Houchens Market of Elizabethtown, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 12, 1965

155 N.L.R.B. 729 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

HOUCHENS MARKET OF ELIZABETHTOWN, INC. 729
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in the unfair labor practices set forth
above, I recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The violations of the Act committed by Respondent are persuasively related to other
unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act and the danger of their commission in the
future is to be anticipated from the Respondent's conduct in the past. The preventive
purposes of the Act will be thwarted unless the Order is coextensive with the threat.
In order therefore to make more effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7,
to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and thereby minimize industrial
strife which burdens and obstructs commerce and thus effectuate the policies of the
Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing
in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire record in the case, I
make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. H. W. Elson Bottling Company, Marquette and Ishpeming, Michigan, is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, Local No. 328, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening employees that rather than meet the Union's demands Respond-
ent would curtail its operations or go out of business altogether; by promising wage
raises to encourage employees to abandon the Union for bargaining purposes and to
defeat the Union; and by granting wage and commission increases to discourage fur-
ther activity and support for the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Houchens Market of Elizabethtown , Inc. and Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 227,
AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-3478. November 12, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 3, 1965, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued
his Decision in the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaing in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth .in the attached Trial Exa.miner.'s Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision and a supporting brief and the Charging Party filed a
brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and Zagoria].
551 NLRB No. 59
730 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner 's Decision, the exceptions and briefs , and the entire record
in this case ,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions , and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner , except as modified herein.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that employee ratification had
never been agreed on by the Respondent and the Union as either a
contract provision or a condition precedent to the execution and ap-
plication of the contract . 2 We also agree that the question of employee
ratification is not a mandatory bargaining subject on which the Re-
spondent may insist to impasse; see North Country Motors, Ltd., 146
NLRB 671. We find, accordingly , as did the Trial Examiner , that by
insisting on employee ratification as a condition precedent to its execu-
tion of the agreed-upon contract , the Respondent violated Section
8(a) (5) and ( 1) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and orders that the Respondent, Houchens Market of Eliza-
bethtown, Inc., Elizabethtown, Kentucky, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as so modified :
1. Amend paragraph 1 of the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order by deleting therefrom subparagraph (a) and inserting in lieu
thereof the following :
"(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
Local 227, AFL--CIO, by refusing, upon request, to sign the collective-
bargaining agreement embodying the terms and conditions of employ-
ment on which the Respondent and the Union had reached agree-
ment on February 8, 1965.
"(b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of
said Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in the
appropriate unit."
2. Amend the notice attached as an Appendix to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision by deleting therefrom the last paragraph of the text
i The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied because the record, in-
cluding the exceptions and the briefs, adequately presents the issues and the positions of
the parties.
2 In these circumstances, we do not adopt and need not pass on his further comments as
to the enforceability of any such agreement.
HOUCHENS MARKET OF ELIZABETHTOWN, INC. 731
and inserting as the first two indented paragraphs of the text of the
notice the following:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America, Local 227, AFL-CIO, by refusing, upon request, to sign
the collective-bargaining agreement embodying the terms and
conditions of employment on which we and the Union had reached
agreement on February 8, 1965.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with the
efforts of said Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the
employees in the appropriate unit.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 12, 1965,1 the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by
the Regional Director for Region 9 (Cincinnati , Ohio), issued his unfair labor practice
complaint against Houchens Market of Elizabethtown , Inc., herein called Respondent
or the Company. That complaint is based on a charge filed on February 15 by Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 227, AFL-
CIO. In substance, the complaint alleges that Respondent engaged in conduct violat-
ing Section 8(a)(5) and (1), and that such conduct affects commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called
the Act. Respondent has filed an answer admitting some facts but putting in issue the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to due notice this case came on to be heard and was tried before Trial
Examiner James V. Constantine on June 8 at Elizabethtown, Kentucky. All parties
were represented at and participated in the trial, and were given full opportunity to
adduce evidence, to examine and cross -examine witnesses, to present oral argument,
and to submit briefs. Respondent's motion to dismiss made at the hearing was denied.
General Counsel's motion for summary judgment was also denied . Respondent and
the Charging Party have filed briefs.
A motion to intervene has been filed by Cyrus Page and Earl Thomas, seeking "lim-
ited" intervention "to show ... their efforts to decertify [the Charging Party] ......
Said motion was denied in a separate interlocutory order of the Trial Examiner.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. AS TO JURISDICTION
The Company, a Kentucky corporation, is engaged at Elizabethtown , Kentucky, in
operating a retail foodstore . Annually, Respondent 's gross retail sales exceed
$500,000 . In addition it annually purchases products valued in excess of $50,000
from other enterprises in Kentucky which, in turn , have received said products directly
from points outside the State of Kentucky. Thus I find that Respondent has an annual
indirect inflow, as that term is used in Siemons Mailing Service , 122 NLRB 81, 85,
and further that such inflow is commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act. As Respondent does a gross volume of business of at least $500,000
per annum , I find that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
over it in this proceeding. Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., 122 NLRB 88.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America , Local 227,
AFL-CIO , herein called Local 227 or the Union , is a labor organization within the
contemplation of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1 All dates refer to 1965 except where otherwise noted.
732 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This case presents the issues of (1) whether the Company and Local 227 had
agreed on all matters which should be embodied in a written , signed collective-
bargaining agreement ; and (2) if the parties had a meeting of the minds , whether
any valid condition precedent existed excusing the Company from signing a written
contract until such condition precedent had occurred . Nearly all the essential facts
in the case are uncontroverted , so that disposition of the case principally depends on
resolution of questions of law.
It is not denied , and I find, that on June 12, 1964, Local 227 was certified by the
Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees of the Company in an
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . That unit, which is not
disputed , is composed of all full-time and part-time employees of the Respondent at
its store located on South Main Street , Elizabethtown , Kentucky, excluding office
clerical employees , store managers, and other supervisors, professional employees,
and guards , as defined in the Act.
It thus is patent that composition of the unit and majority status of the Union are
not an issue in this proceeding . Other material facts may be adequately abridged as
narrated in the following paragraphs.
Following the Union's certification on June 12 , 1964, the Company and Local 227
met in a series of 14 negotiating meetings . These were held on June 30, July 18, 21,
and 30, August 18, September 3, 17, and 24, October 22, November 10 and 30,
December 4 and 10, 1964 , and January 13, 1965.
On November 7, 1964, the Company delivered to the Union a document containing
the Company 's written counterproposals dated November 5, 1964. It contains all
the terms of a complete contract . See General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2. It was
discussed at subsequent meetings at which further negotiations took place. At the
close of the last meeting on January 13, the parties had agreed on everything in said
document except for five items which the Union desired to incorporate therein. These
five items related to ( a) demotion and layoff as grievances which were subject to the
grievance procedure and ultimately became arbitrable , ( b) a reopening clause, (c)
checkoff and maintenance of membership , (d) a 5-percent retroactive pay increase,
and (e ) settlement of a grievance of employee I. L. Miller.
At the close of the January 13 session it was understood that Respondent 's counsel,
Orr, would notify the Union's counsel , Segal , of Respondent 's final answer to the
above five disputed particulars in about 10 days or so. Because Orr soon left the
city it was later understood he would call upon his return . Upon Orr's return about
February 1 he telephoned Segal that the Company accepted the Union's proposals
on items (a) and (b), supra, i.e ., layoffs and demotions would be subject to the
grievance procedure, including arbitration , and a reopening clause would be inserted
in the contract . The language of the reopening clause was also agreed on. But Orr
also told Segal that as to the other three union proposals enumerated in the preceding
paragraph as (c), (d ), and (e ), he would try to hold another bargaining session. A
meeting was later scheduled for February 9. About February 8, Segal , by telephone,
informed Orr that the Union abandoned these three items. Segal testified-and I
credit him-that as a result of this talk with Orr "we had a full agreement and there
was no doubt about it." Therefore Segal canceled the meeting for that day.
Nevertheless, "at the tail end" of the above conversation of February 8, Orr told
Segal that , although all terms and conditions of the contract had been agreed on by
the parties , the contract would have to be submitted to the union membership for
approval . Segal protested that such approval was an internal union matter which
the Company "had no right to get into . .." and Respondent was committing an
unfair labor practice thereby.
Later in the day of February 8, Segal wrote to Orr substantially as follows: (a) He
stated that Local 227 accepted the Company's proposals (as incorporated in General
Counsel 's Exhibit No. 2) as modified by the Union 's proposals relating to demotion,
layoff, and reopening ; (b) the text of the language necessary to achieve these
modifications was set out ; ( c) he stated that he understood the Company would agree
to and sign a contract containing all terms agreed on "only and upon the condition
that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit agreed to said agreement"; and
(d) concluded with the observation that "As I told you I felt your condition was not
proper and usurped the duty and responsibility of the certified collective bargaining
agent, Local 227." (General Counsel's Exhibit No. 3.) Orr received this letter
in due course.
Upon receipt of Union Counsel Segal's letter of February 8, 1965, Company
Counsel Orr replied to Segal by letter dated February 9. See General Counsel's
Exhibit No. 4. In it Orr confirmed their telephone conversation of the day before
concerning the Company's "counterproposal contract dated November 5, 1964," and
HOUCHENS MARKET OF ELIZABETHTOWN, INC. 733
also reaffirmed the Company's position regarding the Union's five proposed modifica-
tions to the above "counterproposal contract" submitted at the last bargaining session
on January 13, 1965. Orr mentioned those five union modifications, stated that the
Company agreed to two of them (one involving demotion and layoff as grievances,
and the other relating to reopening; i e., automatic renewal absent timely written
notices to the contrary), set forth the text thereof verbatim, and reiterated that it
rejected the other three. Further, Orr confirmed his statement of the day before that
the Company "desired and made as an item of bargaining the approval of the con-
tract by a majority of the employees comprising the bargaining unit, and I suggested
and am here offering a counterproposal . to become a part of the Company's
Counterproposal of November 5 as amended." There follows the text of such
counterproposal. Finally, Orr concluded his letter as follows:
As I advised you by phone yesterday, the representative of the union . . . has
stated that any contract agreed upon would necessarily be approved or ratified 2
by a majority of the employees constituting the bargaining unit, and the Com-
pany is of the opinion that the approval of the agreement ... by a majority of the
employees will be beneficial to the employees, the Company and the Union, and,
therefore, it is our opinion that [such counterproposal] should be included m
the contract.
The requirement of ratification by the employees in the unit was not incorporated
in the November 5, 1964, written contract submitted by the Company to the Union.
However, during the course of the negotiating meetings Robert Nutter, the Union's
financial secretary and business repiesentative, stated to the Company's negotiators
that any contract proposed or recommended by him would have to be approved by
the employees. Nutter did not attend the last meeting on January 13. Segal went in
his place.
Two days after receiving Orr's letter of February 9, 1965, Segal telegraphed Orr
as follows: "Even though Houchens Market ... and Local 227 ... have agreed on
all terms of a collective bargaining agreement the Company now informs the Union
that it will not execute said agreement until it has been ratified or approved by a
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. The Union feels that the Com-
pany's position constitutes unfair labor practice, and without in any way waiving that
unfair labor practice the Union intends to submit said agreed contract to the MPHS,
by this action or to seek redress under the Labor Management Relations Act."
The Union is willing and ready to sign the Company's November 5, 1964, written
proposal, as modified by the two changes agreed on by the parties relating to (a)
demotions and layoffs, and (b) reopening.
Concluding Findings and Discussion
In its brief Respondent insists that the burden of proof is on the General Counsel
to establish the violations asserted . I so rule. This burden continues at all times, and
must be carried by affirmative evidence . N.L.R.B. v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing
Co., 326 F. 2d 509, 513 (C.A. 6); Rubin Bros . Footwear Inc., et al., 99 NLRB 610,
611, reversed on other grounds , 203 F. 2d 486 (C.A. 5). It is not sustained, for
example, merely by disproving a defense ; for rejecting a defense , without more, is
insufficient to prove an unfair labor practice as it does not constitute affirmative evi-
dence. Guinan v. Famous Players , 167 N.E. 235, 243 (Mass. ); N.L.R.B. v. Audio
Industries, Inc., 313 F. 2d 858, 863 (C.A. 7).
1. In the absence of contrary testimony , I find that Nutter, Respondent's business
representative who attended all the negotiating sessions but the last , stated to
Respondent 's negotiators at some of those meetings that any final agreement arrived
at would be subject to approval or ratification by the members of Local 227 employed
by the Company . I find that this is not an offer to the Company which was intended
to be accepted ; rather it was no more than a condition imposed on himself by
Nutter which he gratuitously undertook to fulfill. But I further find that Respond-
ent's negotiators did not expressly reply to this ; at most they acquiesced therein by
saying nothing Even if Nutter 's statement is construed as an offer, I find that
Respondent 's silence or acquiescence does not attain the stature of an acceptance.
Hence I find no mutual agreement by the parties that ratification ( a) would become
a term or condition of employment which the parties expected to incorporate in any
written contract agreed on, or ( b) was mutually intended to precede the execution of
a written collective -bargaining contract embodying all terms agreed on. Further,
even if this amounts to a mutual agreement it lacks consideration , for it is no more
a Elsewhere in the letter Orr required that ratification be accomplished "as a result
11of a secret ballot . . . .
734 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
than a promise of a gratuitous undertaking upon a matter outside the ambit of
statutory collective bargaining,3 and not an ingredient of a quid pro quo. Such
promises, even when accepted , are unenforceable legally. See 1 Williston on Con-
tracts, § 138, p. 600 (3d ed. 1937). Upon this branch of the law of contracts, Federal,
not State, law governs. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 153 NLRB 1209.
2. Secondly, I find that the text of Respondent's written counterproposal of Novem-
ber 5, 1964, which was first discussed by the parties at the November 10 meeting, was
agreed on and adopted by the parties on February 8, 1965, with two modifications.
Those two modifications are: (a) that demotion and layoff shall be governed by the
grievance procedures, including arbitration, and (b) that the contract shall be auto-
matically renewed for 1 year at its expiration on the 31st day of March, 1966, unless
either party gave written notice to amend or terminate not less than 60 days prior
thereto. I further find that on February 8, 1965, the text of both of said modifications
was agreed on. Hence I find that on February 8, 1965, the provisions and language of
a complete collective-bargaining contract had been agreed on.
The foregoing findings are not vitiated by the further finding that Orr and Segal
promised to meet on February 8 for further negotiations and that on February 8 Segal
called off the meeting set for that day. These negotiations were to relate to (a) three
modifying items out of five suggested by the Union and which the Company had
rejected, and (b) the submission of the contract to union members for ratification.
Since Segal withdrew the Union's said three modifications in his February 8 telephone
call with Orr, that left no terms of the contract in dispute. Therefore there remained
only the ratification question to be discussed. But since this ratification question
was no more than a gratuitous undertaking or promise, or, in any event, a nonmanda-
tory bargainable issue, it could be withdrawn at any time. And I find that it was
withdrawn by Segal in his telephone conversation with Orr on February 8, 1965.
3. I find that the question of ratifying the agreement by the employee-members of
the Union is a bargainable matter. But I also find that it is of the type which is the
subject of permissive and not mandatory bargaining. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Company, 106 NLRB 939. Although Allis Chalmers was denied enforcement by the
Seventh Circuit (213 R. 2d 374), I am of the opinion that the circuit court's rationale
has been nullified by the Supreme Court in N.L.R B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner Corporation, 356 U.S. 342. Hence the Union was free to refuse to bargain
on the ratification clause at any time. N L.R.B. v. Borg-Warner, Supra.
Since I find that Segal, on February 8, 1965, refused to bargain concerning the
matter of ratification, that ended the matter; and Respondent was not lawfully entitled
to reintroduce it again as a bargainable issue. It follows that Segal lawfully refused
to discuss it on February 8 on the telephone and was not obliged to attend a Febru-
ary 8 meeting to negotiate thereon. Accordingly, Segal properly canceled the
February 8 meeting because all contract terms had been agreed on and nothing
remained for further negotiations.
4. Moreover, I find that in any event ratification may not be insisted on by the
employer regardless of whether the parties understood that the employees should vote
on the contract. Aaron Newman, et al., d/b/a Colony Furniture Company, 144
NLRB 1582, 1588; Quiel Bros. Electric Sign Service Co., Inc, 153 NLRB 326 4
This is because: (a) There is no probative evidence that the Union agreed that
Respondent could condition execution 5 of a collective-bargaining agreement upon
ratification of any sort, and (b) the Act imposes no obligation upon a bargaining
agent to obtain employee ratification of a contract it negotiates in their behalf, so
that the requirement for ratification could only have been one which the Union itself
voluntarily assumed. North Country Motors, Ltd., 146 NLRB 671.
Accordingly, I find that the parties, on February 8, 1965, had agreed on all the
provisions and language of a collective-bargaining contract, that Respondent has
refused to sign such contract until it has first been ratified 6 by the members of the
Union, and that such refusal is proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) as an unlawful refusal
to bargain collectively. H. J. Heinz Company v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514, 523-526.
3 See Darlington Veneer Company, Inc ., 113 NLRB 1101, enfd. 236 F . 2d 85 (CA. 4).
* "The fact that the agreement reached was subject to ratification by the membership of
the Union provides no justification for the Respondent's refusal to sign the draft embody-
ing its terms ." Quiet Bros Electric Sign Service Co, Inc., 153 NLRB 326, 330.
6 It is significant that the written counterproposal prepared by Respondent does not
contain any such agreement and that no such agreement was arrived at in the subsequent
negotiating sessions.
9I do not pass upon the question of whether , if ratification had been agreed on as a
condition precedent , it is lawful to insist on a secret ballot as the only means of expressing
sentiment thereon. This is immaterial in view of the above findings.
HOUCHENS MARKET OF ELIZABETHTOWN, INC. 735
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent found to constitute unfair labor practices, as set forth
in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section
I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it
will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take specific
affirmative action, as set forth below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since it has been found that the parties mutually agreed on the complete terms of a
collective-bargaining contract, it will be recommended that Respondent, upon request
by the Union, be directed to sign a written contract containing such terms. H. J.
Heinz Company v. N.L.R.B., supra. As I am not persuaded that Respondent's con-
duct discloses an attitude of general opposition to the legislative design manifested in
the Act, it will be recommended only that Respondent cease and desist from engaging
in the violations found herein. See Sully-Miller Contracting Company, 152 NLRB
1623.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 227 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
3. All full-time and part-time employees of the Respondent at its store located
on South Main Street, Elizabethtown, Kentucky, excluding office clerical employees,
store managers, and other supervisors, professional employees, and guards as defined
in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Sections 9 and 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
4. On June 12, 1964, and at all times material thereafter, Local 227 has represented
a majority, and since said June 12 has been the exclusive bargaining agent, of all the
employees in the said appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Sections 9 and 8(a)(5) of the Act; and Respondent was on
that date, and has been since, legally obliged to recognize and bargain with Local 227
as such exclusive representative.
5. By refusing to sign a contract, all the terms of which were agreed on, unless
and until the employees in said unit first ratified said contract, Respondent has refused
to bargain with said Local 227 and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
comprehended by Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The foregoing unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the
entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, it is recommended that Respondent, Houchens Market of
Elizabethtown, Inc., Elizabethtown, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from refusing to sign a collective-bargaining contract, the
terms of which have been agreed on, covering employees in the above-described
appropriate unit.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request by Local 227, sign a written contract embodying all agreed on
terms between Respondent and Local 227 covering employees in the aforesaid appro-
priate unit.
(b) Post at its Elizabethtown, Kentucky, store, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix A." 7 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
7If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order"
shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals,
Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
736 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Director for Region 9, shall, after being duly signed by a authorized representative of
Respondent , be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing , within 20 days from
the date of receipt of this Decision , what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith .8
It is finally recommended that unless Respondent shall, within the prescribed
period , notify the said Regional Director that it will comply , the Board issue an
Order requiring Respondent to take the aforesaid action.
If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified
to read: "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL, upon request , execute with Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America , Local 227, AFL-CIO, a contract containing the
provisions upon which we have reached agreement concerning rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment , and other conditions of employment , covering
employees in the bargaining unit described below. The bargaining unit is:
All full-time and part-time employees at our store located on South Main
Street, Elizabethtown , Kentucky , excluding office clerical employees, store
managers , and other supervisors , professional employees, and guards as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT condition the execution of a collective -bargaining contract with
the above-named Local 227 as the exclusive representative of our employees in
the above -described unit upon a ratification by our employees of any such
agreed-upon collective-bargaining contract.
HOUCHENS MARKET OF ELIZABETHTOWN, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Room
2023, Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street , Cincinnati , Ohio, Telephone No.
381-2200.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation and Stand-
ard Allied Trades Council . Case No. 9-CA-333. November 12,
1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 6, 1965, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
155 NLRB No. 69.