General Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 7, 1965

150 N.L.R.B. 829 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT 829
or if not, to a substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges , and will reimburse each of them for any loss of pay
he may have suffered as a result of being laid off or discharged.
Arthur Adams Herman Harper Dale Mether
Charles Argo Joe Leichleiter Lowell Osborne
Jerry Bethel Ed Leonard Fred Uzell
Arthur Cates Fred Martin Robert Vanderpool
Richard Dickman Byron Meek Robert Wilbern
Richard Greenwalt Marvin Melby John Wilcoxson
All our employees have the right to form, join, or assist any labor union, or
not to do so.
WE WILL NOT interfere with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise
of these rights.
WILSON CONCRETE COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
NOTE.-We will notify the above -named employees if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1200 Rialto
Building, 906 Grand Avenue , Kansas City, Missouri , Telephone No. Baltimore 1-7000,
Extension 731, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions.
General Electric Company, Automatic Blanket Plant and Inter-
national Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO. Case No. 11-CA-92160. January 7, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 2, 1964, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision.' He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in
other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended dismissal of those allegations. Thereafter, the General
Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent filed exceptions
to the Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers- in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
150 NLRB No. 75.
830 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the brief, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclu-
sions, and recommendations 2 of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the Board hereby adopts, as its Order, the Recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent General
Electric Company, Automatic Blanket Plant, Asheboro, North Caro-
lina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
1 We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent engaged in surveillance on
May 28 , 1964, in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act . We note and correct the Trial
Examiner 's inadvertent statement that Ward drove the car to the meeting place, but
this error does not require rejection of the Trial Examiner 's credibility finding as to Ward
2 We adopt the Trial Examiner ' s dismissal of various other Section 8(a) (1) allegations,
not for the reasons he stated , but solely because the General Counsel did not sustain his
burden of proof as to them.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On a charge filed on October 1, 1963, by International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board, by the Acting Regional Director for Region 11
(Winston-Salem , North Carolina ), issued a complaint dated March 17, 1964 , naming
General Electric Company , Automatic Blanket Plant , as Respondent . Said com-
plaint , as amended at the hearing, in substance alleges the commission of unfair
labor practices prohibited by Section 8(a) (1) and ( 3), and affecting commerce as
defined in Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7), of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called
the -Act . Respondent has answered admitting some facts but putting in issue the
unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing on the complaint was held before Trial Examiner
James V. Constantine at Asheboro, North Carolina, from April 27 to 30, 1964. All
parties were represented at and participated in the hearing and were granted the
right to present evidence , examine and cross-examine witnesses , file briefs, and offer
oral argument . At the hearing , the complaint was orally amended . Before the
receipt of any evidence at the trial Respondent moved to dismiss portions of para-
graph 7 and 9 of the complaint . This motion was denied in part, granted in part,
and reserved as to part . The reserved part is disposed of herein . Briefs have been
received from the Charging Party and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record in this case , and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent , also called the Company herein, a New York corporation, is engaged
at Asheboro, North Carolina, in manufacturing and selling electric blankets , heating
pads, vaporizers , and baby food warmers. During the past 12 months,,it received
raw materials valued in excess of $100 ,000 directly from, and shipped finished-prod-
ucts valued in excess of $100 ,000 directly to, points outside the State of North Caro-
lina. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-,
ing of Section 2 ( 6) and' (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the
Act to assert jurisdiction over Respondent.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union of Electrical , Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union , is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the
Act.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT 831
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
About May 1963 the Union initiated an 'organizational campaign at Respondent's
Asheboro plant. In connection with the campaign, the Union, among other things,
distributed handbills and, by letter dated August 23, 1963, wrote to Plant Manager
Pace that it was organizing the Company. That letter contains a statement that
certain named employees, including Mozelle Hepler, are serving as voluntary organ-
izers for the Union. Specified conduct of Respondent in connection with the Union's
campaign is alleged to be unlawful. Such conduct is more fully discussed below.
A. Surveillance
1. General Counsel's evidence
About May 28, 1963, a union meeting was held at the home of employee Jewel
Sheppard on Route 5 in Asheboro. Jewel's son, Jerry, directed the parking of cars
thereat for about 13/4 hours, beginning about 6:30 or 7 p.m. During this time Jerry
observed Supervisor Slim Ward accompanied by another person drive a 1955 or 1956
car into an abandoned service station across the street. After a brief stop of 20 or
30 minutes Ward drove on to the home of Hoyt Russell, a short distance right behind
the station, where he remained for a while. Then Ward drove back to the station
where he remained about 20 or 30 minutes before leaving.1
About 7 p.m. on August 27, 1963, employee Eldridge Hussey observed Foreman
Vuncanon, accompanied by his wife, drive up to a cafe near the East Side Building
in Asheboro. I find that Vuncanon is a supervisor and agent under the Act. A
union meeting was scheduled for 7:30 p.m. that evening in the East Side Building.
After remaining parked for about 5 minutes, during which time he "just looked
around," Vuncanon went into the cafe where he purchased cigarettes from a vending
machine. When he returned from the cafe Vuncanon sat in his car for about 5
minutes before he left. This meeting had been announced in a union pamphlet dis-
tributed at the plant. Other union meetings had previously been held at this same
building and had been announced by handbills.
Employee Lyerly confirmed the foregoing except that he testified that Vuncanon
first appeared about 7:40 p.m.
Employee Eldridge Hussey, a member of the Union's organizing committee, tes-
tified that Foreman Vuncanon often stood in a doorway in his department "looking
around" and looking at Hussey also. According to Hussey this did not occur until
he started to wear a union badge at work. Hussey also testified that Vuncanon
stopped speaking to him after he wore the union badge. I find that Vuncanon's
"looking" does not amount to unlawful surveillance.2
Employee Bailey testified that he was constantly watched at work by supervisors.
Elsewhere in this Decision I have not credited this testimony. Even if I found it to
be so, I further find that this is not the type of watching interdicted by the Act, for
supervisors have a right to oversee employees during working time.
2. Respondent's evidence
T. E. "Slim" Ward is the maintenance supervisor at Respondent's plant. I find he
is a supervisor and agent under the Act. Some time before May 28, 1963, one Hoyt
Russell invited Ward to see Russell's new television set at Russell's home. About
6 p.m., Ward drove in his car to the home of "Red" Murray where he asked Murray
to join him in going to Russell's home. Murray suggested that they drive in his
daughter's Chevrolet and Ward agreed. On direct, Ward stated he drove the Chev-
rolet to and from Russell's home. On redirect, Ward testified that Murray did the
driving. (It is not necessary to the issues to ascertain the driver of the Chevrolet.)
They arrived at Russell's home about 6:30 or 7 p.m., when it was dusk or sundown.
At Russell's they parked a "little bit" in the driveway. This driveway is near an
abandoned filling station and-also near Jewel Sheppard's home. Ward observed some
cars at the latter place. Since no one was at home 3 at Russell's, they sat around in
IIn his affidavit to the Board, Jerry placed the Incident about May 7. He testified
he mentioned May 7 because others with him at the time referred to May 7, although he
was confident it was May 28.
2 Sep Salant & Salant, Tiicoa poraterl; 92 NLRB 417, 440-447.
Ward testified on direct that they knocked on the door of Russell's home. On el oss-
examination he denied so knocking. It does not seem necessary to resolve this inconsistency
775'_692-65-vol. 150-54
832 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the car for 5 minutes or so and drove to a nearby grocery store where Ward made a
purchase of sausages . Then they left. The next day Jewel Sheppard asked Ward
why he did not come over the evening before.
Ward claimed it was not raining when he went to Russell 's. I do not credit this
especially since Respondent 's witness Lanier testified credibly that it was raining
heavily that night . He further claims that he was not aware that a union meeting
had been scheduled for that evening at the home of-Jewel Sheppard. "Red" Murray.
did not testify.
Although Vuncanon testified ,, he did not explain why he happened to be in the
vicinity of the East Side Building at that time of evening.
Concluding Findings as to Surveillance
While no direct evidence shows that Respondent knew of the union meetings on
May 28 and August 27, it is,reasonable to draw the inference-and I draw it-that
Respondent had knowledge they were going to be held. Thus Supervisor Kauffman
testified credibly that "in a small plant like ours rumors start and you get it back
from six different directions within the next hour." Further, handbills announcing
union events, including meetings, were distributed at the plant gates. Some of,these
handbills admittedly came into Respondent's possession . See, for example , Respond-
ent's Exhibit No. 39. Finally, some of Respondent 's top supervisors admittedly dis-
cussed these meetings shortly after they were held. This also points to the inference
that Respondent knew thereof prior to the meeting.
It is my opinion , and I find, that Foreman "Slim" Ward engaged in surveillance of
the union meeting at Jewel Sheppard's house on May 28. Admittedly Ward drove
down to Russell's home in the immediate vicinity - of the meeting . Admittedly Ward
proceeded to Russell's home from Murray's home in the car of Murray's daughter
rather than in Ward's car. Admittedly Ward remained some time in the area after
ascertaining that Russell was not home . Further, I find that it was raining heavily
that night. It is difficult to comprehend why Ward was so anxious to go to Russell's
home to see a new television set on a rainy night without even ascertaining whether
Russell would be at home . Accordingly, I do not credit Respondent 's evidence
explaining Ward's presence in the neighborhood.
It is further my opinion, and I find, that Foreman Vuncanon engaged in surveil-
lance of the union meeting held on August 27 at the East Side Building . Admittedly
Vuncanon drove to a cafe in the immediate vicinity, and about 4 miles from home,
where he purchased a pack of cigarettes from a vending machine. But he looked
around for about 5 minutes both before and after making this purchase without
apparent reason therefor. Taylor Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, 83 NLRB
142, 163, is distinguishable.
The above two acts of surveillance occurred in the evening at a time when it was
growing dark. Any information gleaned by observers Ward and Vuncanon would
probably- be negligible because of that impending darkness . Nevertheless the Board
has held that the Act vouchsafes to employees the right to engage in such activities
free of employer oversight . Hence the fact that the surveillance may have been,
fruitless cannot legally justify it. For like reasons, the fact that the surveillance was
open rather than clandestine will not constitute a defense . N.L.R.B. v. Collins &
Aikman Corp., 146 F. 2d 454, 455 (C.A. 4).
B. Restriction in conversation and freedom of movement
William H . Bailey, an employee in the maintenance department , signed a union
card and attended all but two of the Union's organizational meetings. The first
meeting was held at the home of employee Jewel Sheppard in May 1963; the second
was held in the Old East Side Super Market Building about a week later. On the
day following this second meeting, Bailey had occasion to go to the office of Foreman
T. E. "Slim" Ward, whom I have found to be a supervisor and agent under the Act.
Ward told Bailey that Bailey - was talking too much to employees in the plant on
company time and that such talk would have to stop except at nonworking times
which Ward enumerated.
A few days later Carl Kauffman, employee and community , relations manager
(who I find is a supervisor and agent under the Act) accompanied by Foreman Ward,
spoke to Bailey . Kauffman told Bailey that Bailey constantly talked to people, that
this was the second time it was called to Bailey's attention , and that Bailey would
have to "quit it ." Bailey replied that he had cut down on his talking , that "I might
not have quit altogether," and that he was not talking on company time. ; Bailey also
testified that Kauffman told him that Bailey was being watched as to what he was
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT 833
doing, whom he was talking to, and what he was saying. But I do not credit this
last testimony of Bailey because it was elicited by a leading question on direct exam-
ination which suggested the answer after he testified that Kauffman had not said
anything further in this conversation.
Some time after this Foreman Ward invited Bailey' to Ward's office. Kauffman
soon entered at Bailey's request. When Kauffman again accused Bailey of leaving
his -work and talking to others, Bailey requested that Pace, the plant manager, be
summoned. Thereupon the meeting was transferred to the company conference
room, which Pace also attended. Pace charged Bailey with constantly "going over
the mill and talking," and asked Bailey to "own up" to it. But Bailey insisted that
this charge was unfounded. Kauffman added that "they" did not want Bailey talking
because "they" were afraid Bailey would ask employees to sign a union card.
On another occasion Kauffman "brought up" that Bailey in his talks to employees
was soliciting employees to go to union meetings . On still another occasion (in late
July 1963) Kauffman rescinded a privilege, previously enjoyed, of Bailey to sell
doughnuts on company property. The proceeds of such sales were turned over to a
church by 'Bailey. In one of the above meetings Kauffman assured Bailey that
Bailey was free to talk to employees during nonworking time. About August 1963,
Supervisor Allison reprimanded Bailey for going out of his department to check fire
equipment. Bailey testified that Allison had previousy directed him to perform this
work.
On May 31, 1963, Foreman Vuncanon warned Mozelle Hepler that she was using
the restroom too much. The details of this conversation are recited elsewhere in
this Decision in connection with the alleged discriminatory treatment of Hepler.
While some of the foregoing testimony was controverted by Respondent's witnesses,
resolution of the conflict has been rendered unnecessary by the fact that I find no
unlawful restriction in conversation or in freedom of movement on the facts narrated
above. I '
Thus I find that the warnings to-Bailey that he talked too much and left his work
to wander around the mill, even if unfounded, were proper since they were confined
to working time. An employer controls discipline and production. Hence he may
lawfully circumscribe privileges to be' enjoyed during working time and may repri-
mand employees for transcending limits so set. The fact that the reprimand may
turn out to be unjustified does not convert the reprimand 'into an unfair labor prac-
tice unless it is a pretext to cloak alleged reprisals against union members or union
activity. But to establish such reprisals it must be affirmatively shown that nonunion
employees enjoyed privileges denied to prounion employees. Yet the record fails to
disclose such disparate treatment.
Nor is a contrary conclusion required by the statement of Supervisor Kauffman
that the reprimand was based on a fear that Bailey would ask employees to sign
union cards and solicit employees to go to union meetings. This is so because an
employer- may forbid union activity during working hours. Hence a warning pro-
hibiting such activity on company time is lawful, even if the employer mistakenly
believes that an employee is engaging in such activity. Similar considerations apply
to the cancellation of the doughnut-selling privileges previously extended to Bailey;
i.e., I find no reprisal against him for being prounion.
Nor do I find that Foreman Vuncanon unlawfully curtailed any statutory rights
of employee Hepler on May 31. To admonish employees not to use the restroom too
frequently is not unlawful. - The fact that an employee so reproved is a union sym-
pathizer does not alter this result absent- evidence that nonunion employees were
accorded greater latitude to visit the restroom. -
C. Threats
At some undisclosed time Foreman Carl Allison, whom I find to be a supervisor
and agent under the Act, during a conversation with employee Carson Cranford,
Jr., told. Cranford that he thought Cranford "was through with the damned Union."
Cranford replied that the employees, rather than Allison, would decide "whether the
Union comes in or not." Allison also asked employee Austin if anyone was bother-
ing him while Cranford talked to Austin a moment before. I find nothing illegal
in Allison's remarks, as I -consider them neither a threat, nor interrogation, nor
surveillance.
In August 1963, C. H. Pace, Respondent's plant manager, whom I find to be a
supervisor and agent of Respondent under the Act, addressed employees assembled
for that purpose. In his remarks Pace said, among other things, that the employees
did not need a union, but if they wanted one it was up to them. Pace also discussed
834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a recent "drastic changeover" 4 in production methods, and mentioned that no one
was laid off thereby. The next day, Foreman Odell Shaw, a supervisor and agent
under the Act, asked employee Frances Laughlin what she thought of Pace's speech.
Laughlin replied that "it was a bunch of lies" because she had been laid off for a
week for failing to make production. Laughlin added that Pace did the Union
"real good," and that if she had not been for the Union before she was then.
That same afternoon or the next morning Laughlin was called to a meeting with
Supervisors Shaw, Martin, and Lanier. Superintendent Martin asked her why she
made the above statement to Shaw. Laughlin replied that her layoff caused Pace,'s
observations to be lies. Then Martin suggested that Laughlin quit since she was
both dissatisfied and upset.
