General Motors Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsSep 26, 1963

144 N.L.R.B. 862 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

862 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Chevrolet Motor Division , General Motors Corporation and Paul J. Goldener. Case No. 21-CA-5119. September 26, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On June 27, 1963, Trial Examiner Eugene K. Kennedy issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter- mediate Report. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and rec- ommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following modification. We adopt the Trial Examiner's finding, to which there was no ex- ception, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by maintaining in effect shop rules prohibiting employee organizational activity on company premises at any time.' The Trial Examiner recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from maintaining these rules. He stated, however, that he would not rec- ommend the posting of notices on the ground that "special circum- stances" suggested a deviation from that usual requirement. The General Counsel has excepted to the failure to recommend the posting of notices. We find merit in this exception. It is the established practice of the Board and the courts to require a respondent who is found to have violated the Act to post notices informing those con- cerned that it will not engage in the conduct in question. No adequate reason has been presented for deviating from that practice in this case. 1 Chairman McCulloch and Member Leedom adopt this finding in the absence of excep- tions thereto, and without passing on the validity of the Trial Examiner's supporting rationale. Cf their dissenting opinion in Gale Products, Div of Outboard Marine Corp , 142 NLRB 1246. 144 NLRB No. 83. CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 863 ORDER The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner with the following modification : 2 Paragraph 2(a) shall be renumbered as 2(b), and the following shall be inserted as paragraph 2 (a) : (a) Post at its plant in Van Nuys, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its em- ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order" the words "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT maintain in effect shop rules which prohibit employees from engaging in solicitation in connection with union activities during nonworking hours on our premises, or from distributing any written material on behalf of any labor organi- zation on nonworking time in a nonworking area on our premises. CIEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone No. Richmond 9-4711, Extension 1031, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. 864 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding was initiated by a charge filed on December 28, 1962, by Paul J. Goldener, an individual. Thereafter the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ( herein called the General Counsel and Board , respectively ) issued a complaint alleging that Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corporation (herein called Respondent ), was maintaining shop rules which were so inclusive that they unlawfully inhibited the rights of employees guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act). Respondent in its answer denies the allegations of illegality and in the proceeding held before Trial Examiner Eugene K. Kennedy in Los Angeles, California, on March 13, 1963, and in a brief thereafter submitted, advanced defenses to the allegations of the General Counsel which will be considered herein. Upon the entire record in the case, and upon consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Chevrolet Motor Division located in Van Nuys, California, is an unincorporated division of General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation, with its principal offices in Detroit, Michigan , having various automobile manufacturing and assembly plants located in various States of the Union. It annually purchases goods valued in excess of $50,000 transported directly to the above plants from States other than the State in which the respective plants are located, including the plant in Van Nuys, California Respondent is now and at all times material has been an employer en- gaged in commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The shop rules involved SHOP RULES Committing any of the following violations will be sufficient grounds for dis- ciplinary action ranging from reprimand to immediate discharge, depending upon the seriousness of the offense in the judgment of management. 23. Unauthorized soliciting or collecting contributions for any purpose what- soever on Company premises. (Herein Rule 23.) 24. Unauthorized distribution of literature, written or printed matter of any description on Company premises. (Herein Rule 24.) The plant rules, including rules 23 and 24, have been posted. in the General Motors plant at Van Nuys, California, since 1947, and are currently in effect. Aside from their existence and the charge herein, there is no evidence they have been applied to inhibit union organization nor has there been any request for authorization ad- dressed to management pursuant to rules 23 or 24 to engage in solicitation or distribution of literature on behalf of any labor organization. B. The collective-bargaining contract Since 1948 the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, has been the certified bargaining representative of the production and maintenance employees at the Van Nuys plant Goldener, the Charging Party, is a member of the unit rep- resented by the Union. Included in the collective-bargaining agreement are the following provisions. (7) The Union agrees that neither the Union nor its members will intimidate or coerce any employe in respect to his right to work or in respect to Union activity or membership, and further that there shall be no solicitation of employes for Union membership or dues on Company time. The Union further agrees that the Corporation shall take disciplinary action for any violations of this provision. (Herein Section 7.) * * * * * * * CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 865 (92) The plants covered by this Agreement will erect bulletin boards which may be used by the Union for posting notices approved by the Local Manage- ments and restricted to: ( a) Notices of Union recreational and social affairs. (b) Notices of Union elections. (c) Notices of Union appointments and results of Union elections. (d) Notices of Union meetings. (e) Other notices concerning bona fide Union activity such as: Cooperatives; Credit Unions ; and Unemployment Compensation information. (Herein Section 92.) (93) The number , location and size of such bulletin boards in each bargain- ing unit under this Agreement shall be decided by the Local Management and the Shop Committee . ( Herein Section 93.) (94) There shall be no other general distribution , or posting by employees, of pamphlets , advertising or political matter, notices , or any kind of literature upon Corporation property other than as herein provided . ( Herein Section 94.) C. Discussion and concluding findings The following statement in Respondent 's brief is accepted as a correct statement of law as a starting point for consideration of the questions posed by this record: Current Board law with respect to employer prohibitions against solicitation or distribution in furtherance of union objectives by employees on company premises may be summed up as follows : No-solicitation or no-distribution rules which prohibit union solicitation on company property by employees during their non -working time or which prohibit distribution of union literature in non- working areas by employees during their non -working time are presumptively an unreasonable impediment of self-organization and are therefore presumptively invalid both as to their promulgation and enforcement . However such rules may be validated by evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline . See Walton Mfg. Co., 126 NLRB 697, enf. sub . nom. N.L.R .B. v. Walton Mfg . Co., 289 F. 2d 177, and Stoddard- Quirk Mfg Co., 138 NLRB 615. Respondent does not defend the challenged shop rules on the ground that special circumstances make the rules necessary It defends both rules on the basis that actual discrimination or inhibition of union activity has not been demonstrated and that the term "unauthorized" in such rules operates to make them lawful in the absence of showing actual discrimination . The defense is also advanced that the collective- bargaining agreement with the Union saves rules 23 and 24 from being unlawful. Rules 23 and 24 both contain the term "unauthorized ." The necessity for an employee to obtain permission from his employer to engage in otherwise lawful organizational activities diminishes such rights pro tanto and a rule requiring such prior authorization is as presumptively invalid as a rule flatly prohibiting such ac- tivities Cases that have been concerned with the legality of no-solicitation or no- distribution rules have found such rules unlawful even though it would be possible by the terms of such rules to obtain the employer 's permission to engage in organi- zational activities . For example , in Shawnee Industries, Inc., Subsidiary of Thiokol Chemical Corporation , 140 NLRB 1451, the invalid rules read as follows: Vending, soliciting , or collecting contributions for any purpose at any time on the premises, unless authorized by management . [ Emphasis supplied.] Distributing written or printed matter of any description on the premises unless approved by Personnel . [ Emphasis supplied.] In Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company, 139 NLRB 849, the invalid rule was framed in similar language: Solicitations and the posting of distribution of literature , leaflets, cards, or other material for the purpose of donations , contributions , or other reason, will not be allowed on company property at any time without the full sanction of the personnel manager. [Emphasis supplied.] Accordingly , it is found that rules 23 and 24 are not rendered lawful by the inclusion of the term "unauthorized." Respondent also presents as a defense to both challenged rules the absence of any discriminatory use of them in connection with employee organizational activity. The answer to this contention seems clear . It is well settled that proof of a dis- ;riminatory motive is not essential to render such a rule invalid Republic Avia- 866 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793. The mere existence of such a rule may have operated successfully to inhibit free exchange of ideas among employees. Midwestern Instruments, Inc., 131 NLRB 1026, 1031. Irrespective of whether these rules may have done so in the past, the potential remains they will operate to un- lawfully restrain employees in the future. The filing of the charge suggests the probability that at least one employee was concerned about disciplinary action by the enforcement of these rules. Consequently, the absence of any further demonstra- tion of discriminatory application of these rules with respect to union organizational activity is regarded as an irrelevancy in connection with the question of the presump- tive invalidity of rules 23 and 24. The argument is also made by Respondent that the collective-bargaining agree- ment between the Union and Respondent validates the rules. The Union is the statutory bargaining representative of the production and maintenance employees affected by rules 23 and 24. It may bind all employees in the unit not to strike (Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, 123 NLRB 647, 649) and it may also bind its employees with reference to their representatives in connection with grievances. Shell Oil Company, and Shell Chemical Corporation, 93 NLRB 161, 164. As will be developed herein, the proposition that because a union can bargain away certain rights guaranteed to employees by the Act it can therefore contract away all of such rights is rejected. Such a result is unnecessary, unduly mechanistic, and is not consonant with the declared purposes of the Act in protecting rights of employees. The questions remaining deal with an inquiry as to whether the collective- bargaining agreement does in fact purport to bargain away rights of employees which are prohibited by shop rules 23 and 24 and also whether the Act permits an agree- ment limiting organizational rights to the extent of the scope of shop rules 23 and 24. Rules 23 and 24 involve different questions of interpretation in connection with collective-bargaining agreement. Shop Rule 23 As previously indicated, this rule provides for discipline in the event of "un- authorized soliciting or collecting contributions for any purpose whatsoever on Company premises." Although rule 23 prohibits unauthorized soliciting for any purpose on company premises, Respondent argues that section 7 of the collective-bargaining agreement prohibiting solicitation of employees for union membership or dues on company time should be construed with this provision to arrive at a conclusion that employees' solicitation on company premises on their own time is permitted. Assuming such a construction is tenable, it would require an unusual degree of sophistication among the production and maintenance employees to derive this meaning from a reading of shop rule 23, along with section 7 of the contract. Respondent's position has a further potential defect. Even if the claimed im- plication of section 7 of the agreement is given a meaning claimed by Respondent, it would envisage solicitation only on behalf of the contracting Union. It would not be reasonably susceptible of an interpretation permitting employees to com- municate among themselves with respect to organizational activities against the Union or on behalf of a different labor organization. The considerations affecting the legality of such an agreement will be considered in connection with rule 24 where the issue is more squarely posed. At the very least, shop rule 23 would suggest to an employee that its violation would carry with it the possibility of discipline even if it did occur to an interested employee to ponder the meaning of section 7 of the agreement, along with rule 23, assuming a copy of the collective-bargaining agreement was available to the em- ployees. Such an assumption must rest on speculation as the record does not in- dicate whether or not copies of the collective-bargaining agreement were available to the employees. Assuming for the purpose only of construing the question of legality of rule 23 that oral union solicitation on an employee's own time on the employer's premises (other than on behalf of the contracting union) is one of the section 7 rights of the Act 1 that may be bargained away by an employee's representa- I Section 7 reads as follows: Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3). CHr,VROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 867 tive, rule 23 is nevertheless in conflict with the Act. It is found that Respondent's construction of section 7 of the agreement together with rule 23 is unrealistic and reaches a result which probably would not be reached by an employee, even assum- ing an employee were impelled to construe section 7 of a collective-bargaining agree- ment containing 225 sections and 141 printed pages, after reading shop rule 23, and also assuming a copy of the agreement were available for utilization in construing rights and restrictions flowing from provisions contained in these separate documents. Before this type of organizational right can be bargained away, the contractual language must be clear and unmistakable. Monolith Portland Cement Company, 94 NLRB 1358, 1396. Since the contractual language here falls far short of meeting such a test, it is found that section 7 of the agreement does not affect shop rule 23 and that it has the predictable effect of unlawfully inhibiting employees' organiza- tional rights on their own time on company premises. Shop Rule 24 Having found shop rule 23 is invalid, consideration will now be given to the question as to whether the collective-bargaining agreement makes valid shop rule 24 which provides disciplinary action for "Unauthorized distribution of literature, written or printed matter of any description on Company premises." It will be recalled that sections 92 and 93 provide for use of bulletin boards by the Union but not for use by employees, and that section 94 of the agreement provides: There shall be no other general distribution, or posting by employes of pamphlets, advertising or political matter, notices, or any kind of literature upon Corporation property other than as here provided. One can only speculate what the contracting parties meant by "general distribu- tion." In any event it is found that this language would probably create in an employee's mind a fear of possible punishment in the event he distributed any written material on Respondent's premises in nonworking areas.2 Manifestly section 94 of the agreement limits employee rights which otherwise would be guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. The Board has held that a bar- gaining representative may bargain away some Section 7 rights of the employees in the unit, including the right to strike and a limitation on employees' representatives in grievance matters. The Board has also accepted the view that employees' organi- zational activities may be bargained away under some circumstances. In Monolith Portland Cement Company, 94 NLRB 1358, 1396, the Board adopted the following language in the Intermediate Report: The Board has held that despite the general principle that an employer may not prohibit union activities by employees on plant premises during nonworking time such as rest periods or lunch periods, a union can "effectively bargain away the employees' rights to engage in self-organizational activities on the employer's premises during nonworking hours " In Fruitvale Canning Company, 90 NLRB 884, 891, the Board stated: The Board has held that notwithstanding the general principle that an employer may not prohibit union activities by employees on company premises during such nonworking time as rest or lunch periods, a union can "effectively bargain away the employees' right to engage in self-organizational activities on the employer's premises during non-working hours." [Citing] May Department Stores Com- pany, 59 NLRB 976, 981, footnote 17; cf. North American Aviation, Inc., 56 NLRB 959. As far as can be determined this record poses a different question than confronted the Board in the foregoing decisions. It seems probable that previously the Board was only concerned with organizational activities on behalf of the contracting union. Here the Charging Party, a member of the unit represented by the Union, by his act of filing an unfair labor practice charge, raised the question as to whether the Union by agreement with Respondent could lawfully limit his right to communicate with other employees. Relinquishing a right to strike binding all employees in the bargaining unit, or agreeing to a method for the resolution of grievances, are matters which are reason- ably calculated to stabilize industrial relationships and may constitute reasonable 2 Because of the Board's Decision in Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615, the application cf Respondent's rule against distribution of written material will be here considered only insofar as it affects distribution in nonwork areas of Respondent's property 727-083-64-vol. 144-56 868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD concessions at the bargaining table. Decisions sanctioning such agreements are exam- ples of reasonable accommodation between conflicting portions of the Act. Here a balance is to be found between rights guaranteed employees and the power of their bargaining representatives to bargain away such rights. A union agreeing that there shall be no strike during the contract period may operate to inhibit concerted activi- tives of a minority, which are activities protected by the Act. While the union repre- sents all the employees in the unit at the bargaining table, in the interest of obtaining benefits for all, it may bind all, including a possible dissident minority, to refrain from striking. No such considerations suggest themselves in the case where an employer and a union in effect agree that no viewpoint except the union's shall be expressed on the employer's premises, as in the case at hand. Such result circumscribes employees' freedom to communicate, which is as essential to a free and vigorous industrial society as a political one. If the Board decisions relative to bargaining away employees' or- ganizational rights are to be interpreted as Respondent contends, it is apparent that an employer and a union by agreement can curtail freedom of expression among em- ployees and limit to that extent freedom of communication whether in written or oral form. This would necessarily impinge on the right to exchange communication in connection with employees' future choice of collective-bargaining representatives. A holding by the Board or a court that an employee member of a bargaining unit may be barred by contract between his bargaining representative and his employer from communicating ideas antithetical to the union's position or not sponsored or sanctioned by it on the employer's property has not been encountered. The Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U.S. 105, 113 has said: No restriction may be placed on the employees' right to discuss self- organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production of discipline . .. . In N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 33, Chief Justice Holmes in speaking of Section 7 rights observed: Thus in its present application, the statute goes no further than to safeguard the right of employees to self organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without re- straint or coercion by their employer. This is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents. Restriction by contract between an employer and a union of discussion inimical to a union is at least equally repugnant to the principle of freedom of expression, as unilateral action by the employer. It is concluded that the Board in holding that a union may bargain away organizational rights of its employees held no more than the facts presented to it required. Those cases were apparently concerned with organiza- tional activities only on behalf of the contracting union Therefore it is concluded a contracting union may bargain away organizational rights of the employees which it represents only insofar as such organizational rights are exercised on behalf of the contracting union. A contiact which is broader in scope is at least presumptively an unlawful and unnecessary restriction of the employees' right of communication and self-organization. Insofar as this question devolves on a balancing of the employees' right as against the rights of a union, it is believed the following judicial expressions correctly reflect the philosophy of the Act. In Inland Steel Company v. N.L.R.B., 170 F. 2d 247, 258 (C.A. 7) the court observed At this point it is pertinent to observe that the Wagner Act was enacted primarily for the benefit of employees and not for unions. The latter derived their authority from the employees when selected as their bargaining agent rather than from the law. The statement of the court in N.L.R.B. v. Hymie Schwartz, d/b/a Lion Brand Manufacturing Company, 146 F. 2d 773, 774 (C.A. 5), also serves to emphasize the Act granted rights to employees rather than to unions: Contrary to a rather general misconception, the National Labor Relations Act was passed for the primary benefit of the employees as distinguished from the primary benefit to labor unions, and the prohibition of unfair labor practices designed by an employer to prevent the free exercise by employees of their wishes in reference to becoming members of a union was intended by Congress as a grant of rights to the employees rather than as a grant of power to the CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 869 union. Consequently the right of employees lawfully to engage in concerted ac- tivities for the purpose of mutual aid, outside of a union, is specified by the Act. The result reached here as to the scope of the Board's decisions permitting unions to bargain away organizational rights of employees is consonant with these judicial declarations. The end result is that it is lawful for a contracting union to bargain away the right to engage in organizational activities carried on in its behalf, but it is unlawful for a union to attempt to destroy by contract, rights given to employees by the Act to communicate with each other in oral or written form with respect to organizational activities except on behalf of the contracting union. Included in the factors leading to this conclusion are that it is not ordinarily a legitimate concern of an employer to contract with respect to the expression of em- ployees' views with respect to their representatives and that it is incompatible with rights guaranteed to employees that a union should contract with an employer to limit the otherwise lawful right of employees in exchanging information possibly look- ing to a change of representatives. III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputees burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent, by maintaining shop rules, violated the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease maintaining in effect a rule which prohibits employees from engaging in solicitation during their nonworking hours on Respondent's premises and from maintaining in effect a rule which prohibits its employees on their nonworking time from distributing organizational literature in nonworking areas on behalf of any labor organization. The special circumstances presented by this record suggests that this is an appropriate case for deviation from the traditional requirement of posting a notice. Because of the fact that the challenged rules have been in effect for 14 years, and there is no evidence that they have been exercised in a discriminatory manner, in specific situations, it appears that any inhibitory effect of such rules would be remedied by having Respondent change its posted rules in a manner consistent with the views expressed herein. This would remove a possible fear of discrimination, or discipline, in the event that an employee did undertake to engage in activities not sponsored by the contracting union It seems probable Respondent for many years had no occasion to consider rules 23 and 24 and that these rules were regarded as mere formalities not giving rise to question or controversy. Because of the probability that the maintaining of these rules, prior to this matter, was not accompanied by any discriminatory intent and because a change of rules would remedy the violations here found, the requirement of posting a notice by Respondent seems unnecessary and punitive rather than remedial in character and accordingly will not be recommended. The legality of section 94 of the agreement was not put in issue by the pleadings or attacked by the General Counsel. Although it has been found this rule does not serve to validate shop rule 24 and it has been determined as ineffective in eliminating a defense in this proceeding, because its legality has not been put in issue by the pleadings, because Respondent has not been given adequate notice to litigate the validity of this provision, and because a recommended order with respect to this provision of the contract is not necessary or appropriate to the disposition of the issues presented, no recommendation will be made with reference to section 94 of the collective-bargaining agreement. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. By maintaining in effect shop rules which prohibit solicitation of union member- ship during the employees' nonworking time on the employer's premises, or distribu- tion of written material on nonworking time in nonworking areas on the employer's premises, Respondent has engaged in interference, restraint, and coercion in viola- tion of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the Respondent, Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Maintaining in effect a rule which prohibits employees from engaging in solicitation in connection with union activities during their nonworking hours on Respondent's premises. (b) Maintaining in effect a rule prohibiting its employees when they are on nonworking time in a nonworking area from distributing any written material on behalf of any labor organization, or against any labor organization that is not sponsored by the contracting Union. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order what steps have been taken to comply herewith.3 It is further recommended that unless within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order Respondent notifies said Regional Director, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing recommenda- tions, the Board issue an order requiring Respondent to take the aforesaid action. 3 In the event this Recommended Order be adapted by the Board, the provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order," what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." Local 499, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and Iowa Power and Light Company. Case No. 18- CD-28. September 26, 1963 DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE This is a proceeding under Section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act, following the filing of a charge alleging violations of Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Act. A hearing was held before Hearing Officer Charles J. Frisch on May 14, 15, and 16, 1963. All parties who appeared at the hearing were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to adduce evi- dence bearing upon the issues. The rulings of the Hearing Officer made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Briefs were filed by Iowa Power and Light Company, herein called the Company; Local 499, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the IBEW; and Local 33, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumb- ing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, herein called the Plumbers. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board 1 makes the following findings : 1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Brown]. 144 NLRB No. 80.