Franke's, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 10, 1965

151 N.L.R.B. 532 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, or any other concerted activities of our employees, by discriminating against them in regard to their hire or ten- ure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with reprisals for union, or other, con- certed activities. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by the provisos in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. To the extent that we have not already done so, WE WILL offer Raymond Hintlian, Roger LeClair, Donald Washburn, Richard Fitton, Ronald Goulet, and Roger Pigeon immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substan- tially equivalent positions, and make them whole, together with Alton Chase, for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining , members of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. THE GREIF BROS. COOPERAGE CORP. (SEYMOUR & PECK DIVISION), Employer. Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative ) ( Title) NOTE.-We will notify any of the above -named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office , 24 School Street , Boston , Massachusetts , Telephone No. 523-8100 , if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Franke's, Inc. and Hospital-Hotel-Motel , Restaurant Employees Union , Local 200, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartend- ers International Union, AFL-CIO. Case No. 26-CA-1821. Marche 10, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On December 7, 1964, Trial Examiner Samuel M. Singer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, 151 NLRB No. 62. FRANKE'S, INC. 533 as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) which had been alleged in the complaint, and recommended dismissal as to them. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief to that part of the Trial Examiner's Decision which recommended dismissal of allegations of the complaint. Respondent then filed a brief in answer to the exceptions and brief of the General Counsel. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in con- nection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,l conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recommended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent Franke's, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. It is further ordered that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed with respect to any alleged unfair labor practices other than those found by the Trial Examiner. 1 The General Counsel excepted to the credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner. It Is the Board 's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions as to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Such a conclusion is not warranted here. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F. 2d 362 (C.A. 3). TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case was heard before Trial Examiner Samuel M . Singer at Little Rock, Arkansas, on August 5, 1964, pursuant to charges and amended charges filed May 20, June 11, and June 19, 1964 , and a complaint issued on June 24, 1964. The com- plaint alleges that Respondent (herein sometimes called the Company) violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act by discriminatorily discharging and refusing to reemploy an employee because of her union or concerted activity. The complaint also alleges that the Company violated Section 8 (a)(1) and (5) of the Act by dis- paraging the authority and responsibility of union stewards in connection with the performance of their duties under the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties. Respondent in its answer denied the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices . All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses . Briefs have been received from Respond- ent and General Counsel. 534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS AND CONCLSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, an Arkansas corporation with its office and principal place of busi- ness in Little Rock, Arkansas, is engaged in the operation of cafeterias in that city. During the past 12 months, a representative period, it had a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000 from the sale of merchandise. During the same period, it purchased and received goods valued in excess of $5,000 directly from suppliers located outside that State. Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material herein Respondent has been and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Hospital-Hotel-Motel, Restaurant Employees Union, Local 200, Hotel & Res- taurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO (herein called the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Disparagement of activities of union stewards 1. The March 18 incident Following a Board-conducted election, the Union on August 14, 1961, was cer- tified as collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in an appro- priate unit. In January 1962 the parties executed their first collective-bargaining agreement. Their current agreement, signed January 19, 1964, and in effect during the period here involved, provides for a four-step grievance procedure, the first step of which calls for presentation of grievances by a union steward to a supervisor. There are in all three stewards at the cafeteria here involved, one of whom (Lillie Mae Sloan) is the chief steward. On March 18, 1964,1 the first of the two incidents took place which allegedly dis- paraged the activity of a union steward. On that date Haile Davis, a janitorial employee, was assigned to work he thought was not part of his regular job. Davis contacted his steward, Sloan, and they discussed the matter with Irma Lipton, the kitchen supervisor. A heated argument ensued, during which Lipton asked Com- pany Vice President Lewis, who happened to be passing by, to join the group. Lewis asked Davis to describe the "extra added work" since he came on the job. As Davis proceeded with an enumeration, Sloan mentioned a task Davis had omit- ted. Lewis then angrily interrupted Sloan, telling her "to shut her big mouth" so that they might accomplish something. The argument continued until Lewis directed Davis and Lipton to go to the office to settle the problem with W. J. Franke, the company official in charge of personnel and grievance negotiations. The foregoing findings are based on substantially undisputed evidence. Sloan testified, however, that in course of the discussion, Lewis said to Davis, "You and Mrs. Lipton come to the office and we will straighten this out with Mr. Franke. But don't bring Lilly [Sloan] because we will not get anything accomplished with her around." Sloan then told Davis, "if I were you, I wouldn't go to the office without a steward"; Davis agreed not to go without one. Sloan further testified that at a later point Lewis told Lipton, "You don't have to talk to this girl [Sloan]." Lewis denied telling Davis not to bring Sloan with him to Franke's office, explaining that he neither suggested that she go nor that she remain behind. However, he admit- ted hearing Sloan direct Davis not to go to the office without a steward. He also denied telling Lipton not to talk to Sloan but admitted telling Lipton that she "didn't have to put up with this stuff." Davis quit his job at the end of that day (March 18), without going to Franke's office or otherwise further attempting to process his grievance. Davis indicated at the hearing that the described incident was a factor in his decision to leave. At a meeting between the Union and the Company the next day (March 19), Respondent raised, among other things, the question of the stewards' authority to interfere with 'Unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to 1964. FRANKE'S, INC. 535 the supervisors' work.2 Also discussed was the Union's request to return Davis to his job. Shortly thereafter Respondent recalled Davis but the latter left within 10 days for reasons apparently unconnected with the March 18 episode. In the light of the whole record, I credit Sloan's testimony that in course of the discussion of Davis' complaint on March 18, Lewis told Davis not to "bring" Sloan along in further processing the grievance with Franke. Lewis admittedly told Sloan "to shut her big mouth" when he apparently was provoked by what seemed to him to be her meddlesomeness, although in reality she was doing no more than what she thought her job as steward required. The circumstances indicate the likelihood that Lewis told Davis to go to Franke's office without Sloan as testified by Sloan. 2. The April incident About the middle of April, Supervisor Lipton discovered a food theft in the cafe- teria kitchen, and she thereupon told employee Robbie Cole to watch for food steal- ing. Cole checked with Union Steward Sloan as to whether she was required to do this. Sloan told Cole that "it wasn't [her] job to watch." Lipton later approached Cole and, according to Cole, asked "what did I tell Lilly Mae for, because Lilly Mae wasn't a supervisor and she wasn't nothing up there." Cole answered that Sloan was her union steward, but Lipton said that "she and Mr. Franke was my boss and Lilly Mae wasn't nothing up there." Lipton did not testify about this incident. I credit Cole's testimony as above summarized. 3. Conclusions regarding Respondent's conduct toward the stewards Respondent does not dispute the well-settled proposition that the Union, through its stewards, has the right to be present at adjustment of employee grievances and to handle them for grieving employees.3 It contends that Vice President Lewis did not direct Davis, the grieving employee, to refrain from processing his grievance through Steward Sloan, a contention based solely on Lewis' testimony. Having rejected Lewis' testimony on this point and having instead credited Sloan's, I find that Respondent failed and refused to deal with the Union by directing, inviting, and encouraging an employee to deal directly with it, without the presence of a union representative, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. I further find that Respondent's conduct also constituted interference with the right of such employee to exercise his statutory right to be represented by the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1). See Morris Harris et al., d/b/a Union Manufacturing Company, 95 NLRB 792, 793; J. R. Simplot Company, 145 NLRB 171; U.S. Automatic Corpora- tion, 57 NLRB 124, 132-135. As further found, about the middle of April employee Cole consulted Steward Sloan as to whether she had a valid complaint concerning a task assigned her. Supervisor Lipton asked Cole why she went to Sloan, remarking that Sloan "wasn't nothing up there." Lipton repeated this remark after Cole explained that Sloan was her steward. I find that Lipton's remarks, considered in the context of Respondent's conduct respecting the handling of the March 19 incident previously discussed, constituted interference with the right of an employee to file a grievance through the Union and a disparagement of the Union and its steward, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. By its statements and conduct Respondent conveyed the impres- sion to employees that it did not look with favor upon exercise by its employees of the right to consult with their union representative respecting grievances. In making the foregoing findings, I am not unmindful of the background in which the two incidents occurred. As Respondent points out, the record shows that the It appears that Respondent had been concerned even before the March 19 incident as to the manner in which the stewards had been performing their functions. At a meeting between the Union and Respondent on March 12, the Union assured Respondent that the supervisors were not required to discuss changes in employees' work schedules with the stewards. 3 The "union's statutory right to be present at the adjustment of grievances . . . Is a recognition of the Union's continued interest, as the bargaining representative, in the proper administration, interpretation, and application of the terms of its contract as well as in the other terms and conditions of employment affecting the whole plant." Bethlehem Steel Company, 89 NLRB 341, 342, reversed on other grounds, 191 F. 2d 340 (C A.D.C ). See also Hughes Tool Company, 104 NLRB 318, 327-328. Moreover, the collective agree- ment herein expressly authorizes the Union's stewards to attend to adjustment of grievances. 536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Company had been concerned about what it regarded as encroachments by the stew- ards on managerial prerogatives in assigning jobs. Be that as it may, the issue is not whether the stewards intruded upon managerial prerogatives but whether the employees had the right to consult the stewards regarding their work duties and to invoke their assistance in processing grievances if such procedure appeared to them warranted. Nor is it controlling whether the employees' grievances were meritori- ous or not. The "wisdom or unwisdom of the men, their justification or lack of it" (N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 334) did not defeat their right to engage in protected concerted activity. See N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9, 16; N.L.R.B. v. Solo Cup Company, 237 F. 2d 521, 526 (C.A. 8). B. The "discharge" of Helen Sutton 1. The facts Helen Sutton was hired by Kitchen Supervisor Irma Lipton on February 17 or 18 as a part-time saladmaker to work 4 days a week during the absence of Clara Sadler, a regular employee on 90-day maternity leave. Sutton testified that during her interview Lipton told her that if extra help was needed Sutton could work a full 6-day week. According to Sutton, Lipton also told her that "if she worked out all right" she "might replace" employees on vacation in the summer. On May 3, upon receiving word that Sadler was expected to return from leave, Lipton told Sutton that she would be terminated on May 10. The next day, May 4, Sutton left, telling Lipton that she "just didn't want to work any more after that." 4 General Counsel contends that Sutton, although admittedly hired as a temporary part-time employee for an approximate 3-month period during Sadler's absence, would have been given full 6-day week employment and also vacation work, if it had not been for her affiliation with the Union. Respondent contends that Sutton turned out to be a slow, poor worker, that it had decided long before the expiration of the 90-day period not to keep her longer than needed, and that her union affilia- tion had nothing to do with her termination. General Counsel's position rests primarily upon the testimony of Sutton. Sutton testified that after 2 weeks on the job, Lipton told her that "my work was wonderful and I was doing a good job." Elaborating, Sutton testified: She [Lipton] told me that I was doing all right, and if the rest of them would do their work as well, that her job would be light indeed. And she told me if I didn't join the union that she would let me work six days, and the vacations and then after that she would let me work on something else, give me a steady job in the kitchen. I told her I had already joined Local 200 in February. Sutton also testified that on another occasion she overheard Lipton tell another employee (Mrs. Wolinski) that she "didn't see why all the women wanted to join the Union, that they lost their meals and their uniforms and they were getting 20 cents an hour more than any cafeterias in town paid." According to Sutton, Lipton first mentioned the subject of her termination 2 weeks after Easter. Lipton at that time told her that Sadler had informed her that she wanted to return to work, without specifying the return date. Lipton asked Sutton to start looking for another job. When Sutton asked if a week's notice was enough, Lipton replied that it was, indicating that she need not give her any notice at all. Further according to Sutton, on May 3 Lipton called her attention to the fact that the Marion Hotel had advertised for help, but Sutton remarked that she "could get my own job." 5 Later that day, Lipton formally notified Sutton that she would be terminated as of May 10. As already noted, Sutton decided to leave the next day, May 4. Lipton testified that although at the beginning of Sutton's employment she felt that Sutton "was doing all right" and she so informed Sutton when the latter asked about her work, she (Lipton) thereafter concluded (2 weeks after Sutton was on the job) that Sutton was an unsatisfactory employee; and that she so reported to Maylinda Jones, Respondent's office manager.6 Lipton explained that Sutton was "slow" (i.e., consistently late in preparing salads for the counter) and could not remember her work assignments. According to Lipton, she reported the situation to Vice Presi- d Sadler in fact returned to work on May 13 or 14. 5 Sutton testified that subsequently (at the end of August) she worked at the Marion as a waitress. Jones corroborated Lipton's testimony on this. FRANKE'S, INC. 537 dent Franke (in charge of personnel) 60 days after Sutton's employment,7 recom- mending to Franke, however, that they retain Sutton until Sadler returned from leave because they had been unable to find a replacement; and that Franke instructed her "to be sure" not to keep her beyond the 90-day trial period if she was unsatisfactory.8 Franke corroborated Lipton's testimony on this point.9 Lipton acknowledged that Sutton had spoken to her about additional work; namely, vacation work and regular or permanent employment. According to Lipton, she told Sutton that "it was very seldom an employee quit" and this "would be the only way she could have a permanent job"; 10 and that the vacations (which she discussed with her in March) were "too far off." 11 Lipton also acknowledged dis- cussing the Union with Sutton on one occasion. Although on direct examination she could not recall how the matter arose, on cross-examination she testified that the subject was prompted by Sutton's remark about the opening of a regular job in another department. According to Lipton, Sutton quoted Union Steward Sloan that "there was a job opening downstairs on the counter for a meat cutter." Lipton testi- fied, "I told her I didn't have anything to do with that. And she said, well, she needed a permanent job and they had thought maybe she could do the meat cutting, and that is when I said, `Well, if you are not sure of a permanent job and you don't have- Why don't you wait before joining the union.' And she said, `I have already joined the union."' Lipton explained that at the time of this conversation (March), "We were [already] planning to ?et her go as soon as we could replace her." 2. Conclusions regarding "the discharge" Based on the foregoing and the entire record, I conclude that the preponderance of evidence does not support the allegation of the complaint that Respondent discrimi- natorily discharged and refused to reemploy Sutton because of her union or concerted activity. As appears from the recitation of facts, General Counsel's affirmative position that Respondent discriminated against Sutton rests largely upon Sutton's testimony that 2 weeks after she was hired, Supervisor Lipton told her that if she did not "join the union" she would give her full-time employment, as well as vacation work during the summer. Considering the circumstances leading to Sutton's termination and the self- interest of Sutton in the outcome of the proceeding, as well as the comparative demeanor of Lipton and Sutton, I cannot credit this testimony. It seems to me unlikely that Lipton, who impressed me as an astute supervisor, overtly made such damaging and uncalled-for admission. In my view, the more reasonable explanation is, as Lipton testified, that in discussing with Sutton the availability of the meatcutter job about which she learned from Union Steward Sloan, Lipton suggested that Sutton defer joining the Union until she obtained the job, knowing full well that her prospect for a permanent position at Respondent was nil. In the circumstances , I credit Lipton's testimony that she did not promise Sutton full-time and vacation work if 7 According to customary procedure , Respondent reviews the work of new employees after 60 days. 8 Respondent considers employees with less than 90 days of employment as "proba- tionary employees." Under the collective agreement between Respondent and the Union, the Company may discharge such employees at will, without submitting the propriety of the discharge to the grievance procedure. General Counsel called Lucille Charles, who had worked with Sutton part of the time, to corroborate Sutton's testimony that Lipton had praised Sutton's performance, and to rebut Lipton's testimony that she ( Charles ) had complained about Sutton 's work. Charles recalled one occasion when Lipton told her (Charles ) that she "liked " Sutton's work. Charles was not entirely forthright in her testimony . She admitted on cross- examination that Lipton "don't discuss anything like that [ other employees' work] with me." Moreover , she was quite vague and uncertain as to the period in Sutton's employ- ment when Lipton allegedly spoke to her favorably about Sutton's work, placing it at one point as "the 1st of March," which would coincide with the period (the first 2 weeks of Sutton 's employment ) when Lipton herself felt , as she testified , that Sutton "was doing all right." 10 Lipton testified that no openings were "in sight at the time," and that, in any event, other part-time employees with more seniority were in line for such jobs . At the time of her discharge , Sutton was the most recently hired salad girl. "Lipton testified that the first vacation scheduled for a salad girl was for Lucille Charles, on June 13. She stated that the vacation for the elevator operator , originally set for May 8, was later put off to July 13, and that both she and Sutton agreed that Sutton could not physically do this work. 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD she refrained from joining the Union.12 Nor did General Counsel adduce evidence that there existed full-time or vacation work for which Sutton was qualified. There is no credible evidence that any employee-let alone an employee whose position Sutton could fill-went on vacation before Sutton left Respondent on May 7.13 From all that appears, the situation here is one where an employee, hired as a temporary for the specific purpose of replacing another regular employee on leave, is separated when the regular employee returned to her former position. In this connection it is to be noted that Respondent has in its employ many union employees, that there is no evidence that Sutton was active in the Union, and that there appears to be no reason why Sutton-a nominal union member-should have been singled out for discriminatory treatment.14 To be sure, there are here, as in many discharges for cause, suspicious circumstances tending to indicate discriminatory conduct. Thus, as General Counsel points out, Lipton, although contending that Sutton was a slow and poor worker, at no time communicated this to Sutton. It should be noted, however, as indicated by Lipton, that Sutton was only a temporary employee-employed for a 3-month period-and Respondent apparently was content to keep her for a short period despite her short- comings, particularly in view of its apparent inability to locate a replacement. Further, there is evidence that Lipton on one occasion remarked to an employee that she failed to see why the employees wanted a union since they were treated better than other cafeteria employees in the area. Lipton's statement, however, constitutes no more than a privileged expression of opinion which does not, in my view, establish antiunion animus. For all of the foregoing reasons, I find and conclude that General Counsel has failed to meet the burden which is his, of establishing by a preponderance of the substantial credible evidence that Respondent's termination of and refusal to reem- ploy Sutton were discriminatorily motivated, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By encouraging, inviting, and directing an employee to process a grievance with- out the presence of a union steward, Respondent failed and refused to deal with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. Respondent by this and other conduct disparaged the Union's steward, and thereby also interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondent has not violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging and refusing to reemploy Helen Sutton. 12 Lipton's suggestion to Sutton that she defer joining the Union may well constitute Interference , restraint, and coercion, violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. However, since this was neither alleged in the complaint nor was It the thrust of any alleged violation, I make no finding in this regard 1a Although Lipton at one point generalized that "we have people taking vacations all through their anniversary date, all through the year," the record is silent as to whether any employee took vacation between February 17 or 18 ( the date Sutton com- menced work) and May 7. Apparently Lucille Charles was the first employee scheduled for vacation, June 13. 141 take official notice of the Board's decision in Franke'8 Inc, 142 NLRB 551, wherein the Board dismissed charges that Respondent had unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union as the majority representative of its employees in one of its cafeterias not here involved. The Board also dismissed charges that Respondent had unlawfully refused to reinstate strikers and that it had discriminatorily treated employees employed at the cafeteria here in question, noting "the absence from Respondent's conduct relating to the downtown cafeterias of any indication of union animus" (142 NLRB at 565, foot- note 16). The Board did find that Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a) (5), failed to give advance notice to the Union in putting into effect a change in policy affecting the status of an employee at the cafeteria here, and that it violated Section 8(a) (1) through the threats of the manager of another cafeteria to employees at that cafeteria. FRANKE'S, INC. 539 RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I recommend that Franke's Inc., its agents, officers, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to deal or bargain collectively with Hospital-Hotel-Motel, Restaurant Employees Union, Local 200, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Inter- national Union, AFL-CIO, as the majority representative of Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit, by encouraging, inviting, and directing employees to process their grievances without the presence of the Union's stewards or other duly designated representatives of the Union. (b) Undermining the authority of the Union by statements disparaging its stewards in the handling and processing of grievances. (c) Engaging in like or related conduct. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its cafeteria at 511 Louisiana Street, Little Rock, Arkansas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of the said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 26, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in wiiting, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith.16 It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects. 15 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 18In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read, "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to deal with Hospital-Hotel- Motel Restaurant Employees Union, Local 200, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, as the majority representative of our employees in the appro- priate unit by directing, inviting , or encouraging employees to process their grievances without the presence of the Union's stewards. WE WILL NOT make statements disparaging the Union 's stewards in the handling and processing of grievances by said stewards. FRANKE'S, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 746 Federal Office Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee, Telephone No. 534- 3161, if they have any question concerning this notice or if they have information that its provisions are being violated.