Hydril Co. of California

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 18, 1940

23 N.L.R.B. 970 (N.L.R.B. 1940)

In the Matter Of HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and Ou.. WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION , LocAL 128, C. I. O.
Case No. C-1506.-Decided May 18, 1940
Pressure Drilling Equipment Manufacturing Industry-Interference , Restraint,
and Coercion-Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining : all production and
maintenance employees , excluding supervisory and clerical employees ; stipula-
tion as to-Representatives : proof of choice : prior certification ; objections to
evidence upon which finding of majority and certification thereof were based,
without merit-Collective Bargaining : refusal to negotiate in good faith : refusal
of employer to recognize certified Union as exclusive bargaining representative ;
failure of employer to enter into discussions with a sincere purpose to find a
basis of agreement concerning the issues presented and to make contractually
banding such understandings reached in a written signed agreement ; procedure
followed by respondent during and after conferences restricted negotiations to
mere discussions to clarify employer policy and reduce Union to role of mere
advisory body to the management ; ordered to bargain with the Union on
request, and to embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement, upon
request.
Mr. M. A. Prowell, for the Board.
Latham d Watkins, by Mr. Paul R. Watkins, of Los Angeles,
Calif., for the respondent.
Mr. Fred L. Phillips, of Los Angeles, Calif., for the Union.
Mrs. Augusta Spaulding, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF, 'THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by Oil Workers International Union,
Local 128, C. I. 0., herein called the Union, the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director
for the Twenty-first Region (Los Angeles, California) issued its
complaint, dated January 24, 1940, against Hydril Company of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, California, herein called the respondent, alleg-
ing that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor
23 N. L. R. B., No. 105.
970
HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 971
Relations Act; 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the
complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon
the respondent and the Union?
In respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in
substance (1) that although the Board on July 7, 1939, had found
that the Union represented a majority of the respondent's employees
in an appropriate bargaining unit and had certified the Union as
the exclusive representative of all employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining, 2 the respondent, on or about July
16, 1939, and at all times thereafter, refused, upon request, to bargain
collectively in good faith with the Union in that, inter alia, it refused
to embody understandings reached with the Union in a written agree-
ment for a definite period of time; and (2) that by the above and
other acts the respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act.
The respondent filed an answer, dated February 2, 1940, denying
that the Board had jurisdiction over it and that it had engaged in
any unfair labor practices, and asserting that the Board' s certifica-
tion of the Union as exclusive bargaining representative, dated July
7, 1939, was invalid.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on February 5, 1940, at
Los Angeles, California, before William B. Barton, the Trial Exam-
iner duly designated by the Board. The Board and the respondent
were represented by counsel, the Union by one of its officials,' and
all participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence
bearing on the issues was afforded all parties.
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties the record of all the pro-
ceedings in the prior representation case, Case No. R-1381,3 was made
'a part of the record in the instant case. During the hearing the
Trial Examiner made various rulings as to the admission of evidence
and' granted a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the
proof. The Board -has reviewed these rulings and finds that no
prejudicial errors were committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed.
On March 4, 1940, the Trial Examiner filed his Intermediate
Report, a copy, of which was duly served on all parties, finding that
the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and
(5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and recommending that
• 1 Fcrcice of notice of hearing was also made upon Central Labor Council and Los An.
geles Industrial Union Council Neither organization appeared at the hearing.
2 Mat ter of Ilytd, it Company of California and Ott Workers International Union, Local
A.8, C. I . 0., 13 N . L. R. B. 507
0 See footnote 2, supra
972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the respondent cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and,
affirmatively, that it bargain collectively with the Union and embody,
understandings reached in a signed, written contract. On April 3,
1940, the respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
on April 16, 1940, a brief. The Board has considered the respond-
ent's exceptions and brief and in so far as the exceptions are
inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below,
finds them to be without merit.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The respondent, Hydril Company of California, is a California
corporation. At its plant in Torrance, Los Angeles County, Cali-
fornia, it is engaged in the threading of drill pipe and casing and
in the manufacture of pressure-drilling equipment and tool joints for
drill pipe. During the year 1939 the respondent used $394,708 worth
of raw materials, consisting chiefly of steel, forgings, castings, and
sundry commercial articles. Of this amount $465 represented the
value of raw materials purchased from points outside California.
During the same year the respondent's sales exceeded $1,250,000, of
which about $300,000 represented the value of products sold by the
respondent to purchasers in other States and foreign countries.
In 1939 the respondent advertised its products in the following
publications : -Oil Weekly, Institute of Petroleum Technologists, Oil
Equipment, Oil and Gas Journal, Petroleum World, and World
Petroleum.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Oil Workers International Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., is a labor
,organization affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
It admits to membership production and maintenance employees at
the respondent's plant, excluding supervisory and clerical employees.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
C
A. The refusal to bargain collectively
1. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges and the parties stipulated that all produc-
tion and maintenance employees of the respondent at its Torrance,
California, plant, excluding clerical and supervisory employees, con.
stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
i
HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 973
We found this unit appropriate in the previous representation case.'
We see no reason for departing from the unit agreed to by the parties
and previously found appropriate by this Board.
We find that all production and maintenance employees of the re-
spondent at its Torrance, California, plant, excluding clerical and
supervisory employees, constituted and constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of elnploy=
ment, and that said unit insures to the employees of the respondent
the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining and otherwise effectuates the policies of the Act.
2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit
In our Decision and Certification of Representatives of July 7, 1939,
we found that a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit
had designated and selected the ITnion as their bargaining repre-
sentative and certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of all the employees in such unit. The respondent
questions the validity of this certification. The finding of majority
and the certification thereof were based upon five petitions, which
were introduced in evidence in the representation case over objection
of the respondent, and testimony concerning the petitions. These
petitions stated that the "undersigned employees" of the respondent
designated the Union as "their sole agency for collective bargaining
on the matters of wages, hours, and working conditions in their em-
ployment with the Company." All the petitions are dated February
25, 1939, and contain 129 names, which the Union claimed were sig-
natures of employees of the respondent. The names of 123 of the
199 employees in the appropriate unit, as shown by the respondent's
pay roll of May 13, 1939, which was introduced in evidence in the
representation proceeding, appear among the 129 names on the peti-
tions. Uncontradicted testimony of two 5 of the five members of a
committee of the Union appointed for the purpose of securing signa-
tures of employees of the respondent to the petitions showed the
manner in which the petitions were circulated among the employees
and established that the names on the petitions which also appeared
on the respondent's pay roll of May 13, 1939, were the signatures of
employees in the appropriate unit .6 Both of these witnesses were
4 See footnote 2, supra
c One of these two was chairman of the union committee and supervised the preparation
and circulation of all ffie petitions and saw some signatures affixed by employees on each
of the petitions.
In our Decision in the representation case we said : "Union Representative Phillips tes-
tified that because the Union did not desire to place its membership cards in evidence, and
in oidcr to bring its authority to represent the Company 's [respondent 's] employees up to
date, these petitions w ere prerarcd and circulated among employees of the Company on and
after February 25, 1939, which date each petition bears . Maurice K . Loyd, chairman of a
974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cross-examined by the respondent's counsel who in no way chal-
lenged the truthfulness of their testimony. The respondent intro=
duced no evidence in the representation case which cast the slightest
doubt on the genuineness of any of the signatures on the petitions or
the manner in which the signatures were obtained. We find the
objection to the introduction of the petitions in evidence, made by
the respondent in the representation proceeding on the ground that
"no proper foundation" had been laid and on other grounds, and now
urged in the instant case, is without merit.?
We find that on July 7, 1939, and at all times thereafter, the Union
was the duly designated representative of a majority of the employees
in the appropriate unit and that, by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the
Act, was, on that date and at all times thereafter, the exclusive rep-
resentative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining with the respondent in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.
3. The refusal to bargain collectively
The Company, the Union, and counsel for the Board stipulated,
and we find, the following facts :
During September and October 1939 a series of conferences be-
tween the respondent and the Union was held for the purpose of
bargaining collectively. During these conferences the Union pre-
sented to the respondent a proposed agreement covering rates of pay,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.a Also
during the conferences the respondent presented the Union with a
written counterproposal.°
At the first conference, and again at subsequent conferences, the
respondent stated to the Union that the respondent was going into
committee of the Union appointed for that purpose , and four members of the committee
clicu 'ated the five petitions among employees of the Company . They advised the em-
ployees solicited , both members and non -members of the Union, to read the caption and
sign the petitions if they chose , and that signing was an authorization for the Union to
repiescnt the si ;ners for purposes of collective bargaining only and was not an assumption
of membership in the Union . Boyd supervised the solicitation of signatures carried on by
the other four members of the committee . The solicitation occurred on Company property,
before and after work and during lunch hour , but not during working hours."
7 The respondent excepted to certain statements in the Board's decision in the representa-
tion case as erroneous . These exceptions are without merit and , if meritorious, are
immateiial.
8 A copy of this agreement , designated Exhibit "A," is attached to the stipulation of the
parties, designated Board Exhibit No. 4. The preamble of this agreement pros ides
"The Articles of Agreement are entered into between the Hydril Company of California,
Torrance , California , called as ' the Company ,' and the Oil Workers International Union,
hereinafter called `the Union,' for and on behalf of all employees of the Company , covered
by the certification of the National Labor Relations Board on the 7th day of July, 111)39.",
Article I provides :
"Agency and employees covered-The Company recognizes the Oil Workers International
Union and Local #128 of said Union , as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees
covered herein on matters of wages, hours , and conditions , of employment."
8 Exhibit "B" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4. This counterproposal does not contain
the two provisions , set forth in footnote 8, supra , of the Union 's proposed agreement.
HYDRIL COMPANY, OF CALIFORNIA - 975
the negotiations with an open mind on all questions, specifically in-,
eluding the advisability of a contract, and if made with whom it
should be made.
As a result of the above-described conferences concerning the re-
spondent's counterproposal, it was revised and rewritten.10 A con-
ference was then had on the revised counterproposal. • At this confer-
ence the Union stated that the revised counterproposal was not
entirely satisfactory to it but apparently was as far as the respondent
would go, and then requested that the terms of the revised counter-
proposal be embodied in a written agreement, for a definite period
of time, to be executed by both parties.
The respondent advised the Union that the respondent had given
this matter considerable thought and had concluded that it should
not make an agreement with either its employees or the Union;
that the respondent intended to have these principles govern its
relationship with its employees; and that these principles were mat-
ters which, in the practical operation of the business, may be changed
from time to time. The respondent thereafter advised the Union
that so long as the Union represented the majority of the employees
there would be no change in wages, hours, or working conditions
without first taking it up with the Union.
Subsequently the respondent caused to be published and posted
in its plant a bulletin dated October 25, 1939,11 and thereafter on
November 24,1939, a further bulletin.12
We further find'that each bulletin contains numbered statements
covering hours of work, rates of pay, and other conditions of em-
ployment; that like the original and revised counterproposals, neither
bulletin contains the two provisions of the Union's proposed agree-
thent set forth in footnote 8 above, but that each bulletin merely
states : "This bulletin has to do with the employees who are paid on
an hourly basis"; that neither bulletin is signed by the Union or the
respondent; that neither bulletin mentions or refers to the Union by
name or in any way expresses recognition of the Union.
On the basis of the above underlying facts we find that:
(1) -The respondent has refused and failed to recognize-the-Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of the respondent's em-
ployees in the appropriate unit. This is shown by the respondent's
words and deeds during and after the conferences, in particular by
the omission from the respondent's original and revised counter-'
proposals of any provision recognizing the Union as exclusive bar-.
10 Exhibit "C" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4. The revised and rewritten counter
proposal also does not contain the two provisions , set forth in footnote 8, supra, of the
Union's proposed agreement.
11 Exhibit "n" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4.
10 Exhibit "E" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4.
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gaining representative, although the,proposed agreement submitted
by the Union contained such provisions, by the respondent's un-
willingness throughout the conferences to accept the Union as an
equal and responsible participant with whom a mutually binding
agreement- embodying understandings reached should be made, by
the respondent's posting of unilateral bulletins, and by the omission
from such bulletins of any reference to the Union.
(2) The respondent entered into the discussions without a sin-
cere purpose to find a basis of agreement concerning the issues pre-
sented and to make contractually binding such understandings upon
terms as might be reached.13 This is shown by the respondent's
statement at the first and subsequent conferences that it was confer-
ring with an "open mind" on the matter of whether it would make a
contract at all, and with whom, by its statement at the final confer-
ence that it had concluded not to make an agreement with either,
the Union or the employees, and by the posting of the unilateral
bulletins.
(3) The respondent and the Union reached an understanding on
many subjects, but the respondent, upon request, refused to embody
such understanding in a signed, written agreement with the Union .14
(4) The procedure followed by the respondent during and after
the conferences restricted the negotiations to mere discussions to
clarify employer policy and reduced the Union to the role of a mere
advisory body to the management.
(5) By the conduct specified in the four preceding paragraphs the
respondent refused to bargain with the Union in good faith.
(6) The conduct of the respondent specified in the five preceding=
paragraphs did not constitute collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of the Act. Collective bargaining, as contemplated by the Act,
is a procedure looking toward the making of a collective agreement
by the employer with the accredited representatives of his employees
concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. The
duty to bargain collectively, which the Act imposes upon employers,
has as its objective the establishment of such a contractural relation-
13 In its brief the respondent states :
"The record very clearly and without any contradiction whatsoever shows (1) that the
Company was unwilling to enter an acreement with anybody, and (2) that what it pro-
posed would be only piincipics goxerning its relationship with its employees"
"While tl-e Union stated that the revised counterproposal was not entirely satisfactory
to it. it demonstrated its willingness to accept the counterproposal by requestin the re-
spondent to (moody the terms thereof in a signed, written agreement for a definite period
of time. The request of the Union t"at the agreement be for a definite period of time does
not indicate that the parties had not reached an understanding on the revised counter-
proposal Theie is nothing in the record to suggest that the respondent refused to embody
the terms of the revised counterproposal in a signed, written agreement because it was
unwilling to make it for a definite period of time or because there was any disagreement
between the respondent and the Union over the duration of an agreement. See footnote
13, supra.
HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 977
ship to the end that employment relations may be stabilized and ob-
struction to the free flow of commerce thus prevented. The duty
is not limited to the recognition of the employees" representatives
qua' representatives, or to a meeting and discussion of terms with
them. The duty encompasses an obligation to enter into discussion
and negotiation with an open and fair mind and with a sincere
purpose to find a basis of agreement concerning the issues presented,
and to make contractually binding the understanding upon the terms
that are reached. In none of these'respects has the respondent ful-
filled its duty to bargain collectively.
We find that the respondent, by the acts and conduct set forth in
each and all of the six preceding paragraphs, refused to bargain col-
lectively with the Union as the exclusive, representative of its em-
ployees in the appropriate unit in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employmentl'
We find that by such refusal to bargain collectively witli the Union,
the respondent interfered with; restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for
the purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and pro
tection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. TIIE EFFECT OF TIIE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section III
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent
described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and
with foreign countries and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
15 National Labor Relations Board v Sunshine Mining C9 , 110 F (2d) 780 ( C. C A 0),'
enf'g as modified Matter of Sunshine Mining Company and International Union of Aline,
dill and Smelter lVorlers , 7 N. L R . B. 11.;2; National Labor Relations Board v . Biles-
Coleman Lumber Co ., 98 F. (2d ) 18 (C. C. A. 9), enf'g Matter of Biles -Coleman Lumber
Company and Puget Sound District Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, 4 N. L.
Ii. B. 071); National Labor Relations Board v. Griswold Manufacturing Co, 106 F. ( 2d) 713
(C. C. A. 3), ent'g Matter of The Griswold Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated
Ass'u of lion , Steel and Tin IVo9, ers of North A merica, Lodge No 1193 , 6 N L. R B 298;
Heinz Company v National Labor Relations Board, 110 F ( 2d) 843 (C C A 6), enf'g Mat-
ter of II J . Ileinr Company and Canning and Pickle Workers , Local Union No 325, etc.,
10 N L . R B 963; Hartsell Mills Co v National Labor Relations Board , 111 F ( 2d) 291,
(C. C. A. 4 ), enf'g as mocl'ficd as to other issues Matter of Hartsell Mills Company and
Textile Workers Oigan'zrng Committee, 18 N. L R B 269; Fort Wayne Corrugated
Paper Co. V Notional Labor Relations Board, 111 F ( 2d) 869 ( C C A 7 ), enf'g Matter
of Fort I1,ayne Corrugated Paper Company and - Local No. 182 , International Brotherhood
of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers , 14 N. L R. B 1; Matter of Westinghouse
Electric & Manufacturing Company, et at. and United Eldetrical , Radio and , Machine Work-
ers of America, et al, 22 N. L. R. B. 147 , and the court and Board decisions collected
therein.
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
V. THE REMEDY
, Having found that the respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices , we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom. We have
found that the respondent has refused to bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
employees within the appropriate bargaining unit although the Union
vas and is the statutory representative of these employees for the
purposes of collective bargaining. Among other things, the respond-
ent has refused to grant the Union recognition as the statutory rep-
resentative and has refused to embody understandings reached with
it in a signed, written agreement. We shall address our order specifi-
cally to the wrongs sought to be remedied. In order, therefore, to
effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act, we shall, in aid of our
cease and desist order, order the respondent to recognize and otherwise
bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if
understandings are reached with the Union, to embody such under=
standings in a signed agreement, if requested to do so by the Union.
, Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon ' the
entire, record in the, case, the Board makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Oil Workers International Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., is^ a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees of the respondent
at its Torrance , California , plant , excluding supervisory and clerical
employees , constituted and constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining , within the meaning of Section 9 (b)
of the Act.
3. Oil Workers International Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., is and at
all times since July 7, 1939, has been the exclusive representative of
all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing to bargain collectively with Oil Workers Interna-
tional Union , Local 128 , C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all
its employees in such unit , the respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices , within the meaning of Section
8 (5) of the Act.
5. By interfering with , restraining, and coercing its, employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 979
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices, and each of them, are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section
2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
, Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of la-w',
and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent,
`ydril Company of California, Los Angeles, California, and its,
officers, agents, successors, and assigns- shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Oil Workers Inter-
national Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of
all its production and maintenance employees at its Torrance, Cali-
fornia, plant, excluding supervisory and clerical employees;
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid and protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National-
Labor Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Oil Workers Inter-
national Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of
all its production and maintennace employees at its Torrance, Cali-
fornia, plant, excluding supervisory and clerical employees, in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment; and, if an understanding is reached on such matters,
embody said understanding in a signed agreement with said labor
organization, if requested to do so by said labor organization ;
(b) Post immediately in conspicuous places at its plant, and main-
tain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date
of posting, notices to its employees stating : (1) that the responder tt
will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to cease and
desist in paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this Order; and (2) that the
respondent will take the affirmative action set forth in paragraph 2 (a)
of this Order;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region in
writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what,steps
it has taken to comply herewith.'