Holmes Products Corp.v.Honeywell Consumer Products, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 21, 1999

No. 91090210 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 1999)

Hearing: Paper No. 106
February 16, 1999 HRW
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT CITABLE
AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB OCT. 20, 99
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Holmes Products Corp.
v.
Honeywell Consumer Products, Inc., by change
of name of Duracraft Corporation
_____
Opposition No. 90,210
to application Serial No. 74/236,945
filed January 13, 1992
_____
Allen D. Brufsky for Holmes Products Corp.
Lee C. Bromberg and Julia Huston of Bromberg & Sunstein LLP
for Honeywell Consumer Products, Inc.
_____
Before Seeherman, Hanak and Wendel, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Wendel, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Duracraft Corporation has filed an application to
register the mark TURBO for portable electrical fans.1

1 Serial No. 74/236,945, filed by Duracraft Corporation on
January 13, 1992, with claimed first use dates of January 7,
1991. Applicant filed evidence of the change of name of
Duracraft Corporation to Honeywell Consumer Products, Inc. as of
November 21, 1996 and the caption of this proceeding was amended
accordingly.
Opposition No. 90,210
2
Holmes Products Corp. has filed an opposition to the
registration of the mark on the grounds of being merely
descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) and of being a mutilation
of the mark shown on the specimens.2 Opposer alleges that
opposer, since at least as early as January 1992, has been
engaged in the manufacture and sale of portable electric
fans and has been using one or more marks consisting of or
comprising the word TURBO in connection therewith; that
applicant’s mark TURBO is merely descriptive of the goods of
applicant and that opposer as a manufacturer of fans which
are of a related nature to applicant’s goods has a right to
describe its goods with this term; that applicant’s mark
does not function to distinguish applicant’s goods from
those of others; and that, as an additional ground for
opposition, the specimens filed by applicant do not show use
of the mark TURBO but rather TURBO as part of one or more
other marks from which TURBO cannot be severed without
mutilation.
Applicant, in its answer, denied the salient
allegations of the notice of opposition with respect to
these two grounds.

2 Opposer alleged an additional ground in its notice of
opposition, namely, the likelihood of confusion under Section
2(d) based on marks registered by, or marks or trade names used
by, third parties. The Board, on March 1, 1994, granted
applicant’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing this
ground (Holmes Products Corp. v. Duracraft Corp., 30 USPQ2d 1549
(TTAB 1994)) and the case has advanced to final hearing on the
other two grounds.
Opposition No. 90,210
3
The Record
The record consists of the file of the involved
application; the case-in-chief testimony deposition, with
exhibits, taken by opposer of Stanley Rosenzweig, chief
operating officer of opposer; opposer’s notice of reliance
by means of which opposer introduced applicant’s responses
to opposer’s first set of interrogatories, discovery
depositions taken of three of applicant’s officers and
exhibits thereto, copies of three third-party registrations
and the file of applicant’s application S. N. 74/364,764 for
the mark AIR DURACRAFT TURBO FAN;3 and the rebuttal

3 The three other categories of documents which opposer attempted
to introduce by means of this notice of reliance have been
objected to by applicant and the objections are upheld.
The first set of documents consists of documents produced
during discovery depositions taken by applicant of opposer’s
witnesses. Opposer states in its reply brief that it is not
relying upon these depositions and thus the objection is moot.
Even if this were not the case, opposer may not rely upon its own
discovery production in this manner and even documents obtained
from the adverse party could not be made of record by a notice of
reliance alone. See Trademark Rule 2.120(j)(3)(ii).
The next category of documents, described as printed
publications, consists for the most part of newspaper advertising
inserts. As noted by applicant, many of these inserts are
identified only by approximate date, many are nearly illegible,
and no information is given as to the particular newspapers from
which the inserts were obtained. We uphold the objection on the
basis that the documents are not sufficiently identified to be
verified by applicant, not on applicant’s further objection that
the materials are in part directed to products other than
portable electric fans and thus are irrelevant.
The third category is a request that the Board take judicial
notice of the fact that “turbo” is descriptive of high speed and
powerful objects. Opposer has since withdrawn its reliance upon
this request. Moreover, this does not lie within the scope of
information of which the Board may take judicial notice.
Opposition No. 90,210
4
testimony deposition, with exhibits, of Stanley Rosenzwieg;4
the trial testimony depositions, with exhibits, taken by
applicant of Rodney B. Jané, president of applicant and of
Bernard Chui, past president of applicant and prior to that
president of Duracraft Corporation; and copies of
registrations owned by applicant for the marks TURBO-AIRE
and AIR DURACRAFT TURBO FAN, a copy of the file wrapper for
opposer’s mark TURBO BOX FAN and several dictionary
definitions, all introduced by means of applicant’s notice
of reliance.
Mr. Rosenzweig, in his testimony in chief, stated that
opposer sells electrical appliances, including fans,
directly to retailers worldwide; that opposer began selling
two fans under the mark TURBO-JET-AIR and a third fan under
the mark TURBO BOX FAN in 1992;5 that the term TURBO was
chosen to indicate that the fan was more powerful or “had a
little more air because of its design, blade configuration,
number of speeds” (SR 17:9-11); that the term “turbo” is
also used by opposer on fans as a speed designation to
denote the most powerful setting; and that the terms
“turbine” and “turbo” are used in the industry to describe a

4 Applicant’s objections to portions of Mr. Rosenzwieg’s
testimony are discussed infra.
5 In giving his testimony, Mr. Rosenzweig referred to Exhibit 3,
a declaration previously made of record in this case, to refresh
his memory as to dates. Applicant has objected to the
introduction of the declaration for this purpose. The objection
is overruled. See FRE 612.
Opposition No. 90,210
5
type of fan. In cross-examination he acknowledged that
opposer had been sent a cease-and-desist letter by applicant
with respect to use of the word TURBO as a mark, but could
not recall whether opposer had stopped using the word TURBO
as a mark on its packaging and was now using it only as a
speed designation. Mr. Rosenzweig identified a collection
of photocopies of advertisements by various retailers for
fans, heaters and other appliances involving use of the term
“turbo” which had been accumulated during the ordinary
course of business by opposer in keeping track of business
trends, pricing and the like (Exhibit 9).6
Mr. Jané, testifying on behalf of applicant, stated
that the DT-7 TURBO FAN was introduced in 1991 and has been
very successful ever since;7 that the TURBO FAN is a
personal tabletop fan, 6 to 8 inches tall and 6 to 7 inches
wide, circular in design with a “wind tunnel” look and a
spiral front grille with a knob in the front, which comes in
many vibrant colors; that “in a fun way it evokes a jet
engine,” but in reality is very small [RBJ 14:23-24]; and

6 Applicant has objected to those advertisements which are not
for portable electric fans on the ground of irrelevancy. The
objection is overruled. We find use of the term “turbo” in
connection with other electric appliances which contain a fan
mechanism such as hair dryers or convection ovens to be relevant
to the issue of descriptiveness herein.
7 All specifics as to sales figures, extent of the market, etc.
have been submitted under seal, pursuant to a stipulated
protective order.
Opposition No. 90,210
6
that applicant also sells other fans using the TURBO name,
namely, the SUPER TURBO fan, the TURBO BOX FAN, and the
TURBO-AIRE fan, the latter mark having been acquired from
Seabreeze, a Canadian corporation. Mr. Jané identified
Exhibits 3 and 4 as photocopies of the current packaging and
sales sheet for the DT-7 TURBO FAN and Exhibit 5 as a
collection of representative retail advertisements of this
fan. He stated that advertising of the fan is done by
retailers, “via a co-op advertising method,” in circulars
that go to the consumers. Mr. Jané testified that the only
competitor use of the word “turbo” in connection with
portable fans of which he was familiar was opposer’s use and
the only use of the word “turbine” was by one other
competitor, against whom applicant had initiated litigation.
He denied that “turbo fans” would be considered a category
of portable fans.
