Huttig Sash and Door Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 9, 1965

151 N.L.R.B. 470 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
is not suitable where, as here, the 'future scope and composition
of the unit is in substantial doubt, making it impossible to resolve
unit questions now, and giving rise to the danger of prejudice
to other parties who may have an interest therein. In the instant
case , we do not know what types of employees will be employed
and what the nature of their skills and duties will be.6 Accordingly,
we shall grant the Intervenor's motion to dismiss the petition as
premature.?
[The Board dismissed the petition without prejudice to the filing
of a new petition at a time when a representative and substantial
complement of employees exists at the Detroit facility.]
See Armstrong Cork Compnny, supra, at 1580.
IS. G. Adams Company, 107 NLRB 348; Cramet, Inc., 112 NLRB 975; The Lindsay
Wire Weaving Company , 116 NLRB 456 ; Slater System Maryland, Inc ., 134 NLRB 865.
Huttig Sash and Door Company and Local Union 1469 , United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO.
Case No. 11-CA-2456. March 9, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 7, 1964, Trial Examiner Sidney D. Goldberg issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, brief, and the entire
record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom-
151 NLRB No. 56.
HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY 471
mended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent,
Huttig Sash and Door Company, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
In this proceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the complaint 1 alleges that Respondent, after having reached agreement
with the collective-bargaining representative of its employees, unjustifiably refused to
execute a written contract incorporating that agreement and thereby committed an
unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
Respondent answered, denying the commission of unfair labor practices, and a
hearing on the issues so raised was held befoie Trial Examiner Sidney D. Goldberg
at Charlotte, North Carolina, on September 3, 1964, at which all parties were repre-
sented and afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and
argue upon the facts and the law.
For the reasons hereinafter set forth in detail, I find that Respondent and the
Charging Party (herein called the Union) reached an agreement on May 18, 1964,
and that Respondent has refused, without justification, to execute a written contract
embodying that agreement.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent, a Delaware corporation having its principal office in St. Louis,
Missouri , is engaged in manufacturing and distributing millwork and building
products. It has production plants at Missoula, Montana, St. Louis and Kansas City,
Missouri, and 14 assembly plants in 9 different States. The assembly plant at
Charlotte, North Carolina, which is involved in this proceeding, annually imports
into North Carolina material valued at more than $50,000 and annually exports
finished products valued at more than $50,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
On December 20, 1961, the Regional Director of the Board for Region 11, after an
election conducted under his supervision, certified the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the unit described
as follows:
All production and maintenance employees at the Charlotte, North Carolina,
plant, including leadman, but excluding office clerical employees, sales employees,
professional and technical employees and guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find, that the foregoing is an appro-
priate unit for collective-bargaining purposes.
Thereafter, on or about April 26, 1962, Respondent and the Union entered into a
collective-bargaining contract for a period of 2 years. The contract provided for
notice by either party 60 days prior to the expiration thereof of a desire to amend it.
On February 17, 1964,2 the Union notified Respondent that it wished to renew the
contract with 12 specific modifications, including a wage increase in an amount to be
stated at the first bargaining conference.
Issued August 4, 1964, on a charge filed June 18 and an amended charge filed
July 22, 1964.
2 All dates hereinafter are In 1964 unless otherwise specified.
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. The negotiations
1. The evidence
Craven L. Deese, International Representative of the Union, was the principal
witness for the General Counsel and his testimony was corroborated, in most of its
important respects, by the testimony of six of the seven employee-members of the
union negotiating committee. On Respondent's motion, the witnesses were excluded
from the hearing room prior to testifying and Deese, who remained as representative
of the Union, testified first. Each of the employee-witnesses, as well as Deese, testified
credibly; there are no significant inconsistencies in their testimony and the docu-
mentary evidence is corroborative.
Respondent introduced no evidence but based its defense on testimony adduced on
cross-examination of the General Counsel's witnesses.
2. The defense
In addition to its general attack on the sufficiency of the proof in support of the
General Counsel's case, Respondent's defense is that Manager Barnett, who conducted
the negotiations on behalf of Respondent, was without authority to make an agree-
ment and that the Union was aware of this limitation on his authority.
The only evidence in support of this defense is the testimony of Deese that, during
the negotiations for the contract in 1962, which were also conducted for Respondent
by Barnett, a man named McSorley from the St. Louis office of the Company, took
"the leading part" in the negotiating sessions at which he was present. Deese also
testified that McSorley said, at one point, in the 1962 negotiations, that he had made
a telephone call to St. Louis concerning wage rates.
The evidence, however, is undisputed that Barnett was not only the manager of
Respondent's Charlotte plant and, to the employees, the chief representative of
Respondent there, but he had signed the 1962 contract on behalf of Respondent and, in
addition, as such manager, he communicated Respondent's counteroffer of changes
and modifications for the new contract. Moreover, Respondent's answer herein
admits the allegation of the complaint that "W. W. Barnett-Manager ... has been
and is now an agent of Respondent . . . acting on its behalf ...." The foregoing
factors-what Barnett and Respondent did, rather than what Barnett said-constitute
a prima facie showing that Respondent has held Barnett out as its agent having
plenary authority to act for it with respect to the Charlotte plant.3
I regard McSorley's limited participation in the negotiations of 1962 as insub-
stantial when measured against the evidence of Barnett's continued supreme status at
Charlotte as manager, his execution for Respondent of the 1962 contract, his signature
on the counterproposals in 1964, his complete domination of Respondent's side of the
bargaining herein, and the absence of any evidence that Respondent had ever other-
wise suggested, either to the employees or the Union, that there was any limitation
on Barnett's apparent plenary authority .4
Upon all the evidence, therefore, I find that Barnett was the general agent of
Respondent with respect to the Charlotte plant and that any action taken by him in
connection with a collective-bargaining contract covering the employees there is
binding upon Respondent.
3. Findings
The undisputed evidence shows, and I find, as follows:
The parties first met on March 19: Manager Barnett, Plant Superintendent Tor-
rence, and Harold Caudill, an office employee whose duties were not described,
represented Respondent; the Union was represented by International Representative
Deese and a negotiating committee of seven employees consisting of Herman E.
McCoy, chairman, Charles D. Barkley, Wilbert Geer, Craven Hunsucker, Johnny
Johnson, William E. Shinn, and Marshall Townsend. At this meeting they discussed
iThe Act, in Section 2(13) defining "agent," provides that the existence of actual
authority shall not be controlling. See also' James Thompson & Co, Inc., 100 NLRB
456, 462, enfd in part 208 F. 2d 743 (CA. 2) ; Rural Electoic Company, Inc, 130
NLRB 799, 801-802, enfd. in part 296 F. 2d 523 (CA. 10) ; Birmingham Fabricating
Company, 140 NLRB 640; Square Binding and Ruling Co., Inc., 146 NLRB 206.
4 Barnett's assurances that he had full authority to make an agreement are here
treated, not as representations as to his agency, but as serving to negate the argument
that the Union was made aware of any limitation on his apparent power to do so as
established by the evidence above stated . ( Compare Paul Robey, an individual, d/b/a
Crown Drug Company, 136 NLRB 865.)
HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY 473
the 12 modifications proposed by the Union in its letter of February 17.5 No
progress was made: the company representatives said that the current agreement was
a good one and suggested that it be renewed.
Further meetings were held April 2, 9, 20, and 30, and on May 5, at which no
noticeable progress was made. At the meeting of April 9, the Company presented a
counterproposal, signed by Barnett, suggesting an increase of 5 cents an hour for
five named employees, a decrease of 5 cents an hour for four named employees,
elimination of checkoff, limitation of the size of the employees' negotiating committee,
and a modification of the contract provision relating to truckdrivers. The Union
rejected the Company's counterproposal. On April 20 it was proposed that repre-
sentatives of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and of the State Service
be requested to attend meetings thereafter and such representatives were present at
subsequent meetings. At the meeting of May 5 Barnett said that, during negotiations,
the terms of the previous contract would be maintained and that, if final agreement
should be reached at the next meeting, set for May 18, the new contract would be
made retroactive to April 27, the expiration date of the prior contract.
The meeting of May 18, the evidence shows, was regarded by both parties as
critical. On May 5, when the 18th was set as the date for the next meeting, Barnett
had said he was going to look into some cost figures and, as stated, that if an agree-
ment were reached on the 18th, it would be made retroactive to April 27. Deese
came to the meeting with prepared drafts of new articles covering "Jury Duty" and
"Death in the Family" and with revised language for insertion in the articles dealing
with seniority and working conditions.6
The principal question throughout the negotiations was wage rates and, at the
meeting of May 18, the discussion moved back and forth between that subject and
the proposals for changes in the contract terms. The meeting started at 5 p.m. and
continued until about 11 p.m. when agreement was finally reached on a wage increase
of 5 cents per hour for the first year and 4 cents per hour for the second year. Deese's
proposed changes in contract terms were accepted with some modifications and
agreement was also reached on several single-word or short-phrase changes in the
language of the contract . The modifications in the terms of the 1962 contract which,
I find , were agreed to by Respondent and the Union are set forth in detail in Appendix
A hereto.
In response to a question put by the Federal mediator , Barnett, on behalf of
Respondent and Deese , on behalf of the Union , each specifically stated that all neces-
sary subjects had been covered and that full agreement had been reached. Deese
said that a union meeting to ratify the agreement would be held on May 21; that since
the negotiating committee included so large a percentage of the union members he
had no doubt that the vote would be favorable and that , unless Barnett heard to the
contrary, he could assume that the agreement had been ratified . Barnett pointed out
that the agreement provided for continuation of checkoff and requested that Deese
send the Company a list of the men from whose wages deductions would be made
and Deese agreed to do so.
Barnett undertook to have the form of contract prepared but said that because his
duplicating machine was out of order , he doubted that this could be done before the
union meeting. Deese assured him that he had notes sufficient for the purpose.
Barnett then said that he would have the contract typed up the next morning and
copies prepared in town so that they would be ready for examination by the Union
within 3 or 4 days. He also made the point that he wanted the contract executed
promptly.
As the meeting was breaking up, Deese asked Barnett whether, before they
adjourned , he would discuss another matter, separate from the contract . Barnett
agreed and Deese began to discuss the discharge of a driver named "Helms." 7
Barnett refused to discuss the matter, saying that , since there was no contract in effect
when Helms was discharged , he would not deal with it as a grievance and had
5 All negotiations were on the basis of changes to be made in the form of the 1962
contract.
6 This draft bears the date May 5 Deese testified that he had discussed with
Respondent's representatives the wording of a new section 5 in article VI, dealing with
the performance of work by supervisors, but the record does not show whether the draft
was prepared for use at the meeting of May 5 or as a result thereof.
7 The original charge in this case was filed June 18 and stated, as a basis thereof,
that Respondent , " in order to discourage membership in a labor organization, discriminated
in regard to the hire and tenure of employment and to the terms and conditions of
employment of C. A. Helms on and after April 27, 1964 ." The amended charge was filed
July 22 and does not mention Helms.
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
returned the written statement thereof to Shop Steward McCoy; he felt that he was
justified in firing Helms and he would not meet with anyone concerning it. The men
then separated.
4. Subsequent occurrences
The Union met on May 21 and ratified the agreement.
Sometime before the end of the month Deese, telephoning his office from out of
town, asked his secretary whether the contract forms had been received. Upon
receiving a negative answer, he instructed her to call Barnett's office about them.
She did so and Barnett told her they were "out of town to be printed."
On May 31 the new contracts still not having been received, Deese instructed
McCoy to inquire of Barnett concerning them. The next morning McCoy went to
Barnett's office and told him that Deese had asked him to inquire about them.
Barnett said that "the contracts" had been sent "out of town to be printed" and that
he would call St. Louis to find out when they would be in Charlotte. Later that day,
Barnett called McCoy to his office and said that the contract would be there within
2 or 3 days so that the union officials could check it and prepare for the signing. At
this time Barnett also said that he could not sign the contract unless Deese gave him
"a written notice that he would drop the C. A. Helms case." McCoy said he knew
nothing about that matter but would convey the message to Deese.
Some days later Deese's secretary again called Barnett and asked whether the con-
tracts were ready. This time Barnett said that he could not "complete the contract"
until the Helms case had been dropped and she said she would give the message to
Deese.
On Saturday, June 13, Barnett called McCoy to his office and asked him whether
he had seen Deese. McCoy said he had not because Deese was out of town and
Barnett said that he had had a letter "from St. Louis" asking why the contract had not
been signed and their copies forwarded. Barnett also said that he wanted to get the
contract signed and the men paid. McCoy said that if Deese called he would give
him the message.
Deese returned to Charlotte on June 16 and learned from McCoy what had
occurred. He telephoned Barnett who said "my office won't release the contract for
me to be signed until I get a statement from you dropping the C. A. Helms case."
Deese protested that they had reached an agreement; Barnett conceded that this was
so and said he would try to get the contracts from the St. Louis office where they had
been sent for printing. The following day, when Deese again telephoned, Barnett
said he had not been able to reach the St. Louis office.
There were no further communications between Deese and Barnett on this matter.
The employees testified, that working conditions at Respondent's plant continued
as they had been under the prior contract except that supervision appeared to have
become less strict with respect to the nonunion employees than with the members of
the Union and that no grievances were being processed.
5. Conclusions
From the evidence in this case it appears, beyond doubt, that Respondent and the
Union arrived at complete agreement on the terms of a collective-bargaining contract
on May 18 and that Respondent has, without justification, refused to sign a written
contract embodying those terms. Aside from Respondent's claim-above discussed
and rejected-that the Union knew that Manager Barnett had no authority to make
an agreement, Respondent's only argument is that it was not "hostile" to reaching an
agreement with the Union This argument is irrelevant. Section 8(d) of the Act
defines the obligation, imposed by Section 8(a) (5), to bargain collectively as includ-
ing "the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party." In addition to the lack of any doubt that an agreement
was reached, there is also no doubt that the Union has requested the execution of a
written contract embodying the agreement. It follows, therefore, that by refusing to
execute the contract without justifiable reason for its refusal, Respondent has violated,
and is violating, Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.8
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, occurring in connection with
its operations set forth in section I, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to
trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
s Revere Metal Art Company, Inc., 146 NLRB 253; D . J. Calvert et al., d/b/a Monarch
Hardware & Mfg. Company, 145 NLRB 775; N L.R.B. v . R. D. Nesen, 211 F. 2d 559 (C.A. 9).
HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY 475
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it
will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It will be recom-
mended that, upon request of the Union, the Respondent execute a written contract
embodying the terms of the agreement made on May 18, 1964, comply with its terms
retroactively to April 27, 1964,9 and make its employees whole for any losses they
may have suffered by reason of Respondent's unlawful refusal to sign the contract.l9
If no such request is made by the Union, it will be recommended that Respondent
bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in this
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Charlotte, North
Carolina, plant, including leadmen, but excluding office clerical employees, sales
employees, professional and technical employees, and guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times since May 18, 1964, the Union has been, and now is, the exclusive
representative of the employees in the said unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing, on and after June 1, 1964, to execute a written contract incorporat-
ing the terms of the agreement reached on May 18, 1964, Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pur-
suant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is recommended that Respondent, Huttig Sash
and Door Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing, if requested to do so by the Union, to sign a written contract
embodying the terms of the agreement reached with the Union on May 18, 1964, and
to comply with its terms retroactively to April 27, 1964, or, if no such request is
made, refusing, on request, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Upon the request of the Union, sign forthwith a written contract embodying
the terms of the agreement reached with the Union on May 18, 1964, and comply
with its terms retroactively to April 27, 1964, making its employees whole for any
losses suffered by reason of its refusal to sign the contract, in the manner set forth
in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." If no such request is made,
upon request of the Union bargain collectively with it as the exclusive representative
of the employees in the above unit, and if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement.
a Ogle Protection Service, Inc. et at., 149 NLRB 545.
10 Backpay shall bear interest as prescribed in Isar Plumbing it Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Post at its plant in Charlotte, North Carolina, the attached notice marked
"Appendix B." 11 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 11, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respond-
ent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by
it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from
the receipt of this Decision 12 and Recommended Order, what steps it has taken to
comply herewith.
n In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
121n the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX A
The agreement reached May 18, 1964, between Respondent and the Union, I find,
followed the form of the contract between the parties covering the period April 27,
1962, to April 26, 1964, with the following modifications:
A, title IV
Title changed from "Seniority" to "Plant Wide Seniority".
Article IV
Section 1: In the sentence marked "(a)," for the words "departmental basis only"
were substituted the words "plant wide basis, as set out as follows:"
Section 5: For the words "twenty-four (24) hours" were substituted the words
"two working days".
Section 9: For the words "discharged" and "discharge", were substituted "sepa-
rated" and "separation" respectively.
Section 13: The following was added to the first paragraph:
If it should become necessary to further reduce the working force, the employee
shall have the right to exercise his seniority plant wide, providing he has the
skill and ability to perform said job.
Article VI
Section 5: This section was deleted and the following substituted:
At no time will any employee in supervisory authority or any other employee
not covered by this agreement be permitted to perform any of the work covered
by this agreement which would result in the layoff of a regular employee; but
management trainees will be allowed to perform such work during the training
period, providing such training does not result in the loss of earnings opportunity
for the employees covered in this agreement and shall not perform any work
in the cars.
The word "all" was omitted.
Article XIV
Article XXII
In the first paragraph: for "1962" was substituted "1964"; for "1963" was substi-
tuted "1965" and, for "six cents ($.06)", was substituted "five cents ($.05)".
In the third paragraph: for "1963" was substituted "1964" and, for "seven cents
($.07)," was substituted "four cents ($.04) ".
Article XXIII
For "1962" was substituted "1964" and, for "1964", was substituted "1966".
As separate articles, the following paragraphs were added:
JURY DUTY
Any employee called to serve on jury duty in the Courts shall be paid by the
Company the difference in what he receives for said jury duty as compared to
BURGER BOY FOOD-O-RAMA 477
his normal earnings of a forty hour week . This not to exceed two (2) in any
one year . Any employee excused , before noon , from further jury duty for the
day shall report for work for the remainder of the day.
DEATH IN FAMILY
In the event of death in the immediate family of any employee having sixty
or more days service , the employer agrees to pay a days ' pay for each day of
absence up to a maximum of three days , to be counted from the day of death
of the employee 's relative. Payments to the employee hereunder will be based
on the days the employee would have worked under his regular schedule during
such period . The immediate family shall be considered to include any of the
following: wife , son, daughter, mother, father, sister, brother.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL, if requested by Local Union 1469, United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, to do so, sign a written contract incor-
porating the terms of the agreement reached on May 18, 1964, with that Union,
said contract to be retroactive to April 27, 1964, and WE WILL make whole our
employees for any losses suffered by reason of our refusal to execute the con-
tract. If no such request is made, we will, upon request , bargain collectively
with that Union for the unit described herein with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if
an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees at our Charlotte , North Caro-
lina, plant , including leadmen , but excluding office clerical employees, sales
employees , professional and technical employees and guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain , or coerce
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Regresentative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1831
Nissen Building , 310 West Fourth Street, Winston-Salem , North Carolina, Telephone
No. 723-2911, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions.
B.B.S.A., Inc., d/b/a Burger Boy Food -O-Rama and United Store
Employees Union, Local #347, Retail , Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union , AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-3P249. March 9,
1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 31, 1964, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist there-
151 NLRB No. 58.