Indiana Rayon Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 17, 1965

151 N.L.R.B. 130 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days after date of posting, and
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, T6024
Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, Telephone
No. 529-2411, Extension 6396, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Indiana Rayon Corporation and Kentuckiana Joint Board, Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Case No.
35-CA-1688. February 17, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 21, 1964, Trial Examiner George L. Powell issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
had not engaged in unfair labor practices and recommending that
the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel, Re-
spondent, and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connections with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner to the extent consistent with this
Decision.
In the summer of 1962, Kentuckiana Joint Board, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union,
began an active organizational campaign at Respondent's plant. On
July 21, 1962, the Union informed Respondent by letter that it rep-
resented a majority of the employees, that it would prove its major-
ity status with a check of signed authorization cards, and that it
was requesting a meeting for the purpose of negotiating a contract.
S. A. Rosenfield, Respondent's president, replied to this letter, set-
ting a tentative date for such meeting for August 2, 1962.
On July 31, 1962, Respondent's attorney informed the Union that
"in view of the fact that the Company has no reason to believe that
your organization represents a majority of its employees .... [the]
meeting for the purpose you suggest would not be appropriate at
this time .... [the] tentative meeting set for Thursday, August 2,
1962, is indefinitely postponed."
151 NLRB No. 5.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 131
On August 2, 1962, the Union filed a petition for certification with
the Board in Case No. 25-RC-2265. Respondent and the Union
stipulated to a consent election which was held on August 29, 1962,
and resulted in the rejection of the Union by a vote of 120 to 85.
The Union filed timely objections to conduct of the Respondent
affecting the results of the election. On November 8, 1962, the Act-
ing Regional Director issued his report on objections and recom-
mendation to the Board. No exceptions having been timely filed,
the Board on November 26, 1962, adopted the Director's recommenda-
tion, set aside the election, and ordered a new one to be held.
On December 4, 1962, the Union filed unfair labor practices in the
instant case. Following a request by the Union for withdrawal of
its petition for certification on February 28, 1963, the Regional
Director approved such withdrawal.
1. According to the credited testimony of employee Nellie Ziglar,
she had a conversation with Personnel Director Bud Beitman con-
cerning the Union, at a time which "could possibly" have been 2 or 3
weeks before the August 29 election. Ziglar testified that "[Beitman]
asked me if I would come to a union meeting in Greenfield that night
and I said no. I said, `What for,' and he said, `I would like for you
to tell me who was there and what their plans are,' something simi-
lar to that, I mean that's not the exact words, but he sounded like
he wanted to know what their plans were...."
The Trial Examiner held that the General Counsel had failed to
prove the charge that Beitman urged Ziglar to engage in surveil-
lance of the union meeting. He found that "Ziglar's testimony was
vague in that she could not give Beitman's exact words."
We disagree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion. We find that
Ziglar's statement clearly sets forth Beitman's request that she at-
tend the union meeting and report back to him. Such conduct on
the part of an employer is well established to be in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a) (1). That Ziglar be required to quote Beitman's exact
words almost a year and a half after the conversation seems to us
to place an unreasonable burden on the witness. Ziglar's testimony
in the instant case adequately established the nature and purpose of
Beitman's remarks to her and amply supports a conclusion that
Beitman's conduct is violative of the Act.
The Trial Examiner further concluded that a similar conversation
between Beitman and employee Earlene Cottrell, in which the Trial
Examiner found "the testimony of Earlene Cottrell to be clear, con-
cise and directly to the point," also failed to establish a violation of
the Act. The Trial Examiner found that the General Counsel had
not proved that the conversation took place within the statutory time
limit of 6 months before the filing of the charge.
132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We disagree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion. We believe
that the record clearly establishes not only that the Cottrell conver-
sation occurred but that it took place a week or two prior to the
representation election within the 6-month statutory period. The
record shows that the charge in the instant case was filed and served
on December 4, 1962, thus setting June 4, 1962, as the outward limits
of the 6-month statutory period. Cottrell testified that her conver-
sation with Beitman in which he asked her to spy on the union
meeting occurred after employee Ziglar's conversation with Beitman.
The talk with Ziglar took place possibly 2 or 3 weeks before the
August 29 election. We further note that the parties stipulated that
Beitman was director of personnel from the last week of July 1962
until his termination of employment in 1963. The testimony of
Respondent Plant Manager Hartwell establishes that he first became
aware of the Union's organizational campaign in the early part of
June 1962. We think that the record leaves little doubt that Beit.-
man's conversation with Cottrell took place within the 6-month
statutory period and not at a time prior to June 4, 1962. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that this conversation is violative of Section
8(a) (1) of the Act.
2. On August 27, 1962, 2 days before the election held in Case No.
25-RC-2265, Respondent mailed a letter to each of its employees.
On the day before the election, President S. A. Rosenfield gave a
talk to his assembled employees . In his report on objections affect-
ing the conduct of the election, the Regional Director concluded that
this letter and speech improperly interfered with the representation
election and consequently recommended that the election be set aside.
The Board subsequently adopted the Regional Director's finding and
recommendation. The Trial Examiner in the instant case found that
neither the letter nor the speech violated the Act.' We disagree.
In relevant part, the letter of August 27 states :
The simple fact that there are more than twice as many people
such as yourself now employed at Indiana Rayon than there
were eight or nine years ago is proof of what our working to-
gether has meant to you and the many families like yourself in
this area who would otherwise probably not be working in or
near Greenfield ....
We think it is important for you to know that under Federal
law when a union calls a strike among employees over wages or
other money matters, and if the employer decides to continue
his operation in the struck plant to satisfy and keep his cus-
tomers, and is, therefore, forced to hire new employees to per-
manently take the place of those on strike, those striking em-
The letter and the speech are attached as Appendixes to the Trial Examiner ' s Decision
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 133
ployees forever lose their right to come back to work for that
employer ....
We promise you-,and I think we're in a position to, know-
that there is absolutely no difference in rates of pay and fringe
benefits which can be available to you at Indiana Rayon with, a
union from those which are available to you without a union ....
THINK CAREFULLY about the matters which we have
pointed out, keeping in mind that the Company cannot and will
not do any more for you with a union than it has done and will
do without a union .... [Emphasis supplied.]
In his speech of August 28, 1962, Respondent's president made the
following statements :
Since the last time we had an election, some nine years ago,
this company is now more than twice as big. Now, the vast
majority of our competitors are in the South. How then, with
the wages paid there, as compared to what we are paid, does it
happen that we are over twice as big as we were, and the high-
est paid? For the same reason we are standing here today-
because those people, nine years ago, made this a better place
to work in,-because they were determined to give the best to
America's children. AND, if anyone is standing here nine years
from today, it will be because of our determinations tomorrow.
The very fact we are in crowded conditions, considering ex-
pansion, here or elsewhere, whichever is best for the company,
is because, of that determination.
This is the American Free Competitive System. This is our
only right to exist. This is what will make this company
greater, this community greater and this country greater-not
any promise of mine, certainly not the promise of any paid
Union Organizer, but our promise, each and everyone of us, to
our children tomorrow.
It was suggested that I be sure and call your attention to the
deceptive presentation of facts by the Union in our ability to
relocate this plant. ... [Emphasis supplied.]
By this letter and speech, the Respondent effectively conveyed to
its employees the impression that continued employment was linked
to their rejection of the Union in the forthcoming election and that
the Union could do nothing to improve their working conditions
because the Respondent would give employees absolutely nothing
more with the Union than without the Union. Repeated reference
to the election results 9 years ago was clearly designed to impress
upon employees that rejection of the Union in the past was the chief
reason for their continued and prosperous employment and that
voting in favor of the Union would seriously jeopardize their posi-
134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions with the Respondent. Respondent's stress upon its ability to
relocate the plant could only serve to heighten such fears.
This is not to say that Respondent could not refute and correct
any misleading or deceptive union statements which led employees
to believe they would retain employment rights in the event of plant
relocation. However, Respondent did not merely seek to correct the
Union's "deceptive" statements. It chose, also, to emphasize its
ability to relocate the plant. Taken in the context of other remarks,
conveying Respondent's view that the plant would not now exist had
the employees voted for a union 9 years ago, that employees were
now asked to make "our promise to our children tomorrow," that it
would be futile for employees to select the Union with the expecta-
tion that it could help improve wages and working conditions, to-
gether with the absences of any remarks designed to allay the pre-
vailing apprehension over the possibility of plant relocation, the
reminder of Respondent's ability to "relocate the plant" could only
serve as an implied threat to employees clearly violative of 8(a) (1)
that their selection of the Union would probably result in the loss
of their jobs.2
Respondent rounded out this appeal to employees' fear of job loss
by indicating that should the Union, if it won the election, ever call
a strike, strikers would be replaced and, under Federal law, would
forever lose their right to come back to work for Respondent. The
National Labor Relations Act imposes no such extreme penalty upon
employees for exercising the right to strike. While it is true that
an economic striker can be permanently replaced, the striking em-
ployee is entitled to be considered for future employment openings
on the same basis as any other applicant. Respondent's interpreta-
tion of the law could only be viewed as a statement of policy that
striking employees would under no circumstances ever be rehired.
It seems clear that this statement could have no other than a coer-
cive effect upon the employees in their exercise of their statutory
right to select the Union as their bargaining agent.
By such conduct, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and
coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act, and thereby violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.3
2 N.L.R B. v. Rea list, Inc, 328 F. 2d 840 ( CA. 7), enfg. 142 NLRB 573
3 Chairman McCulloch would rest the above 8(a) (1) finding only upon Respondent's
implied threat to relocate the plant should the Union be successful in the election. But
although not finding other statements in the letter and speech to be independently viola-
tive of Section 8(a) (1), Chairman McCulloch nevertheless views them as probative of
Respondent 's overt hostility and strong opposition to the Union , and, beyond that, of its
determined purpose to defeat the Union in the forthcoming election He therefore relies
on such other statements as supplying compelling evidence which serves at once to illumi-
nate the coercive implications of the references to possible plant relocation and to buttress
the ultimate finding we make that Respondent ' s refusal to honor the Union's recognition
demand was rooted not in a good -faith doubt of the Union's majority , but in a desire
tc gain time to dissipate that majority.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 135
3. The Trial Examiner concluded that Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. He assumed without deciding that the
Union in fact represented a majority of Respondent's employees on
July 23, 1962, but found that Respondent's refusal to recognize the
Union at that time was not grounded in bad faith or in an effort to
undermine the Union's status. Consequently he concluded that there
was no violation of the Act. We disagree with the Trial Examiner's
analysis of this aspect of the case.
On July 23, 1962, Respondent received the Union's letter indi-
cating that the Union represented a majority of its employees and
requesting the negotiation of a collective-bargaining agreement. At
this time Respondent employed 236 permanent employees 4 We find
that on July 23, 1962, the Union had at least 119 authorization cards
from Respondent's employees and consequently represented at this
time a majority of Respondent's employees. Respondent does not
contest that 112 employees had signed union authorization cards by
July 23.5 Respondent for various reasons objected to the introduc-
tion into evidence of 21 cards.
With respect to at least 7 of these 21 authorization cards, we find
no merit to Respondent's objections : (1) Jo Anna Daugherty, Judith
Smith, and Nancy Gasper-Respondent objected to the fact that
these employees had not themselves filled in the date on their cards.
The record, however, establishes not only the authenticity of the
signatures but satisfactorily shows by the employees' own testimony
and the testimony of Margaret Nickolas, an employee active in the
union organizational campaign, that these dates and other informa-
tion were inserted on the cards by Nickolas, that the dates on the
cards accurately reflect the dates on which the cards were signed,
and that these procedures were used as a precautionary means to
ward off interference by Respondent's supervisors with the organi-
zational campaign. These cards were properly admitted into evi-
dence for the purpose of establishing the Union's majority status on
July 23.5 There is no adequate support in the record for Respond-
ent's additional contention that employee Smith signed her card
solely for the purpose of having an election. (2) Marjorie Hulman-
4 The Company payroll for the period ending July 28 lists 237 employees Four names
should be removed from the list and 3 names added resulting in 236 permanent em-
ployees on July 23, 1962
The names of Julia Trent, Roberta Winchester, and Gladys Dunn should be removed
because these employees terminated their employment prior to July 23. The name of
Deanna Plank, a summer employee, should also be removed
The names of Imadell Dugger, Nancy Gasper , and Regina Rudicil who were on sick
leave on July 23 should be added.
The Trial Examiner inadvertently removed the name of Bernice Trent rather than
Julia Trent. He also erroneously removed the name of Albert Becraft whom the record
shows was not a supervisor and should be included in the list
5 The names of 71 employees were agreed upon by stipulation ; the cards of 41 other
employees were introduced into evidence at the hearing without objection by Respondent.
6 Irving Taitel, et al., d/b/a I Tastel and Son , a partnership , 119 NLRB 910
136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent objected to testimony by Nickolas establishing Hul-
man's signature and date on the card. The circumstances under
which Nickolas obtained Hulman's signature in the ladies' restroom
and then dated the card, leads us to conclude that the card has been
properly authenticated and should be counted in determining the
Union's majority status. (3) Mary Lou Conaway-Conaway signed
and dated her card on July 21 and mailed it to the Union on July 22.
Respondent received the Union's letter requesting bargaining on
July 23. Respondent contends that since the card was probably not
received by the Union until July 24, the card may not be counted.
The date for determining the Union's majority status is the date the
letter requesting bargaining is received.? Regardless of when the
card may have been received by the Union in this case, the evidence
clearly establishes that the card had been signed and mailed prior
to the date for determining the Union's status and thus can be in-
cluded in the computation. (4) Irene Carlton-Carlton testified that
she signed an authorization card on May 15, 1962, after a friend had
told her that three-fourths of the employees had signed cards. A few
days later, Carlton learned that only one-fourth of the employees
had signed cards. At the hearing, Carlton testified that she had
signed her card only because of her friend's statement. Assuming
that Carlton may have subsequently become disenchanted with the
Union, her testimony reveals that during the 2 months prior to the
Union's bargaining request she took no action to retrieve or revoke
her authorization card. We do not think that Carlton's after-
thoughts, absent some overt action prior to July 23, should result
in the exclusion of her card from the computation of the Union's
majority status." (5) Gloria Jones-Jones testified that she signed
her authorization card on June 2, and sometime subsequent to this
date she terminated her employment with Respondent. Respondent
contends that Jones' card should be excluded because she could not
remember whether she was employed on July 23. The payroll for
the period ending July 28, however, lists Jones as an employee and
we deem this evidence sufficient, in the absence of express evidence
that she was no longer an employee on July 23, to warrant an infer-
ence of Jones' employment at this time and to permit inclusion of
her card in the computation.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the Union had at least
119 valid authorization cards on July 23, the date on which Respond-
ent received the Union's claim of majority and demand for bargain-
ing. As the Union thus represented a majority of the 236 employees
'' Rea Construction Company, 137 NLRB 1769, 1770
8 Derby Coal & Oil Co , Inc, Deco Sheet Metal Works , Inc, and Plumbing , Inc, 139
NLRB 1485, 1504.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 137
in the unit on that date , Respondent could not validly reject the
Union's demand , unless such rejection was based on a good-faith
doubt of the Union 's majority status.9
Respondent argues that the fact that it consented to an immediate
election establishes its good faith and that therefore no violation of
8(a) (5) has been proven . The fact that an employer consents to an
election is a factor which may be indicative of a good-faith desire
and willingness to permit the Board's election machinery to resolve
the questions concerning representation raised by a union's demand
for recognition and its filing of a petition . However, we cannot find
this to be so in this case in view of the fact that , as proven by the
unfair labor practices engaged in by Respondent , it was unwilling
to permit the question concerning representation involved herein to
be resolved in a fair election free from employer interference.10
Under all the circumstances of the case , we find that the Respond-
ent's rejection of the Union 's claim to representative status and its
cancellation of a meeting previously granted the Union to prove its
majority by means of a card check was made, not because of a good-
faith doubt as to the Union 's majority, but in order to gain time in
which to dissipate that majority . Accordingly , we find that, by
engaging in such conduct, Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and
(1) of the Act.11
TIIE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act.
As we have found that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of
the Act by the conduct of Personnel Director Beitman and by the
speech and letter delivered to its employees prior to the representa-
tion election, we shall order Respondent to cease and desist from
inducing, encouraging, or requesting employees to attend and report
to Respondent concerning union meetings and also cease and desist
from inducing or encouraging any of its employees to vote against
any labor organization by threat of economic loss or promise of
benefit.
As stipulated by the parties in Case No 25-RC-2265, we find the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit to be'
All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent at its Greenfield, In-
diana, plant , including service employees , truckdiivers , shipping department employees,
mechanics , and janitors ; but excluding all office clerical employees , the chief maintenance
man, the watchman -janitor, guards, professional employees , and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
30 Bonnie Lass Knitting Hills, Inc , 126 NLRB 1396
"Joy Silk 111ills, Inc v NLRB, 185 F. 2d 732 (C ADC) See also Fied Snow,
et al , d/ b/a Snow it Sons, 134 NLRB 709.
138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In view of these violations and Respondent's refusal to bargain
with the Union in good faith, we shall further order the Respondent
to bargain with the Union, and thus achieve a restoration of the
situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained
but for the commission of the unfair labor practices. Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 194; Greystone Knitwear Corpora-
tion and Donwood, Ltd., 136 NLRB 573. Indeed, under such cir-
cumstances, not to order Respondent to bargain with the Union
would in effect enable Respondent to profit by its unfair labor prac-
tices. Cf. Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S.
678, 687.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
2. Kentuckians Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By requesting employees to attend and report concerning union
meetings, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
4. By its election campaign letter and speech, Respondent inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, in violation of
Section 8(a) (1).
5. By refusing to bargain with Kentuckiana, Joint Board, Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, in good faith as
the representatives of its employees in the appropriate unit, Re-
spondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
7. Respondent has not engaged in other violations of the Act
alleged in the complaint.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that
the Respondent, Indiana Rayon Corporation, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Inducing, encouraging, or requesting employees to attend and
report to Respondent concerning union meetings.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 139
(b) By threat of economic loss or promise of benefit, inducing or
encouraging any of its employees to vote for or against any labor
organization in any election conducted by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with Kentuckians Joint
Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as
the representittive of all production and maintenance employees of
the Respondent at its Greenfield, Indiana, plant, including service
employees, truckdrivers, shipping department employees, mechanics,
and janitors, but excluding all office clerical employees, the chief
maintenance man, the watchman-janitor, guards, professional em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined by the Act.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Kentuckiana Joint
Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment, and,
if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at its plant in Greenfield, Indiana, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for Region 25, shall, after being duly
signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, be posted
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within
10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to
comply herewith.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not specifically
found herein.
11 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " the words "a
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended , you are notified that :
WE WILL NOT induce, encourage , or request any of our employ-
ees to attend and report to us concerning union meetings.
WE WILL NOT , by threat of economic loss or promise of benefit,
induce or encourage any of our employees to vote for or against
any labor organization in any election conducted by the National
Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Kentuckians
Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO , as the representative of the employees in the
following appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay , wages,
hours of work, and other conditions of employment , and, if an
understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is :
All production and maintenance employees including serv-
ice employees , mechanics , truckdrivers , shipping department
employees, mechanics , and janitors , but excluding all office
clerical employees , the chief maintenance man, the watch-
man-janitor , guards , professional employees , and supervisors
as defined by the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization , to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection , or to refrain from such activities.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 Wrest Market Street, Indianapolis,
Indiana, Telephone No. Melrose 3-5921, if they have any questions
concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 141
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, 29 U.S C. Sec. 151, et seq., herein called the Act. This case was heard
before Trial Examiner George L Powell at Greenfield and Indianapolis, Indiana,
from December 3 through 5, 1963, pursuant to a charge filed a year earlier on Decem-
ber 6, 1962, and a complaint issued October 8, 1963, amended November 6 and 19,
1963. It presented, at the outset, a determination of whether the action was barred
under the Board's decision in Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 NLRB 1365 (1954), and, if
not, whether the Charging Party represented a majority of Respondent's employees
at its plant in Greenfield, Indiana, on July 23, 1962, and whether Respondent refused
to bargain as requested but rather engaged in conduct which interfered with,
restrained, and coerced the employees in their organizational activities in order to
undermine the Union and destroy its majority If found to have engaged in such
conduct, Respondent would have violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Respondent answered, denying the commission of the unfair labor practices
alleged.
PRELIMINARY MOTION
At the conclusion of the introduction of the formal papers in this proceeding by
the General Counsel, the Respondent made two motions: (1) to sequester or sep-
arate the witnesses, and (2) to dismiss the complaint on the theory that further pro-
ceedings were baried by the Board's decision in the case entitled Aiello Dairy Farms,
110 NLRB 1365. As to (1), the motion to separate the witnesses was granted and
arrangements were made so that they could be called quickly as needed. As to (2),
the motion for dismissal, counsel for Respondent admitted (for the purpose of the
motion only) that there was a clear and unequivocal demand, proof of majority status,
and 8(a)(1) activities prior to the election, but nevertheless the Union determined
to go ahead and hold the election, the election was held, the Union lost, and subse-
quently filed a charge alleging a refusal to bargain under Section 8(a) (5). With these
admissions, for the purpose of the motion, counsel for the General Counsel and for
the Charging Party admitted that the case was on "all fours" with the Aiello case.
Nevertheless counsel for the General Counsel argued that the Board's decision in
Barker's East Main Corporation, 142 NLRB 1194, indicated clearly that the doctrine
enunciated in Aiello no longer would be applied. Counsel for the Charging Party
not only agreed with the argument of the General Counsel but went on further to
argue that the Aiello decision should be reversed. Upon conclusion of argument by
counsel, I granted the motion to dismiss based upon the decision of Aiello In this
respect I relied upon the decision in Bernel Foam Products Co , Inc. [146 NLRB 1277],
Case No. 3-CA-1995, TXD-430-63, issued September 16, 1963, by Trial Examiner
Sidney D. Goldberg, and Soulian Textile Inc., Case No 3-CA-2007, TXD-543-63,
issued November 21, 1963, by Trial Examiner Sidney Lindner. Although I dismissed
the complaint, I recessed the hearing in order to permit General Counsel to take an
interim appeal from my ruling to the Board before closing the case. During the
period of recess I learned that there were numerous cases pending before the Board
in which the decision of the Board in Aiello was being attacked by the General
Counsel. As the Trial Examiner, as well as the General Counsel, is bound by the
decision of the Board on a point of law, it became apparent that the Board's decision
in Barker's East Main, although not specifically overruling Aiello, certainly estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the General Counsel that it would like to reconsider its
decision in Aiello. There remained two avenues open for me. I could close the
hearing and let the case rest entirely on Aiello or I could hear the case and find the
facts. Considerations in favor of closing the case under Aiello were: (1) speedy
decision; (2) following the recorded law; and (3) saving of time and expense to parties
and Government by not taking evidence on a possibility that may never come to pass.
On the other hand, considerations in favor of developing evidence on the whole case
were: (1) parties, counsel, witnesses, and Trial Examiner were present, and (2) the
cost to the parties and the Government in hearing the whole case would be substan-
tially less than would be the cost of a remand for a full hearing should Aiello be over-
ruled. As over 70 witnesses were available, I decided to hear the complete case and
accordingly reversed my decision dismissing the case on the motion of Respondent.
Two days and 77 witnesses (including recalled witnesses) later I closed the hearing
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
after receiving all the testimony the parties wished to present. They were afforded
full opportunity to introduce evidence and present oral argument.'
Upon the entire record in the case , including consideration of the briefs filed by
the parties , and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent , an Indiana corporation , is engaged at Greenfield , Indiana, in the pro-
duction , sale, and distribution of children 's clothing . During the 12 months preced-
ing the issuance of the complaint , Respondent shipped from its Greenfield , Indiana,
plant finished products valued in excess of $50 ,000 to points outside Indiana.
Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material herein it was an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Kentuckiana Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
herein called Charging Party or Amalgamated , is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Starting in March 1962, but more actively in the summer of 1962, the Amalgamated
began to organize the employees of Respondent for the purpose of becoming their col-
lective-bargaining representative . On July 21 , 1962, the Amalgamated mailed a
letter to Respondent stating that it represented a majority of the employees in the
Respondent's plant, that it stood ready to prove such a majority with a card check, and
it requested a meeting for purposes of negotiating a contract suggesting a meeting
during the week of July 30, 1962 . On July 24, 1962, the Respondent by S. A . Rosen-
field, president , notified Amalgamated that it would meet with it over its claim to
represent a majority of the employees and set a tentative date for such meeting for
August 2, 1962.
On July 31 , 1962, the Amalgamated received a letter from Respondent 's attorney
noting that Respondent had consulted this law firm concerning Amalgamated 's letter
of July 21 , 1962, and stating , "In view of the facts that the Company has no reason
to believe that your organization represents a majority of its employees in an appro-
priate bargaining unit we have advised the Company that a meeting for the purpose
you suggest would not be appropriate at this time. We therefore wish to advise you
that the tentative meeting set for Thursday , August 2, 1962, is indefinitely postponed."
On August 2, 1962, the Amalgamated filed a petition for certification with the
Board. Respondent joined with Amalgamated in a stipulation for a consent election
on August 20, 1962. The election was held August 29 , 1962. In this election, 212
of the approximately 221 eligible voters cast ballots, 85 being for the Amalgamated,
120 against , with 7 challenged ballots. On September 6, 1962 , Amalgamated filed
objections , and on November 8, 1962, the Acting Regional Director issued his report
on objections setting aside the election and ordering a new election . On Novem-
ber 26, 1962 , the Board adopted the recommendation of the Acting Regional Director
and set aside the August 29 election and ordered a second election . As noted above,
the charge was filed in the instant case on December 4, 1962. On February 28, 1963,
the Amalgamated requested the withdrawal of its petition and its consent to an elec-
tion, and on March 13, 1963, such withdrawal was approved with prejudice by the
Regional Director . The first complaint in the case was issued on October 8, 1963.
The complaint as amended alleges that since June 5, 1962 ,2 and on various stated
dates in August 1962, all before the date of the election of August 29, 1962, Respond-
ent's agents interrogated its employees , threatened its employees with discharge, plant
removal , eminent layoffs, refusal to bargain with the Union , or other reprisals if
' The Board has now "reevaluated the merit of" the Aiello rule and finds it "does
not serve to effectuate the policies of the Act" (See Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc.,
146 NLRB 1277 , decision released May 6 , 1964 , Case No. 3-CA-1995 , supra.) Accord-
ingly , Respondent ' s motion , to dismiss made at the conclusion of the General Counsel's
case is denied.
2 This is as far back as a complaint can go as Section 10(b) of the Act precludes its
going back more than 6 months before the charge is filed.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 143
they became or remained members of the Union or gave any assistance or support to
it, threatened to close and discontinue its business if its employees joined, assisted, or
designated the Amalgamated as their collective -bargaining representative , solicited
employees to spy on and report union activities of fellow employees , and spied upon
meetings and other union activities of its employees.
Additionally the complaint as amended alleges that the Amalgamated , on or about
July 20, 1962 , had a majority of the Respondent 's employees in an appropriate unit
and has since then been the exclusive representative of all the employees in said unit
and commencing on or about July 21, 1962, the Amalgamated has requested and is
requesting Respondent to bargain collectively with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of employment , but alleges that
Respondent has refused and continues to refuse to so bargain . The Respondent
engages in this conduct , reads the complaint , in order to undermine the Amalgamated
and destroy its majority status.
Clearly the Amalgamated therefore proceeded to an election with full knowledge
of the alleged violation of Section 8(a)(5) which had occurred in the preelection
period. Since it chose to establish its majority status by the election procedures
provided in the Act , the Board 's decision in Aiello, supra , required a finding that
an employer 's refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) must be predi-
cated on events which occurred after the election. Inasmuch as Aiello is not the
law we can consider all of the merits of the case.
A. Respondent 's alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1), findings and
conclusions with respect thereto
1. Thelbert Tutrow
Employee Gene Cupp asked Plant Manager Hartwell if he could have a meeting
at his ( Cupp's ) house. He was told he could have a meeting and could have anyone
he wished to come.3 Accordingly he invited some employee couples, including Thel-
bert Tutrow and his wife, to his home one evening. There they all "spoke some,"
according to Cupp, about the Union and, "I don't know whether anybody spoke par-
ticularly or not." The following record testimony shows how the General Counsel
elicited precise testimony from Cupp as to Tutrow.
Q. What did Mr. Tutrow say would happen to it?
A. He said that they could move away.
Q. If what?
A. If the Union got in.
Q. That's all you recall?
A. They probably would move away.
On cross-examination Cupp testified that generally what everyone was talking about
at the meeting was good and had points of Amalgamated.
Employee Donald Chapman , the other witness for the General Counsel on this
point, testified that he and his wife were among those who attended the meeting at
Cupp 's home. The record evidence on the Tutrow point is as follows:
Q. Did Tutrow address 4 the group concerning the Union?
A. Yes, he said indirectly I suppose , that it would be kind of foolish for the
Company to stay here when they could move to North Carolina and save freight
bills and get people cheaper there.
Q. Was that all he said?
A. He said it wouldn 't be bad , it wouldn't be so bad if the Union could help
us but they couldn't.
The Charging Party in its brief argues that Tutrow 's remarks were coercive in that
he not only prophesied that unionization would lead to loss of employment,
but implied that Respondent would use its economic power to make the prophecy
come true . The General Counsel, in its brief to me, characterized the above
testimony as establishing that Tutrow told the employees , "that it would be not only
uneconomic for the Respondent to remain in Greenfield but that the Union [Amal-
gamated] could not prevent such removal or help the employees in any way " There
is no merit to either position . This free and easy give and take in a friendly atmos-
a There is no evidence as to why Cupp would ask for this permission . Nevertheless
he did ask and he received permission.
4 There was no "address" given. As Cupp said , the good and bad points were talked
about by everybody.
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
phere as to possibilities involved should the employees select a union as their repre-
sentative cannot be blown up to the point urged. A careful study of Cupp's testimony,
even when lead by the General Counsel, does not amount to any coercion or threat
of use of economic force. Chapman refers to what Tutrow had to say as being
"indirect." Finally, any well-informed employee (and there Indiana employees
impressed me as being well informed and wanting to be well informed as established
by the meeting in the first instance) would discuss all of the possibilities and probabil-
ities of their actions with respect to their own employer as contrasted with general
philosophical discussion.
Not only has the General Counsel failed to carry his burden of proof on the merits
of this meeting, but there is a question that Tutrow is a supervisor in any event.
Respondent denied that Tutrow was a supervisor or threatened employees with
discharge, plant removal, eminent layoff, refusal to bargain with the Union, plant
shutdown and discontinuance, or that he spied upon meetings and other union activ-
ities of employees as alleged in the complaint As to whether Tutrow was a super-
visor, it was established by credible evidence that Respondent in its production opera-
tion employs only five supervisors- George Morgan, foreman of cutting, where he
supervises 25 employees; Edna Hawkins, forelady of parts department, where she
supervises 40 to 50 employees; Margaret Jenkins, forelady of assembly, where she
supervises 45 to 50 employees, Pauline Steele, general forelady, and Terry Hooper,
maintenance foreman, who supervises 1 employee Tutrow is employed as a marker
maker and layout man in the cutting department supervised by Morgan. When an
order comes in, Tutrow first makes a pattern from paper. Once this pattern is
approved Tutrow then makes a metal marker of the same size and shape as the
pattern. He lays out these markers on the bolts of cloth in the most economical way
so that there will be as little scrap material as possible. As stated by Hartwell, "It's
like putting a jigsaw together " Finally, Tutrow will trace around the marker and
thereby "mark" the cloth The bolts of "marked" cloth are then ready to be cut
and bundled by female employees in the cutting department. Tutrow spends 80 to
90 percent of his working time engaged in these duties which are routine for him
but which require a high level of skill. Certain problems may occur in the marking
process to which Tutrow may direct his talents. For example the cutting girls may
come to the end of a bolt of cloth and Tutrow may have to make splice markers for
them to use. On additional orders for the same style of clothing except in different
sizes, Tutrow modifies the original markers which he made Tutrow has worked for
the Company for about 13 years and would be in the top 10 percent of his department
in seniority He is an hourly rated employee and punches a timeclock as do all other
employees in the department. Morgan is salaried and does not punch a timeclock
Several other employees in the voting unit are paid a higher hourly rate than is paid
Tutrow The Company has two separate fringe benefit programs. Tutrow falls in
the program for pioduction and maintenance employees and not in the one for
supervisors and management. Morgan participates in the program for supervisors
and management.
Plant Manager Hartwell does all the hiring and firing of employees in the cutting
department Morgan may recommend the hiring or firing of an employee in the
department but Tutrow does not have such authority Morgan also has the authority
to discipline employees, grant time off to employees, recommend wage increases,
handle employee grievances or complaints, and find work for or transfer employees
from one job to another. Tutrow does not have such authority.
Morgan, on occasion, transmits work instructions to employees in the cutting depart-
ment, including Tutrow, which instructions are to be passed on to still other employees
but Morgan has full responsibility for the production schedule of the department and
the work scheduling of the department. When Tutrow has finished marking the cloth
on a particular line he may tell the girls who are finishing other work that the line is
ready to go but Morgan is the one who is responsible for deciding what production
is to be run on any given day.
In the event Morgan is sick or not at work Hartwell assumes supervisory respon-
sibility over the cutting department. Neither Morgan nor Hartwell has ever delegated
supervisory responsibilities to Tutrow.
Tutrow is classified by Respondent as a marker worker From time-to-time Hart-
well, as plant manager, holds meetings with other supervisory personnel Tutrow does
not attend such meetings but Morgan does.
Finally, at the consent-election conference held on August 20, 1962, the duties and
responsibilities of Tutrow were fully discussed and the parties agreed to put him in
the apropriate unit and let him vote. Accordingly, his name appeared on the voting
list and he voted on August 29, 1962. However, even after agreeing as above, Amal-
gamated challenged his vote at the election contending he was a supervisor.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 145
I find from the above credible evidence that Tutrow is not a supervisor and accord-
ingly what he said in the emloyee meeting is not attributable to the Respondent any
more than what Cupp or Chapman said. Cupp and the other employees certainly
treated him as one of them.
2. Floyd R. (Bud) Beitman
Bud Beitman , formally a salesman , was Respondent's personnel director from the
last week in July 1962 until he left the Respondent's employment on May 17, 1963.
Respondent denied the allegations in the complaint which alleged that Reitman on
or about August 13 and 14 interrogated employees concerning their union member-
ship, activities, and desires, and solicited employees to spy on and report the union
activity of fellow employees.
In their briefs, both the General Counsel and the Charging Party argue that Beitman
requested employees Nellie Ziglar, Doxie Creel, and Earlene Cottrell to spy on a
meeting of Amalgamated and report to him the union plans.
Nellie Ziglar was a young attractive witness who appeared to be honest and cred-
ible. She testified that she and Doxie Creel and Bud Beitman were sitting at a table
in the employee lounge when Beitman "asked me if I would come to a union meeting
in Greenfield that night and I said no. I said, `what for,' and he said, `I would like
for you to tell me who was there and what their plans are,' something similar to that,
I mean that's not the exact words, but he sounded like he wanted to know what their
plans were and I said, 'No, that was too far for me to come.' ..." She also said that
Doxie said, "No." Doxie Creel did not testify. According to Ziglar, this conversa-
tion could possibly have been 2 or 3 weeks before the election. She was "not sure"
as to the time.
Earlene Cottrell was called by the General Counsel and testified regarding the
alleged conversation with Beitman as follows:
Q. (By Mr. LIEBMAN for the General Counsel.) Did Mr. Beitman ask you
to attend that union meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the conversation when he asked you to attend?
A. He just asked me if I cared to go to the union meeting.
Q. What was the purpose; did he say why he wanted you to go to the meeting?
A. No.
Q. Did you make a report to Mr. Beitman after the union meeting?
A. There wasn't anything I could tell him that he didn't already know.
Q. Did you say anything to Beitman about the number of employees who
were at the meeting?
A. No. It was other girls.
Q. Would you repeat that?
A. I said there were other girls who told him. I couldn't tell him a thing
that he didn't already know.
Q. Why did he ask you to go to that meeting, Miss Cottrell?
A. I don't know.
Q. He didn't make any statement of any kind?
A. No.
Mr. LIEBMAN: Didn't Beitman in fact ask you to attend that meeting and
tell him what went on?
The WITNESS: No. He said for me to find out any information other than
what he knew; if they said anything other than what he already knew.
Q. So he asked you to go to the union meeting and find out some information?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you tell him9
A. I told him I didn't find out anything he didn't already know.
Q. What did you tell him about the time he asked you to go and find out?
A. You mean about going?
Q. Yes?
A. At first I didn't want to go.
Q. But you did tell him you would go?
A. I had already been invited to somebody's house and I told him I didn't
want to go because I had already been invited to somebody's house.
Q. What did he say to you then?
A. Then he said, well he would like for me to go.
783-133-66-vol . 151-11
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. And what did you reply to that?
A. I said well if I can make an excuse to this other person I would go
Q. And what did he say then?
A. He didn't say anything else.
Q. He told you to find out what went on didn't he?
A. Yes. -
According to Cottrell this conversation occurred after the Ziglar-Beitman conversa-
tion above, but she did not know the date on which it took place.
Gene Cupp, a witness for the General Counsel who has been identified above, testi-
fied that he was in Beitman 's office about 2 weeks before the election at which time
Beitman "told me that he couldn't care how many people signed them [cards]; that if
they thought about it and thought about what the Union could do and what they
wouldn't do that they would vote No."
Beitman 5 was-served with a subpena by the Respondent. However, Beitman did
not respond to the subpena and accordingly an affidavit which be had signed October 9,
1962, was admitted into evidence and stipulated that if Beitman were present and
called to testify he would testify in the exact same manner as set forth in the affidavit.
This affidavit, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
To the best of my recollection, I did not on August 14, 1962, or on any other
date prior to the election request any employee eligible to vote in the election to
attend any union meeting for the purpose of spying or in any way reporting to
me what was said or done at the meeting or who was in attendance at the meeting.
Discussion and Concluding Findings as to Allegations Relating to Beitman
As noted above Doxie Creel was not called by the General Counsel to testify
although witness for the General Counsel, Nellie Ziglar, testified that she was present
when Beitman had his conversation with Ziglar. However both witnesses for the
General Counsel, Ziglar and Earlene Cottrell, impressed me as honest and credible
witnesses and I do credit them. Ziglar's testimony was vague in that she could not
give Beitman 's exact words but only that "he sounded like he wanted to know what
their plans were...." This evidence is not firm enough or substantial or probative
enough to sustain the General Counsel's burden of proof that Beitman asked her to
go to the union meeting and report back to him. However, the testimony of Earlene
Cottrell was clear, concise , and directly to the point (after she changed her testimony)
that Beitman did ask her to attend the meeting and report back to him But there is
even a fatal weakness in this testimony in that the General Counsel has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made within the
statutory time limit of 6 months before the filing of the charge. Her testimony does
not specify a period of time in which it was made, but only is that it followed the
Ziglar-Beitman conversation which "could possibly" have been 2 or 3 weeks before
the election, she "was not sure." This evidence lacks the necessary weight to cause
a finding of an unfair labor practice.
3. The complaint as to Rosenfield
The complaint alleges that Rosenfield on or about August 28, 1962, threatened
employees with discharge, plant removal, imminent layoff, refusal to bargain, and
threatened to close and discontinue Respondent's business if the employees joined,
assisted , or designated the Amalgamated as their collective-bargaining agent
The only evidence relating to these allegations of the complaint is in General Coun-
sel's Exhibits Nos. 58 and 59. It was stipulated at the hearing that Exhibit No. 58
is a copy of a talk given by Rosenfield to the assembled employees the day before the
election but more than 24 hours before the polls opened. It was further stipulated
that General Counsel's Exhibit No. 59 is a copy of a letter dated August 27, 1962,
distributed by mail to all employees Copies of both the exhibits are reproduced as
Appendixes A and B and are attached hereto.
From the careful study of the talk given by Rosenfield (General Counsel's Exhibit
No 58) before the election, but more than 24 hours before the polls opened, I find
nothing there that will substantiate the above allegations of the complaint. Likewise
from the careful reading of the letter to the employees (General Counsel's Exhibit
No. 59), I find nothing there that would establish by preponderance of the evidence
the allegations of the complaint. Accordingly I will recommend that the complaint
as to the Rosenfield speech and letter be dismissed.
5 The paities stipulated that S. A Rosenfield and Floyd R Beitnian. Jr. left the
employment of Respondent on May 17, 1963
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 147
4. The Peterson talks
Clyde L. Peterson , one of Respondent 's attorneys , spoke to assembled groups of
employees in the employees ' lounge on August 27 and on the morning of August 28,
1962. Each discussion period lasted from 30 to 45 minutes and the number of
employees in each group varied from 12 to 25. Peterson made these talks at the
request of Hartwell and Rosenfield . Respondent gave three reasons for making the
talks:
First, Amalgamated had distributed three handbills to the employees . One was on
August 9, 1962, the last one was distributed the day before the election, and the second
one sometime in between . Respondent was of the opinion that the first two hand-
bills contained false and misleading statements and wished to give answer to them.
The first one contains the following statement:
One of the persistent rumors, we are told , is if the Company were to move they
would not have to take their employees with them. In two recent cases-one
involving a local of the United Automobile Workers in Detroit and the other a
Teamsters local in Elmhurst, New York-the courts held that workers have a
"vested interest" or right to their jobs and the employer is legally obligated to
hire his old employees at the new location.
The second handbill contains the following:
WORKERS HAVE "VESTED RIGHTS " IN JOBS IN
RUNAWAY FACTORIES
In our last handbill we cited two cases of companies running away from the
Union . In the Detroit case involving the United Auto Workers the Company,
Gemmer Manufacturing Company, they worked out a deal with the city of
Lebanon , Tennessee , whereby the city built a new plant , and offered tax benefits.
Management agreed to hire local people.
The court decision knocks all of this into a cocked hat. Most of the workers
in recession-hit Detroit said they'd go to Lebanon.
As pointed out by Peterson , the Gemmer case referred to in the handbill is officially
cited as Oddie v . Ross Gear and Tool Co . On July 16, 1962 , the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit handed down its decision ( 305 F. 2d 143) (reversing the
district court ), holding that the Detroit , Michigan , employees of the Gemmer Com-
pany did not have a "vested interest" or right to their jobs at the new location of the
Company in Lebanon , Tennessee.
The second reason why Respondent felt the talks to employees were necessary was
that Respondent was not sure that the employees understood the mechanics of the
election and wanted Peterson to explain them to the employees.
The third reason why the Respondent wanted to have the talks was to have the
employees ' rights, the employers ' rights, and the rights of Amalgamated fully explained
to the employees by someone who knew what he was talking about and at the same
time providing an opportunity for the employees to ask questions.
Peterson , in the preparation of his speech , used an outline which had been prepared
and used by one of his law partners in a speech which was given in March 1962 to
employees of the Seven-Up Bottling Company in Indianapolis, Indiana. This speech
was subsequently held by the Board not to be coercive and not to justify the setting
aside of the election in that case. (Seven-Up Bottling Company , Inc., 140 NLRB 611).
The General Counsel introduced into evidence an affidavit given by Peterson Sep-
tember 26 , 1962 . Called by the General Counsel for the purpose of identifying the
affidavit , Peterson testified on examination by Respondent 's other counsel that if he
were to testify as to what he said to the employees in the group meetings, his testimony
would be substantially the same as that contained in his affidavit . As noted above,
the parties stipulated that Peterson was an expert in the field of labor relations law
and labor relations matters. And he testified that , "in substance ," he made the same
speech to each group of employees as he made each speech from his outline.
Not all of the 71 witnesses called by the General Counsel testified as to the speeches
made by Peterson . Some witnesses testified that they could recall certain things in
the speeches whereas others , although they could not recall the same things, could
recall additional matters in the speeches . Bearing in mind that the witnesses were
kept separate from the hearing and did not hear any other witness testify , this differ-
ence in recall is explainable either on grounds of inattention or faulty memory, or on
the grounds that the speeches in fact differed . It must have been due to inattention
or faulty memory . Each witness who testified as to Peterson 's talks did not identify
who else was in the same group with the witness and it is hence impossible to find
whether the witnesses were all in the same group or in separate groups. This, of
148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
course , makes it virtually impossible for the Respondent to put on any rebuttal wit-
nesses other than Peterson himself. Peterson specifically denied the testimony of the
General Counsel's witnesses . As the parties stipulated that Peterson was an expert
in the field and as he credibly testified , his speeches , following the same outline, were
"in substance" the same, I find that he did not make the statements attributed to him
by the witnesses for the General Counsel.
Some of the witnesses testified that Peterson made statements which if true would
violate the Act. On the other hand, other of General Counsel's witnesses testified
seemingly in accordance with the Peterson affidavit. For example, Ziglar testified
that Peterson pointed to the sample ballot, explained it, told the employees that it
was totally secret, and that the Board always had a secret election , and urged each
employee to vote but not how to vote. She testified that Peterson spoke of the
rights of employees and that the Union, if elected, would represent all of them. She
did not recall hearing him mention anything about the right to strike, but did recall
his reading from the decision in the Gemmer case. Ziglar was the third witness for
the General Counsel and it was not until the 43d witness before the Peterson speeches
were again in issue.
Employee Paula Oliver, the General Counsel's 43d witness, tended to corroborate
Peterson and Ziglar. She said Peterson told her group of the duties of employees to
vote and that he talked about another case which he represented,6 and that one of
the handbills put out by the Union was a lie, and that was about all that she could
remember. On the point of bargaining, she said that he told them that if the Union
won the election, a union man and a company man would have to decide on the
wages. If they could not agree and a possible result would be a strike, Peterson
explained the workings of a strike and told them that if there was a strike, the Com-
pany could hire replacements. Thereafter she testified she did not recall anything
else. The General Counsel asked her a leading qustion about plant removal. To this
she testified that Peterson said "they could move the plant if they wanted to."
The next witness for the General Counsel on the Peterson speeches was the 52d
witness, Gene Cupp. He generally corroborated the above witnesses but added that
they talked about the Perfect Circle strike and the trouble at that plant. Some of his
testimony follows. Direct examination by the General Counsel:
Q. Do you recall anything else?
A. No, not right off hand.
Q. Do you recall anything about picket lines9
A. Well, he said that the money that we paid for the dues to the Union wouldn't
necessarily have to go back to our company and to us. They could set the dues
at any price they wanted like I said I believe he said that if you were walking a
picket line that they could hire anybody that they wanted to off the street and
wouldn't have to hire you back.
Q. Do you remember if he said anything, did Mr. Peterson mention anything
about collective bargaining or sitting with the Union.
A. He said they wouldn't have to negotiate a contract.
On cross-examination, Cupp agreed in the main with Peterson's version of his talk
to the employees on August 27 and 28. Peterson cross-examined Cupp as follows:
Q. Mr. Cupp, you stated on direct examination that I said in a group of people
in the lounge at the plant that the Company would not have to negotiate a
contract?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If I told you the statement that you made, I assume, referring to the time
of my talk indicated that I had said nothing along those lines but had said that I
would have to negotiate a contract in good faith but would not have to agree
to everything which would be your best memory as to what I said?
A. (No answer.)
Q. What was written down here [Cupp's affidavit] was within a week or two of
my talk. [And is it accurate] for your recollection today as to what I said?
A. The thing I can say right now, the thing I remember was your saying the
Company wouldn't have to negotiate a contract.
Q. Do you recall my starting out in my conversation in the employees' lounge;
by going into an explanation of the election procedures by showing you a sample
ballot, you recall that?
A. Yes, sir.
The Gemmer case
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 149
Q. You recall my further saying that you have the absolute right to vote either
Yes or No as you saw fit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You further recall my statement that the ballot would be totally secret, no
one would know how you voted?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You further recall that I urged you to vote because it is the duty of a good
citizen always to vote?
A. Yes.
Q. And didn't I further tell you that the result of the election would be deter-
mined by a majority of the ballots cast?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall my saying that if a majority of the employees voted for the
Union, they would represent all of the employees?
A. Yes.
Q. And if a majority didn't vote it would probably be a year before another
labor organization could come back and try to organize?
A. Yes.
Q. You recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall my further discussion with you and the other employees
present some material that had been handed out in a union handbill or leaflet
wherein they had stated in the leaflet something about a case which indicated
that an employer could not move his plant, do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Further do you recall my statement that I thought that part of the union
handbill was totally misleading, that I or my office had taken part in that case,
do you recall that?
A. I remember you-
Q. That the decision of the [Circuit Court] of Appeals was directly opposed
to what the handbill said?
A. No I don't honestly recall that.
Q. You recall my saying that the decision was contrary to what the handbill
said?
A. I don't remember him [you] saying that. I remember [you] talking about
the bill.
Q. Do you further recall that I told you and the others present that you had
certain rights; that the Union had certain rights and the employer had certain
rights?
A. Right.
Q. And that those rights would be exercised as quickly, exercised in the event
the Union should win the election and in a particular way, do you recall that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And don't you recall that at this time when we started talking about the
rights of the individuals in the event of a strike and the rights of the Union in
the event of a strike, and the rights of an employer, do you recall that
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You further recall that at this time we then got into the rights and the
duties of the Union and the employer in regard to starting to negotiate a con-
tract and that I then said that each party had to negotiate in good faith but that
neither party had to agree to every demand of the other party, you recall that?
A. The only thing I remember about that it seems to me that the way I can
remember that is that you said that the Company did not have to negotiate a
contract.
Q. Mr. Cupp, to help you refresh your present recollection up to today, 16
or 17 months after my talk in which you were present, is there any difficulty in
your mind, sir, as to the difference between negotiating a contract and signing a
contract, do you recall my talking about both of these things?
A. No, sir.
Q. You don't recall?
A. No, sir, not right off hand.
Q. Do you recall that as I concluded my discussion with you and the other
people present, Mr. Cupp, that I concluded my talk by again explaining to you
your absolute free right to vote, that it would be by secret ballot, and no one
would ever know how you cast your ballot?
A. Yes, sir.
150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. Were any questions asked at the meeting, as you recall?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You recall whether you asked any questions?
A. I don't remember, sir, whether I did or not.
The General Counsel's 53d witness, Donald Chapman, also testified as to what he
heard at a meeting of employees when Peterson talked to them. At the outset he
stated that he did not remember too well what Peterson said but did remember Peter-
son telling about a lie put out by the Union. He also remembered that both sides in
bargaining could be stubborn and that either could say "no, no, no." He also recalled
Peterson saying that in case of a strike the Company could hire new employees in
the strikers' place. That is if the strike was from a failure to reach a contract it
would be an economic strike and the strikers could be replaced. He recalled that
Peterson pointed to a sample ballot and told the employees that the Board would run
a secret election, that if the majority wanted the Union it would represent all of the
employees, but that if it lost there would be no election for another year. He recalls
a discussion of the rights of the employees, the Union, and the employer and that in
bargaining neither had to give all that the other wanted.
The next witness for the General Counsel with respect to the Peterson talks was
the 60th witness, Ruth Gulley. She testified as follows: -
Q. Will you tell what Mr. Peterson said in his speech?
A. Well, some of it, mostly talked about some case that the Union brought up
about winning and he said it was a lie that they didn't win it and all things about
the Union, civilian raises in pay, if we walked out on strike that they could hire
new people in our place and the Union couldn't keep them from it and things
like that
Q. Was anything said about the Company and the Union negotiating a
contract?
A. Well, I don't remember exactly but-
Mr. HARDY: I have no further questions.
The General Counsel called as the 61st witness employee, Eva Garriott. She
impressed me as being an honest witness but one who had an extremely faulty obser-
vation and memory. Because of her demeanor on the stand and of her many inaccu-
racies and contradictions I do not rely on any of her testimony with respect to the
General Counsel' s case.
The next witness General Counsel had with respect to the Peterson talks was the
63d witness, Dorothy Davenport. Her testimony varied from Peterson's affidavit and
to that extent it is not credited. It is obvious that this witness, like Garriott, could not
clearly remember what took place during the talks. She recalled asking Peterson a
question at the conclusion of his talk which had to do with seniority and after first
testifying that Peterson had said the Union had nothing to do with seniority but the
Company had the last word, she admitted that she could have misunderstood and that
Peterson did say that seniority was a matter of contract and until then the Company
had the right to make seniority determinations.? Thus, she corroborates Peterson.
Respondent called one witness who testified to her recollection of the talk she
heard from Peterson. This was Iona Dobbins who credibly testified that after Peter-
son had left the meeting she told the other employees that if Peterson, ". . . had been
my lawyer and had spoke so well for the other side I would fire him." 8 On cross-
examination Dobbins was asked if Peterson had mentioned moving the plant. To
this she replied, "No, he just mentioned that there would be, there was rumors at
that time and he brought out the fact that there was rumors that the plant might move
but he didn't think that Mr. Rosenfield would do that."
Supervisor Edna Hawkins was called to testify on behalf of the Respondent. She
impressed me as being a sharp, vital, and accurate person, and her testimony is cred-
ited as against that of Garriott. In this respect she denied ever making a statement
to any employee to the effect that if the Union got in the plant would move away.9
According to only one witness for the General Counsel, Louise Luca,, almost the same
group of employees were called to listen to the same type of speech by Peterson on both
August 27 and 28 I do not credit this under all the circumstances including the well
known efforts to reach all the employees
8 The record on page 462, line 15, inadvertently used the word "hire" which is corrected
as above to "fire "
9 There appears to have been a question as to whether Hawkins had interrogated an
employee by the name of Minnie Day Hawkins' testimony was to the effect that she
had questioned Minnie but it had to do with her carpool and the question of the Union
never cane up I credit Hawkins.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 151
Conclusions and Findings With Respect to the Peterson Talks
Peterson was called as a witness on behalf of the Respondent and testified that he
never made any statement to any of the employees in the groups that he talked to to
the effect that the employees had nothing to gain by voting for the Union . He also
denied making any statement to the effect that the employees would not get anything
if the Union got into the plant; nor to the effect that the Company would move away
if the Union got into the plant; nor that he ever made a statement to the effect that
as far as the employees out on strike were concerned that the right -to-work law
would permit the Company to hire other girls to come in and take their jobs.'°
I credit Peterson . Witnesses Oliver and Cupp are specifically not credited when in
conflict with the testimony of Peterson.
I find that Peterson made substantially the same talks to each group of employees
during August 27 and 28, 1962. He was introduced to each group by Floyd Beitman
as the Company 's attorney who was there to explain election procedures , the rights of
the parties , and to answer any questions that any employee might raise . Peterson
commenced his talk by telling the employees that the time and place for the election
was Wednesday , August 29 , 1962. He referred to the sample ballot, a copy of which
was posted in the employees ' lounge where each meeting was held, and advised them
of their absolute right to vote as they saw fit and that the ballots were totally secret
and no one would ever know how any employee cast his or her vote. He urged
each employee to vote, explained that the outcome of the election would be decided
by a majority of the ballots cast, and that if any employee failed to vote they would
allow a minority in the appropriate unit to decide the issue which would be binding
on all. He told them that if a majority voted against the Union it would close the
matter for at least a year . He went on to explain the normal chain of events which
would take place if the Union won the election . He explained that the Company
was required to sit down at reasonable times and attempt in good faith to reach an
agreement . He explained that the Union could in good faith refuse to change its
position on any bargainable matter and that the Company could also refuse to change
its position but that both parties had to bargain in good faith and attempt to reach
an amicable agreement . He explained that if an agreement could not be reached,
the Union had a choice to advise the employees that the Company would not meet
its proposals or it could advise the employees of this fact and seek an authorization to
strike. He explained the rights of the Company if a strike were to be called, explain-
ing that it could either close the plant or continue to operate and produce the Com-
pany's products. If they continued to operate , the employee would have a decision
to make, to remain at home , as they were free to do , or to participate in the strike
by carrying picket signs or doing anything else that did not violate State law requiring
peaceful picketing and the nonblocking of ingress and egress to or from the Com-
pany's premises. He explained that if there were a strike the employer would have
to make a second decision whether to operate with a limited complement of employees
or to hire replacements. If the employer 's decision was to hire replacements, these
would be permanent and the striking employees' jobs would be gone for good. He
made it clear , however, that in the event the strike was settled , the settlement agree-
ment could vary the employer 's legal position and in any event that any former
employee could always apply for employment and come to work as a new employee.
After the above general explanation he told his listeners that the employer could
not promise any benefits or threaten to hurt any employee in an attempt to persuade
an employee to vote against a labor organization . He noted that in any preelection
campaign there might be unintended misstatements of fact and told them of such a
misstatement in a union leaflet which he set forth verbatim . This leaflet related to
the Gemmer Manufacturing Company case identified above. He told them that the
case was familiar to him because his office represented the defendant , Gemmer, and
he then told them of the circuit court of appeals ' decision of July 16, 1962 , and read
quotes from the circuit court's opinion to his listeners . Peterson believed the Union's
leaflet, although undated , was passed out during the week prior to the election which
would be some time during the period between August 22 and 29, 1962. He explained
to the employees that although he did not believe the Union intended to mislead them,
and that the decision was quite recent, that each employee had the absolute protected
right to vote his or her own conscience and that no one would ever know how he or
she cast a ballot. He cautioned them to examine all of the facts before deciding how
to vote, and told them that any promises to friends or signatures on any card what-
soever were not binding on them as to how they should vote in the election . He told
them that if the Company had told them they were going to get more money if they
were to vote "No," that that would be an unfair labor practice , and that if the Union
11 Some of General Counsel ' s witnesses mentioned this.
152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had said that they were going to get them more money or more benefits of any kind,
that they should beware of such misleading statements . But if the Union had said
they were going to try to get more money or benefits , this would be a true statement
for the Union had the right to try to do this in the event it won the election.
At the conclusion of his talks , employees in some group asked specific questions,
and, as Peterson said in his affidavit , these questions concerned themselves with
specific contract provisions and his reply in all cases was that that would be a matter
of agreement between the parties and must be determined at the bargaining table.
These questions concerned seniority , pension plans, paid holidays, and other matters
relating to contract negotiations.
I am unable to find any evidence that Peterson made coercive statements in any
of his speeches to the employees on August 27 and 28, 1962. It seems that what he
told the employees was substantially identical to what were told the employees in
the case of Seven- Up Bottling Company, Inc., 140 NLRB 611 ( 1963 ). It seems clear
to me that the speech followed the purpose of correcting false and misleading state-
ments contained in Amalgamated 's propaganda literature distributed earlier, it
explained the mechanics of the election to the employees and the legal rights of the
employees, the Union, and the Company, and gave employees an opportunity to ask
questions relating to these matters . Accordingly , I find the speeches by Peterson
were not violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and will recommend the complaint
in this respect be dismissed.
B. The allegations relating to a refusal to bargain in good faith
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
The first question to be decided in this particular is whether or not on the date
the Union requested recognition and bargaining , the Union did in fact represent a
majority of the employees. The second question then would be whether or not the
Respondent refused to bargain in good faith by refusing to recognize a majority union
for the purpose of defeating the union 's organizational efforts or of destroying its
majority status . Taking up these two questions in order we have the following:
1. Majority status
The Amalgamated's letter requesting recognition and bargaining was dated July 21,
1962 , and received by Respondent on July 23 , 1962. On that date the Respondent
employed 233 employees .11 The burden of the General Counsel would be to prove
that Amalgamated had in its possession valid authorization cards on that date of at
least 117 employees of Respondent . The General Counsel introduced in evidence a
list of names of 126 employees which list was submitted on August 2, 1962, to the
Board 's Regional Office with a petition for an election . Respondent objected to the
receipt in evidence of this list because it would not establish that on the critical date of
July 23 that these 126 employees had signed authorization cards for the Amalgamated.
The General Counsel proceeded with individual witnesses to establish the dates when
the cards were signed . There were 71 cards stipulated which means the Union would
need 46 more cards to reach the 117; 61 cards were received in evidence of which 17
were contested meaning that the Union did not have a majority in uncontested cards.
Inasmuch as there is this issue as to whether the Union had a majority of authorization
cards on July 23, 1962, it is necessary either to probe into the evidence with respect
to each contested card or go to the second point and assume, for purpose of examin-
ing the second point only, that Amalgamated did represent a majority of the employ-
ees on July 23, 1962, and determine if Respondent's refusal to bargain with them on
that date was for the purpose of defeating the Union's organizational efforts or of
destroying its majority status. I will go to the second point.
2. Good-faith doubt
To recapitulate , the demand by the Union was received by Respondent on July 23,
1962. On July 31, 1962 , Respondent through its attorney replied by letter declining
to recognize and bargain with the Union "in view of the fact that the Company has
no reason to believe that your organization represents a majority of its employees."
n This is taken from a list of employees for the period ending July 28, 1962, after
the names of the following employees who quit prior to July 23, 1963 , were removed from
the list: Bernice Trent , Roberta Winchester , Gladys Dunn , and Albert Becraft, main-
tenance supervisor.
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 153
Promptly, thereafter, on August 2, the Union filed a representation petition. The
Respondent promptly met with representatives of the Board and the Amalgamated
and agreed to a consent election being held on August 29, 1962. Between July 23
and July 31, 1962, Respondent, through S. A. Rosenfield, had written Amalgamated a
letter to the effect that it would meet and check into the question of whether the
Union represented the employees. But it never did meet.
Respondent submitted evidence that at the time the request to bargain was received
by it there was doubt as to majority representative status of Amalgamated. Hartwell,
production manager, testified that it was "inconceivable" that the Amalgamated repre-
sented a majority and this was his opinion as well as the opinion of Rosenfield, the
vice president. Hartwell had questioned all of the production supervisors immediately
after receiving the July 21 letter and was advised by them that they did not believe
the Union represented a majority. One Greta Addison, a long-time employee, told
Hartwell she "certainly did not think" the Union represented a majority, none of the
employees at any time wore union buttons or other external evidence of support for
Amalgamated, there was no testimony to show that any employee ever told any of
Respondent 's officers or supervisors that in their opinion the Amalgamated represented
a majority, employee Irene Carlton credibly testified that she told Hartwell that
another employee, in soliciting her signature on a card, had stated that Amalgamated
had three-fourths of the employees signed up when in fact after checking around
Carlton discovered only one-fourth had signed up. She also expressed her own
personal opposition to the Union although she had signed a card. Respondent viewed
with skepticism the validity of authorization cards as a method of showing an
uncoerced majority status.12
Amalgamated filed an election petition immediately upon receiving Respondent's
letter declining recognition, and made no subsequent effort to claim majority status on
the basis of authorization cards until some 4 months after it had lost the election.
This certainly tends to establish that it believed the Respondent did have a good-faith
doubt as to the majority status and it was perfectly willing to go to an election to
prove that it did represent a majority of Respondent's employees. In view of the fact
that the General Counsel has not established that Respondent has engaged in any
conduct in the preelection period which would show that it was stalling in order to
undermine the Union, plus the fact that there was affirmative evidence that Respond-
ent did question the majority status of Amalgamated, I cannot find that Respondent's
refusal to recognize Amalgamated was done in bad faith (see, e.g., Norlee Togs, Inc.,
129 NLRB 14 (1960); Neuman Transit Co., Inc., 138 NLRB 659 (1962)).
The willingness of Respondent to go to an election quickly tends to show that it
was acting in good faith. As stated by the Board in Emma Gilbert, et al., individually
and as Co-Partners d/b/a A. L. Gilbert Company, 110 NLRB 2067, 2070 (1954),
"The willingness of the Respondents to have an immediate election under any auspices,
seems to us very strong evidence of good faith. An employer bent only on avoiding
collective bargaining would not have been so cooperative in seeking to arrange an
immediate election, but rather would have attempted to produce the greatest delay."
The case of Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), is
not applicable in the instant case. Here, even assuming for the purpose of discussion
that Amalgamated did represent an uncoerced majority on July 23, 1962, the General
Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the proof that Respondent did
not have a valid factual basis for a good-faith doubt of Amalgamated's majority and
also failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent's refusal
to recognize the Union was due to a desire to gain time to take action to defeat Amal-
gamated's organizational efforts. Accordingly I will recommend that the complaint
be dismissed.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act.
2. Amalgamated is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. Respondent has not refused to bargain with Amalgamated or otherwise
engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint.
'a Ruth Ann Penry testified that she signed a card only after being threatened with
loss of her job.
154 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
APPENDIX A
Nature Of This Business:
Our goal in its truest form is to clothe America's children more attractively, more
durably and more economically than they were before. Our ability to achieve this
goal better than our competitors is our only right to exist. This is as it should be.
This is what has made this company grow and prosper-this is the attitude that has
made this country great.
Since the last time we had an election, some nine years ago, this company is now
more than twice as big. It accomplished this because we did a better job of clothing
America's children than our competitors-and even more so, because the overwhelm-
ing majority of the people voting in that election believed they could do this job better.
God bless their faith in their ability and their faith in the future, for that is the prin-
cipal reason that twice as many of us are standing here today, with the right to vote
tomorrow.
In the manufacture of our product, we must buy raw materials with which to make
our product, obtain the services of people to make the product and machinery with
which to do the work. Trying to obtain the very best of all three, and not the
cheapest, is the only way to do the best for these children. In so doing, we are really
doing the best for ourselves. America's mothers will recognize our superior fabrics,
our superior workmanship and our superior value. For this reason, only, will your
job be secure.... Not because I promise you, or because some paid Union Organizer
promises you, but because those people, voting in the last election, promised them-
selves and because tomorrow, we will promise to ourselves.
Now, strangely enough, by beginning with trying to give the best to America's chil-
dren, do we end up receiving the best. I would like to read to you the statistics-Heie
in business, as everywhere, it's better to give than to receive.
Now, the vast majority of our competitors are in the South. How then, with the
wages paid there, as compared to what we are paid, does it happen that we are over
twice as big as we were, and the highest paid? For the same reason we are standing
here today-Because those people, nine years ago, made this a better place to work in,
-because they were determined to give the best to America's children. AND, if any-
one is standing here nine years from today, it will be because of our determination
tomorrow.
The very fact we are in crowded conditions, considering expansion, here or else-
where, whichever is best for the company, is because of that determination.
This is the American Free Competitive System. This is our only right to exist.
This is what will make this company greater, this community greater and this country
greater-not any promise of mine, certainly not the promise of any paid Union Orga-
nizer, but our promise, each and everyone of us, to our children tomorrow.
It was suggested that I be sure and call your attention to the deceptive presentation
of facts by the Union in our ability to relocate this plant. Deception in their presenta-
tion of decisions by United States Courts of Justice, Deception in presentation of
wage promises, Deceptions about the wage changes of the engineering program. The
only thing about all these deceptions that concerns me, is that some of us were, for a
time, unknowingly deceived into carrying these deceptions to our fellow employees.
Perhaps there are still a few left. I hope there are none by tomorrow, because I like
to believe there isn't a single person here who would knowingly deceive the person
on the next machine.
There is still time to know.
God Bless You.
APPENDIX B
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION
GREENFIELD , INDIANA
To Our Employees:
August 27, 1962
The election to be held at the plant Wednesday, August 29th, is of such importance
to all of us that we want to take this opportunity to discuss with you in your home
problems which it raises for all of us at the Company, and which it may raise for those
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION 155
in your home. Voting will be by secret ballot and will take place on Wednesday
between 2:00 and 4 : 00 P.M. Nothing which you may have signed beforehand has
any effect whatsoever on your absolute right to vote as you see fit on Wednesday.
The election will decide whether or not you will continue to have the right to speak
for yourself and deal directly with us on matters concerning hours, wages, and
working conditions , or whether you must give up that right to the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers Union. You alone must decide whether a union organizer whom
you may see once a year , if at all , and who does not even live in our community, can
do more for you and the needs of your family than our Company can.
Many of us have been working together at the plant for a good many years. We've
come a long way in those years , as most of you well know. Working together, we
have turned out many products we all can take a share of pride in . That same work-
ing together has developed and improved and will continue to improve working con-
ditions of which we can all be proud . The simple fact that there are more than twice
as many people such as yourself now employed at Indiana Rayon than there were
eight or nine years ago is proof of what our working together has meant to you and
the many families like yourself in this area who would otherwise probably not be
working in or near Greenfield . During the past eight or nine years we have done our
best to improve rates , fringe benefits , and working conditions as fast as the business
operations and our competition has permitted . As you all know, practically 100% of
our competition is now located in the South . At the present time we are, on the
average, paying more in rates and fringe benefits than the competitors whose prices
we must be able to meet in order to sell our products to our customers-and obviously
our customers must continue to be satisfied , not only with the quality of our product,
but with the price as well . No business can remain in operation for very long if its
customers should leave and go to a competitor because quality is better , price is
better, service is better , or for any combination of these three main factors We are
sure that each of you has a friend or friends who work in a union plant and know all
about problems that may arise , such as short paychecks or no paychecks that strikes
bring. Strikes are the union's system , certainly not ours. We think it is important for
you to know that under Federal law when a union calls a strike among employees
over wages or other money matters, and if the employer decides to continue his opera-
tion in the struck plant to satisfy and keep his customers, and is, therefore , forced to
hire new employees to permanently take the place of those on strike, those striking
employees forever lose their right to come back to work for that employer . In effect,
the striking employees merely change places with unemployed persons who were look-
ing for work before the strike began.
We are sure that the union man from New Albany ( that 's a long way from Green-
field) or one of his representatives has indicated to some of you what they think they
could do for you . We promise you-and I think we 're in a position to know-that
there is absolutely no difference in rates of pay and fringe benefits which can be avail-
able to you at Indiana Rayon with a union from those which are available to you
without a union.
You must decide whether you want to share a part of each paycheck with the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union to pay initiation fees, monthly dues, plus
fines and assessments which can be made against you by that union , or whether you
would rather have rates of pay and fringe benefits to keep for yourself and your
family what you have earned and which is yours. Look at the union plants in this
area and compare the steadiness of their employment with ours. Even in a seasonal
industry such as ours we have done our best and will continue to do our best to avoid
layoffs and short paychecks wherever possible.
THINK CAREFULLY about the matters which we have pointed out, keeping in
mind what the Company cannot and will not do any more for you with a union than
it has done and will do without a union. We sincerely believe that after you have
carefully studied this matter you will vote "NO" on Wednesday . A majority of the
votes cast will decide this important matter. Don't let anyone make that decision for
you. We urge you to vote and firmly believe that it is in your best interests and in the
best interests of your family to vote "NO."
We want to thank you in advance for taking the time at your home to give this your
careful consideration.
Sincerely,
INDIANA RAYON CORPORATION
By Buddy Rosenfield