Mr. Chui similarly testified that the TURBO FAN was
designed to evoke the image of a turbine engine by means of
features such as the arrangement of the grilles, the shape
of the fan, the center control which is “a tipper at a angle
like a propeller” and accordingly was designed to suggest
that the consumer would get a relatively powerful fan
despite its small size. Mr. Chui identified photocopies of
both present and past packaging of the TURBO FAN (Exhibits
17 and 18), as well as sheets from catalogs first used to
Opposition No. 90,210
7
introduce these fans to retailers (Exhibit 21) and
subsequent thereto (Exhibit 22 and 23). Mr. Chui was aware
of opposer’s TURBO-JET-AIRE fan but believed that it had
only been on the market for a short period of time, although
long enough for instances of actual confusion with
applicant’s fans to occur. He stated that opposer stopped
use of its TURBO marks after applicant’s cease-and-desist
letter and now only uses the term “turbo” as a speed
setting. He identified and made of record the assignment
agreement in which applicant acquired the TURBO-AIRE mark
being used by Seabreeze.8
Opposer’s rebuttal testimony, with exhibits, taken of
Mr. Rosensweig is directed to opposer’s first use of its
TURBO-containing marks on fans. In its brief, opposer
raises the issue as to whether or not applicant made valid
use of its mark prior to the filing of the application and
argues that opposer’s prior valid use should be controlling.
Applicant has objected to the testimony and accompanying
exhibits on the basis that opposer’s purported priority is
irrelevant to the issues of this opposition. Applicant has
responded to opposer’s arguments with respect to non-use,
but only in order to preserve its right to request a

8 Applicant introduced during cross-examination of Mr. Rosensweig
on rebuttal a copy of the settlement agreement made between
Seabreeze and opposer at a time prior to this assignment as
evidence of the attempt by these two entities to curtail
applicant’s use of its TURBO mark.
Opposition No. 90,210
8
reopening of the trial to fully present its case on the
issue, if deemed relevant.
Opposer has neither pled the issue of lack of valid use
by applicant prior to the filing date in the original notice
of opposition nor amended the notice to add this ground.
Accordingly, we will give no consideration to opposer’s
arguments on the issue. Furthermore, the question of
opposer’s first use is completely irrelevant to the two
grounds of opposition before and thus applicant’s objections
to the rebuttal testimony and accompanying exhibits are
upheld. The testimony has been given no consideration.
The Opposition
As a preliminary matter, we must clarify the grounds
before us. Opposer, in the notice of opposition, alleged as
a ground for opposition that TURBO is merely descriptive as
applied to applicant’s portable electric fans. Opposer has
since attempted to expand this ground to encompass the
question of genericness as well. As pointed out by
applicant, genericness was not a pleaded issue, either
originally or by amendment of the notice of opposition.
While applicant has responded substantively to opposer’s
arguments, applicant has also argued that opposer is
precluded from asserting the issue.
It is clear that the issue of genericness was not pled,
nor was it tried by implied consent of the parties, as is
Opposition No. 90,210
9
the prerequisite for the pleadings to be considered amended
under the provisions of FRCP 15(b). Accordingly, we have
given no consideration to opposer’s claim that the term
“turbo” is generic, when used in connection with portable
electric fans.
The two grounds which are before us are whether the
mark TURBO is merely descriptive of applicant’s goods and
whether the mark sought to be registered, i.e., TURBO, is a
mutilation of the mark or marks shown on the specimens of
record.
The second ground for opposition can be dismissed
summarily. Although the specimens show use of the composite
phrase AIR DURACRAFT TURBO FAN, it is well established
that individual components of a composite mark may be
registered separately, so long as the element sought to be
registered creates a separate and distinct commercial
impression from the other elements and per se identifies and
distinguishes the product from those of others. See In re
Berg Electronics, Inc., 165 USPQ 487 (TTAB 1969) and the
cases cited therein. Here the house mark AIR DURACRAFT
clearly serves as a separate and distinct mark from the
product mark TURBO. Moreover, although opposer argues that,
at the very least, applicant’s mark is TURBO FAN, not TURBO,
we find no need for applicant to include the generic term
FAN as part of its claimed mark. TURBO is the term which is
Opposition No. 90,210
10
being relied upon by applicant to distinguish its product
from those of others; the word FAN is obviously no more than
the name of the product in general.9 Thus, we find no
mutilation involved in applicant’s seeking to register the
mark TURBO alone on the basis of use of the mark in the
manner shown in the specimens of record.
The main issue in this proceeding is whether or not the
mark TURBO is merely descriptive, as used with applicant’s
portable electric fans. As a corollary, if the mark TURBO
is merely descriptive, the issue becomes whether or not
applicant has shown that the mark has acquired
distinctiveness, such that it is entitled to registration
under the provisions of Section 2(f).10
Opposer takes the position that the term “turbo” is
merely descriptive of a portable electric fan having certain
characteristics or features, namely, one which is more
powerful than others of comparable size. Opposer asserts

9 In the Berg case, the specimens show use of a composite mark
which included the house mark BERG and the mark sought to be
registered, GRIPLET. The word TERMINAL, the name of the goods,
was set forth directly below the word GRIPLET and could easily
have been considered a portion of the mark. Nonetheless, the
Board found that GRIPLET to be the mark for the specific goods
and thus capable of being separately registered.
10 Although opposer argues that in order for applicant to qualify
its mark for registration on the basis of acquired
distinctiveness, applicant must have made a claim under Section
2(f) in its application, this is not true. Opposer having raised
the issue of descriptiveness, applicant is not to be deprived of
showing acquired distinctiveness as a defense thereto, even
though the application was not published under Section 2(f). See
Opposition No. 90,210
11
that the trial testimony of opposer’s witness Mr. Rosensweig
supports use by opposer of the term “turbo” to indicate a
more powerful fan. Opposer then points to applicant’s
packaging on which applicant uses language such as “unique
turbo design means more power, less noise” [Applicant
Exhibit 17] as evidence that applicant itself is defining
“turbo” as meaning more powerful. In addition, opposer
contends that there are at least five competitors of
applicant who use the term “turbo” descriptively to signify
a fan of greater power, as shown by the advertisements
included in Opposer’s Exhibit 9 for fan-containing
appliances such as the Vidal Sassoon Turbo Hair Dryer
(1057), the King of Fans ceramic heater with high-efficiency
turbo fan (1076), and the Delonghi Turbo Tech Heat
Accelerator (1010).11

Colonial Arms Corp. v. Trulock Firearms Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1678 (TTAB
1987).
11 Opposer also argues that applicant is collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issue of descriptiveness because applicant
had abandoned a previous application for the mark AIR DURACRAFT
TURBO FAN (S.N. 74/364764) after a disclaimer of AIR and FAN was
required (not TURBO FAN as stated by opposer). This argument is
without merit. There was no adjudication of the issue of
descriptiveness of the term TURBO; in fact, an application later
filed by applicant for the same mark issued as a registration
with a disclaimer only of AIR and FAN.
Opposer’s additional argument that the Office has already
determined the issue of descriptiveness of the term “turbo,” in
that the mark TURBINE FAN was registered on the Supplemental
Register, is equally without merit. Even though applicant may
have equated the word “turbine” with “turbo” in an infringement
suit against the user of a mark containing the term “turbine,”
this does not make the words synonymous for purposes of
registration.
Opposition No. 90,210
12
On the issue of acquired distinctiveness opposer argues
that applicant has failed to come forth with sufficient
evidence of secondary meaning. Specifically, opposer
asserts that applicant has done little advertising or
promotion per se; its sales have decreased in recent years;
the sales volume for this particular fan in the total market
is very small; and others have used and continue to use the
designation TURBO for their products.
Applicant, on the other hand, argues that its TURBO
mark is, at the most, suggestive, as applied to applicant’s
products. Applicant points out that in the dictionary
references which applicant has made of record the term
“turbo” is identified as a prefix derived from the word
“turbine,” a term inapplicable to applicant’s small fans,
and that “turbo” has no recognized meaning as “more
powerful” or the like. In fact, argues applicant, the mark
TURBO is incongruous when used with applicant’s small
plastic fans, and that if it had appeared likely that
consumers would make the direct association of TURBO with
the nature of applicant’s fans “it would have been
superfluous for Applicant to use the tagline ‘Unique 7"
Turbo Design Means More Power, Less Noise’ on its
packaging.” [Brief p. 16-17].
Applicant goes on to argue that opposer’s own use of
TURBO as part of its trademarks, as well as its application
Opposition No. 90,210
13
to register the mark TURBO BOX FAN, belies any contention by
opposer that the term is descriptive. Applicant maintains
that other competitors in the relevant field have also used
the term only in a non-descriptive manner and that applicant
has taken action to restrain this use of TURBO as a
trademark, such as by requiring opposer to cease use of its
marks and acquiring the TURBO-AIRE mark of Seabreeze.
Applicant insists that opposer’s evidence of use of “turbo”
in connection with products other than fans per se is
irrelevant, and even if considered, the use is often as part
of a mark, not in a descriptive manner. Applicant argues
that neither opposer nor its competitors need the term
“turbo” to describe their portable fans, that words such as
“powerful,” “high velocity,” or the many synonyms for
“powerful” serve just as well.
On the issue of acquired distinctiveness, applicant
takes the position that opposer has the burden of proving
that the mark has not become distinctive and that opposer
has failed to carry this burden. Even if opposer had,
applicant insists that its evidence of the extent of use of
TURBO “as the name for its fan products”; the popularity of
the DT-7 model; and the prominence of its TURBO mark in
advertisements by retailers for applicant’s fans supports a
finding of acquired distinctiveness. Applicant further
points to the testimony of its witnesses as to applicant’s
Opposition No. 90,210
14
exclusive use of the TURBO mark in the portable electric fan
field. Applicant has acquired the TURBO-AIRE mark of
Seabreeze and opposer has ceased use of TURBO as other than
a speed setting.
A term is merely descriptive within the meaning of
Section 2(e)(1) if it immediately conveys information about
a characteristic, purpose, feature or function of the goods
or services with which it is being used. Whether or not a
particular term is merely descriptive is not determined in
the abstract, but rather in relation to the goods or
services for which registration is sought, the context in
which the mark is being used, and the significance the mark
is likely to have, because of the manner in which it is
used, to the average purchaser as he encounters the goods or
services bearing the mark. See In re Abcor Development
Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1978); In re Nibco
Inc., 195 USPQ 180 (TTAB 1977) and the cases cited therein.
In the present case, we find that opposer has met its
burden of proving that TURBO as used by applicant is merely
descriptive of the basic characteristics or features of its
portable electric fans.
The strongest evidence that TURBO will be viewed by the
purchasing public as descriptive of features of applicant’s
fan is the manner of use of the term “turbo” by applicant
itself in the packaging of its personal fan. In applicant’s
Opposition No. 90,210
15
Exhibit 18 (the original packaging), the designation AIR
DURACRAFT TURBO FAN is directly followed by the phrase
“Unique 7" Turbo Design Means More Power, Less Noise!” while
on another portion of the packaging, the fan is described as
having a “Quiet, powerful 2-speed turbo design.” In the
more recent packaging (Applicant’s Exhibit 17), the fan is
similarly described in terms of its “Efficient 7" turbo
design” and that the “Unique Turbo Design Means More Power,
Less Noise!” Thus, while applicant may argue that the
standard dictionary definitions of the term “turbo” are not
applicable to its small personal fan, applicant itself has
given another meaning to the term “turbo,” as applied to
portable electric fans. The taglines and informational text
used by applicant in its packaging make clear to purchasers
that “turbo” as applied to its fan is not simply a reference
to any resemblence in appearance the fan may have to a jet
engine. Instead, it directly conveys the information that
this fan is more powerful than other fans of comparable
size. Similarly, in the catalog sheets distributed to
retailers, applicant’s direct customers, which promote
applicant’s fans (Applicant’s Exhibits 21-23), applicant not
only refers to its fans in language such as “our new turbos”
or “our unique turbos” but also provides information such as
“it may look like a jet engine but the Air Duracraft  is
actually extremely quiet”; it “blows more air than other
Opposition No. 90,210
16
fans of its kind”; and one of its major features is a “high
pitch turbo blade.” Throughout its packaging and
promotional materials applicant uses “turbo,” as a
definitive term for particular features of its fan, i.e.,
that by its design, it is more powerful than other
comparable personal size fans. See In re Pennzoil Products
Co., 20 USPQ2d 1753 (TTAB 1991)[applicant’s use of MULTI-VIS
in advertisements as part of informational matter about the
goods, and in close proximity to language touting the
“multi-viscosity” feature of the motor oil, provides
evidence of the descriptive significance of the term].
Thus, we find that applicant, from the introduction of
its fans in 1991, has been using the term “turbo” in a
descriptive manner both before its immediate customers (the
retailers) and the ultimate purchasers of the portable fans.
The term “turbo” has been equated with “more powerful,” the
same meaning for which opposer claims to have used the term
in its TURBO marks, and clearly the meaning imparted by
opposer in using “turbo” as the highest speed setting.
Although applicant argues that its competitors in the
portable fan field have only used the term in a non-
descriptive manner, this is of little significance when
applicant itself has taken great pains to describe just how
applicable the term “turbo” is to its fans, not just in
terms of appearance but in terms of function. As for
Opposition No. 90,210
17
opposer’s evidence of use of the term “turbo” by others for
other electric appliances which contain a fan element, even
if this usage is as part of a mark, “turbo” once again is
descriptive of a high degree of power for the fan element.
The question thus turns to whether applicant is
entitled to register the mark under Section 2(f), on the
basis of acquired distinctiveness. Here, contrary to
applicant’s arguments, the burden of proof lies with
applicant and not opposer, since applicant is the one
asserting acquired distinctiveness as a defense to any
holding of mere descriptiveness. See Yamaha International
Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co. Ltd., 840 F.2d 1572, 6 USPQ2d
1001 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
“To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must
show that, in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself.”
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). The burden is upon applicant to
demonstrate that the term TURBO, when viewed by potential
purchasers of applicant’s portable electric fans, would be
associated by these purchasers with the source of the fan,
rather as a descriptor of features of the fan. We find that
applicant has failed to meet this burden.
Opposition No. 90,210
18
We agree that applicant has submitted sales and market
percentage figures demonstrating an outstanding and
continued level of success for its TURBO fans since its
introduction in 1991. But as it has frequently been stated,
the popularity of a product cannot be equated with
recognition of a designation used in connection with this
product as an indication of source. See In re Bongrain
International (American) Corp., 842 F.2d 1316, 13 USPQ 1727
( Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Recorded Books Inc., 42 USPQ2d 1276
(TTAB 1997). Even if applicant may have been successful in
forcing others to cease use of TURBO in a trademark sense,
applicant has not been as successful in establishing
recognition of its own use of TURBO as a trademark, rather
than as a descriptor of characteristics or features of a fan
being marketed under the AIR DURACRAFT or DURACRAFT mark.
Applicant has presented testimony to the effect that
its fans are promoted to consumers by means of co-op
advertising done by retailers. Although in most of the
retail advertisements introduced by applicant (Applicant’s
Exhibit 5), the term TURBO is found in close proximity to
the DURACRAFT or AIR DURACRAFT mark, so as to be perceived
as a part of the composite mark for the product, in a few
cases the phrase “7 in. Turbo” is used in the same ad as a
description of the fan. On the other hand, opposer has made
of record a much greater number of advertisements (Opposer’s
Opposition No. 90,210
19
Exhibit 9) which show this descriptive use of the term
“turbo” by retailers in advertising applicant’s product. In
many of these advertisements, we find the terms “personal
turbo fan” (1001), a “desk top turbo fan” (1008), “turbo
fan” (1009), or “7" turbo fan” (1021) being used to describe
applicant’s fan, with DURACRAFT the sole source indicator.
In view of this inconsistent use of the term “turbo”, i.e.,
sometimes as an indication of source, but more frequently as
a descriptor of fan characteristics, we find that applicant
has failed to prove that purchasers would make the requisite
association of TURBO with the source of the fan. While
these advertisements may not have originated from applicant,
it was applicant’s duty to police the use of its mark by
retailers handling its products. Here, as in the
advertisements for other fan-containing appliances, the
impression created is that the term “turbo” describes the
forcefulness or power of the fan, rather than the particular
source thereof.
Accordingly, we find that the term TURBO is merely
descriptive of applicant’s portable electric fans under
Section 2(e)(1) and that applicant has failed to establish
acquired distinctiveness for the term under Section 2(f).
Opposition No. 90,210
20
Decision: The opposition is sustained.
E. J. Seeherman
E. W. Hanak
H. R. Wendel
Trademark Administrative Judges,
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board