Gary Aircraft Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 15, 1965

151 N.L.R.B. 7 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 7
For the reasons discussed above, we determine that the dispute
should be settled in favor of the plant employees represented by the
Steelworkers. In making this determination we are assigning the
controverted work to employees represented by the Steelworkers and
not to that union or its members. Furthermore, our determination is
limited to the particular controversy that gave rise to this proceeding.
DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
Pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act, and upon the basis of the
foregoing, the Board makes the following determination of the
dispute.
1. Employees of United States Steel Corporation's Fairless Works,
in the production and maintenance unit currently represented by
Local 4889, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, are entitled
to perform the work of loading the Employer's cargo of semifinished
steel products into the Employer's ships at the Employer's Fairless
Works dock at Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania.
2. Accordingly, Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion, AFL-CIO, is not and has not been lawfully entitled to force or
require the United States Steel Corporation to assign the loading of
the Employer's cargo into the Employer's SS Columbia at the Em-
ployer's dock to members of said organization.
3. Within 10 days from the date of this Decision and Determina-
tion of Dispute, Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion, AFL-CIO, shall notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in
writing, whether or not it will refrain from forcing or requiring the
Employer, by means proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Act,
to assign the work in dispute to its members rather than to em-
ployees represented by Local 4889, United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO.
Gary Aircraft Corporation and International Association of
Machinists, AFL-CIO. Case No. 23-CA-177. February 15,
1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 11, 1964, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondent had engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam-
iner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support thereof.
151 NLRB No. 3.
8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Mem-
bers Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, Gary
Aircraft Corporation, San Antonio, Texas, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act was
heard before Trial Examiner George A. Downing in Victoria , Texas, on August 11
and 12, 1964, pursuant to due notice. The complaint, issued on June 5, 1964, based
on charges and amended charges dated March 25 and May 13 and 28, 1964, alleged
in substance that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and ( 3) of the Act by informing employees that it had selected em-
ployees for discharge because of their union membership and activities and by dis-
charging Lodovico Freier on March 13 because of his union membership and
activities .' Respondent answered , denying the allegations of unfair labor practices
and also denying that Leadman Andy Phillips, Jerry D. Lambert , and Lonnie G.
Coleman were its agents and supervisors.
Upon the entire record in the case , and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent, a Texas corporation with its principal office at San Antonio, Texas,
maintains a plant at Foster Field, Victoria, Texas, where it is engaged in the manu-
facturing and overhauling of aircraft components and aircraft overhauling for the
United States Air Force. During the course of its fiscal year from April 1962 to
April 1963, Respondent performed services for the Department of Defense (U.S. Air
Force) in an amount of $170,000; it made sales to or performed services for cus-
tomers outside the State of Texas in an amount exceeding $50,000, and it purchased
from extrastate sources goods or services also in an amount exceeding $50,000. Re-
spondent is therefore engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
'An allegation of surveillance was dismissed at the hearing on Respondent's motion,
joined in by the General Counsel, and an allegation of interrogation is now hereby dis-
missed, with the General Counsel's concurrence as stated in his brief.
GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 9
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and issues
Respondent employs some 250 production and maintenance employees in its plant
at Foster Field where it is engaged in the maintenance and reconditioning of C-54
aircraft for the United States Air Force. After some preliminary organizational
effort by IAM in November 1963 and January 1964, a general meeting of employees
was held on March 9 and was attended by some 14 employees An in-plant organiz-
ing committee was chosen , and on the following day the Union notified Respondent
by telegram that it was conducting an organizing drive and that Lodovico Freier,
J. W. McElvain , F. M. Carr, and Charles E. Ellis were members of its organizing
committee . On March 9 Respondent made a general reduction in force, terminating
some 61 employees in various departments , and on March 13 it terminated Freier
and 2 other employees.
The chief issue herein is whether Respondent was discriminatorily motivated in
terminating Freier or whether his termination was part of the reduction in force.
Subsidiary issues are whether Leadmen Lonnie G. Coleman, Jerry D. Lambert, and
Andy Phillips were supervisors within the meaning of Section 2 ( 11) and whether
Respondent is responsible for certain statements made by Leadman Phillips.
B. Leadmen as supervisors
As is typical of such borderline cases as leadmen, crew leaders, and working fore-
men, there were facets of the evidence here which pointed both in the direction of
employee status and in that of supervisory status. Except as discussed below, how-
ever, the evidence did not establish that the leadmen had or exercised any of the
supervisory powers listed in Section 2(11) of the Act. What is chiefly in issue under
the evidence is whether they responsibly directed the crewmembers, whether they had
and exercised authority effectively to recommend the transfer and discharge of em-
ployees, and whether their position was such as to identify them as representatives
of management in the eyes of the employees.
Of some 250 production and maintenance employees prior to March 9, more than
100 were employed in the tank sealing department under the general supervision of
Foreman Jack McCool. More than 60 of those worked on the day shift on 6 sepa-
rate crews, each of which was under a leadman, and the remainder worked on the
night shift under the supervision of a single foreman. Four of the crews worked
in the hangar, where McCool had his office and where he spent 80 percent of his
time, but the other two worked at the warehouse, a block or more away. Save for
the leadmen, there was no one in the supervisory hierarchy between McCool and
the employees on the day shift.
Specifically in issue was the supervisory status of Jerry i mbert, Lonnie Coleman,
whose crew worked at the warehouse, and Andy Phil ipl- s, whose crew-worked at the
hangar. Though Lambert did not become a leadrffa'n until after the events involved
herein, his testimony concerning the authority he exercised as leadman was relevant
to the issue of the status of leadmen generally.
The leadmen punched the timeclock and were paid at hourly rates like the other
employees, but they received substantially higher wages than all except the most
experienced crewmembers They also did a substantial amount of manual work,
though it generally consisted of the lending of a temporary hand and of demon-
strating to inexperienced employees how to do the job.2 Thus Coleman testified as
Respondent's witness that he averaged possibly 2 or 3 hours a day in helping out and
in showing employees how to do something, and that he walked from pair to pair
(of the two-man teams) "and tried to get things going." He spent the remainder of
his time in doing "paper work"; i.e., in taking care of the worksheets for the jobs,
the timecards, and the "squawk book," in which the inspectors listed all discrepancies
in the work.
Coleman testified further that McCool spent from 20 minutes to 2 hours at the
warehouse (McCool estimated his warehouse time at 20 percent), that McCool
would explain to Coleman what he wanted and would outline the work schedule,
and that it was up to Coleman to get the work done. Lambert testified similarly
that McCool gave him general instructions as to the work to be done, that he then
2 Freier testified without denial that Coleman and the other leadmen wore white shirts
and khaki pants , that the crewemen wore brown shirts and regular work clothes, and that
Coleman never became dirty, as did the crewmen , from working with the black compound
which was used on the job.
LO DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
assigned the duties to the crewmembers, and that he spent some 80 percent of his
time in assigning jobs and looking over the work of the employees and the remaining
20 percent on paperwork and in taking care of the "squawk book." As for Phillips,
Albert Beerwart testified that Phillips assigned most of the work to the men, making
some of the decisions himself, because there was no one else around to make them.
Beerwart also testified that Phillips made recommendations for raises and that he
"wrote out the papers" for the discharge of an employee and informed him he was
fired, though Beerwart did not know who had made the decision. Lambert testified
without denial that he recommended to McCool the transfer from his crew of Thomas
Beerwart and that McCool approved the transfer, and that he similarly informed
McCool he wanted to discharge one Frank Soto, that McCool approved, and that
he (Lambert) signed the termination slip specifying that he had initiated the dis-
charge action. Similar evidence concerning Coleman's participation in transfers and
discharges is summarized under section D, infra, dealing with Freier's discharge, as
is also evidence concerning Coleman's action in assembling and lecturing his crew
on the subject of union solicitation on the job.
CONCLUDING FINDINGS
As section 2(11) is to be read in the disjunctive, an employee qualifies as a super-
visor if he exercises any one of the powers there specified. West Penn Power Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 337 F. 2d 993 (C.A. 3), and cases there cited. Of course, the mere re-
sponsibility of making work assignments in a routine fashion does not make an em-
ployee a supervisor, nor the mere fact that he spends a portion of his time instructing
less experienced employees (id.). Here, however, the circumstances were such that
because of McCool's relative remoteness from the men, there was no one else around
for much of the time to make assignments or decisions or to direct the work, and
when those facts are coupled with the leadmen's responsibility for getting the job
done, the authority which the leadmen exercised was plainly lifted above the routine
class. Furthermore, a finding that the leadmen were not supervisors would mean,
of course, that McCool was the only supervisor over some 60-odd employees work-
ing in 6 separate crews and at 2 different locations, a clearly disproportionate ratio
of employees to admitted supervisors.
I also conclude and find on Lambert's undenied testimony and on the evidence
surrounding Coleman's participation in the transfer and discharge of Freier (sec-
tion D, infra) that the leadmen were authorized to make, and that they did make,
effective recommendations for the transfer and discharge of employees.
Finally, I conclude and find from all the evidence, including the participation of
the leadmen in initiating and in making discharges and including the employee
appeals to Coleman concerning Freier's union activities, that the leadmen occupied
a position in which they were identified as representatives of management in the eyes
of the employees.
I therefore conclude and find that Leadmen Coleman, Phillips, and Lambert were
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
C. Interference, restraint, and coercion
Albert T. Beerwart testified that on March 13, Leadman Phillips reported to him
that McCool had directed the discharge of Beerwart' s son , Thomas, but later in-
formed him that another employee had been chosen instead. When Beerwart in-
quired whether Thomas was to have been discharged because of his union activities,
Phillips nodded affirmatively. Corroborating testimony was given by Leo Franklin.
Thomas Beerwart testified that when Phillips informed him he was to be dis-
charged, he asked the reason, and that Phillips replied that McCool said that Beerwart
was a union agitator but that Phillips told McCool that Beerwart was not.
Phillips was not called as a witness, and McCool's testimony contained no denial
of the statement allegedly attributed to him by Phillips.
I conclude and find that by Phillips ' statements that Thomas Beerwart had been
selected for discharge because of his union activities, Respondent interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act.
D. Discrimination-Freier's discharge
There is little dispute concerning the circumstances of Freier's discharge; only the
question of motive is in issue. Freier had worked on Leadman Wickham's crew
until Friday, February 28, when the crew was broken up. Freier applied to Leadman
Coleman for a transfer to his crew (as did Leadman Wickham and another em-
GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 11
ployee), and Coleman, who was familiar with Freier's work on an earlier job, chose
Freier, and McCool approved the transfer, despite the fact that Freier had shortly
before received a written reprimand concerning his job performance. Freier began
work on Coleman's crew on March 2 and was discharged on March 13.
In the meantime the Union's telegram of March 10 (see section A, supra) in-
formed Respondent that it was conducting an organizing drive and that Freier was
a member of the organizing committee. Actually, Respondent had prior knowledge
that Freier was engaged in organizing activities, for Coleman admitted on cross-
examination that shortly after Freier came onto his crew 3 two of the men com-
plained to him about Freier's solicitations to attend a union meeting and asked
Coleman to have Freier leave them alone. Coleman accordingly assembled the en-
tire crew and told them that if they talked about the Union, they should do so on
their own time.
The reduction in force on March 9 included 22 employees in McCool's depart-
ment, 4 of whom were in Coleman's crew and who were selected by McCool after
seeking Coleman's opinion as to the correctness of the selection. Coleman agreed
that McCool had made the best choices and did not suggest that Freier would be a
better choice for discharge than any of the four.
Freier testified that on March 13 Coleman informed him immediately after the
lunch hour, "I am going to have to let you go," stating as the reason that Freier was
the man with the least seniority on the crew and also the one with the least experi-
ence. Coleman exhibited to Freier a termination slip which recited that the cause
of termination was, "Work not up to Gary Aircraft standard for period of time
employed," and on the line marked "Termination initiated by," Coleman's name
appeared.
When Freier questioned the soundness of the cause assigned, Coleman indicated
unwillingness to talk about the matter, and when Freier suggested it might be easier
for Coleman if he left at once, Coleman agreed. On a subsequent trip to the plant
to pick up his toolbox , Freier questioned Coleman as to whether his union participa-
tion had anything to do with the discharge, but Coleman did not answer him.
Leadman Lambert testified, however, that about a week after Freier's discharge
(before Lambert became a leadman), he questioned Coleman as to why Freier was
terminated and Coleman informed him that McCool had heard Freier "talking
union" over at the warehouse and had said that Freier was going to have to go.
We turn now to Respondent 's evidence.
McCool testified that he was instructed by Production Superintendent Shadwick
on the morning of March 9 to terminate 25 of the employees in his department (out
of a total of 65 to be laid off); but because certain work in progress needed to be
completed, he obtained Shadwick's approval to terminate only 22 of the 25 and to
retain 3 until later in the week. One of his employees quit during the week, leaving
two to be laid off, and McCool notified Coleman on the morning of March 13 that
Coleman had to let one more man go and that Coleman should, "Think it over and
let [McCool] know." Coleman notified McCool just before the lunch period that
he thought Freier should be terminated because he "wasn't getting it" and had the
least seniority and the least experience on the crew. McCool thereupon directed
Coleman to make out the termination slip, and Coleman later informed him that
Freier was leaving immediately.
McCool testified that he had no discussion with Coleman regarding Freier's union
activities and did not know whether Freier in fact had engaged in union activity.
He denied ever telling Coleman he had heard Freier talking union in the warehouse
and denied telling Coleman that because Freier was talking union he would have to
let Freier go. McCool made no denial, however, of the statements attributed to him
by Phillips concerning Thomas Beerwart, summarized in section C, supra.
Coleman's testimony was in substantial accord with McCool's and was not in sub-
stantial conflict with Freier's testimony concerning the actual making of the dis-
charge. He testified in part that McCool told him to make out the termination slip
and to take care of the discharge , and that he specifically denied Freier 's suggestion
that he was being discharged because of the Union.
Coleman testified that he chose Freier originally over Leadman Wickham for
transfer to his crew because he knew of Freier's capabilities from working with him
on an earlier job, and that Freier was superior to Wickham in his ability to work and
3 As there is no evidence that Coleman knew of Freier's activities prior to that time,
Freier's testimony concerning a statement made by Coleman (and denied by the latter)
that Coleman was supposed to "get rid of" Freier after working him for a few days is
without value on the issue of discriminatory motivation
12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
could "work circles around" Wickham. As regarded seniority, Coleman admitted
that Freier had seniority plantwide over many members of his crew, including the
four who were terminated on March 9, all of whom had been on Coleman's crew
longer than Freier. But as for March 13, Coleman explained his choice of Freier
on the basis that Freier's attitude was poor and his seniority was less than that of the
other crewmembers. Indeed, Coleman went on to testify that Freier's attitude was
poor before he came to Coleman's crew, that Freier had been having trouble over
in the hangar, and that even after he came with Coleman he was slow and did a lot
of talking and "just wasn't as good as the rest of the men there." In the face of that
testimony, however, Coleman conceded that McCool had chosen correctly the four
men to be discharged on March 9.
Coleman also denied Lambert's testimony concerning their discussion of Freier's
discharge. I credit Lambert, however, because of the inconsistencies in Coleman's
explanations concerning Freier as above set forth and as later more fully adverted to
and because of the indirect corroboration which Lambert received from the undenied
statements concerning the basis on which McCool had originally chosen Thomas
Beerwart for discharge.
Concluding Findings
The burden was on the General Counsel, of course, to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence on the entire record that Respondent discharged Freier because of
his union membership and activities as alleged. W. C. Nabors, d/bla W. C. Nabors
Company, 89 NLRB 538, 540, enfd. 196 F. 2d 272 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 344 U.S.
865. Considering the case first as it was postured by the General Counsel's evidence,
a prima facie case was plainly made out that Respondent was discriminatorily moti-
vated in discharging Freier. Thus, on the heels of formal notification from the
Union that an organizing drive was underway and that Freier was on the Union's
committee, Respondent discharged Freier and simultaneously informed Thomas
Beerwart that he also had been selected for discharge because McCool considered
him a union agitator. Evidence that the motive was identical in Freier's case was
supplied by Lambert's testimony concerning Coleman's statements made to him a week
after Freier's discharge.
We turn then to the question whether Respondent's evidence was sufficient to over-
come the General Counsel's case, which otherwise clearly requires a finding that Re-
spondent discharged Freier because of his union membership and activities.
On analysis, however, Respondent's evidence falls far short of establishing its de-
fenses and, indeed, in certain respects tends to confirm the General Counsel's own
showing. That was particularly true of much of Coleman's testimony, who was
chargeable under Respondent's case with having made the selection for discharge and
who was entrusted with the actual handling of the discharge. To be noted at the out-
set was Coleman's admission of knowledge of Freier's union activities which reached
him sometime prior to the union meeting of March 9. Significant also was the fact
that at the time of the transfer a few days earlier, Coleman held Freier's capabilities
in high regard, having chosen him over a leadman, who generally excels his crew-
members in skill and seniority. Similarly, as late as the reduction in force on
March 9, Coleman did not question McCool's selection for discharge of four other
employees nor did he suggest that Freier should be substituted for any of the reasons
which he was to assign some 4 days later or later still as a witness on the stand. It is
plain that Coleman's later appraisal of Freier was inconsistent with his earlier one
and that if Freier's performance were as unsatisfactory as Coleman later attempted
to make it out to be, he would not have chosen Freier for transfer in the first instance
and would have recommended him to McCool for discharge on March 9 in the second
instance.
And because under Respondent's case it was Coleman who acted for it in choosing
Freier and in effecting his discharge, McCool's testimony is of no assistance in over-
coming the inconsistencies presented by Coleman's explanations. Thus, assuming the
bona fides of McCool's explanations for delaying until March 13 the completion of
the reduction in force, it was Coleman who made the selection and who carried
through the discharge action and it was Coleman alone who undertook to explain
the basis of his selection in the light of the earlier happenings. Furthermore, McCool
himself had chosen Thomas Beerwart to complete the reduction and had assigned
to Phillips in explanation the same ground (i.e., union activities) which Coleman
later assigned to Lambert in explaining Freier's discharge.
Respondent also points to the fact that it discharged none of the other three mem-
bers of the Union's organizing committee, and the General Counsel points in turn to
the fact that two of the three were not in McCool's department and that the third
GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 13
one, who was, quit the day before Freier's discharge. In any event, I find the fore-
going facts to be without significance, under all the evidence, on the issue of dis-
criminatory motivation.
I therefore conclude and find on the clear preponderance of the evidence on the
record as a whole that Respondent discharged Freier because of his union member-
ship and activities.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative
action which is conventionally ordered in such cases, as provided in the Recom-
mended Order below, which I find necessary to remedy and to remove the effect of
the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. For reasons
which are stated in Consolidated Industries, Inc., 108 NLRB 60, 61, and cases there
cited, I shall recommend a broad cease-and-desist order.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1).
2. By discharging Lodovico Freier on March 13, 1964, because of his union
membership and activities, Respondent engaged in discrimination to discourage
membership in the Union, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices proscribed by
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend that the Respondent,
Gary Aircraft Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in International Association of Machinists, AFL-
CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging or in any
other manner discriminating against employees in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Informing employees that they have been selected for discharge because of
their union activities.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees
in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist said Inter-
national Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Offer to Lodovico Freier immediate and full reinstatement to his former or
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by pay-
ment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned
from March 13, 1964, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings
during said period (Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 240), said backpay to be
computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per-
cent per annum. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
(b) Notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces
of the United States of his right to full reinstatement, upon application, in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of
1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or, its agents, for
-examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under this Recommended Order.
14 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(d) Post in its offices and plant at Foster Field , Victoria , Texas, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix A." 4 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by
the Regional Director for Region 23, shall , after being signed by Respondent's repre-
sentative , be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof , and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing , within 20 days from
the receipt of this Decision , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.5
4 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order"
shall be substituted for the words " the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" In the
notice If the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals,
the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words " a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order."
5 If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified
to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tion Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Association of Machin-
ists, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization , by discharging employees or
in any other manner discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT inform employees that we have selected employees for dis-
charge because of their union membership or activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization . to form, join, or assist
said International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
WE WILL offer to Lodovico Freier immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges , and make him whole for any loss of pay he may
have suffered as a result of our discrimination against him, in the manner pro-
vided in the Trial Examiner 's Decision.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or
remaining , members of the above -named or any other labor organization.
GARY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative) (Title)
NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon applica-
tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act of 1948 , as amended . after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 6617
Federal Office Building, 515 Rusk Avenue , Houston , Texas, Telephone No. Capitol
8-0611 , Extension 4271 , if they have any question concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions.