Hartford Fire Insurance Co.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 29, 1999

No. 75190464 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 1999)

Hearing: Paper No. 11
September 29, 1998 BAC
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT CITABLE AS
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB JULY 26, 99
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Hartford Fire Insurance Company
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Serial No. 75/190,464
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John R. Garber of Cooper & Dunham LLP for Hartford Fire
Insurance Company
Irene Williams, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
107 (Thomas Lamone, Managing Attorney)
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Before Hanak, Quinn and Chapman, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Chapman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Hartford Fire Insurance Company has filed an
application to register the mark shown below
Ser. No. 75/190464
2
for “property and casualty insurance underwriting services
for commercial accounts” in International Class 36.1
Registration has been finally refused under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), in view of
five prior registered marks owned by two different
entities--(1) SPECTRUM for “arranging and administering
life insurance programs for employees of corporate
clients,”2 (2) SPECTRUM CARE for “underwriting and
administering life insurance featuring life insurance with
a convalescent care rider which is sold to employees of
corporate clients,”3 and (3) the mark shown below

1 Application Serial No. 75/190,464, filed October 31, 1996. The
application is based on claimed first use dates of August 19,
1996. The application includes a statement that “The stippling
in the drawing is for the purpose of contrast and is not part of
the mark.”
2 Registration No. 1,261,933, issued December 20, 1983, Section 8
accepted, Section 15 acknowledged. The claimed dates of first
use and first use in commerce are August 1, 1981 and August 30,
1981, respectively.
3 Registration No. 1,826,584, issued March 15, 1994. The term
“care” is disclaimed. The claimed date of first use is December
27, 1989.
Ser. No. 75/190464
3
for “underwriting and administering life insurance which is
sold to employees of corporate clients,”4 all three owned by
Lincoln National Corporation; and (4) SPECTRUM ANNUITY5 and
(5) the mark shown below,6
both for “providing a unique selection of variable annuity
insurance contracts to independent insurance agents for
reoffering to the general public,” and both owned by
Massachusetts Financial Services Company.
The Examining Attorney contends that applicant’s mark,
when used in connection with its services, so resembles all
of the previously registered marks as to be likely to cause
confusion, mistake or deception.
Applicant has appealed the final refusal to register.
Briefs have been filed, and an oral hearing was held on
September 29, 1998.
We reverse the refusal to register. In reaching this

4 Registration No. 1,826,583, issued March 15, 1994. The claimed
date of first use is November 1, 1988.
5 Registration No. 1,163,036, issued July 28, 1981, Section 8
accepted, Section 15 acknowledged. The term “annuity” is
disclaimed. The claimed date of first use is February 13, 1979.
6 Registration No. 1,163,035, issued July 28, 1981, Section 8
accepted, Section 15 acknowledged. The term “annuity” is
disclaimed. The claimed date of first use is February 13, 1979.
Ser. No. 75/190464
4
conclusion, we have followed the guidance of the court in
In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).
We first consider the similarity or dissimilarity of
the marks in their entireties, as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. The Examining
Attorney contends that all of the cited marks include the
word SPECTRUM, which is the dominant feature of each of the
cited registered marks; and that the Examining Attorney
must give greater weight to the literal or word portions of
marks. Applicant, in turn, argues that each of the cited
marks is different from applicant’s mark which includes a
distinctive design of a rainbow; and that the term SPECTRUM
is a weak mark in the insurance field, as evidenced by the
seven registrations initially cited by the Examining
Attorney7, which include not only the five registrations
still maintained as bars to applicant’s mark, but also
Registration No. 1,941,326 for the mark BROAD SPECTRUM for
“underwriting insurance for automobiles,” owned by Midwest
Mutual Insurance Company8; and Registration No. 1,576,801

7 The Examining Attorney withdrew two cited registrations
following applicant’s amendment to its identification of
services.
8 Issued December 12, 1995. The claimed date of first use is
November 1, 1982.
Ser. No. 75/190464
5
for the mark SPECTRUMED for “health insurance underwriting
services,” owned by Cuna Mutual Insurance Society.9
We agree with applicant that the numerous cited
registered marks would tend to suggest that the term
SPECTRUM is a weak mark in the insurance field. As the
Court of Custom and Patent Appeals stated in the case of
Sure-Fit Products Company v. Saltzson Drapery Company, 254
F.2d 158, 117 USPQ 295, 297 (CCPA 1958): “Where a party
chooses a weak mark, his competitors may come closer to his
mark than would be the case with a strong mark without
violating his rights. The essence of what we have said is
that in the former case there is not the possibility of
confusion that exists in the latter case.” See also, In re
General Motors Corp., 23 USPQ2d 1465 (TTAB 1992); and In re
Starcraft Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1163 (TTAB 1990).
Certainly the seven registrations originally cited by
the Examining Attorney do not evidence use of the marks in
the marketplace, nor the public’s specific understanding
thereof. However, these seven registrations clearly
indicate that the Patent and Trademark Office, apparently
in recognition of the different types of insurance offered,

9 Issued January 9, 1990, Section 8 accepted, Section 15
acknowledged. The claimed dates of first use and first use in
commerce are October 1, 1988 and October 15, 1988, respectively.
Ser. No. 75/190464
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and/or in recognition that the marks were not identical,
has granted registrations which include the word SPECTRUM
to different companies for different types of insurance
underwriting services. Inasmuch as there are several
separate companies which own registrations for various
“SPECTRUM” marks for different types of insurance
underwriting services, specifically, health insurance, auto
insurance, life insurance and annuity insurance, these
marks are accorded a narrow scope of protection. See In re
J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 179 USPQ 184 (TTAB 1973). This
factor comes down in applicant’s favor.
We turn next to the similarity or the dissimilarity of
the services, as described in the application and the five
cited registrations, and the similarity or dissimilarity of
the trade channels and purchasers. The Examining Attorney
asserts that services need not be identical or even
directly competitive to support a finding of likelihood of
confusion; that when the cited registrants’ normal fields
of expansion are considered, insurance underwriters can
expand to provide various types of insurance; and that the
channels of trade for applicant’s services are presumed to
encompass the registrants’. Applicant, on the other hand,
argues that the involved different types of insurance
underwriting services are completely different in nature,
Ser. No. 75/190464
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and are in fact limited in terms of channels of trade and
classes of purchasers.
The Examining Attorney is correct that services need
not be identical or even competitive to support a finding
of likelihood of confusion, but it is also true that the
Board must take into account the services as identified,
including limitations set forth therein. See Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Association v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
In this case, applicant’s services are limited to
property and casualty insurance for commercial (not
household or individual) accounts, and the five cited
registrations are each limited as well. Specifically, the
cited registrants’ services are limited to life insurance
sold to employees of corporate clients, one including a
convalescent care rider (Lincoln National Corporation); and
annuity insurance contracts sold to independent insurance
agents for reoffering to the general public (Massachusetts
Financial Services Company). That is, each of the cited
registrations, as well as the involved application, are
limited not only by the specific type of insurance (e.g.,
life, annuity, property and casualty), but also each
identification of services is further limited by reciting
specific purchasers or ultimate intended users (e.g.,
Ser. No. 75/190464
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employees of corporate clients, independent insurance
agents for resale to the public, commercial accounts).
In determining the degree of care such purchasers
would exercise, we acknowledge that the record is devoid of
evidence on this point. However, it seems apparent that
the prototypical consumer as specifically identified in the
respective recitations of services (e.g., independent
insurance agents purchasing annuity insurance contracts to
be resold to the general public, life insurance offered to
employees of corporate clients, and commercial entities
purchasing property and casualty insurance), would probably
exercise a reasonably high degree of care before making
such purchases. See Freedom Savings and Loan Association
v. American Fidelity Assurance Company, 222 USPQ 71, 74
(TTAB 1984).
The Examining Attorney argued but submitted no
evidence that life insurance for employees of corporate
clients, annuities sold to independent agents, and/or
property and casualty insurance for commercial accounts are
sold through the same channels of trade to the same
purchasers. In fact, the limitations within the various
identifications of services, and the existence of the
numerous SPECTRUM marks owned by different companies
remaining unchallenged on the register, would indicate
Ser. No. 75/190464
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otherwise. These limitations underscore the differences
between these involved services. Thus, the specific
limitations in the involved services and the resulting
separate trade channels are factors in applicant’s favor.
Moreover, the record is silent regarding different types of
insurance emanating from the same entity under the same
mark.
Based on the ex parte record before us, we find that
although the six involved marks share the word SPECTRUM,
that word is afforded a narrow scope of protection in the
insurance field; and that the cited registrants’ and
applicant’s respective services and channels of trade as
identified are specifically separate and different.
Accordingly, the Examining Attorney has not met the burden
to show that consumers would be likely to be confused as to
the source of the involved services.
Decision: The refusal to register under Section 2(d)
is reversed.
E. W. Hanak
T. J. Quinn
B. A. Chapman
Administrative Trademark Judges,
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board