shroud.” Id. (citing Hoefgen ¶ 57, Figs. 6, 7). The Examiner determines there was sufficient motivation to combine the teachings of the references. Id. at 3–4. Referring now to the first limitation argued by Appellant, the Examiner finds Roberts teaches a dock comprising an engagement member configured to releasably engage the engagement member of the shroud, as recited in claim 21. Final Act. 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 86, 87). Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 7 Appellant “disagrees that Roberts teaches or suggests a dock configured to releasably engage a shroud.” Appeal Br. 3. According to Appellant, “Roberts discloses that electronic devices are placed on shelves – there is simply no disclosure that the shelf engages a shroud coupled to the electronic device.” Id. The Examiner responds by noting that the definition of “a shroud is a thing that envelops or obscures something” and finds Roberts teaches “a shroud/cover for portable electronic devices capable of releasably engage with a docking station.” Ans. 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 86, 87 and Figs. 4, 5). We agree with the Examiner’s findings. Roberts discloses a storage and charging station system, for portable electronic devices such as tablets or laptop computers, and having multiple shelves 130. Roberts ¶ 86 and Figs. 4, 5. The Examiner finds the shelves, which are designed to each hold a device, each teach a dock. Ans. 4. Roberts further discloses a top sidewall 151, to limit access and/or removal of an electronic device stored in the top shelf. Roberts Fig. 8. In view of the Examiner’s undisputed interpretation of a shroud as “a thing that envelops or obscures something” (Ans. 3), we agree with the Examiner’s finding (Ans. 4) that Roberts’ top sidewall 151 teaches the claimed shroud because it serves to at least partially obscure the device placed on the shelf 130 directly below the top sidewall 151 (Roberts Fig. 8). Appellant’s argument that “Roberts discloses that electronic devices are placed on shelves” is unpersuasive because it does not specifically address the Examiner’s finding that top sidewall 151 teaches the claimed shroud. Appeal Br. 3. Appellant further argues, “it is unclear how Roberts teaches or suggests a shroud coupled to a portable electronic device that is releasably engaged with a dock.” Id. This argument is not commensurate with the Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 8 scope of the limitation at issue. Rather, this argument conflates several different limitations from claim 21 and therefore is not responsive to the rejection, which relies on the combined teachings of Cohen, Roberts, and Hoefgen to teach the paraphrased features. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument based on Roberts alone is not persuasive of Examiner error. Claim 21 further recites “wherein the engagement member of the dock is configured to disengage the engagement member of the shroud in response to receiving an unlock command initiated at the portable electronic device via a software application on the portable electronic device.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant argues that Milojicic fails to teach “locking a portable electronic device on a dock via a control demand as alleged by the Examiner.” Appeal Br. 4. Rather, “Milojicic discloses that a transmitter 11 located remotely from an electronic device 12 sends a wireless locking signal that causes the electronic device to ‘virtually’ lock.” Id. at 4 (citing Milojicic ¶¶ 26, 27). Therefore, according to Appellant, “it is unclear how Milojicic discloses locking an electronic device on a dock.” Id. As an initial matter we point out that Appellant’s argument that Milojicic fails to teach “locking a portable electronic device on a dock via a control demand,” is based on a limitation that is not recited in claim 21. Limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied upon for patentability. In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). Moreover, assuming that Appellant instead intends to argue the limitation recited above, the argument is not responsive to the rejection because the Examiner merely relies on Milojicic to teach electronic lock and unlock commands. Final Act. 3. In contrast, the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 9 Cohen, Roberts, and Milojicic to teach the limitation above. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument based on Milojicic alone is not responsive to the Examiner’s findings, which are based on the combined teachings of the references. Final Act. 3–4. Claim 21 further recites “the shroud configured to be paired with the portable electronic device for communication therewith.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant argues that “none of the cited portions of Hoefgen teaches or suggests a shroud configured to be paired with a portable electronic device for communication therewith. In fact, a word search for the term ‘pair’ is nowhere to be found in Hoefgen’s entire disclosure.” Id. at 4. In response, the Examiner points out that the rejection of the limitation at issue is based on the combined teachings of Cohen, Hoefgen, and Milojicic. Ans. 5. In particular, the Examiner finds “Milojicic further discloses controlling the locking and unlocking mechanism of the docking station of the electronic device via pairing it to the electronic device by way of Bluetooth (a well-known pairing communication protocol).” Id. (citing Milojicic ¶ 35). Appellant’s argument that Hoefgen fails to mention pair or pairing is not responsive to the rejection, which relies on Milojicic’s disclosure of Bluetooth to teach or suggest pairing. See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument directed at the wrong reference). Moreover, Appellant’s argument that Hoefgen fails to mention pairing is unpersuasive because “the question under [35 U.S.C. § 103] is not merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 10 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)); see also MPEP § 2123. Appellant does not demonstrate why pairing a shroud and an electronic device would not have been suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art by Milojicic’s disclosure of Bluetooth, a well-known pairing protocol. Appellant next disputes the Examiner’s rationale for combining Hoefgen’s teachings with those of Cohen. Appeal Br. 4–5. The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Hoefgen and Cohen to teach or suggest certain limitations of claim 21 such as the shroud, dock, engagement members for locking, and the portable electronic device. Final Act. 3–6. The Examiner determines that sufficient motivation existed to combine the teachings of the references. Id. at 6. In particular, the Examiner determines that “[i]t would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to combine Hoefgen’s teaching with Cohen’s modified[] teaching in order to enable an optimized alternative method to lock and unlock the anti-theft docking component.” Final Act. 4. Appellant argues the “Examiner has not provided any convincing evidence to support the obviousness rejection based on Hoefgen.” Appeal Br. 5. According to Appellant, “it is unclear what exactly is the ‘optimized alternative method’ referred to in the Office Action and how this is at all related to the fact that the shroud and the portable electronic device are paired with one another.” Id. The Examiner responds: Cohen on [sic] teaches a housing apparatus designed to envelope an electronic device such that safe and secure transactions may occur whilst the device within the apparatus, Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 11 the apparatus has a locking mechanism that secures the electronic device to the apparatus (Column 4, lines 35–44). Combining Hoefgen with Cohen one of ordinary skill in the art may optimize the security component of Cohen’s apparatus and system by enabling the locking and unlocking by authorized individuals, the electronic device during the transaction process. Ans. 5. Appellant’s argument that the “Examiner has not provided any convincing evidence to support the obviousness rejection based on Hoefgen” is unpersuasive because Appellant fails to provide evidence or reasoning that specifically addresses the Examiner’s stated motivation. Appeal Br. 5. Indeed, as the Examiner points out, one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cohen with Hoefgen to “optimize the security component of Cohen’s apparatus and system by enabling the locking and unlocking by authorized individuals, [of] the electronic device during the transaction process.” Ans. 5. Appellant does not address this rationale. Appellant further argues insufficient motivation existed because, “as noted by the Examiner, Cohen already discloses ways to lock the electronic device within the housing that would require access by authorized individuals, including fingerprint locks.” Reply Br. 1–2. In essence, Appellant argues Cohen teaches away from the combination by already disclosing a means to lock the electronic device. We are unpersuaded. If a reference discloses a different solution to a similar problem, it does not teach away from the claimed subject matter unless the prior art reference also criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the solution claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Likewise, a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 12 motivation to combine. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Appellant’s argument does not demonstrate insufficient motivation to combine the teachings but merely shows that the locking mechanisms of Cohen and Hoefgen are different solutions to a similar problem; arguably having offsetting advantages and disadvantages. Appellant further argues that “the locking in Cohen does not occur between the housing and the base but, rather, between the bezel and the housing to enclose the electronic device.” Reply Br. 2. This argument is untimely. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (“Any argument raised in the reply brief which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in the examiner’s answer, . . . will not be considered by the Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”). Here, Appellant did not raise the argument in the Appeal Brief. See generally Appeal Br. 3–5. Nor has Appellant shown good cause for introducing such a new argument in the Reply Brief. We, therefore, do not consider this argument. Accordingly, Appellant does not proffer sufficient evidence or argument to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining the teachings of Cohen and Hoefgen. For the reasons discussed above, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 21. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as the rejection of independent claim 37 and dependent claims 22, 24–32, 37, 38, 40 and 41, which Appellant does not argue separately with particularity. Appeal Br. 5–7. Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 13 Obviousness Rejection of Claim 23 The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Milojicic, and Hoefgen teaches or suggests “wherein the shroud comprises a wireless communications interface configured to communicate and be paired with the portable electronic device,” as recited in claim 23. Final Act. 4 (citing Cohen 1:51–65, 2:42–60, 4:35–44); Ans. 5 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 57–60, Milojicic ¶ 35). Appellant argues that: the cited portions of Cohen nowhere teach or suggest that the housing includes a wireless communications interface configured to communicate and be paired with the mobile electronic device. At most, Cohen discloses that the housing facilitates communication between an accessory device and the mobile device (see col. 1, lines 51–65) but not between the housing and the mobile device. In addition, as with Hoefgen, Cohen also does not disclose the term “pair” at all. Appeal Br. 5; Reply Br. 2. Appellant’s argument (Appeal Br. 5) that Cohen nowhere teaches or suggests that “the housing includes a wireless communications interface,” is unpersuasive because the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Cohen and Hoefgen, rather than Cohen alone, to teach the limitation at issue (Ans. 5). In addition, Appellant’s argument that neither Cohen nor Hoefgen “disclose[s] the term ‘pair’ at all,” is unpersuasive because it does not address the Examiner’s findings that Milojicic’s disclosure of Bluetooth, a well-known pairing protocol, teaches or suggests the pairing aspect of the limitation at issue. Ans. 5 (citing Milojicic ¶ 35). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 23 are not responsive to the Examiner’s findings. Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 14 Obviousness Rejection of Claim 33 The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic, and Hoefgen teaches or suggests “wherein the dock is configured to disengage the shroud in response to communication with an electronic key,” as recited in claim 33. Final Act. 4; Ans. 6. In particular, the Examiner finds “Cohen teaches a shroud/cover component that may be removably engaged or disengaged from a dock like structure to which locking techniques may comprise an electronic key such as fingerprint reading authentication” and “Hoefgen teaches remotely configuring the locking and unlocking of the docking device by way of authorized signals that actuate the locking mechanisms of the apparatus accordingly (Paragraph 73), i.e. an electronic key protocol.” Ans. 6 (citing Cohen 4:45–47, Hoefgen ¶ 73). Appellant argues without evidence that “Cohen nowhere mentions, much less suggests, an electronic key” and “Hoefgen actually teaches away from use of keys altogether.” Appeal Br. 5; Reply Br. 2. Such conclusory arguments, amounting to little more than a paraphrasing of the claim language and a general denial, are unpersuasive to rebut the Examiner’s findings. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Accordingly, this argument is unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error and we sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claim 33. Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 15 Obviousness Rejection of Claims 34 and 35 The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Hoefgen, and Milojicic teaches or suggests “wherein the dock comprises an alarm configured to be activated in response to unauthorized removal of the portable electronic device and/or the shroud from the dock,” as recited in claim 34 and “wherein the dock comprises an alarm configured to be activated in response to unauthorized removal of the dock from a support surface,” as recited in claim 35. Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 6. In particular, the Examiner finds “Hoefgen teaches a wide range of anchors that may provide power to the device and/or include alarm capabilities in the event that the device is removed from the anchor without authorization” and “Milojicic teaches to effectively lock an electronic device such that alarm is sent when the locking mechanism is compromised or when unauthorized removal of the electronic device [occurs]” Ans. 6 (citing Hoefgen ¶ 13, Milojicic ¶¶ 13, 31, 42). Appellant first argues that “Cohen nowhere mentions, much less suggests, an alarm at all” and “Milojicic does not teach or suggest a dock at all.” Appeal Br. 6; Reply Br. 3. Appellant’s arguments do not address the actual reasoning of the Examiner’s rejections. Instead Appellant attacks the references singly for lacking teachings that the Examiner relies on a combination of references to show. Our reviewing court requires that references must be read, not in isolation, but for what they fairly teach in combination with the prior art as a whole. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 16 Appellant next argues that Hoefgen’s “paragraph 13 says nothing about an alarm.” Reply Br. 3. We are unpersuaded, noting the cited paragraph discloses in part that “[r]etailers have implemented a wide range of anchors that may provide power to the device and/or include alarm capabilities in the event that the device is removed from the anchor without authorization.” Hoefgen ¶ 13. Accordingly, these arguments are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error and we sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 34 and 35. Obviousness Rejection of Claim 39 The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Hoefgen, and Milojicic teaches or suggests “wirelessly pairing the shroud with the portable electronic device,” as recited in claim 39. Final Act. 8; Ans. 7. In particular, the Examiner finds “Hoefgen teaches software on the electronic device that pairs the electronic device with the apparatus to further enable the electronic device to communicate and control the locking mechanism of the shroud component” and the “pairing and control protocol requires the input of an authorization code to further enable the control commands.” Ans. 7 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 57, 58, 80). The Examiner finds “Milojicic further discloses controlling the locking and unlocking mechanism of the docking station of the electronic device via pairing it to the electronic device by way of Bluetooth (a well-known pairing communication protocol).” Ans. 7 (citing Milojicic ¶ 35). Appellant argues that “Milojicic does not mention the term ‘pair’ at all or communication between a shroud and portable electronic device.” Appeal Br. 6; Reply Br. 3. Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 17 Appellant’s argument that Milojicic does not mention communication between a shroud and portable electronic device is unpersuasive because the Examiner relies on Hoefgen rather than Milojicic to teach or suggest this limitation. Ans. 7 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 57, 58, 80). In addition, Appellant’s argument that “Milojicic does not mention the term ‘pair’” is unpersuasive because it does not address the Examiner’s findings that Milojicic’s disclosure of Bluetooth, a well-known pairing protocol, teaches or suggests the pairing aspect of the limitation at issue. Ans. 7 (citing Milojicic ¶ 35). Next, Appellant argues that “Milojicic even discloses that virtually locking is not physically locking the electronic device.” Appeal Br. 6 (citing Milojicic ¶ 37). The limitation at issue in claim 39, however, recites “wirelessly pairing the shroud with the portable electronic device.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant’s argument that Milojicic does not disclose physically locking the device relies on a limitation not recited in claim 39 and therefore is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Accordingly, these arguments are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error and we sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claim 39. Obviousness Rejection of Claims 42 and 43 The Examiner finds the combination of Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic, and Hoefgen teaches or suggests “wherein the shroud is configured to communicate with the portable electronic device via the software application,” as recited in claim 42, and “wherein the shroud is configured to communicate with the dock for disengaging the shroud from the dock,” as recited in claim 43. Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 9. In particular, the Examiner finds “Hoefgen teaches a security apparatus such as a cover/shroud that envelopes Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 18 an electronic device which is [then fastened] to a docking station” and the “electronic device has a locking mechanism that is controlled by software installed on the electronic device.” Ans. 7–8 (citing Hoefgen ¶¶ 49, 52–54, Figs. 5, 6). The Examiner also finds “Hoefgen teaches the shroud/cover component being configured to communicate with the dock for disengaging the shroud from the dock.” Id. at 8. Appellant argues that “neither Cohen nor Roberts teaches or suggests a shroud communicating with a portable device at all let alone via a software application on the portable electronic device.” Appeal Br. 7. This argument is unpersuasive because it does not address the Examiner’s reliance on the teachings of Hoefgen. Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 7–8. Appellant further argues that “Hoefgen discloses that an electronic device communicates with the unlocking mechanism via a software application rather than with the shroud” and “Hoefgen appear[s] to disclose mechanical engagement between the hub and the locking mechanism rather than communication between a shroud and the dock.” Reply Br. 3 (citing Hoefgen ¶ 49). We are unpersuaded, because Appellant fails to address all the Examiner’s findings. See Hoefgen ¶¶ 51–54, Figs. 5, 6 (The case 108 also electronically engages the device 102.). For example, Appellant does not explain why Hoefgen’s electronic device 102 partially enclosed by case/shroud 108 and electronically communicating with base/dock 104 to disengage case/shroud 108 by releasing locking arms 124 fails to teach the limitations at issue here. Hoefgen ¶¶ 51–54, Figs. 5, 6. Furthermore, Appellant does not persuasively address the Examiner’s finding that Roberts “discloses dock component configured to releasably engage a cover/shroud component to prevent the removal of the cover/shroud as well as the Appeal 2022-000417 Application 15/829,332 19 portable electronic device from the dock.” Final Act. 3 (citing Roberts ¶¶ 86, 87). Accordingly, these arguments are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error, and we sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 42 and 43. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21–35 and 37–43 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 21, 23–25, 31–35, 37, 41, 42, 43 103 Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic, Hoefgen 21, 23–25, 31–35, 37, 41, 42, 43 22, 26–30, 38–40 103 Cohen, Roberts, Milojicic, Hoefgen, Keller 22, 26–30, 38–40 Overall Outcome 21–35, 37–43 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation