GOOGLE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 12, 2021

2020005033 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/445,917 02/28/2017 Eric HC Liu 0715150.841-US2 1011
104433 7590 11/12/2021
Byrne Poh LLP/Google LLC
11 Broadway Ste 760
New York, NY 10004
EXAMINER
DANG, HUNG H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
PMB
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/12/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
info@byrnepoh.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ERIC HC LIU, JONATHAN JAMES EFFRAT, and
CHARLES GORAN

Appeal 2020-005033
Application 15/445,917
Technology Center 2100
BEFORE MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and
CHRISTA P. ZADO, Administrative Patent Judges.
ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–17, and 19–22. Off. Act. 1;
Appeal Br. 6.2 Claims 2 and 18 were previously canceled. Appeal Br. 6.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Google LLC.
Appeal Br. 4.
2 We use “Spec.” to refer to the Specification filed August 13, 2018; “Off.
Act.” to refer to the Office Action filed November 6, 2019; “Appeal Br. to
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed generally to controlling home lighting that is
personalized for the user. Spec. ¶ 3. Existing systems can control the times
at which lights come on or go off and come on when motion is sensed. Id.
More specifically, the invention describes
methods, systems, and computer readable storage mediums for
determining the mood of the user, deriving an appropriate
lighting scheme, and then implementing that lighting scheme on
all devices within a predetermined proximity to that user,
including conventional lighting devices, such as lamps, track
lighting and overhead lighting, and unconventional lighting
devices, such as phones, tablets, TVs, and clocks.

Id. ¶ 4.
Lighting devices may include “conventional lighting devices, such as
lamps, track lighting and overhead lighting, and unconventional lighting
devices, such as phones, tablets, TVs, and clocks.” Spec. ¶ 4. “[A]
centralized lighting controller system comprising one or more central
processing units, CPU(s), for executing programs and also includes memory
storing the programs to be executed by the CPUs.” Id. ¶ 9. “[T]he lighting
controller 101 is also configured to perform at least some operations
associated with the lighting application 102, such as analyzing data from
sensors and lighting devices and predicting a user’s tasks.” Id. ¶ 27. A
lighting map shows lighting devices within a predefined area, like rooms in a

refer to the Appeal Brief filed, March 23, 2020; “Ans.” to refer to the
Examiner’s Answer filed April 30, 2020; and “Reply Br.” to refer to the
Reply Brief filed June 23, 2020.
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structure occupied by the user. Id. ¶ 48. “The lighting characteristics of the
subset of the lighting devices are controlled via one or more of the networks
to satisfy the lighting need of the user.” Id. ¶ 53.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for adaptive lighting, comprising:

at a computer system having one or more processors and memory
storing programs for execution by the one or more processors:

identifying a lighting map that identifies, for each of a plurality
of lighting devices in a home environment:

one or more lighting characteristics that are controllable via
one or more networks of the home environment; and

a position of the lighting device in the home environment,

wherein the plurality of lighting devices includes a
conventional lighting device and one or more non-
conventional lighting devices, each of the non-conventional
lighting devices having a controllable illuminated display
screen and/or a status light;

obtaining contextual information for the home environment from
a plurality of smart devices via the one or more networks,
wherein the contextual information includes (i) a current
location of a user in the home environment, (ii) a time of day,
(iii) current movement of the user, and (iv) one or more
indications of: sound in proximity to the current location of
the user, ambient light level in proximity to the current
location of the user, calendar events of the user, device
interactions by the user, and web interactions by the user;

based on the contextual information, inferring a user task and a
lighting need associated with the user task;
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based at least on the current location of the user, the current
movement of the user, and the positions of the lighting
devices in the home environment, determining using the
lighting map a first subset of the identified lighting devices
that are located in proximity to the current location of the user
and according to a predicted path of the user to meet the
lighting need associated with the inferred user task, wherein
the subset of the lighting devices includes at least a first non-
conventional lighting device of the non-conventional lighting
devices; and

controlling via the one or more networks the lighting
characteristics of the first subset of the lighting devices,
including the screen and/or the status light of the at least the
first non-conventional lighting device, to satisfy the lighting
need.
Appeal Br. 24 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied and other evidence relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Mueller US Pat. No. 6,016,038 Jan. 18, 2000
Bourquin US 2020/0201267 A1 Aug. 12, 2010
Czarnecki US Pat. No. 7,909,642 B1 Mar. 22, 2011
Sampsell US 2011/0175553 A1 July 21, 2011
Kahn US 2013/0018284 A1 Jan. 17, 2013
Lashina WO 2013/186665 A2 Dec. 19, 2013
Clavenna US 2015/0091473 A1 Apr. 2, 2015
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REJECTIONS3
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6–12, 14–17, 19, 20, and 22 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lashina, Clavenna, and Bourquin.
Off. Act. 5–20.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Lashina, Clavenna, Bourquin, and Czarneck. Id. at 20–21.
Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Lashina, Clavenna, Bourquin, and Kahn. Id. at 21.
Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Lashina, Clavenna, Bourquin, and Sampsell. Id. at 21–24.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Board conducts a limited de novo review of the appealed
rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light
of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are
waived. See id.; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
OPINION
Appellant argues language shared identically in independent claims 1,
17, and 20, which claims differ only in their preambles claiming respectively
a method (claim 1), a system (claim 17), and a computer readable storage
system (claim 20). Appeal Br. 8–12; Reply Br. 7–8 (reproducing language

3 The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms Seventh Edition (©
2000) (“IEEE Dictionary”) is not relied on to reject any claim but is other
evidence cited by the Examiner and argued by Appellant in connection with
interpretation of claim terms “API” and “illuminated display screen.” Off.
Act. 4–5, 14; Ans. 5 (cite to dictionary is for purpose of understanding the
meaning of a term), 8; Appeal Br. 19–20; Reply Br. 10, 12.
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common to independent claims). Claim 1 is analyzed below as
representative of the independent claims. Dependent claims 5, 6, 13, and 21
are separately argued and separately analyzed. Appeal Br. 19 (claim 6), 20
(claim 21), 21–22 (claims 5 and 13).
“Before considering the rejections . . ., we must first [determine the
scope of] the claims.” In re Geerdes, 491 F.2d 1260, 1262 (CCPA 1974).
In some of the issues below, Appellant argues the meanings of “API” and
“illuminated display screen.” See, e.g., Appeal Br. 19–20 (“API”); Reply
Br. 10 (“illuminated display screen”). The Examiner makes findings and
conclusions as to the meanings and both the Examiner and Appellant rely to
some extent definitions appearing in the IEEE Dictionary. See fn 3 above.
“application program interface” (API)
The IEEE Dictionary defines API as “[t]he interface between the
application software and the application platform, across which all services
are provided.” IEEE Dictionary, 46. In the context of claim 6, the Examiner
interprets the API definition in the IEEE Dictionary as meaning “the lighting
devices being responsive to commands sent in accordance with a software
interface for specifying lighting characteristics.” Off. Act. 5, 14; Ans. 8–9.
Appellant acknowledges the IEEE Dictionary definition but, again in the
context of claim 6, argues “[t]he API standardizes the communication
interface and allows a user to achieve the same lighting result across the
different types of lighting devices.” Appeal Br. 19–20; Reply Br. 13 (claim
21).4 Appellant then argues “an API allows the lighting application to be

4 Appellant’s arguments based on Webopedia and microcode are first
presented in the Reply Brief. Reply Br. 12–13. The Examiner had no
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interoperatively compatible with different types of lighting devices - both
conventional and nonconventional.” Appeal Br. 20 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 37, 40).
The record supports the Examiner’s finding regarding the IEEE
Dictionary definition of API. Appellant does not dispute this. How the
definition of API applies to the claims, principally claim 6, is disputed.
Neither the Examiner nor the Appellant persuasively argue why the other’s
counter proposal is wrong or outside the scope of the definition. Both
interpretations regarding how to apply the definition here are within the
scope of the definition. Accordingly, the definition of record supports that
an API is a software interface that specifies lighting characteristics and
controls both conventional and nonconventional lighting devices. See Off.
Act. 5; Appeal Br. 20.
“display screen”
In the Answer, the Examiner first presents the IEEE Dictionary
definition of “display screen” as “[t]he surface of a display device on which
the visual representation of data is displayed.” Ans. 5 (citing IEEE
Dictionary, 324). Appellant does not dispute the definition or argue its
application. Reply Br. 5. The Specification is also consistent with the
definition. See Spec. ¶ 22 (TV’s, tablets, phones, and clocks all have
“display screens”).5 We therefore agree with the Examiner and use the

opportunity to respond to these arguments and they are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

5 The term is claimed in connection with the “nonconventional” lighting
devices only. See claim 1 (“each of the non-conventional lighting devices
having a controllable illuminated display screen”); Spec. ¶ 49.

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IEEE Dictionary definition of “display screen” as supportive of the plain and
ordinary meaning of the term. See Ans. 5.
Issue No. 1: Does Lashina teach “non-conventional lighting devices,”
as recited in claim 1?

For that portion of claim 1 reciting “a conventional lighting device
and one or more non-conventional lighting devices,” the Examiner cites
Lashina’s teaching of digital lighting technologies like LEDs as “a viable
alternative to traditional (non-conventional) fluorescent, HID and
incandescent lamps.” Off. Act. 7 (citing Lashina ¶ 2). The Examiner quotes
Lashina as teaching that “LED includes, but is not limited to, various
semiconductor-based structures that emit light in response to current, light
emitting polymers, organic light emitting diodes (OLEDs),
electroluminescent strips, and the like.” Id. (quoting Lashina ¶ 19). The
Examiner finds the LED of Lashina can be an LED-based light source
“alone or in combination with other non LED-based light sources.” Id.
(citing Lashina ¶¶ 19, 23).
Appellant denies that a LED “in place of fluorescent and incandescent
illumination is still a conventional lighting device in light of the Appellant's
disclosure.” Appeal Br. 16. In response to the Examiner’s assertion that the
examples of conventional and nonconventional lighting devices from the
Specification (Ans. 3) are not definitions, Appellant argues the Specification
may include “enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be
afforded by the written description contained in applicant’s specification.”
Reply Br. 8–9 (citing MPEP 2111).
We are not persuaded that an LED as described in Lashina is not a
non-conventional lighting device. Lashina teaches the LED includes
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“various semiconductor-based structures that emit light in response to
current.” Lashina ¶ 19. Appellant argues that LED lighting is conventional
because it is used “in place of fluorescent and incandescent illumination.”
Appeal Br. 16. Appellant alleges LED lighting “is still a conventional
lighting device in light of Appellant’s disclosure.” Id. Appellant does not
cite to any such disclosure.
The Specification does not support Appellant. The Specification
describes “unconventional lighting devices” as including clocks.6 Spec. ¶ 4.
Conversely, conventional lighting devices are “lamps, track lighting and
overhead lighting.” Id. LEDs as described in Lashina are “semiconductor-
based structures that emit light” and are more like the non-conventional
examples than the conventional examples. Thus, even assuming the
examples are intrinsic evidence of the meaning of non-conventional lighting
devices (see Reply Br. 8–9), the Specification’s examples of non-
conventional lighting devices support the Examiner’s finding that the LEDs
described in Lashina are non-conventional lighting devices.
As to claim 1’s recitation of conventional lighting devices, the
Examiner cites Clavenna. Off. Act. 10–11 (citing Clavenna ¶ 21).
Paragraph 21 of Clavenna states, in part, “the illuminating elements 105 may
comprise various lighting technologies, such as, for example, LCD, LED
(non-conventional lighting devices), plasma, red-green-blue (RGB) bulb,
incandescent etc., and thus may have various lighting characteristics, such
as, for example, a color range, maximum and/or minimum lumen intensity,
delay of reaction, frequency, and the like.” Appellant does not argue that

6 We note that it is common knowledge that digital clocks display the time,
date and other information with LEDs.
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Clavenna fails to teach a “conventional lighting device” or that a person of
ordinary skill would not have reason to combine Lashina and Clavenna.
Issue No. 2: Does Lashina teach “each of the non-conventional
lighting devices [has] a controllable illuminated display screen and/or a
status light,” as recited in claim 1?