The foregoing is an adequate abridgment of the General Counsel's evidence.
Respondent's testimony is to the effect that after Pace's speech Superintendent Mar-
tin explained to Laughlin that neither she nor anyone else was laid off for failure to
make a piece rate, and that she and some others were laid off when the floor and
equipment were renovated in changing over "from the old control to a new control."
Previous to this Laughlin had complained she was unable to make the rate on another
job, and so Martin transferred her to her present job. But she was physically pre-
vented from starting on her new job for about a week because of the above-mentioned
renovations. Her guaranteed rate, even when she did not make production, on the
first job was $1.62 an hour.
I do not accept Respondent's explanation that Laughlin was idle from work
because she was transferred to another job after complaining that she could not
make production on her present job. This is so because the new job to which
Laughlin was assigned would not start for a week, whereas her old job continued to
run. No rational explanation is given as to why Laughlin preferred or relished a
week's unpaid idleness to a job (no matter how unproductive) which guaranteed
her $1.62 an hour. Hence I find that Laughlin was right when she contended that
she had been laid off temporarily for poor production.
Nevertheless, I do not find that Laughlin's layoff was illegal or that it displayed
union hostility. •I find that it was no more than layoff and, as such, did not con-
stitute an unfair labor practice. Nor do I, construe Respondent's suggestion that
Laughlin quit as a threat to a union adherent. I find that such suggestion was not
prompted by antiunion motives. Hence I find nothing illegal in the advice to
Laughlin that she quit if she was so dissatisfied as to be upset with her job. Cf.
Ce?tain-Teed Products Corpo,ation, 147 NLRB 1517.
D. Interrogation
In June 1963, Supervisor Kauffman asked employee Jack Shortsleeve if employee
Hepler had signed him up for the Union. Shortsleeve merely replied that Kauffman
knew Shortsleeve better than to ask that. Kauffman's denial is not credited.
In September 1963, employee Joan Williams overheard Supervisor Lanier speak-
ing to employee Emily Auman at a table in Respondent's cafeteria. During the
course of this conversation Lanier asked Auman if Airman heard any girls on the
second shift talking union. When Auman replied that she had not, Lanier com-
mented that she guessed that those girls "liked the conditions the way they were,"
and Auman said she guessed so.
Lanier denies making any inquiries regarding union sentiment among the,girls on
the second shift. She claims that she talked to employees Auman and Poe on the
day the Union issued a handbill stating, according to Lanier, that if the IUE comes
in S & S (the Company's savings and security program) goes out. In this conver-
sation Lanier claims Poe expressed a desire not to lose her savings and security plan,
which plan Lanier praised. At this point Lanier claims that Williams suggested that
savings could be deposited in a bank, but Lanier replied that "you won't get as much
interest." Williams testified that the foregoing conversation took place at another
time than the one at which the union sentiment of the second shift was mentioned.
Lanier denies two separate talks took place as brought out in the testimony of
Williams.
The evidence persuades me and I find that Lanier twice engaged in conversation,
as testified by Williams. But I find that only the first 'of these contravenes Section
8(a) (1) because in it Lanier sought information as to the Union among employees
on the second shift. No legitimate objective is shown for this inquiry; hence it is
objectionable under the Act because it produces a coercive impact upon employees.
'It was so described by employee Frances Laughlin, who testified for the General
Counsel.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT 835
Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770. On the other hand I find that the conversa-
tion relating to the S & S plan is innocuous and therefore protected by Section 8(c)
of the Act.
Sometime in August 1963 employee Bailey "walked by a guy and spoke to him..."
As he walked through the door, Bailey encountered Foreman Allison, who accosted
Bailey with the words, "Did you get him, Bill?" I find that this question contains
no coercive elements and cannot be characterized as an unlawful inquiry into Bailey's
activities. Accordingly, I find no violation of the Act in this incident.
E. The discrimination against Mozelle Hepler
1. General Counsel's evidence, chronologically recited
This employee started to work for Respondent a little more than 12 years ago. At
all times material she operated a thermostat and a planishing bracket machine. About
May 1963 she signed a union card and later (on the 28th of the month) attended the
first union meeting at employee Jewel Sheppard's house. Beginning August 27, 1963,
Hepler wore a union badge. In late August 1963 Respondent was notified in writing
that Hepler was on the Union's organizing committee. Since that August Hepler
has been giving out handbills for the Union.
A few days after the first union meeting (or about May 31), Foreman George
Vuncanon spoke to Hepler in the presence of Pauline Lanier, Respondent's specialist,
employees services. I find that both Vuncanon and Lanier are supervisors and agents
of Respondent under the Act. Vuncanon complained that Hepler was visiting the
restroom too much and it would have to be stopped. Foreman "Slim" Ward was
also present at the time. Hepler replied that she used the restroom only when she
had to, that she intended to continue to go to it only when necessary, and that she
did not use it too much.
At some date following the foregoing conversation Respondent time studied 5
Heplei's method of operating her machine and made changes in such operation. The
General Counsel and the Union contend this was prompted by discriminatory motives.
A description of this operation before the change seems desirable. Hepler ran a
punch press which planished brackets and targets. After placing a bracket in the
machine with her right hand she activated the press by striking two exposed levers
with her wrists, at the same time removing her hands from the area of the stamping
hammer which shaped the product. Then she would remove the machine bracket
with her right hand. This routine, called a cycle, was repeated for each bracket. A
somewhat similar procedure was pursued in planishing targets. To start the machine's
hammer it is necessary to hit or push two levers simultaneously, but they are so
located that they cannot be started unless both hands are taken away from the area
where the stamping or shaping part of the press hammers the material. In effect
these levers also act as safety devices which protect the hands of the operator in case
he or she forgets to remove the hands from the path of the dropping hammer.
About August 1963, Respondent installed new switches to replace the levers.
These switches, called microswitches, required that the operator press both switches
simultaneously with his fingers to activate the punch press. They were so designed
that-wrists would not fit into the small aperture where a starting button was located.
Hence the machine could not be started by hitting the switches with the wrists. The
switches were changed overnight on Monday after Hepler, had left for the day.
When she arrived on Tuesday morning she found that the change in switches had
been consummated. When Hepler asked Foreman Vuncanon about it, he replied
it would be explained to her at a meeting. That meeting was held later in the morn-
ing, Supervisors Martin, Vuncanon, and Lanier being present. At that meeting
Hepler asked if the rate involving the new switches would be revised. Someone
replied that there would be no increase in the rate because Hepler was making too
much as it was. She disagreed. Martin explained that the switches were changed
as a safety measure, and another supervisor insisted that the hand movements on
the new arrangement took no more time than on the old. Finally, Hepler was
reminded not to use the restroom except on breaks and lunch periods. Hepler
replied that she went only when necessary.
At some undisclosed time (probably in the middle of March 1964) after the
switches were changed another change was made in the operation pertaining to the
planishing of brackets. This decreased Hepler's earnings, she claimed, because the
5 This was made by C. H. Bunting, a motion time survey analyst, in the presence of
Supervisor Carl Kauffman.
836 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rate was lowered from $ 1.21 to $1 . 13 a thousand pieces. Hepler first learned of this
one morning when she observed the different method of operating ; she had not been
previously informed that this would occur.
At some other unidentified time in the fall of 1963 Hepler's thermostat job was
slowed down . It was then restudied . As a result she was required to check 6 1 out
of 25 rather than at the former rate of 1 out of 200 pieces, but the task rate for, the
job remained the same. Hepler claimed this slowdown reduced her earnings from
about $1 .62 to $1 . 36 an hour . Hepler was told the slowdown was necessary because
it was feared that a higher speed would burn out the motor.
The day after Hepler's job was time studied , safety switches were attached to her
machine, replacing the microswitches . According to Hepler these new switches not
only were not necessary but they slowed down her production so that her hourly
pay fell from about $ 1.55 to about 87 cents; and , as a result , Respondent had to make
up the difference between $ 1.45, the minimum guaranteed on the job, and 87 cents.
By becoming proficient , Hepler claims, she was able to increase her earnings to' $1.27
an hour . However, Respondent a little later added a fixture which slowed Hepler's
production rate to $1.03 an hour.
On September 25, 1963, Hepler was laid off. The circumstances leading to this
action are summarized in the paragraphs immediately following.
Just before quitting time on the previous day Hepler had,gone to the restroom.
As she came out she observed Superintendent James Martin and Foreman - Vuncanon
in the aisle nearby. To reach her machine Hepler had to pass by Martin and Vun-
canon . When Hepler arrived at her machine , Plant Nurse Hilda Brower happened
to be there. About the same time Vuncanon came over and asked Hepler whether
she was having trouble with her work or with her machine . When Hepler replied in
the negative , Vuncanon wanted to know why Hepler spent so much time in the rest-
room. Hepler said nothing . Thereupon Vuncanon inquired if Hepler was having
other problems because she had been away from her work so long. Hepler answered
that her monthly period had caused her to go to the restroom . Vuncanon went
away. Then Hepler turned to Nurse Brower and, after stating why she went to the
restroom , inquired if Brower "heard [what] that, son-of-a-bitch asked me." Brower
replied that she never heard such language.
Employee Shortsleeve also overheard the profanity used by Hepler in speaking to
Nurse Brower. On another occasion Vuncanon told employee Shortsleeve, after
Hepler was laid off, that Vuncanon was "put under pressure up there" to watch
Hepler, and that he, Vuncanon , had to follow orders. Employee Jack E. Shortsleeve,
a fellow employee of Hepler in the punch press department , testified that he observed
Supervisors Vuncanon and "Slim" Ward on a number of occasions "look towards
[Hepler's] machine ... and they'd turn and walk off." I find that this is hot unlawful
surveillance.
Early the next morning, September 25, Hepler asked Vuncanon to get off her
back and leave her alone . Vuncanon answered that he had to pressure her because
he was pressured from "up front ." When Hepler rejoined that Vuncanon had asked
her a very personal question the previous day, he told her that the matter would be
taken up at a meeting with her later in the morning . In his conversation , Vuncanon
also mentioned that Hepler was "being watched" by "someone else ... eight hours a
day." 7 About 10 a.m. of the same day Hepler was called to a meeting with Super-
visors Kauffman , Martin, and Vuncanon . Martin spoke first , insisting that the Com-
pany would not tolerate Hepler's language in talking to Nurse Brower , and that this
conduct was uncalled for and embarrassing to the employees . He added that the
Company did not and would not tolerate the use of profanity , making degrading
references to supervisors , and the use of indelicate language in mixed company.
Martin also criticized Hepler's excessive use of the restroom . Hepler defended her-
self by asserting that she was justified and had every right to use such language
because Vuncanon had asked her a personal question and she had never had to tell
a man about a certain time of month before. Then Martin told her she was being
laid off for a week on account of such profanity . According to Hepler, Martin
insisted that her frequent use of the restroom was not a factor in disciplining, her.
Hepler testified that she had not been warned about her too frequent use of the
restroom until after she had attended the first union meeting in 'May 1963.8 But
she did not testify , and the record otherwise does not disclose any evidence , concern-
6 This check or inspection occurred while other parts were in the machine being shaped.
7I find this is not unlawful surveillance since there existed cause for watching Flepler-;
i e., her constant visits to the restroom. i
8 Hepler also testified that at least one other employee, Mary Alder, used the restroom
as often as she but without incident , reprimand , or criticism,
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT 837
ing the frequency of her visits prior to May 1963. Hepler returned to work a week
after September 25, 1963. Since then she,has been reprimanded for excessive use of
the restroom. She also testified that her foreman, Vuncanon, and other employees
frequently resorted to profanity in the plant without impunity. This was confirmed
by other witnesses for General Counsel, including employees Joan Williams and
Carson Cranford, Jr. Both Williams and Cranford were members of the Union and
wore union badges. Both were reprimanded at one time or. another, after they
joined the Union, for the use of profanity; but no disciplinary action was taken
against them therefor.
The General Counsel and Charging Party contended that the reprimands of Cran-
ford and Williams were prompted by the fact that they belonged to the Union,'and
that this harassment is discriminatory because nonunion employees were not similarly
reproved for engaging in profanity. But I find nothing antiunion in reprimanding
Cranford and Williams. Not only were other union employees not so reprimanded
for using profanity, but no disciplinary penalties were inflicted on Cranford and
Williams. Hence I find no violation of the Act occurred when Cranford and Wil-
liams were warned not to use profanity. Lipman Bros., Inc., et al., 147 NLRB -1342,
is distinguishable.
2. Respondent's evidence 9
a. The time studies -
In April 1963, Hepler' left her work station several times not onlyto go to the
restroom but also to visit the dispensary.'°
C. H. Bunting, the Company's motion time survey analyst, testified that on
-March 18, 1963, he set a rate of $1.21 per thousand on planishing brackets following
a time study thereof on'March 11, 1963. He also explained the operation thoroughly
to Mozelle Hepler and the foreman before the rate became effective. _ Prior to the
study, the machine's hammer became engaged' by pressing with each wrist two
exposed levers, one on each side of the operator. On May 7, 1963, another time
study was made because microswitches were substituted for the levers. These micro-
switches resulted in less movement of the hands and were safer. A new rate of
$1.16 per thousand was established by Bunting on May 6, 1963, 1 day before he
made his actual study of the operation.
Shortly after this Bunting observed Hepler using the palms of, her hands, instead
of her fingers, to engage the switches, although on May 7 he had instructed her to
use her fingers. Not long after that, Respondent decided to install safety switches to
replace the microswitches. But after observing Mozelle's movements while operat-
ing with the safety switches, Bunting noticed that,the operator's hand did- not travel
any greater distance than with the microswitches. Accordingly, Bunting informed
Hepler's foreman that no change in rate would be instituted as a result of the intro-
duction of safety switches.
On September 5, 1963, a new fixture was substituted for that on the bracket planish-
ing machine. As a consequence Bunting restudied the job on the same day. On
September 9, 1963, a new rate of $1.13 per thousand was put into effect. The
previous rate was $1.16 per thousand.
On March 18, 1963, Bunting set a rate of $1.08 per thousand for,planishing tar-
gets. At this time the machine was activated by levers. On May 27, 1963, switches
were substituted for the levers, and a larger fixture replaced the smaller one. This
caused,Bunting to restudy the job. He then set a new,rate of $1.01 per thousand.
On September 10, 1963, this operation was terminated because the work was let out
to a subcontractor.
On ,October 7, 1963, Bunting made a periodic semiannual audit of Hepler's thermo-
stat, machine. In effect this amounts to a time restudy. He discovered that the
machine was running faster than the established rate called for. With the assistance
of an employee called a fixer Bunting decelerated the machine to the original speed
set by the rate. On March 23, 1964, the operator of the thermostat machine was
asked to inspect 4 out of every 100 thermostats, whereas prior to this the inspection
ratio was 1 in 500.11 These inspections were performed while the machine was
cycling and did not interfere with production. No change in the rate of $1.19 was
therefore necessary and none was made. -
Included here is evidence brought out on cross-examination
10 After being warned about her visits to the dispensary Hepler cut down on them but
still goes. This is because she has metal slivers , occasioned by her work, removed from
her fingers. .
n Hepler testified it was 1 in 200.
838 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
b. The May 31 meeting
At a meeting held on May 31, 1963, attended by Hepler, Lanier, and Vuncanon,
Vuncanon reminded Hepler that she had been away from her work station entirely
too much , that there was pressure to get out production , and that Hepler would
need to stay at her work area more in order to be able to get the production . Hepler
agreed with Vuncanon . Thereupon Vuncanon praised Hepler as a good employee
and Hepler told Vuncanon he had always been a good foreman to her.
c. The explanations concerning machine changes
On or about August 9 Supervisor Kauffman happened to notice that Hepler,
instead of using her fingertips to touch the microswitches which start the planishing
machine,12 was depressing the switches with part of her arms. Hence the hazard
existed that her hands were exposed to injury in the "pinch point" area because they
may not have been pulled back far enough. Because of this, Kauffman discussed the
situation with Motion Time Survey Analyst Bunting. It, was thereafter decided
between them to install safety switches whereby the buttons thereon were so recessed
in a cavity that the operator could reach them only by using fingertips, and could
not trip them by accidentally touching them with her arm. Then Kauffman directed
Foreman Vuncanon to cause this to be done over the weekend.
On August 13 Kauffman received a report that Hepler inquired whether a new
rate would be established because safety switches had been installed. So a meeting
was called for the purpose of explaining the matter to Hepler. On August 13, 1963,
Superintendent Martin, at a,meeting attended by Vuncanon, Lanier, and Hepler,
explained to Hepler why the microswitches were changed to safety switches and why
this did not affect the piece rate. He told her further that she could make- the rate
if she did not take excessive breaks from work and warned her to stop such exces-
sive breaks or he would "take some kind of action."
d. The profanity of September 24
On September 24, 1963, Vuncanon noticed that Hepler was gone from her work
area about 15 minutes When Hepler returned, Vuncanon asked if the machine
had broken down. Hepler replied that it had not, and asked why Vuncanon had
inquired. Vuncanon then said that he noticed Hepler's prolonged absence and won-
dered if Hepler had a problem. Hepler answered that she did have, and that it was
her period. Assuring her "that's all right," Vuncanon walked away. Nevertheless he
gave her a "contact slip," which is a written reprimand, for being away so long.
After Vuncanon left, Hepler spoke to Hilda Brower as recited in the next paragraph.
Hilda Brower is the Company's plant nurse. On September 24, 1963, about 3:30
p.m., she had occasion to be present in the punch press area of the plant. While
there she talked to some employees. Then, as Brower was proceeding through the
area, Hepler accosted Brower with the question, "Do you know what that god damn
George Vuncahon said to me? .... He asked me where I had been and I said I was
having my monthly and if he didn't believe me I'd show him." Hepler appeared
upset and spoke in a loud voice, but there is no evidence that any other employee
other than Shortsleeve overheard it. Brower claims she did not say anything in
reply. Immediately thereafter Brower informed Supervisor Lanier of this incident, re-
peating Hepler's words, but not Hepler' s name. Lanier asked Brower to identify the
employee and she did. This was subsequently reduced to writing on September 27:
The next day Hepler apologized for her remarks of the previous day to Brower,
adding that she "did not mean anything against" Brower. In reply Brower stated that
she wished Hepler had apologized the day before on the occasion of the profanity.
On September 24 Lanier immediately reported to Kauffman what Brower told her
and he said he would discuss it the next morning. The next morning Kauffman
interviewed Brower about it. Another female employee had been laid off a week or
two for profanity about a year before this.
e. Hepler's layoff on September 25
Hepler was called to a meeting in the forenoon of September 25. Earlier in the
day Supervisors Kauffman, Vuncanon, and Martin reviewed Hepler' s case and
" As heretofore noted, these switches are located one on each side of the operator and
the machine 's hammer cannot be activated unless both switches are pressed simultaneously.
By bringing the hands back to press the switches the hands are removed from the area
referred to as a "pinch point" or "any two parts coming together."
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT 839
decided to give Hepler a 1-week disciplinary layoff if the information reported to
them about Hepler was "confirmed." At this meeting Hepler was laid off a week
for the use of profanity toward a-supervisor. Also, she was again reminded of her
unsatisfactory conduct in visiting the restroom too often. Hepler justified her lan-
guage by insisting Vuncanon inquired into her personal matters. Hepler also claimed,
according to Vuncanon, who was present, they were riding her because she wore a
union badge, but she insisted that she "believed' in this" and would "fight for-it."
According to Martin, Hepler also mentioned she was a member of the Union, that
she worked for the Union and believed in it, and would stick to her conviction that
the Union was good. Martin replied that he respected the right of employees to
work with and for a union.
Concludings Findings as to Hepler
Preliminarily it is worthy of comment that the burden of proof to establish viola-
tions of law rests upon the General Counsel (Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., etc., 99
NLRB 610, 611), that being a member of a labor organization or engaging in activi-
ties on its behalf does not insulate an employee against employer control of produc-
tion and discipline.13 Guided by these standards I am of the opinion, and find, that
Respondent's treatment of employee Hepler has not been shown to contravene the
Act. More specifically, I find that neither the changes made on Hepler's machine
nor her layoff for a week were inspired, activated, or prompted by antiunion motives.
1. As to the changes in Hepler's operating procedures
It is my opinion, and I find, that the changeovers from levers to microswitchess and
from microswitches to safety switches were made as a matter of management judg-
ment that these methods of starting the machine represented improved and safer
methods of operating Hepler's machine. I accept Respondent's explanation of-the
necessity for these changes While Hepler may have suffered some diminution of
earnings as a result, this was a temporary situation which soon corrected itself; no
consistent loss of pay is discernible in the record. Hence I find that these changes
do not warrant a finding of either harassment or loss of earnings which may be
construed to flow from antipathy to or dislike for Hepler's prounion sympathies.
For the same reason I find that the changes in rates on Hepler's job, whenever made,
and the failure to change rates when the method of operating the machine was revised,
were dictated by management decisions and were not motivated by antiunion
considerations.
Nor do I find that the deceleration of the speed of Hepler's machine beginning
October 7, 1963, and the increased number of spot inspections added on March 23,
1964, were motivated by discriminatory reasons. Rather, I find that these two modifi-
cations in production procedures were instituted because Bunting, the time survey
analyst, considered them necessary. Thus I find that the slowdown lowered the
machine's speed to that originally called for by the rate set therefor; and the added
number of inspections was not so burdensome as to interfere with Hepler's earnings,
for they were performed during intervals in the cycle when the machine did not need
her guidance and she was momentarily free to spot check a finished bracket or target.
And Hepler's earnings, as-disclosed by the record, confirm that she did not suffer a
discernible reduction in earnings over a substantial period of time following these two
alterations in Hepler's operating procedures.
2. As to Hepler's layoff for 1 week
As found above, Hepler was laid off for I week beginning September 25, 1963. I
find that this layoff was imposed as a disciplinary measure because Hepler used
profanity the day before, that she was so informed, and that the reason given her was
neither a pretext nor a cloak to conceal a desire to harass or discriminate against her
for her union membership and activities. Admittedly Hepler engaged in profanity on
September 24, although the exact words are in dispute. It is not necessary to resolve
this particular conflict in the evidence. Admittedly she was told her layoff resulted
from the use of profanity. Hence it follows that she was laid off for cause. This is
action which Section 10(c) of the Act renders lawful, unless such layoff was seized
upon as-a pretext to punish her for her union activities.
But I am unable to find pretext. While it is true that long before September 24
Respondent had knowledge of Hepler's union activities, and I so find, it is also true
that Respondent had knowledge of the union activities of several other employees.
11 "Union activity did not confer immunity from discipline." Metals Engineering
Corporation, 148 NLRB 88.
840 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
These employees are specifically mentioned by name in the Union 's letter of Au-
gust 23, 1963, to Plant Manager Pace. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 42.) Yet no dis-
ciplinary action was taken against other union adherents , including Jewel Sheppard,
at whose home the first union meeting was held on May 28, 1963. The fact that
Hepler was disciplined, therefore, does not demonstrate a pattern of discrimination
against union members from which it may be inferred that a reason given for dis-
ciplinary action constitutes a pretext.
Nor do I find a pattern of discrimination or harassment of union members in the
reprimands given to employees Williams and Cranford, both union members, for using
profanity. While it is true that the record reveals that profanity was prevalent in the
plant, it also shows that Respondent objected to its use and sometimes did warn those
who resorted to it. In any event, it is patent that neither Williams nor Cranford were
active in the union movement and that their reprimand cannot be associated with their
being union members. At most it is coincidental that Williams and Cranford
happened to be union members.
Finally, I find it significant that Hepler was not suddenly laid off for an old offense
upon Respondent's acquiring knowledge of her union activities; rather, the action
against her was taken almost immediately after the offense occurred.14 Hence another
reason for laying the foundation for an inference of pretext is lacking. In this connec-
tion I have not overlooked the General Counsel's evidence, which I credit, that Fore-
man Vuncanon said he had orders to watch Hepler and therefore was under pressure.15
This may well mean that Hepler was under observation for her allegedly excessive use
of the restroom, for which she had been reprimanded on May 31, 1963, and again in
the fall of 1963. Of course Vuncanon's statement may have other connotations, one
or more of which may aid the General Counsel' s case. But the state of the record is
insufficient to show antiunion hostility in these remarks of Vuncanon. Nor have I
disregarded the other unfair labor practices found here. While these demonstrate a
dislike of the Union by Respondent, they fail to establish that Respondent unlawfully
discriminated against Hepler in suspending her for a week.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
Those activities of Respondent found to constitute unfair labor practices set forth
in section III, above , occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent set
forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in specified unfair labor practices,
it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Since the violations found do
not go "to the very heart of the Act" (N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532,
536 (C.A. 4) ), an order of great breadth is not warranted. Accordingly , the scope of
the order recommended will be of a type calculated to prevent recurrence of the illegal
acts found and like or related conduct.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
3. By coercively ( a) engaging in surveillance of employees at union meetings, and
(b) interrogating employees regarding their union membership , activities , and desires
and those of their fellow employees , Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
prohibited by Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not committed any other unfair labor practices ascribed to it by
the complaint.
1* Hepler's obscene language was uttered about quitting time on September 24, and she
was laid off the next morning.
111 do not credit Respondent 's contrary evidence.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT 841
RECOMMENDED ORDER
By reason of the above findings and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this
case, it is recommended that Respondent , its officers , agents, successors , and assigns
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees regarding their union membership, activi-
ties, and desires and those of their fellow employees.
(b) Coercively engaging in surveillance of its employees at union meetings.
(c) In any like or similar manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to. effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Post at its plant at Asheboro, North Carolina, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 11, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized agent of
Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily affixed. Respondent shall take reasonable steps to insure
that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the
date of receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith 17
It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects.
It is finally recommended that unless within the prescribed period Respondent noti-
fies said Regional Director, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing Recom-
mended Order, the National Labor Relations Board issue an Order requiring the
Respondent to take the aforesaid action.
18 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order"
shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals,
Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
11 In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be
modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date
of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees concerning their union
activities, membership, or desires or those of their fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of our employees at union meetings.
WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form , join, or
assist the below-named, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any or all such activities.
All our employees are free to become or remain, and to refrain from becoming or
remaining , members of International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, AUTOMATIC BLANKET PLANT,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1831
Nissen Building, 310 West Fourth Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Telephone
No. 724-8356, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions.