Hudson Ridge Owners Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 13, 1994

313 N.L.R.B. 1055 (N.L.R.B. 1994)

1055
313 NLRB No. 185
HUDSON RIDGE OWNERS CORP.
1 All dates are 1993 unless otherwise stated.
2 The judge’s decisions contain two inadvertent errors, which do
not affect our result. In the second paragraph of sec. III of the
judge’s initial decision, the reference to Goldberg should be to Sha-
piro. In the last sentence of the third paragraph of the judge’s sup-
plemental decision, the judge erroneously stated that Howard Horne
testified (inter alia) that Respondent Omni purchased goods and
services worth $1000 from suppliers outside the State of New Jersey
during the 12-month period preceding November 1992. Actually, the
parties stipulated to this fact without testimony from Horne on this
particular point.
Hudson Ridge Owners Corp. and Hudson Ridge
Owners Corp., Debtor in Possession, and Omni
Property Management Group, Inc., Joint Em-
ployers and Local 617, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO. Case 22–
CA–18579
April 13, 1994
DECISION AND SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
BY MEMBERS STEPHENS, DEVANEY, AND
BROWNING
On June 30, 1993,1 Administrative Law Judge Joel
P. Biblowitz issued his attached initial decision in this
proceeding, in which he found, inter alia, that the Re-
spondents are joint employers, but that the record
failed to establish that the operations of the Joint Em-
ployer Respondents met the statutory standard for the
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over this proceeding.
More specifically, the judge found that the record
failed to establish that in the 12-month period preced-
ing November 1992 the Respondents collectively pur-
chased more than a de minimis amount of goods and
services directly or indirectly from suppliers outside
the State of New Jersey. Thus, in his initial decision
the judge ultimately dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that the Respondents had been engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act. The judge did find in his initial decision, how-
ever, that if jurisdiction had been established he would
have concluded that the Respondents had violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged in the com-
plaint, by failing and refusing to execute the collective-
bargaining agreement that the parties agreed to in
1992.
Both the General Counsel and the Charging Party
filed exceptions, with supporting briefs, to the judge’s
finding that the record failed to establish the basis for
the Board’s assertion of statutory jurisdiction. In the
alternative, they requested that if the Board agreed
with the judge’s finding on this jurisdictional issue
then the case should be remanded to the judge for the
purpose of reopening the record to adduce additional
evidence on the jurisdictional issue.
The Respondents did not file any exceptions to the
judge’s initial decision, and did not file a response to
the exceptions filed by the General Counsel and the
Charging Party. Nor did the Respondents file an oppo-
sition to the General Counsel’s and the Charging Par-
ty’s alternative requests for a remand of the jurisdic-
tional issue to the judge.
On September 30, the Board issued an Order Re-
manding the Proceeding to Administrative Law Judge
for the purpose of reopening the record to receive ad-
ditional evidence on the above-described jurisdictional
issue, and thereafter issuing a supplemental decision
and recommended Order. In its Order Remanding, the
Board noted that no exceptions had been filed to the
judge’s findings that the Respondents are joint employ-
ers and that if jurisdiction had been established the Re-
spondents’ failure and refusal to execute the agreed-
upon collective-bargaining agreement would have been
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The
Board further noted that, consequently, the joint em-
ployer status of the Respondents and their failure and
refusal to execute the agreed-upon collective-bargain-
ing agreement were no longer at issue and, having thus
been finally decided, those matters were not within the
scope of the remand.
On December 3, the judge reopened the record pur-
suant to the September 30 Order Remanding. On De-
cember 17, the judge issued the attached supplemental
decision, finding that the record now establishes that
the operations of the Respondents meet the statutory
standard for the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over
this proceeding, and more specifically that the record
establishes that in the 12-month period preceding No-
vember 1992 the Respondents purchased more than a
de minimis amount of goods and services directly from
suppliers outside the State of New Jersey.
Respondent Omni filed exceptions, with a support-
ing brief, to the judge’s supplemental decision, and the
General Counsel and the Charging Party filed answer-
ing briefs to Respondent Omni’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the supplemental decision
and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and
has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2
and conclusions and to adopt the recommended supple-
mental Order as modified.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the De-
cember 17, 1993 recommended Order of the adminis-
trative law judge and orders that the Joint Employer
Respondents, Hudson Ridge Owners Corp. and Hudson
Ridge Owners Corp., Debtor in Possession, and Omni
Property Management Group, Inc., North Bergen, New
Jersey, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
1056 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 We adopt, inter alia, the judge’s recommendation as part of his
remedy that the Respondents be required to reimburse any employ-
ees for any loss of earnings or benefits they may have suffered as
a result of the Respondents’ unlawful failure and refusal to execute
the collective-bargaining agreement that the parties agreed to in
1992. Backpay for any such losses shall be computed in the manner
set forth in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd.
444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest to be computed in the
manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB
1173 (1987).
The judge inadvertently failed to include mention of this reim-
bursement aspect of his remedy in his notice to employees. We shall
substitute a revised notice for that of the judge.
1 Unless indicated otherwise, all dates are in 1992.
2 The discrepancy between these figures is caused principally by
the fact that Hudson operates on a calendar year and on a cash-flow
basis, so that the date that the maintenance payments were received
is when they were credited to Hudson’s account.
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modi-
fied.3
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(c) and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs.
‘‘(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to determine any amounts due under
the terms of this Order.’’
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to sign a contract with
Local 617, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO (the Union), the collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of certain of our employees, when all the
terms of the contract have been agreed on.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request of the Union, execute the con-
tract previously negotiated and agreed on with the
Union.
WE WILL reimburse any employees, with interest,
for any loss of earnings or benefits they may have suf-
fered as a result of our failure and refusal to execute
the contract previously negotiated and agreed on with
the Union.
HUDSON RIDGE OWNERS CORP. AND
HUDSON RIDGE OWNERS CORP., DEBT-
OR IN POSSESSION, AND OMNI PROP-
ERTY MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., JOINT
EMPLOYERS
Bert Dice-Goldberg, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thadeus R. Maciag, Esq. (Maciag & Northgrave), for Re-
spondent Hudson Ridge.
Donald Webb Dickson II, Esq., for Respondent Omni.
David Grossman, Esq. (Schneider, Goldberger, Cohen, Finn,
Solomon, Leder & Montalbano, P.C.), for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard by me on May 10, 1993, in Newark, New Jersey.
The complaint, which issued on November 9, 1992,1 and was
based on an unfair labor practice charge filed on July 22 by
Local 617, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–
CIO (the Union) alleges that Hudson Ridge Owners Corp.
and Hudson Ridge Owners Corp., Debtor in Possession
(Hudson), and Omni Property Management Group, Inc.
(Omni), at times collectively called Respondent as they are
alleged to be joint employers, violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) because, since about January 28, Omni failed and refused
to execute the agreement that Respondent and the Union had
reached full agreement on.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. JURISDICTION AND THE FACTS
Hudson is a New Jersey corporation engaged in the owner-
ship and operation of a condominium complex located in
North Bergen, New Jersey, the sole facility involved (the fa-
cility). Omni, also located in New Jersey, is a corporation
which is a managing agent for residential properties in the
State of New Jersey. Its connection with this matter is that
it is the managing agent for Hudson for the facility. Hud-
son’s income comes from the maintenance payments of the
facility’s apartment owners as well as the laundry receipts.
The gross receipts of Hudson in 1991 was $407,000; the
gross receipts for 1992 were $497,000.2 Omni’s owner and
sole shareholder, Howard Horne, testified that Omni’s gross
business, at the time of the hearing, was about $5000 a
month; ‘‘at one point it was probably as much as $12,000
1057HUDSON RIDGE OWNERS CORP.
3 As to where this fuel oil came from, he testified:
Without a careful review of the books and records and a de-
termination actually from the court as to whether or not fuel oil
which is purchased from a New Jersey fuel oil vendor yet is
picked up at a terminal in New York is out of state goods and
services, I can’t comment as to whether or not there was $5,000
worth of goods and services.
a month, but business is off in this economy.’’ Omni is the
managing agent for two or three other residential properties
in New Jersey in addition to the facility. As regards pur-
chases from outside the State of New Jersey, Horne testified
that fuel oil purchased for the facility from a New Jersey
vendor amounts to between $70,000 and $80,000 a year.3 Jay
Ferguson, who was employed at the facility between July
1990 and March 1993 as a porter, testified that he has ob-
served some supplies being delivered to the facility by Co-
lumbus Distributors with a truck that had New York State li-
cense plates. In addition, when the facility replaced the car-
peting in some of the ‘‘new units,’’ the carpeting was pur-
chased from a New York company. No amount was given
for the amount of these purchases. Horne testified that Omni,
which has only two employees, purchased its office supplies
from local retail stores in New Jersey.
As the managing agent for Hudson, Omni collects the
maintenance payments paid monthly, holds the money in a
trust account, pays the bills for the facility, and serves as a
conduit for information from the facility’s board of directors
to the facility’s employees. At least during early to mid-
1992, the employees at the facility were paid by check enti-
tled: ‘‘Omni Property Management Group, Inc. Hudson
Ridge Trust Account.’’ Counsel for Respondent Hudson
states that this bank account is a Hudson account with Hud-
son’s Federal identification number and that the payroll ac-
count also contains Hudson’s name and Federal identification
number with Omni’s mailing address.
Harold Petsch, vice president and business agent for the
Union, was the Union’s representative responsible for nego-
tiating a new collective-bargaining agreement to replace the
one that expired June 30, 1991. The principal representing
Respondent in these negotiations was Blake Kelly, vice
president of Omni. On May 20, 1991, Petsch sent his initial
contract proposals to Omni, and his initial meeting on July
30, 1991, was with Kelly. Between that time and October
1991, he had a number of phone conversations with Kelly
about the new contract. In October he met at Omni’s office
with Kelly, Horne, and Larry Shapiro, a principal officer of
Hudson to discuss the new contract. All spoke at the meeting
and (neither at this meeting nor at any other time) nobody
proposed that the new contract be limited to Hudson. At this
meeting, terms and conditions of employment, including
wages and holidays, were discussed. On January 2, Kelly
faxed him proposed modifications of the contract. Petsch tes-
tified that in a telephone conversation on January 17 he and
Kelly reached agreement on a tentative agreement. Three or
four days later, Petsch met with the employees at the facility
and informed them of the agreement that he reached with
Kelly; the employees voted to ratify the agreement. By letter
to Kelly dated January 28, Petsch enclosed the contract ‘‘for
your review. Please let me know your comments. Upon your
approval we will make final contract and meet for signa-
tures.’’ Having received no reply, Petsch called Kelly 2
weeks later and asked him if he had reviewed the contract
and he said that he had. Petsch asked him to sign it and re-
turn it to him, and he said that he would do so. On about
April 13, Petsch again called Kelly and asked him to sign
the contract and return it to him. He also asked Kelly when
he was going to pay the employees the new higher rate of
pay set forth in the new agreement and when he would pay
the retroactive pay that was owed to the employees. Kelly
told him that the following week the employees would re-
ceive the new rate of pay and retroactive pay; at about this
time Kelly did as promised. During this conversation, Kelly
asked Petsch to reduce the wage rate in the contract and the
Employer would make up the difference in overtime. He stat-
ed that they were negotiating a bank loan and would have
an easier time if the contract contained a lower wage rate.
Petsch refused unless they agreed to put it in writing, so they
dropped the proposal. In May, he again spoke to Kelly and
asked him when he was going to return the signed agreement
to him. Kelly said that he had given it to Horne for his sig-
nature and he was waiting for Horne to sign it. Petsch again
spoke to Kelly on about June 29, asking him to return the
signed agreement. Again, Kelly said that Horne had it on his
desk and was going to sign it. When he did, Kelly would
send it to him.
By letter dated September 4, counsel for Hudson mailed
counsel for the Union a copy of the contract. The enclosed
letter referred to two changes made in the contract: correct-
ing the name of the ownership entity and deleting the manag-
ing agent as a party to the contract. The enclosed contract
was signed by Horne. However, where the Employer (or Em-
ployers) were originally listed as ‘‘Owners of Hudson Ridge
Condominiums and Omni Management Company,’’ this was
crossed out on the cover and signature pages and replaced
by ‘‘Hudson Ridge Owners Corp.’’ on the cover page, and
‘‘Hudson Ridge Owners Corp. By Omni Management Com-
pany, Agent for Employer,’’ on the signature page. As stated
above, Petsch testified that at no time did Kelly, or anybody
else, ask him to exclude Omni from the contract. The first
time he was aware of that was when he received the signed,
altered agreement from counsel for Hudson.
At the hearing, the complaint was amended to allege that
George Affrey was a supervisor and agent of Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act.
Affrey is the superintendent at the facility; the regular com-
plement of employees at the facility has been three porters
and two maintenance employees. Horne testified that Affrey
‘‘directly supervises’’ these employees. Ferguson testified
that Affrey interviewed him, showed him around the facility,
explained what had to be done, and hired him on the spot.
Affrey receives calls from the tenants and distributes the
work to the employees. He tells employees what their work
schedule will be and occasionally he directs an employee to
cover for an absent employee. On one of those occasions, a
maintenance employee was absent for 3 months, Affrey told
Ferguson to fill in for him until they found somebody else.
In March 1993, Affrey’s gross weekly wages were $693; the
other employees’ wages ranged from $290 to $538. Ferguson
was laid off in about March 1993; at that time, Affrey told
him that Horne had called and said that they had to lay
somebody off, they had to cut back. I find that the evidence
establishes that Affrey was a supervisor within the meaning
of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act.
1058 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 The General Counsel alleges that because Respondent failed to
provide subpoenaed information regarding jurisdiction to the hearing
he should be allowed to use secondary evidence under Tropicana
Products, 122 NLRB 121 (1958), to prove jurisdiction here. I have
some difficulty with this request. The full subpoena was not sent
until May 5, 1993, and was received by Omni on May 6, 1993, two
business days before the commencement of the hearing. As stated
above, Omni is a two-person operation. Horne testified that the sub-
poenaed documents were in the possession of his accountant who
was not available when the subpoena was received. At the hearing,
Horne offered to open its records to the General Counsel’s inspec-
tion. I therefor find that Respondent did not refuse to supply the sub-
poenaed information, but rather, because of its situation, simply
needed additional time to make the documents available. I offered
the General Counsel the opportunity to adjourn the case to look over
the subpoenaed documents, but this offer was refused. The General
Counsel’s request is therefore denied.
5 It should be noted that even if I had allowed the use of second-
ary evidence here, Ferguson’s testimony was insufficient to establish
jurisdiction here.
III. ANALYSIS
The initial issue here is whether Respondent is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act. The gross receipts of Hudson were $407,000 and
$497,000 in calendar years 1991 and 1992. The discrepancy
is caused by, among other things, the fact that the Company
operates on a cash-flow basis and a slight delay in receiving
monthly maintenance charges could make a difference in
what year the receipts are credited to. It is clear, however,
that Hudson’s yearly gross does not reach the Board’s juris-
dictional standard of $500,000. In order to satisfy this stand-
ard, the General Counsel must establish that Hudson and
Omni (which grossed between $100,000 and $200,000 in
management fees in 1991 and 1992) are joint employers.4
Based on these facts, I find that Hudson and Omni are
joint employers of the employees at the facility. In NLRB v.
Browning-Ferris Industries, 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir.
1982), the court stated: ‘‘Where two or more employers exert
significant control over the same employees—where from the
evidence it can be shown that they share or co-determine
those matters governing essential terms and conditions of
employment—they constitute ‘joint employers’ within the
meaning of the NLRA.’’ Although Hudson and Omni have
separate ownership and control, I find that under the standard
set forth above they constitute joint employers. Omni pays
the employees from an account containing both Omni’s and
Hudson’s names and Hudson’s Federal identification number.
In addition, Omni’s control over the employees at the facility
is illustrated by the fact that when Ferguson was laid off
Affrey told him that Horne told him that somebody had to
be laid off. The principal evidence of the sharing of respon-
sibilities over the terms and conditions of employment for
the employees at the facility comes from the contract nego-
tiations and the resulting agreement. The principal negotiator
for Respondent was Omni Vice President Kelly. With the ex-
ception of the October 28 meeting where Goldberg was
present with Horne and Kelly, all Petsch’s contacts were
with Kelly. When he wanted to know when the employees
would be paid the new rate of pay, Kelly told him. When
Respondent wanted a change in the contract, Kelly asked
him. And finally, the contract was signed by Horne. All this
establishes that Omni significantly controls the employment
of maintenance personnel at the facility, and is therefore a
joint employer with Hudson of the employees at the facility.
Having found that Hudson and Omni constitute joint em-
ployers, their gross revenues can be combined. 373-381
South Broadway Associates, 304 NLRB 1108 (1991). Hud-
son’s gross revenues in 1991 and 1992 were $407,000 and
$497,000, respectively. Omni’s gross revenues during this
period was between $144,000 to about $60,000 at about the
time of the hearing. It is clear that during the events in ques-
tion, in 1992, the gross revenue of Hudson and Omni ex-
ceeded $500,000. 30 Sutton Place Corp., 240 NLRB 752
(1979). The other requirement for the assertion of jurisdiction
is that the entity’s purchase of goods from outside the State
be more than de minimis. Mar Del Plata Condominium
Assn., 282 NLRB 1012 (1987). As stated above, I have re-
jected the General Counsel’s request that it be allowed to es-
tablish the Board’s jurisdiction here through secondary evi-
dence, Ferguson’s testimony.5 The sole direct evidence estab-
lishing out-of-state purchases is a statement made by Horne
at the hearing. He and counsel for Hudson arrived late for
the hearing and, when I gave Horne an opportunity to state
his position, prior to being sworn, he stated, inter alia:
Without a careful review of the books and records
and a determination actually from the court as to
whether or not fuel oil which is purchased from a New
Jersey fuel oil vendor yet is picked up at a terminal in
New York is out of state goods and services, I can’t
make a comment as to whether or not there was $5000
worth of goods and services.
I find that this statement is not clear enough to constitute
evidence that the fuel oil that Respondent purchased comes
directly from outside the State of New Jersey. Rather it ap-
pears that it is just as likely that it was a theoretical state-
ment of where the oil might come from. Further, I find that
I cannot take official notice of the fact that there are pres-
ently no producing oil wells in the State of New Jersey as
a means of finding Board jurisdiction here. It may be that
Respondent purchases its oil from a dealer in New Jersey
which then purchases it from a New Jersey refinery, which
purchased it from outside the State of New Jersey. This
would be double indirect and not sufficient to establish juris-
diction.
Finally, by letter dated May 6, 1993, counsel for Hudson
wrote to counsel for the General Counsel. In addition to stat-
ing some jurisdictional facts, and stating, ‘‘this law firm does
not presently represent Omni,’’ the final paragraph states:
Finally, you asked if Omni would concede that it en-
gages in interstate commerce, in order that you might
withdraw your subpoena duces tecum. As I stated to
you on the telephone, I believe Omni would readily
stipulate to the fact that it has . . . purchased from time
to time a nominal amount of supplies from out-of-state
sources.
In a ‘‘Certification’’ presented by Horne when he arrived at
the hearing here, he stated that counsel for the General
Counsel requested that he stipulate that Omni’s gross reve-
nue exceeded $500,000 and that it purchased goods and sup-
1059HUDSON RIDGE OWNERS CORP.
6 I should state that had the jurisdictional requirements been met,
the violation here was pretty obvious. Petsch’s credible
uncontradicted testimony established that he had reached agreement
with Kelly on all the terms of a new agreement, and that on a num-
ber of occasions Kelly reassured him that Horne would sign it. As
I have found that Hudson and Omni are a joint employer, and Re-
spondent has presented no defense to Omni’s refusal to sign the
agreement that it negotiated with the Union, this refusal would have
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
plies valued in excess of $5000 directly from points outside
the State of New Jersey. He stated:
Omni is a very small concern. It currently employs
only two persons and at its highest point probably only
employed four. Omni’s gross revenues have never even
approached $250,000, and, without records, it is hard to
say if goods and supplies were purchased in that
amount from outside of the state, but it is not likely,
given that Omni does business solely in the State of
New Jersey and purchases most of its supplies, which
are such items as copy paper and computer ribbons at
Staples and like retail outlets in New Jersey.
In Horne’s sworn testimony, he repeated that Omni’s office
supplies are purchased at Staples and Office Max stores in
New Jersey.
I find that the admission contained in the May 6, 1993 let-
ter is insufficient to establish jurisdiction here. At the time
of the letter, Counsel Maciag was not the attorney for Omni
and he specifically said so in the letter. Also, the letter states
that he believed that Omni would stipulate that it ‘‘purchased
from time to time a nominal amount of supplies from out of
state sources.’’ Not only is this not a formal stipulation and
less than definitive, but it is contradicted by the statements
contained in Horne’s testimony and his certification that all
of Omni’s office supplies are purchased at local stores in
New Jersey.
On the basis of all the above evidence, I find that counsel
for the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respond-
ent has satisfied the Board’s jurisdictional requirement that it
purchase a de minimis amount of goods or supplies from
outside the State. I therefore recommend that the complaint
be dismissed.6
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Hudson and Omni constitute joint employers of the em-
ployees involved here.
3. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondent
has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
4. Therefore, the complaint is dismissed.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended7
ORDER
It having been found that Respondent’s operations does
not satisfy the Board’s jurisdictional requirements, the com-
plaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Bert Dice-Goldberg, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thomas Ludwig, Esq., for Respondent Omni.
David Grossman, Esq. (Schneider, Goldberger, Cohen, Finn,
Solomon, Leder & Montalbano, P.C.), for the Charging
Party.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was originally heard by me on May 10, 1993. I issued a de-
cision in the matter dated June 30, 1993, wherein I found
that General Counsel had failed to establish that the oper-
ations of the joint employer Respondents satisfied the
Board’s jurisdictional requirement that the employer purchase
a de minimis amount of goods or supplies from outside the
State. I did find that the joint employer Respondents satisfied
the Board’s $500,000 gross revenue standard and that if the
General Counsel had established that the Board had jurisdic-
tion herein, I would have found that the Respondents vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
By Order Remanding Proceeding to Administrative Law
Judge, dated September 30, 1993, the Board found that ‘‘the
record is inconclusive on the issue of whether the operations
of the joint employer Respondents meet the statutory stand-
ard for the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over this pro-
ceeding.’’ The Board therefore remanded the case to me ‘‘to
receive additional evidence on the issue of whether the joint
employer Respondents meet the statutory standard for the
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over this proceeding.’’
Pursuant to this remand, the hearing herein reopened on
December 3, 1993. The sole testimony was provided by
Howard Horne who, at the time of the events herein, was the
owner and sole shareholder of Respondent Omni Property
Management Group, Inc. which, at the time, was the manag-
ing agent for Hudson Ridge Owners Corp., which owned and
operated a condominium complex in North Bergen, New Jer-
sey. Horne testified that for the 12-month period preceding
November 1992, the jurisdictional period herein, Respondent
Hudson Ridge made purchases of in excess of $5000 from
suppliers outside the State of New Jersey, principally for ele-
vator and burner service, and that for the same period, Re-
spondent Omni purchased goods and services worth $1000
from suppliers outside the State of New Jersey.
As I have previously found that Respondents Hudson
Ridge and Omni constitute joint employers, their out-of-state
purchases for the relevant period exceed $6000, clearly more
than the de minimis amount required by Mar Del Plata Con-
dominium Assn., 282 NLRB 1012 (1987). As I have also pre-
viously found that their combined gross revenue for the rel-
evant period exceeds $500,000, I find that the General Coun-
sel has established that Respondents’ operations satisfy the
Board’s jurisdictional standards. 30 Sutton Place Corp., 240
NLRB 752 (1979).
1060 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Hudson Ridge and Respondent Omni con-
stitute joint employers of the employees of the Respondents.
2. Respondents have been engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. Local 617, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
4. The following employees of Respondent constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time porters, maintenance
men, utility and groundkeepers employed by Respond-
ent a its North Bergen facility.
5. Since on about September 4, 1992, Respondents, have
failed and refused to execute the collective-bargaining agree-
ment previously agreed to by Respondents and the Union, al-
though requested to do so by the Union since about January
1992, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have violated the Act, I
will recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. As the sole violation is the failure and re-
fusal to execute the agreed-upon collective-bargaining agree-
ment, Respondents will be ordered to execute the agreement
upon request of the Union. In addition, if any employee in
the unit suffered a loss of earnings or any other benefits due
to Respondents’ refusal to execute the agreement, Respond-
ents shall reimburse that employee for his losses.
On these findings of fact conclusions of law and the entire
record, I issue the following recommended1
ORDER
The Respondents, Hudson Ridge Owners Corp. and Hud-
son Ridge Owners Corp., Debtor in Possession and Omni
Property Management Group, Inc., Joint Employers, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to execute collective-bargaining
agreement on which the Union and Respondents had pre-
viously reached full agreement upon.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
(a) Upon request of the Union, execute the collective-bar-
gaining agreement previously agreed on by the parties.
(b) Reimburse employees in the unit described above for
any losses they may have suffered due to the Respondents’
refusal to execute the collective-bargaining agreement herein.
(c) Post at the facilities in North Bergen, New Jersey, and
Edgewater, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice marked
‘‘Appendix.’’2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 22, after being signed by
Respondents’ authorized representatives, shall be posted by
the Respondents immediately on receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken
to comply.