For that portion of claim 1 reciting “each of the non-conventional
lighting devices having a controllable illuminated display screen and/or a
status light,” the Examiner relies in part on paragraph 19 of Lashina, as
discussed in connection with Issue No. 1. Off. Act. 7 (citing Lashina ¶ 19
(“LED . . . emit[s] light in response to current”)). Further, the Examiner
Lashina’s LED is “a lighting unit that includes one or more LED- based light
sources (multiple LED-based light sources= illuminated display screen).”
Id. The Examiner also relies on Mueller, as incorporated into Lashina. Id.
According to the Examiner, Mueller teaches “LED based lighting units with
[an] illuminated display screen.” Id. (citing Mueller Abs., 7:40).
Appellant cites Figure 4 of Mueller illustrating a light module
comprised of LED sets “capable of generating light, such as for illumination
or display purposes.” Appeal Br. 17 (citing Muller, Abs., Fig. 4). Appellant
argues that the light module is “capable” of generating light does not support
a finding that the light module is an “illuminated display screen.” Id.
In response, the Examiner cites the IEEE Dictionary definition of a
display screen as “[t]he surface of a display device on which the visual
representation of data is displayed.” Ans. 7 (citing IEEE Dictionary, 324).
The Examiner then argues “the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation of
‘illuminated display screen’ is an illuminated surface for display purposes,”
which is taught by Lashina. Id. In its Reply, Appellant disputes this
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interpretation and argues Lashina’s LED lighting fixture does not include the
word “surface.” Reply Br. 10.
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and adopt them as
summarized above. Specifically, Appellant does not raise any issue beyond
attorney argument that Lashina does not have a “surface.” This is
insufficient to overcome the Examiner’s prima facie showing based on
Mueller as incorporated by Lashina. Appellant does not argue the
incorporation of Mueller by Lashina.
Appellant’s argument that Mueller is “capable” of being the recited
illuminated display screen is sufficient to support the Examiner’s finding.
Cf. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1476–1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (anticipation
based on inherently capable). Further, it is proper to use inherency to supply
a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis. PAR Pharm., Inc. v.
TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194–1195 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Issue No. 3: Does Lashina teach “controlling via the one or more
networks the lighting characteristics . . . including the screen and/or the
status light of the nonconventional lighting device,” as recited in claim 1?

For that portion of claim 1 reciting “controlling via the one or more
networks . . . the display screen,” the Examiner cites Lashina where lighting
settings may include parameters to control light output and parameters set to
control behaviors of the lighting fixture, including as the Examiner finds
above, non-conventional lighting devices. Off. Act. 10 (citing Lashina
¶ 42). The Examiner further cites Lashina’s teaching of storing settings and
“a user interface of a mobile phone and/or a tablet computer” to
“communicate with the lighting controller 120 and alter one or more lighting
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settings.” Id. (citing Lashina ¶¶ 55–56, 46, Figs. 1, 2 (lighting settings of
lighting systems are controllable via networks 101, 201).
Appellant repeats its argument that Mueller as incorporated in Lashina
does not teach an “illuminated display screen.” Appeal Br. 18; see Issue No.
2 above. Appellant also argues Mueller teaches “‘an addressable network’
that is capable of selecting LED sets of the light module and changing their
intensities.” Id. (citing Mueller, 1:9–10, 7:41–56).
We agree with the Examiner based on the summary of findings above.
Appellant’s argument based on Mueller’s “addressable network” is not
relevant to the Examiner’s findings based on Lashina.
Issue No. 4: Does Lashina teach “based on the contextual
information, inferring a user task and a lighting need associated with the
user task,” as recited in claim 1?

For the “based on contextual information inferring a user task”
recitation of claim 1, the Examiner relies on Lashina. Off. Act. 8 (citing
Lashina ¶¶ 47, 63). The Examiner cites Lashina’s teaching of
lighting contextual parameters may include lighting fixture type,
geographical location of the lighting fixtures, time of the year,
time of the day, activity, user defined contexts, etc. User defined
contexts may include one or more descriptors defined by a user
that describe the situation or activity for which the lighting
setting is intended.

