Hayman Electric

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 1994

314 N.L.R.B. 879 (N.L.R.B. 1994)

879
314 NLRB No. 145
HAYMAN ELECTRIC
1 Hayman Electric, Inc. is the only Respondent filing exceptions.
Its exceptions are limited to the judge’s findings concerning its rela-
tionship with and conduct toward Local Union No. 592, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
2 It is undisputed that the Respondent was shown authorization
cards for its employees. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to reach
the judge’s discussion at fn. 8 of his decision concerning whether
it would have been significant to the question of majority status if
the cards had not been shown.
Member Cohen agrees with the judge’s ruling that under the ra-
tionale of Casale Industries, 311 NLRB 951 (1993), the Respondent
is time-barred from questioning the Union’s majority status as of the
signing of the recognition agreement. He affirms the judge’s conclu-
sion that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act solely on
that ground.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings. In this regard, we reject the
Respondent’s contention that the judge’s crediting of NECA Chapter
Manager Knecht’s testimony over that of Walter Hayman is based
on a factual error concerning Hayman’s past involvement with the
Union. The judge noted that Hayman was once an assistant business
manager for the Union and would have more than just a passing
knowledge of labor relations. The Respondent correctly asserts that
there is no evidence that Hayman was ever an assistant business
manager for the Union. However, the judge’s credibility resolution
is not based solely on this error. The judge’s principal reasons for
crediting Knecht’s denial that he offered any explanation to Hayman
about the Union’s cover letter and recognition agreement is that the
explanation Hayman attributed to Knecht was unbelievable and the
documents standing alone made complete sense. We find that this
provides sufficient support for the judge’s credibility resolution.
The General Counsel excepts to a factual error by the judge and
to the judge’s failure to make a factual finding. The correct date for
the recognition agreement executed by Hayman with IBEW Local
211 is November 27, 1990. Further, the record shows that the Re-
spondent, Janney Electrical Contractor, Inc., signed a Letter of As-
sent binding it to the NECA agreement with IBEW Local 211 for
residential work, effective December 1, 1989.
4 The label for the notice for the Respondent, Pyramid Electric,
Inc., is corrected to read ‘‘Appendix D.’’
Hayman Electric, Inc. and Local Union 211, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
and Local Union No. 592, International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers
Frank J. Byers, Inc. and Local Union 211, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
and Local Union No. 592, International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers
Janney Electrical Contractor, Inc. and Local Union
211, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers
Pyramid Electric, Inc. and Local Union 211, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
Cases 4–CA–20687, 4–CA–21001, 4–CA–20690,
4–CA–20841, 4–CA–20882, 4–CA–20689, and 4–
CA–20691
August 25, 1994
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS STEPHENS
AND COHEN
On January 27, 1994, Administrative Law Judge
Wallace H. Nations issued the attached decision. The
Respondent, Hayman Electric, Inc., and the General
Counsel filed exceptions. The Respondent filed a sup-
porting brief1 and the General Counsel and the Charg-
ing Party, Local Union No. 592, International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers (the Union), filed answer-
ing briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings,2 findings,3 and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.4
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondents, Hayman Electric, Inc.,
Vineland, New Jersey; Frank J. Byers, Inc., Clayton,
New Jersey; Janney Electrical Contractor, Inc., Estell
Manor, New Jersey; and Pyramid Electric, Inc.,
Collings Lake, New Jersey, their officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order.
Barbara O’Neill, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Denise M. Keyser, Esq. and Ian D. Meklinsky, Esq., of Had-
donfield, New Jersey, for the Respondents.
Michael Katz, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Charg-
ing Party Local No. 592.
Robert F. O’Brien, Esq., of Haddonfield, New Jersey, for
Charging Party Local 211.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WALLACE H. NATIONS, Administrative Law Judge. On
April 30, 1992, Local Union 211, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers (IBEW 211) filed unfair labor practice
charges against Hayman Electric, Inc., Frank J. Byers, Inc.,
Janney Electrical Contractor, Inc., and Pyramid Electric, Inc.
(individually Hayman, Byers, Janney, and Pyramid or collec-
tively Respondents). Between June 25 and August 31, 1992,
Local Union No. 592, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW 592) filed unfair labor practice charges
against Byers and Hayman. Between July 30 and August 27,
880 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1992, the Regional Director for Region 4 issued complaints
and notices of hearing in all of the IBEW 211 cases and the
IBEW 592 cases against Byers. On October 7, 1992, the Act-
ing Regional Director issued a complaint and notice of hear-
ing in the IBEW 592 case against Hayman. On December
16, 1992, the Regional Director issued an order consolidating
cases which consolidated for trial all the above referenced
cases. All of the complaints, with the exception of IBEW
592’s complaint against Byers in Case 4–CA–20882, allege
that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the Act), by refusing to meet and
bargain with IBEW 211 and IBEW 592 (collectively referred
to as the Unions), thereby withdrawing recognition from the
Unions. IBEW 592’s complaint against Byers in Case 4–CA–
20882 alleges that Byers violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act by refusing to provide certain information to IBEW
592.
Between August 11 and October 13, 1992, the Respond-
ents filed timely answers to the complaints referenced above.
Respondents admit service of the charges, jurisdiction, and
that the Unions are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondents also admit agency
status and that they were each members of the National Elec-
trical Contractors Association (NECA) and bound to the col-
lective-bargaining agreements between NECA and the
Unions. In addition, the Respondents admit that Hayman and
Byers had collective-bargaining relationships with the
Unions, that Janney and Pyramid had collective-bargaining
relationships with IBEW 211, and that in a timely fashion,
the Respondents notified the Unions that they intended to ter-
minate their collective-bargaining agreements with the
Unions upon the expiration of the NECA agreements. The
Respondents also admit that the Unions requested bargaining
for new contracts and that the Respondents declined to do so
because they viewed their relationships to be merely 8(f) re-
lationships which they could revoke upon contract expiration.
Counsel for the General Counsel asserts that the Respondents
had an obligation to meet and bargain with the Unions be-
cause their relationships were in fact 9(a) relationships. As
for IBEW 592’s additional complaint against Byers, Byers
asserts that it provided some information to IBEW 592 and
that it had no obligations to provide the rest of the informa-
tion.
Hearing was held before me in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
on February 9 and 10, 1993. Briefs were filed by the parties
as well as citations to cases decided after the hearing. Based
on the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs,
I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Hayman, a New Jersey corporation, has an of-
fice and principal place of business in Vineland, New Jersey.
Respondent Byers has an office and principal place of busi-
ness in Clayton, New Jersey. Respondent Janney, a New Jer-
sey corporation, has an office and principal place of business
in Estell Manor, New Jersey. Respondent Pyramid is a New
Jersey corporation and has an office and principal place of
business in Collings Lake, New Jersey. All the Respondents
are engaged in the business of electrical construction and
maintenance. Having admitted the jurisdictional allegations
of the complaints, I find that Respondents are now, and have
at all material times been, employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE INVOLVED LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
It is admitted and I find that the Unions are labor organi-
zations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues for Determination
The complaints present for determination two issues:
1. Did the Unions establish 9(a) relationships with Re-
spondents?
2. Did Respondent Byers unlawfully refuse to provide cer-
tain information requested by IBEW Local 592?
B. Background Information
For many years, IBEW Locals 211 and 592 have rep-
resented employees employed by contractors in the electrical
business on the basis of their geographic jurisdiction. IBEW
Local 211’s jurisdiction encompasses the southeastern por-
tion of the State of New Jersey, Cape May County, and most
of Atlantic County, New Jersey. IBEW Local 592’s jurisdic-
tion encompasses the southwestern portion of the State of
New Jersey, the eastern section of Salem County, Gloucester
County, the western section of Atlantic County, and almost
all of Cumberland County, New Jersey. The Respondents are
electrical contractors that have worked in both Union’s juris-
dictions. The Respondents have on occasion moved their em-
ployees who were members of one involved Local Union
into the jurisdiction of another Local to perform work there.
This was done under the ‘‘portability’’ provisions of their
contracts which allowed a limited number of journeymen
electricians to be brought into the jurisdiction of a Local of
which they are not a member. The Respondents could also
move employees between the jurisdictions of the involved
Local Unions under the residential contract to which they
were parties. The residential portion of the Respondent’s
businesses, however, was only a fraction of their overall
business, with one of the largest Respondents estimating it
accounted for 15 percent of its business. The Respondents
have at all relevant times been members of NECA and bound
to the various collective-bargaining agreements entered into
between NECA and the Unions. Specifically, NECA had two
collective-bargaining agreements with IBEW Local 211: a
contract for commercial inside work whose term ran from
September 1, 1989, through August 31, 1992, and a contract
for commercial outside work whose term ran from October
1, 1990, through September 30, 1992. NECA had two collec-
tive-bargaining agreements with IBEW Local 592: a contract
for commercial inside work and a contract for commercial
outside work whose terms ran from October 1, 1989, through
September 30, 1992. NECA also had a collective-bargaining
agreement covering residential work with both Unions, as
well as IBEW locals 269 and 439, whose term ran from Oc-
tober 1, 1990, through September 30, 1992, otherwise re-
ferred to as the ‘‘crop’’ agreement.
Byers signed letters of assent binding it to the NECA
agreement with IBEW Local 211 for commercial inside and
881HAYMAN ELECTRIC
1 These letters of assent contain the following pertinent language:
The Employer agrees that if a majority of its employees author-
izes the Local Union to represent them in collective bargaining,
the Employer will recognize the Local Union as the exclusive
collective bargaining agent for all employees performing elec-
trical construction work within the jurisdiction of the Local
Union on all present and future jobsites.
2 The names of various employees for whom cards were sent to
the Respondents are spelled differently throughout the record and the
exhibits. I have attempted to find the most likely spelling and having
done so, have used that spelling throughout this decision.
outside work, effective February 27, 1989. Pyramid signed a
letter of assent binding it to the NECA agreements with
IBEW Local 211 for commercial inside work, effective June
1, 1989. Hayman signed a letter of assent binding it to the
NECA agreement with IBEW Local 211 for commercial in-
side work, effective November 27, 1990. Janney signed let-
ters of assent binding it to the NECA agreements with IBEW
Local 211 for commercial inside work, effective October 31,
1988. Byers signed letters of assent binding it to the NECA
agreements with IBEW Local 592 for commercial inside
work, effective March 23, 1989, commercial outside work,
effective August 1, 1989, and residential work, effective Au-
gust 1, 1989. Hayman signed letters of assent binding it to
the NECA agreements with IBEW Local 592 for residential
work, effective July 28, 1989, and commercial inside work,
effective August 20, 1989.
After the Board issued its decision in John Deklewa &
Sons, 282 NLRB 1375 (1987), the IBEW sent its various
locals information dealing with ways to convert existing 8(f)
relationships into 9(a) relationships. Both Local Unions in-
volved in this proceeding set up a procedure to do that with
electrical contractors with whom they had a contractual rela-
tionship. IBEW Local 592 took the following steps: (1) it
had new letters of assent signed by electrical contractors
doing business in its jurisdiction;1 (2) it had new authoriza-
tion for recognition cards signed by its members; (3) the con-
tractors were then sent a packet containing signed authoriza-
tion cards for their employees the Local showed on its man-
ning board as then working for the contractor, together with
a letter of explanation and what is termed hereinafter as a
‘‘recognition agreement.’’ The letter sent to the contractors
reads:
As per the recognition language contained in our Let-
ter-of-Assent, enclosed please find copies of Authoriza-
tion-for-Recognition cards signed by a majority of your
bargaining unit employees. This proof of majority status
converts our Agreement from Section 8(f), pre-hire sta-
tus to Section 9(a) majority status.
The recognition agreement calls for the employer’s signa-
ture, title, name of company and date. It reads:
I have received and reviewed the authorization cards
signed by my employees that empowers Local 592
IBEW to represent them in collective bargaining and I
concur.
Local 211 followed a similar procedure. It had new au-
thorization cards signed on a voluntary basis each time a
member was referred to a job. Its business manager, George
Fenwick, testified that the various contractors with whom it
had dealings were shown the cards for their employees and
then asked to sign a voluntary recognition agreement. The
IBEW Local 211 recognition agreement reads:
The below named employer, having satisfied itself
that International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Local Union 211, represents a majority of its employees
in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining, does by
the signing of this document agree to negotiate and bar-
gain with Local Union 211 either by itself or through
its chosen representative, recognizing Local Union 211
as the exclusive bargaining representative of said em-
ployees in accordance with the provisions of Section
9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
The recognition agreement called for the signatures of a
representative of the involved employer and the Union and
a date of signing. After the agreement was executed, Local
211 sent to the Employer a packet containing a cover letter,
authorization cards signed by the Employer’s employees, and
a copy of the previous months benefits contribution form list-
ing the contractor’s employees for that month. The cover let-
ter reads:
Enclosed for your records is a fully executed copy
of the Recognition Agreement.
In addition, attached is a copy of Authorization for
Representation cards signed by (appropriate number) of
your employees. That number represents a majority of
your employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
Also attached is a copy of last month’s NEBF report
for your company that shows these are the employees
for which you are paying fringe benefits.
In accordance with the Letter of Assent you signed,
this will convert our Section 8(f) pre-hire relationship
to a Section 9(a) relationship under the National Labor
Relations Act. If you have any questions, please contact
me immediately.
C. The Action Taken by Respondents in Response to the
Unions’ Demand for 9(a) Recognition
1. Respondent Byers
Frank Byers signed a recognition agreement for Local 211
as set out above on behalf of Respondent Frank J. Byers,
Inc. on April 10, 1989, and it was signed by Fenwick on be-
half of Local 211 on April 12. The Local sent Byers a packet
as described above with the cover letter dated April 28,
1989, and enclosed six authorization cards. The cards were
signed by employees Rodney D’Ottavio, dated January 23,
1989, Glenn Petersen, dated January 23, 1989, George Gross,
dated February 27, 1989, Ronald Lucas, dated February 23,
1989, James Schmitz, dated February 27, 1989, and Milburn
Thomas, dated February 23, 1989.2 The contribution report
enclosed with the packet lists all these men and no one else.
Byers testified that he saw a copy of a blank Local 211
recognition agreement at some point before he signed one.
He testified that this was given to him by NECA Chapter
Manager Joseph Knecht. According to Byers, he inquired of
Knecht about the significance of the agreement and Knecht
said he was unclear as to its meaning, but would report back
after checking with NECA’s attorneys. Byers testified that
882 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 I allowed this information in the record over the objection of
General Counsel. I do not believe this information is necessary to
the correct decision in this proceeding, but allowed it in evidence
to afford the Respondents to make their full argument to the Board.
Knecht subsequently reported that ‘‘the agreement was not a
major concern. The agreement had to do with the IBEW
being able to maintain certain controls over different types
of benefits and different funds around the country having to
do with the IBEW and their members.’’ Byers testified that
he accepted this explanation without question and signed and
returned the recognition agreement to Local 211. Knecht tes-
tified that he had a conversation with Byers in April 1989
relating to the new letters of assent and did not give advice
about the recognition agreements. In fact, he testified that the
first time he saw such an agreement was about 5 months
prior to the hearing in this proceeding. With regard to the
question of Byers about the letters of assent, he testified that
he told Byers that ‘‘it was just another factor of doing busi-
ness with the IBEW.’’ I do not credit Byers’ testimony about
the purported advice given him by Knecht about the recogni-
tion agreement and credit Knecht’s testimony that he and
Byers never discussed the matter. Knecht is still NECA
chapter manager and presumably is aligned with Respondents
in this matter. Moreover, the explanation of the meaning of
the recognition agreement espoused by Byers simply does
not make sense and totally ignores the clear intent of the
agreement set out in its terms and amplified in the cover let-
ter sent by Local 211 and one from Local 592 which he re-
ceived in May 1989.
Local 592 sent a packet as described above to Byers on
May 25, 1989, by certified mail, return receipt requested.
The packet was signed for by Byers on May 27, 1989. The
enclosed recognition agreement was signed by Frank Byers
and dated May 31, 1989, and returned to the Local Union.
The cards shown to have been sent to Byers included
those for IBEW Local 592 members, Carl Chowing, Richard
DeMarco, Gordon Aranjo, Carl Howell, and Kenneth Simp-
son. With the exception of the card for DeMarco, which was
not dated, the cards were signed in February, April, and May
1989. The Local 592 monthly benefits contribution report
used by the Union and employers to report hours and wages
for employees reflects that for May 1989, Byers reported in-
come and hours for six employees, C. Howell, G. Aranjo, W.
McCullough, R. Demarco, K. Simpson, and C. Chowing.
Byers admits receiving and signing the recognition agree-
ment from Local Union 592, but denies receiving the cards
and the letter of explanation. I do not credit his denial. He
told a Board agent in the investigation of this case and a
Federal district court that he had never received the cards.
Subsequently he claims to have found them shortly before
this hearing began. Byers’ testimony in other respects was
shown to be either not truthful or incorrect as a matter of
failed memory, as for example his testimony about his pur-
ported conversations with Knecht about the Local 211 rec-
ognition agreement. I believe that to be the case with respect
to what he received from IBEW Local 592 and credit the
Local with sending him the entire packet containing the letter
dated May 25, 1989, the cards described above, and the rec-
ognition agreement.
Byers never contacted either Local Union about the mate-
rial, and prior to his refusal to bargain in 1992, never ques-
tioned the majority status of IBEW Locals 211 and 592, the
appropriateness of the unit, or the effect of signing the rec-
ognition agreement on the relationship between the Local
Union and his Company. The Respondent introduced evi-
dence which purports to show that for the period April 10,
1987, through April 10, 1989, there were approximately 11
Byers employees who had worked in the geographic jurisdic-
tions of Local 211 and: (1) who had been employed for at
least 30 working days in the 12-month period immediately
preceding April 10, 1989; or (2) who had some employment
in the 12-month period immediately preceding that date and
had a cumulative amount of employment of 45 days or more
in the 24-month period immediately preceding April 10,
1989. It also introduced similar information which showed
that approximately 32 Byers employees worked in Local
592’s jurisdiction for at least 30 working days in the 12-
month period immediately preceding May 31, 1989, or had
some employment in the 12-month period immediately pre-
ceding that date with a cumulative amount of employment of
45 working days or more in the 24-month period imme-
diately preceding May 31, 1989.3 On the other hand, Byers
did not show that on the dates that he signed the recognition
agreements that his employees were not the ones for whom
cards were supplied and who were the employees listed on
the contribution forms supplied to the Unions by him. More-
over, the business managers for both Local Unions testified
credibly that they could have supplied more cards if Byers
or any other employer demonstrated having more employees
than the ones for which cards were supplied. No such request
was made by Byers.
2. Respondent Hayman
Walter Hayman signed a recognition agreement with Local
211 on November 27, 1990. Hayman testified that he signed
the recognition agreement under what he called an intimi-
dated state of mind. He had a contract to do electrical work
on a McDonald’s restaurant being constructed within the ju-
risdiction of Local 211. Though he had received permission
before construction started to bring in an employee who was
a Local 592 member, when work began Local 211 objected.
After a round of discussions which involved the International
Union, he was allowed to use the employee, Leo Meade, but
had to first sign a letter of assent with Local 211. He was
sent a letter by Local 211 which stated that he had to come
to the Local’s office and sign a new letter of assent and rec-
ognition agreement. When he went to the union hall to sign
this letter, he was also given a Local 211 recognition agree-
ment to sign. He testified that he signed everything put in
front of him and does not remember seeing an authorization
card for Meade at the time. He did read the recognition
agreement ‘‘real fast’’ before signing it. The recognition
agreement is dated November 27, 1989. According to
Fenwick, a copy of Meade’s card, dated October 22, 1990,
was shown to Hayman before he signed the agreement.
At the time of signing, Hayman did not question the ma-
jority status of Local 211, the appropriateness of the unit, or
any other facet of the recognition he was extending. Meade
was the only Hayman employee working in the jurisdiction
of Local 211 when the card was signed. If as claimed by Re-
spondent Hayman, the Local 211 recognition agreement was
signed because he did not believe that Meade could work in
the Local’s jurisdiction unless he did so, it does not explain
883HAYMAN ELECTRIC
why he did not repudiate the agreement upon completion of
the job, or why he did not file a grievance asserting the port-
ability provisions of the contract were being violated. As
Hayman did not repudiate his extension of voluntary recogni-
tion until well into 1992 when the other Respondents also re-
pudiated them, I do not credit his late assertion of intimida-
tion.
On March 29, 1991, Local 211 sent Hayman a cover letter
together with an executed copy of the new letter of assent
and recognition form. It asked Hayman to contact Fenwick
immediately if he had any questions. Hayman did not contact
Fenwick and did not question the agreement, the majority
status of the Union, nor the appropriateness of the unit upon
receipt of this letter.
Local 592 sent Hayman the packet described above to-
gether with authorization cards signed by Robert Dooley on
May 1, 1989, Leo Meade on April 29, 1989, and Mike
Vizzard, undated. The contribution form for Hayman’s busi-
ness for the month of April shows as Hayman’s employees
R. Dooley, L. Meade, W. Vizzard, and K. Poloff. Vizzard
testified that he signed the card sometime in May 1989. The
acknowledgement letter was signed by Hayman on May 30,
1989, and returned to the Local Union. In his direct testi-
mony, Hayman testified that he received three cards with the
recognition agreement. On cross-examination, he asserted
that he did not receive either the cover letter or the cards
with the recognition agreement. I did not find his testimony
in this regard to be credible. I find that he received the cover
letter, authorization cards, and recognition agreement in the
same package.
Hayman also testified that he called Knecht and asked him
about the Local 592 recognition agreement at the time he re-
ceived it. According to Hayman, Knecht told him that ‘‘it
was nothing more than the employees somehow were getting
their fringe benefits and the union didn’t like it and it was
to protect the union which made sense to me at the time be-
cause a man had hired me, we were doing some work at a
98 and if he went out of town he would have had just
enough time to collect his retirement benefits out of Vine-
land so I figured that makes sense to me and I just went
along with it. He [Knecht] told me it had to do with the
fringe benefits, that somehow the men were getting their
fringe benefits in an envelope and this was to stop it.’’
Knecht testified that he did not discuss the recognition agree-
ment with Hayman and as noted above did not see a recogni-
tion agreement until about 5 months before this hearing. I
credit Knecht’s testimony that he did not give Hayman the
advice Hayman purportedly received. Again the purported
explanation is not believable and the cover letter and rec-
ognition agreement make complete sense. It should also be
noted that at one time, Hayman was an assistant business
manager for Local 592 and would have more than just a
passing knowledge of labor relations.
While acknowledging that three cards sent to Hayman by
Local 592 represent a majority of Hayman’s employees in
May 1989, it introduced evidence that eight persons worked
for Hayman in the Local’s jurisdiction for at least 30 work-
ing days in the 12-month period immediately preceding May
31, 1989. Hayman did not ask to see cards for these employ-
ees, however.
3. Respondent Pyramid
Local 211 sent a letter dated April 24, 1989, to Pyramid,
which reads:
A recent review of our files has revealed that we are
lacking certain vital documents. Accordingly, enclosed
are the following:
1. Five copies of a current Letter of Assent-A; and
2. Two Copies of a Recognition Agreement
I am aware that your company is not currently per-
forming work in Local 211 jurisdiction. However, since
you do perform work in this Local’s jurisdiction from
time to time, it is important that I have these documents
on file. Please sign all copies of the enclosed docu-
ments and return them to me in the enclosed envelope.
Pyramid, by its secretary and shareholder John Medica,
signed the recognition agreement on June 1, 1989, and it was
signed by Fenwick on June 6. It is identical in its language
to the one signed by Byers for Local 211. Pyramid had per-
formed work in the jurisdiction of Local 211 prior to the
time the letter was sent. Fenwick believes the Company was
working in the area when the recognition agreement was
signed.
Medica testified that Pyramid has been in business since
1981 and does commercial and industrial electric work in the
jurisdictions of Locals 439, 211, and 592. Pyramid’s normal
jobs in the period 1989 to 1992 averaged 3 employees, with
some calling for 9 or 10 for a short duration of time. There
were times when Pyramid employed only one or no employ-
ees. He used men from Local 211, and also used some from
Local 592. During 1989, he used men exclusively from Local
592.
He testified that the recognition agreement with Local 211
was mailed to him. Upon receipt of the agreement and cover
letter, he called Frank Byers, then president of the local
NECA chapter. According to Medica, Byers told him he had
checked with Knecht and that the letter of recognition was
a document to protect the Union against their employees col-
lecting their own benefits. Based on this explanation which
I have heretofore found has no basis in fact, Medica signed
the agreement and mailed it back. He claims to have had no
idea that signing the agreement changed his Company’s rela-
tionship with the Union. He did not consult an attorney be-
fore signing nor he did not speak with any union representa-
tive before or after signing to ask them what the agreement
meant. In April 1989, he had one Local 592 member work-
ing for him. This employee was named Dave DeVleechower.
In September 1992, he had two employees, DeVleechower
and Ed Watt.
He terminated the authority of NECA to bargain for his
Company because he no longer wanted to be a union con-
tractor. He testified that rates are too high, going from one
jurisdiction to another is a problem, and with the raises the
Union’s keep getting, he did not think he could stay in busi-
ness.
In 1989, Pyramid had one employee from January to Sep-
tember. From September 1989 to approximately June 1990,
it had no employees. From June 1990 until September 1992,
it had 3 to 4 and up to 10 employees working steadily. He
884 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 The Board in J & R Tile, supra, also referred to several other
cases concerning the burden of proof needed to establish 9(a) status.
In Harris Painting, supra, the only evidence presented, beside the
8(f) agreement itself, was the existence of a union-security clause in
that agreement. In Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., supra, the only evi-
dence presented to establish 9(a) status was that the parties’ collec-
tive-bargaining relationship commenced before the enactment of Sec.
8(f) of the Act. In American Thoro-Clean, 283 NLRB 1107 (1987),
there was absolutely no evidence presented to establish that the par-
ties had transformed the relationship from an 8(f) to a 9(a) relation-
ship. In all these cases the Board concluded that the burden had not
been met.
had employees working in Local 211 jurisdiction from June
1990 to September 1992.
4. Respondent Janney
Janney executed a recognition agreement with Local 211
on December 1, 1989. The Local sent him a letter like the
one sent to Byers, enclosing copies of five authorization
cards, for employees Robert Larria, dated December 14,
1989, Clarence Davenport, dated December 13, 1989,
Charles Parker, dated July 24, 1989, Ralph Tunnell, dated
October 13, 1989, and Mark Baillio, dated October 11, 1989.
The contribution report for the month of November 1989 re-
flects as employees, C. Parker, M. Baillio, R. Tunnell, T.
Ferguson, G. Hazard, and W. Gallagher. Hazard would not
be counted as part of the unit as he worked only 8 hours in
the month of November. A contribution report for Janney for
December reflects employees as C. Parker and R. Larria.
Fenwick stated that Janney was shown three cards when he
signed the agreement. The cards from Larria and Davenport
were obtained after Janney signed the recognition agreement
and were sent subsequently with the packet to Janney.
Janney did not inquire of anyone about the meaning of the
agreement nor did he question any aspect of it with Local
211. Janney claims that when he received his letter from
Local 211, there were no cards attached. Yet, he did not call
or write the Union and inquire about this seeming omission.
As was the case with the other Respondents making a similar
claim, I do not believe it and find that cards were sent to
him with the executed agreement. He claims that when he
signed the agreement, he did not understand that it changed
his relationship with the Union. I find this difficult to believe
as the recognition agreement he signed states this on its face.
I do not believe that the signing of agreements with labor
unions is any different from an employers signing any other
contract in his business. The employer has a duty to inquire
before signing and barring some fraud or misrepresentation
is bound by what he signs.
Janney further testified that aside from Parker, he had no
employee in 1989 that worked more than 21 days. He cal-
culated this by looking at the Union’s contribution forms and
dividing by eight the number of hours shown for each em-
ployee he had during the year. He testified that Robert Larria
is a residential wireman from Local 592, that Clarence Dav-
enport is a residential wireman from Local 211 who did not
work for Janney because of travel involved, that Mark
Baillio is a journeyman electrician from Virginia Beach, Vir-
ginia, and that Tunnel is a residential wireman from Local
211.
D. Discussion and Conclusions with Respect to the
Relationship of the Respondents and Local Unions
1. The legal guidelines for determining whether a 9(a)
relationship exists in the construction industry
In John Deklewa & Sons, supra, the Board reevaluated the
law interpreting Section 8(f) of the Act, along with the asso-
ciated ‘‘conversion’’ doctrine, and announced a new rule.
The Board rejected the conversion doctrine which permitted
an 8(f) relationship to convert to a 9(a) relationship because
it required the Board to ‘‘‘look back’ any number of years
into a relationship characterized by sporadic and shifting em-
ployment patterns to determine whether the union, at any
time, enjoyed majority support.’’ 282 NLRB at 1383. The
Board viewed the doctrine as creating ‘‘serious practical
problems with the reliability and relevance of evidence pur-
porting to establish majority status.’’ Id. According to the
Board, reaching a conclusion as to whether or not there was
a conversion occurred ‘‘in adversarial litigation based on [the
factors noted above that were] often incomplete, contradic-
tory . . . unavailable. . . . [not in fact the best indicators of
majority status and] based on a highly questionable factual
foundation.’’ 282 NLRB at 1383–1384.
In rejecting the conversion doctrine, however, the Board in
Deklewa did not reject the notion that a union seeking to rep-
resent employees in the construction industry could never ob-
tain 9(a) status. Indeed, since Deklewa the Board has stated
that a party can prove the existence of a 9(a) relationship ei-
ther through a Board-conducted representation election, or a
union’s express demand for, and an employer’s voluntary
grant of, recognition to the union based on a contempora-
neous showing of union support among a majority of the em-
ployees in an appropriate unit. Deklewa, 282 NLRB at 1385
and fn. 41; Golden West Electric, 307 NLRB 1494 (1992);
J & R Tile, 291 NLRB 1034, 1036 (1988); Harris Painting,
286 NLRB 642 (1987). Short of a Board election, however,
the issue of what evidence is required to establish that a
union has created a 9(a) relationship is not entirely clear.
In J & R Tile, supra, a successor employer in the construc-
tion industry filed an RM petition asserting that its prede-
cessor’s contract with the union was an 8(f), not a 9(a), col-
lective-bargaining agreement. In that case the only evidence
presented to establish that the relationship had been trans-
formed into a 9(a) relationship was that the contract provided
for health, welfare, and pension benefits and that the prede-
cessor employer’s president had been a union member; there-
fore he must have known his employees were also union
members. The Board looked at the facts twice and in both
instances concluded that the evidence presented was ‘‘insuf-
ficient to establish that the contract . . . was entered into
pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act.’’ 291 NLRB at 1035,
1037. The Board noted in that case that the very availability
of 8(f) agreements in the construction industry renders am-
biguous a union’s demand to execute an agreement and con-
cluded that in order to establish voluntary recognition pursu-
ant to Section 9(a) of the Act in the construction industry,
there must be evidence that ‘‘the union unequivocally de-
manded recognition as the employees’ 9(a) representative’’
and that ‘‘the employer unequivocally accepted it as such.’’
219 NLRB at 1036. The Board in Deklewa and in J & R
Tile cited Island Construction, 135 NLRB 13 (1962), as an
example of a case in which a union sought and obtained 9(a)
recognition from a construction employer.4 In Island Con-
885HAYMAN ELECTRIC
struction, supra, a union demanded recognition from a con-
struction industry employer asserting that it represented a
majority of that employer’s employees. The union showed
the employer, upon request, authorization cards signed by a
majority of the employer’s employees at that time, which the
employer checked against its payroll list. There was no evi-
dence presented in that case to verify the union’s claim of
majority status. The Board found the collective-bargaining
agreement entered into between the union and the employer
after the verification of majority status to be a 9(a) agree-
ment, and not an 8(f) agreement, and therefore a bar to an
RC petition filed by another union. In Precision Striping,
284 NLRB 1110, 1112 (1987), the Board indicated that in
certain circumstances an employer-conducted poll prior to
recognition may establish a 9(a) relationship. And finally, the
Board has indicated that in situations where an employer ad-
mits to the majority status of the union, the 9(a) relationship
is established. Thus, in Carmichael Construction Corp., 258
NLRB 226 fn. 1 (1981) (cited approvingly in Brannan Sand
& Gravel Co., 289 NLRB 977, 979 fn. 9 (1988), and Golden
West, supra, the Board relied on the employer’s admission of
majority status to satisfy the burden of proof of 9(a) status.
In Golden West, an employer filed an RM petition and the
Acting Regional Director dismissed the petition as contract
barred based on the conclusion that a recognition agreement,
very similar to the recognition agreements in the instant
cases, established the Union as the 9(a) collective-bargaining
representative. On review, the Board remanded the case back
to the Region to develop a full record as to ‘‘what evidence,
if any, supported the Union’s claim, and the Employer’s ac-
knowledgment of the Union’s status of majority representa-
tive.’’ Supra at 1494. On remand, the hearing included testi-
mony as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the recognition agreement, including testimony by both the
employer and the union concerning authorization cards that
were shown to the employer when the employer was re-
quested to sign the recognition agreement. The testimony es-
sentially established that sometime in September 1988, the
union representative visited the employer’s jobsite, requested
that the employer sign a letter of assent and a recognition
agreement, presented the employer with signed authorization
cards, and the employer responded, ‘‘Yeah, these are the sig-
natures of the guys.’’ Although at trial, the employer testified
that he never saw any cards, on cross-examination the em-
ployer admitted that he did not doubt that the union rep-
resented a majority of his employees at that time. The Board
found that the union had met its burden to establish that the
relationship had been transformed into a 9(a) relationship:
[U]nder all the circumstances presented, the Union has
established by the weight of the evidence a clear intent
of the parties in September 1988 to establish a 9(a) re-
lationship founded on the Union’s majority status. The
voluntary recognition agreement signed by the Em-
ployer by its terms unequivocally states that the Union
claimed it represented a majority of the employees and
the Employer acknowledged that this was so. In this re-
gard, [the Employer] testified that he had read the vol-
untary recognition agreement before signing it and, at
the time he signed it, was in agreement that the Union
represented a majority of his unit employees. Thus, al-
though there is conflicting evidence as to whether the
Employer in fact saw the authorization cards, there is
no dispute that the Employer knew at the time it signed
the recognition agreement that both parties were in ac-
cord that the Union was seeking recognition as the unit
employees’ majority representative and that the Em-
ployer was granting the Union recognition as such.
[Fns. 5 and 6 omitted; 307 NLRB at 1495.]
In the recent case of Casale Industries, 311 NLRB 951
(1993), the Board further discussed what is sufficient to es-
tablish a 9(a) relationship in the construction industry and set
a time limitation on challenges which may be made to exist-
ing apparent 9(a) relationships. In Casale, the Board faced a
challenge by one union to a longstanding bargaining relation-
ship between an association of contractors and an incumbent
union, a relationship which had been created following a pri-
vate election in which employees of the association’s em-
ployer-members had been given the choice of being rep-
resented by one or the other of two unions. Under the terms
of the agreement leading to the election, all parties to it
agreed that the winner would be recognized as the employ-
ees’ bargaining representative just as if certified by the
Board. The winner thereafter entered into a series of collec-
tive-bargaining agreements with the association that extended
over a period of about 6 years. Another union filed a petition
with the Board seeking to represent the employees of two
employers within the association, Casale and Miller. The pe-
titioner argued that even if the multiemployer bargaining unit
could constitute an appropriate unit, the majority showing
must be demonstrated on a single-employer basis to satisfy
the requirements for a 9(a) status under Deklewa. Because
there was no showing that a majority of either Casale’s or
Miller’s employees voted to be represented by the incumbent
local, the contract cannot be Section 9(a) with respect to ei-
ther employer. The petitioner also argued that the ‘‘election’’
conducted by the parties was insufficient to establish a 9(a)
relationship between the incumbent local and the association
because the election lacked Board safeguards; there was no
‘‘no union’’ choice on the ballot; and the certification was
devoid of any delineation of the appropriate unit or the par-
ticipants. The Regional Director decided that a voluntarily
extended 9(a) relationship existed between the association
and the incumbent local in the larger multiemployer unit and
that the smaller unit sought by the petition was inappropriate.
On review of this decision, the Board looked at the relation-
ship and held, 311 NLRB at 952–953:
Under Deklewa, the Board presumes that parties in
the construction industry intend their relationship to be
an 8(f) relationship. Thus, the burden is on the party
who seeks to show the contrary, i.e., that the parties in-
tend a Section 9 relationship.
In the instant case, it is clear that the parties intended
a Section 9 relationship. The parties agreed to hold an
election and further agreed that the winner would be
recognized by the employers ‘‘as if the election had
been conducted by the NLRB itself and an appropriate
certification(s) issued.’’ As no showing of majority sta-
tus is necessary to establish an 8(f) relationship, the
very fact that the parties [intended] to hold an election
indicates that they intended to establish a 9(a) relation-
ship by proof of majority support. The parties’ analogy
886 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 See Comtel Systems Technology, 305 NLRB 287 (1991).
6 Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., supra, does not require a contrary
result. There was no showing in that case that the parties intended
a 9(a) relationship. Rather, the General Counsel argued, unsuccess-
fully, that the Board should presume that pre-1959 relationships were
9(a) relationships. By contrast, in the instant case, there is a showing
that the parties intended a 9(a) relationship. Similarly, in J & R Tile,
supra, and in American Thoro-Clean, supra, there was no showing
that the parties intended to have a 9(a) relationship.
to Board certification . . . is further evidence that they
meant to create a 9(a) relationship. Plainly, if the par-
ties had intended only an 8(f) relationship, it would
have been entirely unnecessary for them to have en-
tered into these agreements and to have used these pro-
cedures.
Of course, even where parties intend a 9(a) relation-
ship, that intention will be thwarted if the union does
not enjoy majority status at the time of recognition.
Clearly, if majority status is challenged within a reason-
able time, and majority status is not shown, the rela-
tionship will not be a valid 9(a) relationship.5
In the instant case, there is at least a substantial
question as to whether majority status has been shown.
In this regard, we note that the employees were not pre-
sented with a ‘‘no union’’ choice. Further, quite apart
from this problem, there was no separate tally of the
votes of the employees of Casale and Miller. However,
the challenge to majority status came 6 years after Sec-
tion 9 recognition was extended and accepted. The par-
ties reached agreement on three successive contracts
during that period. The issue before us is whether to
permit a challenge to majority status after 6 years of
stability in a multiemployer relationship.
We will not permit the challenge. Our conclusion
that the petitions should not be processed in single-em-
ployer units is based on the proposition that a challenge
to majority status must be made within a reasonable pe-
riod of time after Section 9 recognition is granted. In
Comtel, the Board’s statement of the governing prin-
ciples included a requirement that the challenge to ma-
jority status be made within a reasonable period of
time. In the instant case, the Section 9 recognition was
extended 6 years before the challenge to majority sta-
tus. For the reasons that follow, we believe that this 6-
year period was more than a reasonable period of time.
In nonconstruction industries, if an employer grants
Section 9 recognition to a union and more than 6
months elapse, the Board will not entertain a claim that
majority status was lacking at the time of recognition.
A contrary rule would mean that longstanding relation-
ships would be vulnerable to attack, and stability in
labor relations would be undermined.
These same principals would be applicable in the
construction industry. In Deklewa, the Board said that
unions in the construction industry should not be treat-
ed less favorably than those in nonconstruction indus-
tries. As shown above, parties in nonconstruction indus-
tries, who have established and maintained a stable Sec-
tion 9 relationship, are entitled to protection against a
tardy attempt to disrupt their relationship. Parties in the
construction industry are entitled to no less protection.
Accordingly, if a construction industry employer ex-
tends 9(a) recognition . . . and 6 months elapse without
a charge or petition, the Board should not entertain a
claim that majority status was lacking at the time of
recognition.6
Because the challenge to majority status in this case
was made substantially more than 6 months after the
grant of Section 9 recognition, we would not permit the
challenge. Accordingly, we would not process these pe-
titions in single-employer units.
Because we have found that the appropriate unit for
an election in this case is the recognized multiemployer
bargaining unit, the petitions seeking single-employer
units cannot be processed . . . . [Fns. 11, 13–17, and
19 omitted.]
2. The Unions’ established valid 9(a) relationships
with Respondents
I have found that each employer has signed a recognition
agreement which on its face or as amplified by a cover letter
which I have found they received, clearly and unequivocally
sets out a union demand for recognition as the 9(a) bar-
gaining representative of the Employers’ employees and a
voluntary recognition by the Employers of that status. The
recognition agreements acknowledge the majority status of
the Local Unions. Additionally, each Respondent signed a
new letter of assent which clearly states that if a majority of
its employees authorizes the Local Union to represent them,
the Employer will recognize the Local Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative for all employees
performing construction work within the jurisdiction of the
Local Union on all present and future jobsites.
I can find nothing inappropriate with the unit encom-
passing the employees of Respondents working within the
geographic jurisdictions of the involved Local Unions. This
is the historic unit utilized by the parties in their collective-
bargaining agreements and there were shown to be dif-
ferences in the working conditions between the Locals’ juris-
dictions. Recognizing a union on the basis of its geographic
jurisdiction has not been found to be an inappropriate unit.
See Oklahoma Installation Co., 305 NLRB 812 (1991);
Ameritech Communications, 297 NLRB 654 (1990); Wilson
& Dean Construction Co., 295 NLRB 484 (1989); Dezcon,
Inc., 295 NLRB 109 (1989); P. J. Dick Contracting, 290
NLRB 150 (1988).
With respect to the showing of majority status, I find that
with the exception of Respondent Pyramid, both Local
Unions had valid authorization cards for a majority of each
Respondent’s employees as reflected on that Respondent’s
monthly benefits contribution form for the month preceding
the signing of the agreements. I find that the cards authoriz-
ing Local 592 to represent the named employees were shown
to Respondents Byers and Hayman at the time they signed
the recognition agreements with that Local Union. Respond-
ents Byers and Janney were supplied with authorization cards
demonstrating majority support for Local 211 at the time of
their executing a recognition agreement or subsequent to
their signing of their agreements. Respondent Hayman may
not have seen the card signed by Leo Meade authorizing
Local 211 to represent him, but acknowledged at the hearing
that Meade was its only employee working in Local 211’s
887HAYMAN ELECTRIC
7 I believe it is sufficient for the Unions to have established major-
ity status as of the time of signing of the recognition agreements and
that it is unnecessary for the Unions in the circumstances here pre-
sented to satisfy the eligibility requirements of Daniel Construction,
133 NLRB 264 (1963). In Bay Area Sealers, 251 NLRB 89 (1980),
the union proved 9(a) majority status by showing that on the day
the employer signed the collective-bargaining agreement it had
signed authorization cards from four of the six employees in the
unit. And, in Golden West, 307 NLRB at 1495 fn. 6, the Board
noted at the end of its decision that ‘‘the evidence shows that, at
the time of recognition, the Union had majority support within the
unit.’’
8 Although most of Respondents were shown authorization cards
for their employees, I would not find it significant to the question
of majority status if they had not been given them in light of Re-
spondents’ failure to question the Unions about this issue. The Board
has repeatedly held from Deklewa to Casale that construction indus-
try unions are not in a less favored status than those in nonconstruc-
tion industries. In a nonconstruction setting, a union may approach
an employer and demand recognition asserting that it represents a
majority. At that point the employer is free to accept or reject the
union’s request for recognition, can file an RM petition, and can ask
to see the union’s evidence of majority status. If the employer asks
for verification and is given evidence of majority status, the em-
ployer is obligated to recognize the union. See Linden Lumber Divi-
sion v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974); Sullivan Electric Co., 199
NLRB 809 (1972). The union, however, is not required to show the
employer any evidence of majority status unless the employer re-
quests to see the evidence. Moisi & Son Trucking, 197 NLRB 198
(1972); Soil Engineering Co., 269 NLRB 55 (1984); Marysville
Travelodge, 233 NLRB 527 (1977); Lincoln Mfg. Co., 160 NLRB
1866, 1876–1877 (1966). If an employer voluntarily recognizes a
union based solely on that union’s assertion of majority status, with-
out verification, an employer is not free to repudiate the contractual
relationship that it has with the union outside the 10(b) period, i.e.,
beyond the 6 months after initial recognition, on the ground the
union did not represent a majority when the employer recognized the
union. Morse Shoe, Inc., 231 NLRB 13 (1977); Berbiglia, Inc., 233
NLRB 1476 (1977). Moreover, where an employer outside the con-
struction industry expressly recognizes a union as the 9(a) represent-
ative, the union becomes the 9(a) representative of the unit employ-
ees, unless the employer timely produces affirmative evidence of the
union’s lack of majority at the time of recognition, i.e., within the
10(b) period. See Royal Coach Lines, 282 NLRB 1037 (1987); E. L.
Rice & Co., 213 NLRB 746 (1974); Moisi & Son Trucking, supra,
or, outside the 10(b) period, presents evidence that the employer has
a good-faith doubt that the union represents a majority of his current
employees, Auciello Iron Works, 303 NLRB 562 (1991); Wayne
Electric, 226 NLRB 409 (1976). The Board’s ruling in Casale,
supra, effectively extends time limitations similar to 10(b) limitations
to the construction industry.
jurisdiction at the time of his signing of the recognition
agreement with Local 211.
With respect to Pyramid, Local 211 sent Pyramid a letter
on April 24, 1989, at a time when Pyramid was not working
in Local 211’s jurisdiction, and requested that Pyramid exe-
cute a letter of assent and a recognition agreement in antici-
pation of future work within Local 211’s jurisdiction.
Fenwick could not recall if any cards were ever presented to
Pyramid. The fact that Local 211 could not go back 3 years
and piece together what, if anything, it had done to get Pyr-
amid to sign the recognition agreement, and if it had any
cards signed by any Pyramid employees, does not compel a
finding that no 9(a) relationship had been formed, especially
in light of the express language of the recognition agreement
which Pyramid signed. There is nothing in the law which
would necessarily preclude an employer in the construction
industry from entering into a voluntary 9(a) recognition
agreement with a union, even if at the time it had no em-
ployees, provided it was clear that the union would not be
foisted upon the employees but that the employer would give
his employees the opportunity to indicate whether they
would like to be represented by the union. General Motors
Corp., Saturn Corp. and Auto Workers, UAW, Cases 7–CA–
24872 and 7–CB–6582, Advice Memorandum dated June 2,
1986, 122 LRRM 1187, 1191–1192 (1986). Medica testified
that Pyramid had used men from the Local 211 hall. He also
testified that he employed one employee in 1989 out of
Local 592, that from June 1990 to September 1992, he em-
ployed anywhere from three to nine employees in Local
211’s jurisdiction with two employees working as of Sep-
tember 1992. Fenwick testified that the contractors had to get
their employees to work in Local 211’s jurisdiction from the
Local 211 hall, with the limited exception of portability, and
that all employees referred out to a contractor were requested
to sign an authorization card for Local 211. It is thus reason-
able to assume that all Pyramid employees who worked in
Local 211’s jurisdiction after Pyramid executed the recogni-
tion agreement had signed Local 211 authorization cards.
Significantly, no Pyramid employee is complaining about the
recognition extended Local 211 by Pyramid.
The Unions clearly and unequivocally asserted majority
status among the employees in Respondents’ work force and
based on that assertion demanded recognition. Both Unions
were in possession of authorization cards which apparently
represented a majority of the Respondents’ employees at the
time the demand for recognition was made.7 Each Respond-
ent read the demand and signed the voluntary recognition
agreement which acknowledged majority status. None of the
Respondents questioned majority status at the time of signing
until April 1992, a period ranging from 1-1/2 years to 3
years.8 None of the Respondents questioned the appropriate-
ness of the unit being defined as the geographical jurisdiction
of each involved Local Union for the same period of time.
I find that the Local Unions have satisfied the requirements
of J & R Tile and Golden West and have established 9(a)
relationships with the Respondents as of the date of execu-
tion of the recognition agreements.
I do not credit Respondents’ late assertions that they did
not understand the significance of what they were signing.
The documents they admittedly read and signed clearly state
their purpose, that is to change an existing 8(f) relationship
to a 9(a) relationship. There was no purpose in the Unions
demanding recognition based on majority status and the Re-
spondents signing of recognition agreements if all that was
intended was to preserve the existing 8(f) relationships. I be-
lieve that the Respondents knew what they were signing and
at the time of signing were consciously consenting to chang-
ing their relationships with the involved Local Unions to 9(a)
status. It was only much later, when economic conditions in
the area worsened significantly did Respondents have second
thoughts about what they had done.
Finally, I find that the Board’s recent holding in Casale,
supra, bars the Respondents’ challenge to their relationship
with the involved Locals, or to majority status of the Unions
at the time of signing of the recognition agreements or the
appropriateness of the involved units, such challenges com-
888 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing far after the 6-month period established by the Board for
making such challenges. Even if I had not found that the in-
volved Local Unions had satisfied the requirements of J &
R Tile and Golden West and successfully had converted their
relationships with Respondents to 9(a) relationships, I would
find that Respondents are barred from questioning the rela-
tionship established by the signing of the recognition agree-
ments based on the recognition agreements alone, under the
holding in Casale.
Based on the foregoing, I find that Local Union 592 has
had a 9(a) relationship with Respondent Byers since May 31,
1989, and with Respondent Hayman since May 30, 1989. I
find that Local Union 211 has had a 9(a) relationship with
Respondent Byers since April 10, 1989, with Respondent
Hayman since November 27, 1990, with Respondent Janney
since December 1, 1989, and with Respondent Pyramid since
June 1, 1989. Respondents Byers and Hayman withdrew rec-
ognition from and refused to bargain with Local Union 592
since May 1 and July 24, 1992, respectively. Respondents
Hayman, Byers, Janney, and Pyramid withdrew recognition
from and refused to bargain with Local Union 211 since
April 3, May 1, April 3 and 10, 1992. Since the dates of
withdrawal of recognition from the Local Unions, Respond-
ents have continued to refuse to recognize and bargain with
the Local Unions. Such actions are unlawful and in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
E. The Information Request by IBEW Local 592
Sometime in early February 1992, IBEW Local 592 Busi-
ness Manager Ben Merighi was told by his members that
Frank Byers, president of Byers, held a meeting with his em-
ployees and asked them if they would stay with him if he
went nonunion. Merighi investigated and found that a new
corporation had been established to do electrical construction
and maintenance under the name Byers Electrical Construc-
tion (BEC). BEC was listed as being located at the same ad-
dress as Byers and was ‘‘composed of’’ Frank Byers Jr. and
Stephanie A. Clowney, Frank Byers’ son and daughter. In
order to work as an electrical contractor in New Jersey, the
contractor must be licensed by the State. To Merighi’s
knowledge, neither Clowney nor Byers Jr. were licensed in
New Jersey as electrical contractors. Merighi obtained a copy
of the business permit issued to BEC for the State of New
Jersey. That listing was under a different name, Joseph M.
Quinn. At this point Merighi discussed his findings with his
attorney, Michael Katz.
On May 29, 1992, Katz wrote a letter to Byers’ attorney,
Frederick J. Rohloff, requesting information concerning BEC.
Noting that IBEW Local 592 had discovered that ‘‘a com-
pany trading as Byers Electrical Construction—[was] cur-
rently performing work at the Foster-Forbes Millville, New
Jersey facility which [was] customarily . . . performed by
Frank J. Byers, Inc.,’’ Katz requested the following informa-
tion:
1. The identity of the principals (i.e., owners, stock-
holders, officers, and directors) of Byers Electrical Con-
struction.
2. Whether Byers Electrical Construction is utilizing
any trucks, equipment, tools, or materials which are
owned by Frank J. Byers, Inc. or any of its principals.
3. Whether any electricians who are or who have
been employees of Frank J. Byers, Inc. are currently
performing the work in question for Byers Electrical
Construction.
4. The wage rates, job classifications, and fringe ben-
efits provided to the employees performing the work.
In response, Frank Byers wrote to Katz dated June 3,
1992. Frank Byers said that he did not ‘‘own or control
[BEC and that] . . . [a]ny other information that you have
requested will have to be obtained from other sources.’’
On June 25, 1992, Katz wrote to Frank Byers requesting
additional information. In the June 25 letter, Katz requested
this information ‘‘[f]or purposes of enabling Local 592 to
monitor and administer its collective bargaining agreements
with [Byers] and, further, for purpose of investigating poten-
tial grievances.’’ Specifically, Katz requested:
1. The names and addresses of all officers, stock-
holders, and directors of Frank J. Byers, Inc.
2. The names and addresses of all officers, share-
holders, and directors of Byers Electrical Construction.
. . . .
5. Identify the owner of all trucks and equipment uti-
lized by Byers Electrical Construction, state whether
Frank J. Byers, Inc. has loaned, leased, sold, or other-
wise conveyed or provided any vehicles or equipment
to Byers Electrical Construction. If such has occurred,
state the date thereof and identify the vehicles and
equipment involved.
6. Payroll records of Frank J. Byers, Inc. from [De-
cember 1, 1991] to the present.
On August 13, 1992, Rohloff, responded to this letter.
First, Rohloff informed Katz that to the extent IBEW Local
592 had already obtained the information it requested from
the State of New Jersey, ‘‘it did not need any further re-
sponse from him.’’ Also, Rohloff informed Katz that Frank
Byers is the father of the two principals of BEC, that neither
Frank Byers nor Byers has any connection with BEC, and
that Byers has made no loans, contributions, payments, or
advances of capital to or on behalf of BEC. In addition
Byers has not loaned, sold, or otherwise conveyed or pro-
vided any vehicles or equipment to BEC ‘‘with the exception
of the loaning of some equipment on occasion.’’ Finally,
Rohloff explained that Byers had already been the subject of
several audits and that because Byers and BEC are ‘‘com-
pletely separate and distinct business entit[ies]’’ Byers is in
no position to furnish information concerning that entity.
When a union seeks information concerning data about
employees and operations other than those represented by the
union in order to establish a double-breasted, single-em-
ployer, or alter ego operation, the information is not pre-
sumptively relevant but the union must show an objective
factual basis for believing that such a relationship between
the two operations exists. Arch of West Virginia, 304 NLRB
1089 (1991); Electrical Energy Services, 288 NLRB 925,
931–932 (1988); M. Scher & Son, 286 NLRB 688, 690–691
(1987); Barnard Engineering Co., 282 NLRB 617, 619–621
(1987); Pence Construction Corp., 281 NLRB 322, 324–325
(1986); Doubarn Sheet Metal, 243 NLRB 821, 823–824
(1979). A union is entitled to information that is relevant for
determining whether a violation of the collective-bargaining
889HAYMAN ELECTRIC
9 Electrical Energy Services, supra at 932.
10 Barnard Engineering Co., supra at 620.
11 Electrical Energy Services, supra; New York Times Co., 265
NLRB 353 (1982); Kroger Co., 226 NLRB 512, 513 (1976).
12 Barnard Engineering Co., supra at 621; Doubarn Sheet Metal,
supra at 824.
13 Arch of West Virginia, supra at 1089 fn. 1; United Graphics,
281 NLRB 463, 465–466 (1986); Doubarn, supra.
agreement has occurred and to determine whether in fact a
grievance should be filed. Electrical Energy Services, supra
at 932; Barnard Engineering Co., supra at 620; Pence Con-
struction Corp., supra at 324–325; Doubarn Sheet Metal,
supra.
I find that the Local Union has met its burden of estab-
lishing an objective factual basis for believing that BEC
might have a legally relevant relationship with Byers. At the
same time Byers is notifying Local 592 that it is terminating
its collective-bargaining relationship with Local 592 upon
contract expiration, Frank Byers is talking to Local 592
members about remaining as employees of Byers if he
chooses to operate nonunion. Local 592’s business manager,
Merighi, discovers a recent listing with the State of New Jer-
sey with a very similar name, BEC, operating out of the
same address, owned by Frank Byers’ daughter and son, nei-
ther of whom were licensed in the State of New Jersey as
electrical contractors. In addition, Merighi is told that BEC
is performing work at jobsites awarded to Byers. Under all
these circumstances, it was reasonable for Local 592 to con-
clude that BEC might be related to Byers. Westmoreland
Coal Co., 304 NLRB 528 (1991); Jervis B. Webb Co., 302
NLRB 316 (1991).
In addition, the parties have a 9(a) contractual relationship
and therefore Byers has a continuing obligation to recognize,
and bargain with, Local 592 upon contract expiration, includ-
ing an obligation to continue terms and conditions of em-
ployment pending negotiations for a new contract. Local 592
is entitled to the requested information to determine to what
extent any violations of the contract have occurred by the op-
eration of BEC.
Once the information sought by Local 592 is deemed rel-
evant, the Employer is obligated to provide all the informa-
tion requested in a timely fashion.9 The Union is not re-
quired to apprise Byers of its reasons for believing that Byers
and BEC are one and same10 and Byers may not refuse to
provide information because the Union may have obtained
some of the information sought from a different source.11 In
addition, Local 592 is not required to accept at face value
Byers’ assertion that it is not related to BEC12 and is entitled
to conduct its own investigation and evaluation of the merits
of its claim. Nor is Local 592 required to take at face value
Byers’ assertion that, because it allegedly has no relationship
with BEC, the information requested is not in Byers’ posses-
sion.13
By failing and refusing to comply with Local 592’s nec-
essary and relevant information request as discussed above,
Respondent Byers has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents are employers engaged in commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. IBEW Local Unions 211 and 592 are labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The appropriate unit for purposes of collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act for
IBEW Local Union 211 with respect to Respondents Byers,
Hayman, Janney, and Pyramid is their employees working
within the geographic jurisdiction of IBEW Local Union 211.
4. IBEW Local Union 211 has been the designated exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the unit based on Section
9(a) of the Act and has been recognized as such by Respond-
ent Byers since April 10, 1989; by Respondent Hayman
since November 27, 1990; by Respondent Janney since De-
cember 1, 1989; and Respondent Pyramid since April 24,
1989.
5. The appropriateuUnit for purposes of collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act for
IBEW Local Union 592 with respect to Respondents Byers
and Hayman is their employees working within the geo-
graphic jurisdiction of IBEW Local Union 592.
6. IBEW Local Union 592 has been the designated exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the unit based on Section
9(a) of the Act and has been recognized as such by Respond-
ent Byers since May 31, 1989, and by Respondent Hayman
since May, 30, 1989.
7. By withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bar-
gain with IBEW Local Union 211, Respondents Byers,
Hayman, Janney, and Pyramid have engaged in conduct in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
8. By withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bar-
gain with IBEW Local Union 592, Respondents Byers and
Hayman have engaged in conduct in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
9. By failing and refusing to supply the information re-
quested by IBEW Local Union 592 in its requests dated May
29 and June 25, 1992, Respondent Byers has engaged in con-
duct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
10. The unfair labor practices found to have been com-
mitted by Respondents are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in conduct
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, it is rec-
ommended that they be ordered to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondents have unlawfully with-
drawn recognition from and refused to bargain with the
Local Unions with which I have found they have a 9(a) bar-
gaining relationship, it is recommended that Respondents be
ordered to, upon request, recognize and bargain with the
Local Unions with which they have been found to have a
9(a) bargaining relationship over wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment for their employees in
the units found to be appropriate, and if agreement is
reached, embody the agreement in a collective-bargaining
agreement.
It is recommended that Respondent Byers be ordered to
comply with the requests for information filed with it by
IBEW Local Union 592 on May 29 and June 25, 1992.
890 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
16 See fn. 15, above.
17 See fn. 15, above.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended14
ORDER
A. The Respondent, Hayman Electric, Inc., Vineland, New
Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain
with IBEW Local Union 211 and IBEW Local Union 592
with whom Respondent executed recognition agreements and
which Local Unions are the designated collective-bargaining
representatives for its employees in the appropriate units.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211 and
IBEW Local Union 592 with whom it executed recognition
agreements as the exclusive collective-bargaining agents for
its employees in the appropriate unit and, on request, bargain
in good faith with the Local Unions over wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment of the unit em-
ployees and, if agreement is reached, embody such agree-
ment in a collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Post at its facility in Vineland, New Jersey, copies of
the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix A.’’15 Copies of the
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
B. The Respondent, Frank J. Byers, Inc., Clayton, New
Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain
with IBEW Local Union 211 and IBEW Local Union 592
with whom Respondent executed recognition agreements and
which Local Unions are the designated collective-bargaining
representatives for its employees in the appropriate units.
(b) Failing and refusing to comply with the information re-
quests made by IBEW Local Union 592 on May 29 and June
25, 1992.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211 and
IBEW Local Union 592 with whom it executed recognition
agreements as the exclusive collective-bargaining agents for
its employees in the appropriate unit and, on request, bargain
in good faith with the Local Unions over wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment of the unit em-
ployees and, if agreement is reached, embody such agree-
ment in a collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Comply with the information requests made by IBEW
Local Union 592 on May 29 and June 25, 1992.
(c) Post at its facility in Clayton, New Jersey, copies of
the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix B.’’16 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
C. The Respondent, Janney Electrical Contractor, Inc.,
Estell Manor, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain
with IBEW Local Union 211 with whom Respondent exe-
cuted a recognition agreement and which Local Union is the
designated collective-bargaining representative for its em-
ployees in the appropriate unit.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211 with
whom it executed a recognition agreement as the exclusive
collective-bargaining agent for its employees in the appro-
priate unit and, on request, bargain in good faith with the
Local Union over wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment of the unit employees and, if agreement
is reached, embody such agreement in a collective-bargaining
agreement.
(b) Post at its facility in Estell Manor, New Jersey, copies
of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix C.’’17 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
891HAYMAN ELECTRIC
18 See fn. 15, above.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
D. The Respondent, Pyramid Electric, Inc., Collings Lake,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain
with IBEW Local Union 211 with whom Respondent exe-
cuted a recognition agreement and which Local Union is the
designated collective-bargaining representative for its em-
ployees in the appropriate unit.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211 with
whom it executed a recognition agreement as the exclusive
collective-bargaining agent for its employees in the appro-
priate unit and, on request, bargain in good faith with the
Local Union over wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment of the unit employees and, if agreement
is reached, embody such agreement in a collective-bargaining
agreement.
(b) Post at its facility in Collings Lake, New Jersey, copies
of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix D.’’18 Copies of
the notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 4, shall, after being signed by the Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from and refuse to
bargain with IBEW Local Union 211 and IBEW Local
Union 592 with whom we executed recognition agreements
and which Local Unions are the designated collective-bar-
gaining representatives for our employees in the appropriate
units.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211
and IBEW Local Union 592 with whom we executed rec-
ognition agreements as the exclusive collective-bargaining
agents for our employees in the appropriate unit and, on re-
quest, bargain in good faith with the Local Unions over
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
of the unit employees and, if agreement is reached, embody
such agreement in a collective-bargaining agreement.
HAYMAN ELECTRIC, INC.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from and refuse to
bargain with IBEW Local Union 211 and IBEW Local
Union 592 with whom we executed recognition agreements
and which Local Unions are the designated collective- bar-
gaining representatives for our employees in the appropriate
units.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to comply with the informa-
tion requests made by IBEW Local Union 592 on May 29
and June 25, 1992.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211
and IBEW Local Union 592 with whom we executed rec-
ognition agreements as the exclusive collective-bargaining
agents for our employees in the appropriate unit and, on re-
quest, bargain in good faith with the Local Unions over
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
of the unit employees and, if agreement is reached, embody
such agreement in a collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL comply with the information requests made by
IBEW Local Union 592 on May 29 and June 25, 1992.
FRANK J. BYERS, INC.
892 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from and refuse to
bargain with IBEW Local Union 211 with whom we exe-
cuted a recognition agreement and which Local Union is the
designated collective-bargaining representative for our em-
ployees in the appropriate unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211
with whom we executed a recognition agreement as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining agent for our employees in the
appropriate unit and, on request, bargain in good faith with
the Local Union over wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment of the unit employees and, if agree-
ment is reached, embody such agreement in a collective-bar-
gaining agreement.
JANNEY ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR, INC.
APPENDIX D
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from and refuse to
bargain with IBEW Local Union 211 with whom we exe-
cuted a recognition agreement and which Local Union is the
designated collective-bargaining representative for our em-
ployees in the appropriate unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL extend recognition to IBEW Local Union 211
with whom we executed a recognition agreement as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining agent for our employees in the
appropriate unit and, on request, bargain in good faith with
the Local Union over wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment of the unit employees and, if agree-
ment is reached, embody such agreement in a collective-bar-
gaining agreement.
PYRAMID ELECTRIC, INC.