Global Connection, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 29, 1999

No. 74684250 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 29, 1999)

Oral Hearing: Paper No. 14
September 1, 1998 GDH/gdh
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB JUNE 29, 99
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Global Connection, Inc.
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Serial No. 74/684,250
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Thomas E. Anderson of Gifford, Krass, Groh, Sprinkle, Patmore,
Anderson & Citkowski, P.C. for Global Connection, Inc.
Cheryl S. Goodman, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 102
(Tom Shaw, Acting Managing Attorney).
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Before Cissel, Hohein, and Wendel, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Hohein, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Global Connection, Inc. has filed an application to
register the mark "TIFFIN CUSTOM FURNITURE" for "furniture,
namely, racks for audio/visual components".1
Registration has been finally refused under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on the ground that
applicant’s mark, when applied to its goods, so resembles the

1 Ser. No. 74/684,250, filed on June 5, 1995, which alleges dates of
first use of October 1, 1994. The words "CUSTOM FURNITURE" are
disclaimed.
Ser. No. 74/684,250
2
mark "TIFFIN SYSTEMS," which is registered for "furniture, namely
work benches; work tables; storage cabinets; mobile tool carts;
accessories[,] namely shelves, drawers, risers, legs and tops for
benches, tables and cabinets; and components therefor,"2 as to be
likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception.
Applicant has appealed. Briefs have been filed and an
oral hearing was held. We affirm the refusal to register.
Turning first to consideration of the respective marks,
applicant argues that the overall commercial impression of its
"TIFFIN CUSTOM FURNITURE" mark differs from that of registrant’s
"TIFFIN SYSTEMS" mark. Such marks, while concededly sharing the
term "TIFFIN," not only are visually and phonetically distinct,
according to applicant, but are different in meaning. In
consequence thereof, applicant insists that "[a] customer
encountering the marks would be left with different commercial
impressions."
While applicant is correct that the respective marks
must be compared in their entireties, we agree with the Examining
Attorney that, in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion
on the issue of likelihood of confusion, "there is nothing
improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided
[that] the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the
marks in their entireties." In re National Data Corp., 753 F.3d
1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For instance, "that a

2 Reg. No. 1,438,073, issued on April 10, 1987, which sets forth dates
of first use of March 1986; combined affidavit §§8 and 15. The word
Ser. No. 74/684,250
3
particular feature is descriptive or generic with respect to the
involved goods or services is one commonly accepted rationale for
giving less weight to a portion of a mark ...." 224 USPQ at 751.
Here, as the Examining Attorney points out, the
designation "TIFFEN is the dominant [and source-indicative]
portion of both the applicant’s and registrant’s marks because
the [disclaimed] terms CUSTOM FURNITURE in the applicant’s mark
and the term SYSTEMS in the registrant’s mark are descriptive [if
not generic] terms which are less significant" in forming the
overall commercial impression of each mark. Inasmuch as "[t]he
dominant portions of both marks are identical in appearance,
sound and meaning," we agree with the Examining Attorney that,
overall, the applicant’s and registrant’s marks project
essentially the same commercial impression when used in
connection with their respective goods. Clearly, if such
substantially similar marks were to be used in conjunction with
the same or closely related goods, confusion as to source or
sponsorship would be likely to occur.
Considering, therefore, the extent to which the
respective goods are either essentially the same in part or
otherwise closely related, it is settled that a likelihood of
confusion must be found if an applicant’s use of its mark for the
goods set forth in its application is likely to cause confusion
with any of the goods listed in the registrant’s registration for
its mark. See, e.g., Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981). Moreover,

"SYSTEMS" is disclaimed.
Ser. No. 74/684,250
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as the Examining Attorney correctly observes, goods need not be
identical or even competitive in nature in order to support a
finding of likelihood of confusion. It is sufficient, instead,
that the goods are related in some manner and/or that the
circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they
would be likely to be encountered by the same persons under
situations that would give rise, because of the marks employed in
connection therewith, to the mistaken belief that they originate
from or are in some way associated with the same producer or
provider. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Enviro-Chem Corp., 199 USPQ
590, 595-96 (TTAB 1978); and In re International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910, 911 (TTAB 1978).
It is applicant’s position, however, that its racks for
audio and video components are substantially different from
registrant’s goods since the former "are designed to be
cosmetically pleasing" and "to hold audio/video electronic
equipment inside the home, such as in the living room, bedroom,
or den." Ignoring, in its main brief, that registrant’s goods
include storage cabinets, applicant contends that:
In contrast, Registrant’s goods are
various work benches and tool boxes. These
goods may be classified as furniture for
trademark [registration] purposes, but they
are not furniture in the sense of furnishings
and would not be found in a furniture or
audio/video store. Work benches and tool
boxes are typically designed to store tools
and to provide work surfaces for the use of a
mechanic or tradesman. A primary goal and
selling point for these goods is their
toughness rather than their physical
appearance. These goods would typically be
purchased by or for a mechanic or tradesman
Ser. No. 74/684,250
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for use in a place of business or in a garage
or workshop. ....
Applicant adds, in its reply brief, that unlike
registrant’s storage cabinets, its product "is not a ’storage
rack’, but rather a frame for assembling stereo/audio components
into a tower." Asserting, furthermore, that the Examining
Attorney "has not provided evidence to show that the [respective]
goods are related," applicant maintains that confusion is not
likely because:
The channels of trade are so separate that
the consumers of the respective goods are not
going to encounter the respective ...
products. Accordingly, the goods are not
used or marketed in circumstances [in] which
they are going to be found together or give
rise to circumstances which would give
consumers a belief that the goods come from
the same source.
The Examining Attorney, on the other hand, contends in
particular that "a rack for audio/video components is essentially
a type of storage rack, and storage racks and storage cabinets
are related goods." Such goods, she insists, "are often
manufactured by the same entity, sold in the same channels of
trade, and marketed to the same class of purchasers. As support
for her position, the Examining Attorney has made of record five
use-based third-party registrations for marks which, in each
instance, are registered for "racks" or "storage racks," on the
one hand, and "storage cabinets," on the other. Although such
registrations are not evidence that the different marks shown
therein are in use or that the public is familiar with them, they
nevertheless have some probative value to the extent that they
Ser. No. 74/684,250
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serve to suggest that the goods listed therein are of a kind
which may emanate from a single source. See, e.g., In re Albert
Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993) and In re
Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 (TTAB 1988) at
n. 6. In addition, the Examining Attorney has made of record
excerpts from numerous articles retrieved during her searches of
the "NEXIS" data base showing that, not only are "storage
cabinets" commonly used to hold and display televisions, VCRs
and/or stereo systems, but there are types of "storage cabinets"
which, like applicant’s racks, are designed especially for stereo
and/or video components. For example, an article in an October
30, 1980 edition of the New York Times reports that the "design
director of Designers Institute of America ... designed a series
of storage cabinets to hold televisions, stereo sets and home
computers." Likewise, another article from the January 25, 1987
issue of the St. Petersburg Times refers to "built-in storage
cabinets for a TV, stereo, home computer or other den-type gear."
In view thereof, and since the instruction manual
specimens of record show that applicant’s racks for audio/visual
components clearly serve, in light of the hinged glass doors
thereon and adjustable shelves inside, as storage cabinets for
such components in addition to being designed to display them in
a stacked or tower configuration, we concur with the Examining
Attorney that applicant’s goods and registrant’s storage cabinets
are closely related, if not essentially identical, goods.3 As

3 We judicially notice, in this regard, that Webster’s New World
College Dictionary (3rd ed. 1997) at 193 defines "cabinet" in relevant
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such, they would be sold through the same channels of trade,
including home improvement centers and department stores, to the
identical classes of purchasers.
Accordingly, we conclude that purchasers and
prospective customers, familiar with registrant’s "TIFFIN
SYSTEMS" mark for furniture such as its storage cabinets, could
reasonably believe, upon encountering applicant’s substantially
similar "TIFFIN CUSTOM FURNITURE" mark for its racks for
audio/visual components, that such closely related if not
essentially identical goods emanate from, or are otherwise
sponsored by or affiliated with, the same source. In particular,
even if consumers were to notice the different descriptive words
in the respective marks, they could still reasonably conclude, in
light of the presence of the shared source-indicative term
"TIFFIN" therein, that registrant has expanded its storage
cabinet systems to include such closely related custom furniture
as racks for audio/visual components.
Decision: The refusal under Section 2(d) is affirmed.

part as: "1 a case or cupboard with drawers or shelves for holding or
storing things ... 2 a boxlike enclosure ... that houses all the
assembled components of a record player, radio or television, etc."
Similarly, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1979) at 151 lists
such term in pertinent part as meaning: "1 a : a case or cupboard
usu. having doors and shelves ... c : an upright case housing a radio
or television receiver: CONSOLE". It is apparent, therefore, that
registrant’s "storage cabinets" would encompass the type of racks for
audio/video components sold by applicant and that registrant’s goods
may be considered identical in part to applicant’s goods. It is also
pointed out that the Board may properly take judicial notice of
dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Hancock v. American Steel & Wire
Co. of New Jersey, 203 F.2d 737, 97 USPQ 330, 332 (CCPA 1953) and
University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.,
Inc., 213 USPQ 594, 596 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ
505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Ser. No. 74/684,250
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R. F. Cissel
G. D. Hohein
H. R. Wendel
Administrative Trademark Judges,
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board