Id. (quoting Lashina ¶ 47). The Examiner finds describing a “situation or
activity” is the recited “inferring a user task.” Id. Both paragraphs 47 and
63 are cited as teaching the recited “lighting need associated with the user
task.” Id. (citing Lashina ¶¶ 47 (intended lighting setting), 63
(“implementable lighting settings in accordance with the user's
preferences”)).
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Appellant argues “Lashina merely discloses ‘describing’ a situation or
activity for which the lighting setting is intended, whereas the pending
claims require ‘inferring’ (e.g., predicting) a user task based on the
contextual information.” Appeal Br. 19 (citing Spec. ¶ 27). The Examiner
responds that Lashina teaches that activities of the user are determined and
appropriate lighting is set for the activity from contextual data and inferred
as claimed. Ans. 6 (citing Lashina ¶ 47). Further, inferring is recited
whereas “predicting” is used in the Specification claim and should not be
imported into the claim. Id.
Appellant’s argument regarding recitations (i) through (iv), listing
types of “contextual information,” are waived. Reply Br. 11. This argument
was first presented in the Reply and the Examiner was not afforded an
opportunity to respond. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Regardless, the use of
“include” is open ended. Cf. SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415
F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“includes,” like “comprising,” does not
foreclose additional elements). Any one of the listed examples of contextual
information satisfies the claim, as would contextual information not listed in
the claim. Lashina discloses at least item (ii) of listed contextual
information, time of day. Lashina ¶ 47.
We agree with the Examiner and adopt the findings made as
summarized above. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. We
agree that Lashina’s disclosure of storing user activities is part of inferring a
user task. Lashina ¶ 47. As cited by Appellant, the Specification explains
that the lighting application can “obtain additional information about the
user's activities and current state” in order to “predict” user tasks. Appeal
Br. 18 (citing Spec. ¶ 27) (emphasis added). Thus, the Specification also
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uses user “activities” as an inference of a user task. We also agree with the
Examiner that “inferring” does not require “predicting” a user task.
Issue No. 5: Does Lashina teach “wherein at least one of the first
subset of the lighting devices is responsive to commands sent in accordance
with an API configured to specify lighting characteristics, including one or
more of lighting on/off state, and lighting hue, saturation and brightness,”
(“API” limitation) as recited in claim 6?

The Examiner finds Lashina’s teaching of storing and sending
commands, based on contextual information like the time of day, regarding
lighting settings teaches the API limitation. Off. Act. 14–15 (citing Lashina
¶¶ 55–56). As discussed above, the Examiner applies the interpretation of
the IEEE Dictionary to find “the lighting devices being responsive to
commands sent in accordance with a software interface for specifying
lighting characteristics” where “the lighting controller’s commands is in
accordance with a software interface (API).” Id. at 14 (citing IEEE
Dictionary, 46).
Appellant acknowledges the IEEE Dictionary definition of API and
argues that, like the Specification, the API must be “interoperatively
compatible” with both conventional and non-conventional lighting devices.
Appeal Br 20. Appellant argues Lashina describes only a conventional
lighting fixture, i.e., LED. Id.
Above in the discussion of claim interpretation, we agreed with
Appellant that API includes both conventional and non-conventional
lighting devices. We determined that Lashina’s teaching of LED lighting
was non-conventional and, therefore, Appellant’s argument is not
persuasive. See also n. 4 above.
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Issue No. 6: Does Sampsell teach “prior to determining the first
subset of the identified lighting devices, updating the lighting map by
querying via an API the one or more non-conventional lighting devices to
confirm that the first non-conventional lighting device includes first
characteristics to satisfy the lighting need,” (“lighting map” limitation) as
recited in claim 21?

The Examiner relies on Sampsell’s claim 17 to teach the lighting map
limitation. Off. Act. 22. Claim 17 of Sampsell recites, in pertinent part,
querying a portion of the plurality of luminaries regarding the
capabilities of each of the queried luminaires;

receiving information from each of the queried luminaires
regarding each queried luminaire’s capabilities; and

sending a command from a controller to the one or more of the
plurality of luminaires based on at least one of a unique identifier,
the universal identifier, and a group identifier.

Sampsell, claim 17.
Appellant argues Sampsell’s teaching of software or a software
protocol is not an API as claim 21 requires. Appeal Br. 21; Reply Br. 13.
Appellant argues Sampsell does not update the lighting map via an API
query. Appeal Br. 21 (citing Sampsell, claim 17). Furthermore, according
to Appellant, “an API is a specific form of software command.” Reply Br.
13.
Appellant’s response, as noted above, is that the “API is a specific
form of a software command,” and not a software protocol. Reply Br. 13.
Above we determined, and Appellant agreed, the IEEE Dictionary meaning
of API is “[t]he interface between the application software and the
application platform, across which all services are provided.” IEEE
Dictionary, 46. Appellant does not explain what “specific form of software
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command” is required by the “application software” in an API that would
preclude the “software protocol” of Sampsell from being or at least
suggesting an API.
We agree with the Examiner and adopt the Examiner’s findings
summarized above. Appellant does not explain why Sampsell’s software
commands sent to a controller are not an API as per the ordinary meaning
applied to the term. We also determine, as the Examiner finds, that
“Sampsell teaches updating the lighting devices database (lighting map) by
querying the lighting devices via software protocol (API) for capability
information, and storing the information in the database.” Ans. 9 (citing
Sampsell, claim 17).
Issue No. 7: Has the Examiner articulated stated reasoning with
some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness
for combining Lashina, Clavenna, Bourquin, and Kahn in rejecting claim 5
and Lashina, Clavenn, Bourquin, and Kahn in rejecting claim 13?

For claim 5, the Examiner finds Czarnecki teaches a controllable
lighting element (“light source”) which may be a pair of LEDs at a “power
outlet center,” as recited in claim 5. Off. Act. 21 (citing Czarnecki, 3:55).
As further support, the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill would have
reason to combine Czarnecki’s controllable lighting element with Lashina
“because that would help a user in locating the outlet center.” Id. (citing
Czarnecki, Abs.).
Appellant argues Lashina does not “attempt to solve the problem of
locating an outlet center.” Appeal Br. 22. The Examiner responds that
Lashina addresses the “generic problem of controlling LED light sources”
and Czarnecki teaches LED light sources at the power outlet. Ans. 10.
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We agree with the Examiner and adopt the Examiner’s findings
summarized above. The claims are directed to controlling lighting
characteristics. See, e.g., claim 1. Lashina operates and controls, among
other light sources, an LED-based lighting unit. Lashina ¶¶ 23, 24.
Czarnecki’s power outlet includes a light source, which may be a pair of
LEDs. Czarnecki, 3:55–58. Lashina’s light source requires power, i.e.,
“locating a power outlet,” to “control LED light sources” by providing
power, which Czarnecki teaches. See Ans. 10. These teachings of Lashina
and Czarnecki provide support for the conclusion of obviousness. Off. Act.
21.
For claim 13, the Examiner cites Kahn as teaching the “inferred task”
of waking up the user. Off. Act. 21 (citing Kahn ¶ 45 (“the system can
detect when the user is awake”). The Examiner argues Kahn would have
been combined with Lashina because Kahn “would allow a user to provide
feedback after waking up.” Id.
Appellant argues the conclusion of obviousness is wrong for similar
reasons as those stated for claim 5. Appeal Br. 22. The Examiner responds
that Kahn detects a “user waking up so that Lashina's system can control
LED light sources to assist user in performing the task of providing feedback
about the sleep session.” Ans. 10. Appellant argues the Examiner does not
“identify[] a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in
the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new
invention does.” Reply Br. 14 (quoting KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 418).
We disagree. The obviousness inquiry allows for inferences and creative
steps that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have employed that predictably
yield no more than one would expect. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416–418. The
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Examiner has stated a reason for the combination and Appellant has not
argued specifically why that reason is insufficient. Appellant does not
respond to the Examiner’s showing summarized above.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3–17, and 19–22 are affirmed.
More specifically, claims 1, 3, 4, 6–12, 14–17, 19, 20, and 22 are
affirmed under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lashina,
Clavenna, and Bourquin; claim 5 is affirmed under35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Lashina, Clavenna, Bourquin, and Czarnecki; claim 13 is
affirmed under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lashina,
Clavenna, Bourquin, and Kahn; and claim 21 is affirmed under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Lashina, Clavenna, Bourquin, and
Sampsell.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 6–
12, 14–17,
19, 20, 22
103 Lashina, Clavenna,
Bourquin
1, 3, 4, 6–
12, 14–17,
19, 20, 22

5 103 Lashina, Clavenna,
Bourquin, Czarnecki
5
13 103 Lashina, Clavenna,
Bourquin, Kahn
13
21 103 Lashina, Clavenna,
Bourquin, and
Sampsell
21
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–17,
19–22

Appeal 2020-005033
Application 15/445,917

19
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED