Faurecia Exhaust Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2008

353 N.L.R.B. 382 (N.L.R.B. 2008)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
353 NLRB No. 34
382
Faurecia Exhaust Systems, Inc. and International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America, UAW,
Region 2-B. Cases 8–CA–37192, 8–CA–37229,
and 8–CA–37354
September 30, 2008
DECISION AND ORDER REMANDING
BY CHAIRMAN SCHAUMBER AND MEMBER LIEBMAN
On April 2, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Ira San-
dron issued the attached decision, finding that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by announc-
ing a rule prohibiting employees from posting union lit-
erature in the production plant’s lunchroom without
management permission. The judge further found that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by warn-
ing and suspending employee Marvin Blue when Blue
asked two coworkers to obtain for him the names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers of unit employees, for
use in a union organizing campaign.1 The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with
this Decision and Order Remanding.2
1. The judge found that the Respondent’s production
supervisor, Jeff Lovejoy, violated Section 8(a)(1) by
“announc[ing] a rule” to employees, shortly after finding
a union leaflet posted in the assembly plant’s lunchroom.
Specifically, Lovejoy told employees that they could not
post union literature anywhere in the lunchroom without
the Respondent’s permission and that they could be dis-
charged if they disregarded this rule. The Respondent
excepts, and we find merit to those exceptions.

1 The judge dismissed allegations that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by prohibiting employee Guadalupe Montez from wearing a
union T-shirt, and Sec. 8(a)(3) by discharging Montez. No exceptions
were filed to these dismissals.
The Respondent, however, excepts to the judge’s failure to dismiss
the 8(a)(1) T-shirt allegation on the additional grounds that it was time
barred by Sec. 10(b). We agree with the judge that, in light of his dis-
missal of this 8(a)(1) allegation on the merits, it is unnecessary to ad-
dress the Respondent’s 10(b) defense.
2 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Schaumber and Member Liebman constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
At the time Lovejoy made the posting announcement,
the Respondent’s work force was governed by a series of
work rules set forth in an employee handbook that all
employees received when hired. One of the work rules
prohibits solicitation and distribution and states, in rele-
vant part, “[t]here shall be no distribution of literature by
employees in any work area at any time.” Another rule,
identified in the handbook as work rule 34, pertains to
“posting” and states that “[t]here shall be no posting of
notices, letters, or printed material of any description on
Company property by an employee unless approved by
the Human Resources department.”
In finding that Lovejoy’s statement violated Section
8(a)(1), the judge applied the Board’s standard for de-
termining whether workplace no-distribution rules are
lawful. The complaint, however, did not allege an
unlawful prohibition against distribution of union litera-
ture; nor is there evidence that Lovejoy said anything to
employees about their right to distribute union literature.
Rather, the complaint alleged an unlawful posting prohi-
bition—specifically, that by “orally promulgating a rule
that employees could not post union literature or other
literature in the lunchroom . . . without seeking permis-
sion from Respondent’s management,” Lovejoy violated
Section 8(a)(1).
In accord with the complaint allegation, we have as-
sessed Lovejoy’s statement under the legal standard ap-
plicable to no-posting rules. Under this standard, an em-
ployer may lawfully prohibit the posting of union litera-
ture anywhere on its property, provided that it does not
engage in unlawful discrimination. Absent evidence of
discrimination, a rule requiring management permission
before posting is not unlawful. See Flamingo Hilton-
Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287, 287 (1999) (dismissing allega-
tion that respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining
a “policy requiring prior management approval before
any employee posts a written notice on the hotel’s prem-
ises”).
Here there is no evidence that the Respondent’s no-
posting rule was applied in a discriminatory manner.
Further, as the judge found, Lovejoy’s prohibition of
lunchroom postings was simply a “reiteration” of the
existing posting prohibition set forth in work rule 34, and
there is no evidence that the Respondent previously al-
lowed employees to post materials without management
permission. Finally, we reject the judge’s reliance on the
timing of the announcement—on the same day that the
Union first distributed flyers to employees—as demon-
strating an antiunion motivation. In this connection, the
announcement naturally coincided with the violation of
the preexisting and valid no-posting rule. For these rea-
sons, we find that Lovejoy’s statement to employees did
FAURECIA EXHAUST SYSTEMS 383
not violate Section 8(a)(1), and we shall dismiss this al-
legation.
2. In May 2007, the Respondent suspended employee
Marvin Blue and issued him a warning for the stated rea-
son that he violated several handbook rules by “persis-
tently and improperly pressur[ing] a number of other
employees to provide to [him] lists of employee names
and phone numbers.” Applying the legal analysis set
forth in Wright Line,3 the judge found that the suspension
and warning violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). For the
reasons set forth below, we find it necessary to remand
the 8(a)(3) allegations to the judge for further analysis
under Wright Line.
At the request of the Union, Blue began soliciting un-
ion support among employees in December 2006. The
Respondent stipulated that it immediately became aware
of Blue’s soliciting activity, and an internal management
email that month advised HR Director John Plenzler that
Blue was “beginning to call and harass many employees
while pushing the praises of the [Union].” There is no
evidence that the Respondent took any action against
Blue at this time in response to his union soliciting.
In April 2007, the Union asked Blue to obtain employ-
ees’ names, addresses, and phone numbers. Blue, in
turn, asked gap leaders Jennifer Samples and “Meechy”
to obtain this information for him because he believed
they sometimes worked in the office where the informa-
tion was kept.4 Samples reported Blue’s request to the
Respondent’s plant manager. The Respondent allegedly
concluded from Samples’ report that Blue was seeking to
surreptitiously circumvent the “personnel records” provi-
sion of the employee handbook, which assures employ-
ees that their “personnel information will not be released
to outside parties without [their] permission.” Accord-
ingly, the Respondent suspended and warned Blue, pur-
portedly because he engaged in conduct unprotected by
the Act.
Where, as here, an employer is charged with violating
Section 8(a)(3) by taking adverse action against an em-
ployee for engaging in Section 7 activity, the Board ap-
plies the test in Wright Line to determine whether the
violation has been established. Under Wright Line, the
General Counsel must first show by a preponderance of
the evidence that protected activity was a motivating
factor in the employer’s adverse action. If this is estab-
lished, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it

3 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
4 There are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that gap leaders are
employees, and not statutory supervisors.
Throughout much of his decision, the judge mistakenly refers to
Samples as Sales.
would have taken the same adverse action even in the
absence of the protected activity. See, e.g., SFO Good-
Nite Inn, LLC, 352 NLRB 268, 269 (2008).
Cases analyzing adverse action under Wright Line are
treated as presenting either a question of “dual motiva-
tion” or one of “pretext.” In a dual motivation case, the
“employer defends against a § 8(a)(3) charge by arguing
that, even if an invalid reason might have played some
part in the employer’s motivation, the employer would
have taken the same action against the employee for a
permissible reason.” Palace Sports & Entertainment,
Inc. v. NLRB, 411 F.3d 212, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2005). If the
employer cannot demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it would have taken adverse action against
the employee for the permissible reason, then its rebuttal
defense fails and a violation will be found. In a pretext
case, i.e., a case in which the “reasons given for the em-
ployer’s action are . . . either false or not in fact relied
upon . . . the employer fails by definition to show that it
would have taken the same action for those reasons, and
thus there is no need to perform the second part of the
Wright Line analysis.” SFO Good-Nite, supra, slip op. at
2. See also Rood Trucking Co., 342 NLRB 895, 897–
898 (2004).
Here, the judge found that the General Counsel satis-
fied his initial burden under Wright Line. That part of
the judge’s analysis is clear to us. What is not clear,
however, is the judge’s Wright Line analysis in rejecting
the Respondent’s rebuttal defense. Specifically, we can-
not discern whether it is based on a dual-motivation
analysis or a pretext finding.
As explained, the Respondent’s defense to the 8(a)(3)
allegation is that Blue engaged in statutorily unprotected
conduct, in disregard of a handbook rule that shields em-
ployees from unauthorized disclosure of their confiden-
tial personnel information, by surreptitiously attempting
in May to obtain employees’ names, addresses, and
phone numbers from individuals who were not author-
ized to release this information. The judge rejected this
defense by finding that Blue’s request for the employees’
contact information was protected. However, the judge
further found that:
[E]ven assuming arguendo that Blue’s conduct in seek-
ing employees’ names and phone numbers was unpro-
tected, the Company’s internal emails make it clear that
Respondent expressed hostility toward Blue for his un-
ion activity months previously. I have to conclude that
Respondent’s motive for disciplining Blue in May was
based at least in substantial part on his soliciting co-
workers to support the Union, activity that went back to
December 2006 and was undeniably protected. Ac-
cordingly, his suspension violated the Act, even assum-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD384
ing arguendo that his attempts to obtain employees’
names and phone numbers were unprotected.
By stating that Blue’s discipline in May was based “at
least in substantial part on his soliciting” activity in De-
cember, the judge seems to apply a dual-motive analysis
by indicating that the Respondent’s motive for disciplin-
ing Blue was based both on his allegedly unprotected
conduct in May and on his “undeniably protected” solic-
iting activity in December. Of course, the discipline
would not be unlawful under Wright Line if his conduct
in May was deemed unprotected and if the Respondent
established that it would have disciplined Blue for that
conduct regardless of his protected activity in December.
But having found a violation, the judge may have con-
cluded that the Respondent failed to make this required
showing.
Alternatively, the judge’s discussion could be read as
resting on a finding of pretext, i.e., that the Respondent’s
asserted reason for disciplining Blue—his May con-
duct—was “false or not in fact relied upon.” SFO Good-
Nite, supra, slip op. at 2. A possible finding of pretext
underpinning the judge’s analysis also is suggested by
the judge’s finding, elsewhere in his decision, that the
Respondent engaged in disparate treatment by disciplin-
ing Blue.
In sum, because we are unable to discern the precise
analytical basis for the judge’s conclusion that the Re-
spondent did not meet its Wright Line rebuttal burden of
demonstrating that Blue was lawfully disciplined, we
cannot determine at this time whether the judge correctly
found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) by
disciplining Blue. Therefore, we shall sever the com-
plaint allegation concerning Blue’s discipline, and re-
mand this issue to the judge. On remand, the judge
should explain which analytical framework under Wright
Line he meant to apply, reanalyze the 8(a)(3) allegation
under that analysis, and specify the evidence relied on in
reaching that conclusion.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by orally
promulgating a rule that employees could not post union
literature or other literature in the lunchroom without
seeking permission from the Respondent’s management.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint allegation
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by
suspending and warning Marvin Blue in May 2007 is
severed from this case and remanded to the administra-
tive law judge for further appropriate action consistent
with this decision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judge shall prepare
and serve on the parties a supplemental decision, after
which the provisions of Section 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules shall be applicable.
Rudra Choudhury, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael A. Snapper and Keith J. Brodie, Esqs. (Barnes &
Thornburg LLP), for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. The amended
consolidated complaint dated October 31, 2007, stems from
unfair labor practice (ULP) charges that International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW, Region 2-B (the Union or UAW)
filed against Faurecia Exhaust Systems, Inc. (Respondent or the
Company). The alleged violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) relate to unrepre-
sented production workers at Respondent’s Toledo, Ohio facil-
ity.
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Toledo, Ohio, on
January 15–16, 2008, at which the parties had full opportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence. I have duly considered the General Coun-
sel’s and Respondent’s helpful posthearing briefs.
Issues
Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by the fol-
lowing conduct against the named employees because they
engaged in union activity.1
1. Terminated Guadalupe (Lupe) Montez on March 27.
2. Suspended Marvin Blue on May 11, and issued him a
written warning on May 16.
Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) by the following
conduct.
1. In about late December 2006, by then Site Manager Jack
Caccioppo, orally promulgated, and since that time has main-
tained, a rule prohibiting temporary employees from wearing
union insignia clothing at work.
2. On that same occasion, by Caccioppo, orally warned
Montez about wearing union insignia clothing at work.
3. On May 16, by Human Resources (HR) Manager John
Plenzler (Plenzler),2 threatened Blue with termination if he
engaged in further union activity.
4. On about July 26, by Production Supervisor Jeff Lovejoy,
promulgated an overly-broad distribution rule, to wit, that em-
ployees could not post union literature in the lunchroom (or
breakroom) without management’s permission.
5. On that same occasion, by Lovejoy, threatened employees
with termination if they violated such a rule.

1 All dates hereinafter occurred in 2007, unless otherwise specified.
2 Not to be confused with Eric Plenzler, a supervisor at the facility.
FAURECIA EXHAUST SYSTEMS 385
Witnesses and Credibility
The General Counsel’s witnesses, other than undisputed
agents of Respondent it called pursuant to Section 611(c), were
Blue and Montez, and former employee Jeromy Finley.
Respondent called Caccioppo, Lovejoy, and Plenzler, as well
as quality engineer Bryan Kennedy and former gap leader Jen-
nifer Samples. Respondent has admitted the supervisory and
agency status of all of these individuals but Samples.
Credibility resolution is crucial in determining the merits of
the allegations. In making my credibility findings, I have con-
sidered witness demeanor, the plausibility of testimony, and the
evidentiary principle of corroboration. As to the last element,
both the General Counsel’s and Respondent’s cases were defi-
cient.
Thus, the General Counsel provided no corroboration of
Montez’ testimony that he wore a union T-shirt at work in De-
cember 2006, and that Caccioppo told him to remove or cover
it up; that he voiced prounion sentiment at a monthly employ-
ees’ meeting in March (attended by 11–12 employees, by his
account); or that he asked for and received permission to leave
early on March 23. According to Montez, Blue was among the
welders present at 2 p.m. that day when he asked Sales for such
permission,3 but Blue did not testify on the matter. This raises
the suspicion that Blue’s testimony would not have been cor-
roborative, and I therefore draw an adverse inference against
the General Counsel on this point. See Palagonia Bakery Co.,
339 NLRB 515, 538 (2003); Dalikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622,
622 (2001); International Automated Machines, 285 NLRB
1122, 1123 (1987), enfd. mem. 861 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 1988).
I rejected the General Counsel’s proffered affidavit of ex-
employee Michael Chaney,4 whom the General Counsel sub-
poenaed but was unable to locate. I found that its admission, in
the absence of its maker, would have been fundamentally unfair
to Respondent, especially when Respondent had terminated
Chaney for failing a drug test prior to the time he gave his
statement. In light of his discharge, he had a potential bias
against Respondent, about which Respondent would have had
no opportunity to inquire on cross-examination. Further, as I
noted on the record, the General Counsel chose to rest instead
of pursuing its option to seek subpoena enforcement in Federal
district court.
Even if the General Counsel were to successfully appeal my
ruling, the affidavit addressed only the events of March 23, and
did not touch on Montez’ contentions that he engaged in union
activity. Moreover, as to March 23, the affidavit (GC Exh. 23
at 2) stated that Montez asked Sales at about 11:20 a.m. for
permission to leave early, inconsistent with Montez’ testimony
that he asked for permission at 2 p.m. and then again at 2:30
p.m.
Conversely, Respondent did not elicit testimony from any-
one whom Blue allegedly “harassed” in about May by asking
them to obtain employee information for the Union, for which
he received a suspension and a warning. Notably, one of those
persons was Sales, whom Respondent called as a witness but
did not question about Blue.

3 Tr. 330.
4 Rejected GC Exh. 23.
For reasons to be stated, I do not find that Sales, a gap leader
at relevant times, was a statutory supervisor. Nevertheless, she
had firsthand knowledge of the incidents on which Respondent
based the imposition of discipline on Blue, and I conclude that
she would have been reasonably expected to testify for Re-
spondent about them. Respondent’s counsel’s decision not to
question Sales regarding Blue’s activities raises the suspicion
that her testimony would have been unfavorable to Respondent,
and I therefore draw an adverse inference against Respondent
on the matter. See Palagonia Bakery Co., supra; Dalikichi
Sushi, supra; International Automated Machines, supra.
I recognize the well-established precept that credibility find-
ing is not an all-or-nothing proposition; witnesses may be found
partially credible, since merely because a witness is discredited
on one point does not automatically mean that he or she must
be discredited in all respects. Dalikichi Sushi, supra at 622;
Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 182 NLRB 796, 799
(1970). Instead, the trier of fact may appropriately weigh the
witness’ testimony with the evidence as a whole and evaluate
its plausibility. Golden Hours, supra at 798–799; see also
MEMC Electronic Materials, 342 NLRB 1172, 1200 fn. 13
(2004).
I now turn to the credibility of the two alleged discrimina-
tees. Montez was not a credible witness, even aside from lack
of corroboration. His testimony was often confusing, contra-
dictory, or implausible, and even evasive, especially as to the
events of March 23 that formed the sole basis for his termina-
tion.
He first testified that on March 23, he had a conversation
with Sales at 2 p.m., in which he requested and received per-
mission to leave early. However, he subsequently testified that
she ignored him when he asked at 2 p.m., and that he had a
second conversation with her at 2:30 p.m.
His testimony that he was finished with all of his work when
he asked her to leave at 2 p.m. was contradicted by his later
testimony that he returned to his work area to “double-check”
whether everything was done. In this regard, he testified that
after the 2 p.m. conversation, he mopped the floors. He
equivocated on why he performed this work, and his answers
were conflicting. He stated that he did it voluntarily and that it
was not part of his regular job assignments, yet he also testified
that Sales assigned employees to mop the floors and that “I had
to mop the floor . . . before I left.”5
Finally, as to March 23, timecard records show that he
punched out at 2:19 p.m.,6 contradicting his testimony that he
spoke to Samples at 2:30 p.m.
I find implausible his testimony that Sales totally ignored
him when he asked to leave early at 2 p.m. and that she rou-
tinely ignored him when he asked her questions. Also implau-
sible and stilted was his account of the March monthly employ-
ees’ meeting, at which he allegedly engaged in the following
dialogue with Caccioppo. The latter asked, “Do you really
think we need a union here as good as we’re going?” and Mon-
tez replied, “Yes, I think it would be a good idea to have a un-

5 Tr. 335.
6 See R Exh. 7. The parties so stipulated. Tr. 482.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD386
ion.”7 This testimony strikes me as self-serving and far-
fetched, particularly in light of Montez’ averment that in De-
cember 2006, Caccioppo warned him against wearing a T-shirt
with union insignia.
I further find suspect his testimony that on the one day he al-
legedly wore a union T-shirt at work, he “just simply forgot”8
for the first time to wear the employer-issued orange vest that
he was required to have on at all times in work areas.
Finally, Respondent’s Exhibit 2 is a written warning dated
March 5 that Montez received. At his termination interview on
March 26, he told Plenzler that he had no prior reprimands.
When asked on cross-examination why he had said this, Mon-
tez replied that he had not recalled the incident, hardly believ-
able when it occurred earlier in the same month.
Accordingly, I do not credit Montez where his testimony
conflicted with that of Respondent’s witnesses, Samples, in
particular.
In contrast, Blue was generally credible and consistent, and I
do not doubt his honesty, despite his lack of precise recall, es-
pecially as to the specifics of everything Lovejoy said at the
July employees’ meeting in the lunchroom. As was the case
with Finley, his testimony blurred the distinction between so-
licitation and distribution. However, I do not expect rank-and-
file employees to be cognizant of the nuances of the law per-
taining to distinctions between the two types of activity.
Sales was Respondent’s only witness who was directly in-
volved in the underlying situations that led to Montez’ termina-
tion and Blue’s suspension. As to the events of March 23 per-
taining to Montez, Sales appeared candid and readily answered
questions posed to her. I do not believe that she would have
fabricated an incident to use against him, and I credit her ver-
sion of what occurred over his.
All of Respondent’s other witnesses were admitted supervi-
sors and agents, and I have evaluated their credibility in light of
what I have stated above. They were generally consistent, with
one exception. Both Plenzler and Caccioppo testified that the
former was the final decisionmaker regarding Montez’ termina-
tion. On the other hand, a document that Lovejoy prepared
after his termination meeting with Montez indicates that
Lovejoy made the decision.9
Facts
Based on the entire record, including witness testimony,
documents, and the parties’ stipulations, I find the following
facts.
Respondent, a Delaware corporation and subsidiary of a
business enterprise headquartered in France, has an office and
place of business in the facility. Respondent has admitted ju-
risdiction, and I so find.
The facility, which operates in conjunction with Respon-
dent’s plant in Troy, Ohio (Troy West or TW), receives unas-
sembled components for exhaust systems from TW, assembles
them, and then ships them out to customers, in particular,
Chrysler and Dodge. As reflected in the organizational chart,10

7 Tr. 293.
8 Tr. 382.
9 GC Exh. 17.
10 GC Exh. 2.
TW is a parent plant with overall authority over the facility.
Thus, HR Manager Plenzler, whose office is at TW, has re-
sponsibility for hiring, new employees’ orientation, termina-
tions, and other normal HR functions at both plants. The pro-
duction employees’ handbooks at each are identical. All per-
manent production employees are issued copies of the hand-
book and acknowledge receipt. The parties stipulated that at all
times material, the provisions in the 2007 handbook (the hand-
book)11 applied, including work rule provisions (work rules).
The production or hourly employees at the two plants are not
represented by a labor organization, in contrast to some of Re-
spondent’s other locations. Including temporary employees,
TW has a little less than 300 production or hourly employees,
and the facility has about 36. Temporary employees work side-
by-side with regular employees and are treated the same as far
as assignments and job duties.
Both plants have two categories of production employees:
welder and material handler (or sequencer). Welders, who are
higher paid,12 work on an assembly line, where they weld com-
ponents for exhaust systems and perform related functions; and
material handlers receive, move, and pack products, largely in
the “supermarket,” the area where materials are kept.
At times material, Caccioppo, as site manager, was the high-
est-ranking manager at the facility. Each of the three shifts had
a production supervisor and a gap leader, and approximately six
welders and four material handlers. On first shift, Lovejoy was
the supervisor and Sales the gap leader. The first shift also had
a maintenance person. In addition, two salaried people worked
in the office, one of whom was quality engineer Bryan Ken-
nedy.
I. GAP LEADER SALES’ STATUS
The job description of a gap leader generated by Respon-
dent’s high-level management beyond Ohio essentially de-
scribes lead person-type functions.13
Caccioppo was the sole witness to testify about gap leader
functions at all times relevant, and I credit his following unre-
butted testimony. Gap leaders were paid at the welder rate plus
30 cents an hour. Their responsibilities were to train new em-
ployees, organize the activities of the production line, assign
people to specific tasks, and monitor standardized work proc-
esses. They had no role in determining how many hours a shift
would work or how many employees would be needed, or in
authorizing overtime. They did not fill in for absent shift su-
pervisors; a role that Caccioppo or other supervisors performed.
If gap leaders observed any performance problems, they con-
ferred with supervisors, who determined the course of any fur-
ther action. In this regard, when Sales concluded that Montez
had breached company policy on March 23, she reported it to
Lovejoy, the shift supervisor, who decided what steps to take
next.
For the most part, welders had preset rotation schedules and
rotated every 1–2 hours. Gap leaders did have occasion to

11 GC Exh. 3.
12 Welders were paid about $15 an hour; material handlers started at
$12 an hour.
13 R. Exh. 5. Compare, job description of “production supervisors,”
R. Exh. 6.
FAURECIA EXHAUST SYSTEMS 387
make reassignments if an employee was absent or had to leave
early, based on their assessment of the capability of individual
employees. However, welders and material handlers were
trained to perform all the functions of their respective positions,
and only new employees might have been unable to do so.
The party asserting that an employee has supervisory status
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act has the burden
to establish it by a preponderance of evidence. Kentucky River
Community Care, 532 U.S. 706, 710–711 (2001); Masterform
Tool Co., 327 NLRB 1071, 1071 (1999); Chevron U.S.A., 309
NLRB 59, 72 (1992).
Sales’ only potential exercise of supervisory authority would
have been in her direction of employees. However, in order to
conclude that direction amounts to supervisory responsibility,
the record must show that the putative supervisor has the au-
thority to direct work and take corrective action, if necessary,
and will suffer adverse consequences if he or she does not take
such action. Oakwood Health Care, 347 NLRB 404, 411
(2006). As the Board has stated in recent decisions, supervi-
sory direction entails the exercise of independent judgment, as
opposed to being merely routine or clerical. Network Dynamics
Cabling, 351 NLRB 1423, 1425 (2007); Alstyle Apparel, 351
NLRB 1287, 1287 (2007).
Here, welders and material handlers, with the exception of
new employees, were capable of doing all jobs in their respec-
tive classifications. If a gap leader had problems with an indi-
vidual employee, he or she went to the shift supervisor, who
decided what action to take.
Accordingly, I conclude that Sales did not possess authority
to direct within the meaning of Section 2(11) or possess any
other indicia of supervisory authority. Therefore, she was not a
supervisor under the Act.
II. GUADALUPE MONTEZ
On August 30, 2006, Montez began working as a temporary
employee, as a quality inspector who inspected mufflers com-
ing off the welders’ line.
Montez was represented by the UAW when he worked for a
previous employer. Starting in late December 2006, Montez
testified, he talked to Blue and other employees in favor of the
Union approximately every other day. However, I credit Blue’s
testimony that he was the one who initiated discussions of the
Union with Montez. No other witnesses confirmed that Montez
ever spoke to them on the subject, and there is no direct evi-
dence that Respondent knew of any such conversations. On a
daily basis, Montez wore a wristwatch from the “Platinum
Club,” a UAW-sponsored community organization.14
According to Montez, he wore a union T-shirt to work on
one occasion, in late December 2006.15 Although Montez testi-
fied that other employees were present when Caccioppo told
him to take it off or cover it up, no witnesses corroborated his
account. I also find stilted and implausible Montez’ account of
what was allegedly said, to wit, that Caccioppo stated, “You
know you’re not supposed to be wearing that here;” Montez
asked why not, saying it was only a T-shirt; and Caccioppo

14 See GC Exh. 20, which presumably shows the watch.
15 See GC Exhs. 20 and 21, photographs of the shirt.
then stated, “No, it’s more than a T-shirt; it’s a UAW T-
shirt.”16 I do not believe that Caccioppo would have been so
clumsy in expressing antiunion sentiment. Montez offered no
reason why he all of a sudden decided to wear a union T-shirt
to work on that particular occasion, when he had never worn it
at the facility before, and the record is devoid of any surround-
ing circumstances explaining his timing. Finally, Montez con-
ceded on cross-examination that on the day in question, he was
not following the requirement that he wear a company-issued
orange vest in his work area at the time when Caccioppo ap-
proached him.
Caccioppo denied that he ever saw Montez wear a union T-
shirt at the facility. For the above reasons, I credit his denial
and do not find as a fact that Montez did so.
When Montez started, Kennedy, his supervisor, stated that if
he did a good job, he could become permanent. Montez was
made a permanent employee on February 19 as a first-shift
material handler under Supervisor Lovejoy. One of his main
responsibilities was to ensure that the welders’ line was fully
stocked, and he spent much of his time in the supermarket.
Respondent, usually through Caccioppo, conducted manda-
tory monthly meetings for employees, both permanent and
temporary, for each shift. Montez testified that at the monthly
meeting held on March 1, which he attended with about 10–11
other employees, the subject of the Union came up. No other
witness corroborated Montez’ account of what was said. His
description thereof was, once again, artificial and stilted, and
self-serving as well (see p. 3, supra). I also consider it peculiar
that, if Montez were credited on Caccioppo’s alleged antiunion
statements to him in December, he would have been so bold in
expressing his prounion sympathies at an open meeting.
I asked Caccioppo if he said anything about the Union at any
monthly meetings. He readily answered that he did so, at least
at the December 2006 meeting, and also volunteered that fol-
lowing the Union’s organizing drive in July, he had an “im-
promptu gathering” of all employees. In December 2006, the
gist of his remarks concerned union organizing and what sign-
ing an authorization card signified. At more than one meeting,
he discussed information that the Union was distributing, as
well as why Respondent had a union-free policy and wished to
remain union-free. Kennedy substantially corroborated Cac-
cioppo’s testimony. The General Counsel has not alleged that
any of his statements violated the Act.
Caccioppo, Kennedy, and Lovejoy all testified that Montez
did not make any statements at the March 1 meeting, and I
credit them.
On March 5, Lovejoy issued Montez a written warning for a
safety violation, to wit, making a u-turn that caused a tub of
resonators to slide off and flip onto the floor and in the direc-
tion of two employees.17 However, the sole reason that Re-
spondent has advanced for Montez’ discharge was job aban-
donment on March 23.

16 Tr. 275.
17 R. Exh. 2. No specific work rule is cited.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD388
Events of March 23
As stated earlier, Montez’ testimony concerning his leaving
early on Friday, March 23, contained numerous internal contra-
dictions, conflicted with timecard records (R. Exh. 11), and was
uncorroborated. I therefore cannot find reliable his testimony
on the subject.
I find the following facts based on Samples’ credited testi-
mony. At about 1:30–2 p.m., Montez approached her on the
production line. No one else was in the immediate area. He
asked if the welders were done, and she replied, “Yes.” That
was the extent of their conversation. She did not see him again.
His shift ended at 3 p.m.
Later, when Samples was “making the rounds” to ensure that
everything on the shift was completed, she noticed that the
supermarket had not been stocked and that Montez was not
there. She unsuccessfully looked around for him. A welder
told her that he had gone.
Welders generally finished a little early, and Montez often
asked her if they were done. After the welders were through,
Montez had other job duties to perform before he was done for
the day. Based on Montez’ testimony, this included mopping.
Section IX.2 of the work rules provides that the Company
has a “‘zero tolerance’ approach” to certain violations, includ-
ing, “9. Job abandonment. Defined as walking off the job and
leaving the company premises without notification to your
immediate line-leader [GAP leader] or Supervisor.”
Lovejoy was not at the facility that day. Samples left on his
desk a copy of the handbook page containing the above section,
placing arrows by zero tolerance and the job abandonment pro-
vision. At the top, she hand-wrote, “Jeff—Guadalupe left on
Friday after 7 hr. day. Did not notify me or Jack [Caccioppo]
that he was leaving!” (Emphasis in original.)18
Montez’ Termination
Lovejoy read Samples’ note the following Tuesday, March
27. He then checked payroll records and communicated with
Samples, Caccioppo, and Plenzler. Plenzler testified that the
zero-tolerance notification policy is based on fire safety:
should there be a fire and an employee has not notified man-
agement that he/she is leaving the building, firefighters’ lives
could be endangered because of the mistaken belief that the
employee is still inside and needs rescue.
Lovejoy terminated Montez that afternoon for job abandon-
ment.19 Typed in the comments box was: “On Friday 3/23/07,
Guadalupe clocked out at 2:15 p.m. without asking or receiving
approval from his supervisor GAP leader or Site Manager.”
The document is not signed by Montez, who received nothing
in writing. I credit Montez’ unrebutted testimony that Lovejoy
stated that Samples had said there was a miscommunication
between her and Montez.
After the termination, Lovejoy prepared an email20 (the ad-
dressee is not clear), stating that Montez had been terminated
for job abandonment and that at the time of the termination
interview, Montez claimed it was a miscommunication between

18 GC Exh. 16.
19 See GC Exh. 15, dated March 29.
20 GC Exh. 17.
Samples and him. The email went on to state that it was clear
to Lovejoy that Montez was fully aware he was going home
without permission.
Plenzler’s testimony clarified that Montez’ offense was not
in leaving early per se, but in failing to provide notification
thereof: he explained that Respondent has a “no-fault” atten-
dance policy, meaning that attendance points are assessed for
leaving early, but no disciplinary action is otherwise imposed.
Plenzler was inconsistent as far as who made the decision to
terminate Montez. He first testified unequivocally that he was
the final decisionmaker but later testified that Lovejoy’s post-
termination email was “forwarded to me for approval of termi-
nation.”21
Plenzler, Caccioppo, and Lovejoy all denied having any
knowledge of Montez’ union support or activities at the time of
his termination.
No other employees have been terminated at the facility for
job abandonment. However, three employees at TW were ter-
minated for that reason in April–June 2007.22 In one, the em-
ployee apparently walked out and said he was not coming back;
in the other, the employee took extended breaks three times in
one night. The third is silent as to the underlying facts.
Jeromy Finley, who became a permanent welder in April
2007, was terminated in December 2007, for failing a drug test
in apparent violation of another of Respondent’s “no tolerance”
policies, possession or consumption of intoxicating beverages
and/or controlled substances.
III. MARVIN BLUE
When he worked for a previous employer, Blue served as a
UAW shop steward. He has been a welder for the Company
since June 2006, with Lovejoy his immediate supervisor at all
times. In about October or November 2006, the Union con-
tacted Blue about organizing Respondent’s employees, and at
around that time, he first talked to other employees on the sub-
ject.
The facts set out in the following two paragraphs are based
on Blue’s unrebutted and credible testimony. I again note that
Respondent’s counsel asked Samples no questions about Blue,
even though he called her as a witness. Moreover, Respondent
did not call any other employees who allegedly complained
about Blue’s harassing them for information.
In early 2007, Blue had a conversation in the parking lot
with gap leader, Sales, and welder Eric Taylor, prior to the
beginning of the shift. Blue stated that he sometimes thought
the employees needed a union. Samples replied that if Cap-
piocco heard him talk about unions, he could get terminated.
In early April, the Union asked Blue to obtain employees’
names and phone numbers. Later that month, Blue asked
“Meechy,” the night-shift gap leader (whom Respondent no
longer employs), if he could get that information for Blue to
pass on to the UAW. Meechy said that he would try. On or
about May 9, Blue, in a telephone conversation, made the same
request to Samples, who also replied that she would try. He
testified that he asked them because he trusted them and be-

21 Tr. 489, 510.
22 R. Exhs. 10–12.
FAURECIA EXHAUST SYSTEMS 389
lieved that, as gap leaders, they had access to the information;
in the regular course of their duties, they spent time in the su-
pervisors’ office.
On the morning of May 11, at the conclusion of his morning
break, Blue was called to a meeting in the conference room
with Caccioppo, Lovejoy, and Kennedy. Caccioppo stated that
Blue was suspended until further notice, for violating company
policy by harassing people for names and phone numbers.
Caccioppo gave no specifics, and Blue denied any wrongdoing.
On the morning of May 16, Lovejoy called Blue and told
him to come to a meeting in the conference room that after-
noon. Blue did so. Present were Caccioppo and Lovejoy, with
Plenzler participating by conference call.
Plenzler read Blue verbatim the contents of General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 14, a memo dated May 16, 2007, from Plenzler to
Blue, and signed by Plenzler and Caccioppo. The memo states
that the Company received complaints regarding Blue’s behav-
ior and the requests he made of other employees for employee
lists and phone numbers. The matter was fully investigated and
the determination made that Blue had violated the following
provisions of the handbook when he “persistently and improp-
erly pressured a number of other employees to provide to you
lists of employee names and phone numbers:” section 1.2–
harassment/sexual harassment, and section 1.3–productive
work environment.
Relevant portions of those sections are as follows:
1.2–Harassment/Sexual Harassment; the opening para-
graph states that the Company “has established a strict pol-
icy prohibiting unlawful harassment (racial, national ori-
gin, color, disability, religious, age, sexual, sexual orienta-
tion) of employees, including implied or expressed forms
of sexual harassment”
. . . .
1.3–Production Work Environment Policy; in particu-
lar, “Any behavior that causes an intimidating, threatening
or unsafe environment is unacceptable. Examples of un-
acceptable behavior may include the use of profanity, gos-
sip, and/or the spreading of rumors, physical intimidation,
creation of unsafe conditions and mental harassment.”
Plenzler further stated that Blue’s “attempts to obtain
employee phone numbers was an attempt to violate Sec-
tion 1.10 of the handbook, which protects the confidential-
ity of employee records. You have no right to such infor-
mation from company records, and your actions threatened
the privacy of your fellow employees as well as company
policy.”
Section 1.10 relates to personnel records. The relevant
paragraph states, “Your personnel record is considered
confidential. Other than verification of employment, per-
sonnel information will not be released to outside parties
without your permission .”
. . . .
Plenzler warned Blue that any further violation of those poli-
cies would subject him to discipline up to and including termi-
nation, asked him to sign the memo, and stated that he would
have his job back. Blue signed it. I credit Blue’s unrebutted
testimony as follows. Blue then stated that he wanted it on
record that he supported the Union and knew his rights. Plen-
zler acknowledged that there was “activity” in December 2006
and January, of which Blue was part.
Plenzler next told Blue he could return to work the following
day and would be paid for the time he was suspended. Blue
lost no pay or other benefits as a result of the suspension.
The parties stipulated that General Counsel’s Exhibit 18 is
comprised of the only documents that Respondent furnished in
response to the following portion of the General Counsel’s
subpoena duces tecum: all employees at the facility who were
disciplined for harassment and/or sexual harassment during the
period from July 26, 2005–July 26, 2007.
General Counsel’s Exhibit 18 shows that only one employee
other than Blue has been disciplined for that reason: Matt
Kirshner, who in October 2006 received a 1-day suspension for
making racist remarks to other employees. Respondent pro-
vided no documentation that it has disciplined anyone other
than Blue for misconduct pertaining to the work environment or
confidentiality of employee records.
The parties stipulated that management knew of Blue’s un-
ion activities beginning on about December 13, 2006. An
email of that date referred to Blue’s “persistence” in talking to
other employees about the union, and reflected management’s
concern over this.23
Soon afterward, Plenzler, by email dated December 19,
2006, directed supervisors to investigate the “complaints”
against Blue.24 In that email, he also stated that “I would like to
finalize a date to meet with the workforce regarding our Union
Free Policy as this is heating up quickly.”
In an email from Plenzler to Caccioppo dated May 3, 2007—
8 days before Blue’s suspension—entitled “Union Activity,”
Plenzler discussed reports of (unnamed) employees soliciting
support for the Union and expressed his opinion that “the union
is coming after us in strength.”25
In an email dated May 15, 2007, after Blue’s suspension,
Caccioppo advised Plenzler that regarding the third shift, Blue
had been “very pro-Union in his discussions and comments all
the time” with one employee but had not asked him for any
information.26
Finally, Supervisor Eric Plenzler, in an email dated July 27,
2007, to Supervisors Lovejoy and Tonia Carter, stated that a
change in labeling employee lockers “may not be a good idea
with all of the union stuff going on. Marv [Blue] has already
been disciplined for trying to get the names of all of the hourly
people, why should we make it easier for him to obtain this
information?”27
IV. JULY 26, 2007 MEETING
The complaint limits the alleged violation to Lovejoy’s oral
promulgation of a rule that employees could not post union
literature or other literature in the lunchroom without seeking

23 See GC Exh. 5 at 1. See also GC Exh. 6.
24 GC Exh. 7.
25 GC Exh. 8.
26 GC Exh. 9.
27 GC Exh. 13 at 2.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD390
permission from Respondent’s management. Therefore, I need
not address what Lovejoy might have said about solicitation, as
opposed to distribution.
As background for this meeting, two provisions in the hand-
book are relevant:
Section 1.14, which provides, inter alia, that “Only author-
ized personnel are permitted to post, remove, or alter any notice
on the bulletin boards. If you would like to post a notice, you
should see your Human Resources Representative for proper
instructions.” In practice, only company documents are posted
on the bulletin boards.28
Work rule 34, which states: “There shall be no posting of
notices, letters, or printed material of any description on Com-
pany property by an employee unless approved by the Human
Resources department.”29
For about a week starting on July 26, UAW representatives
engaged in distributing a prounion flyer to employees at the
outside of the facility.30 At some point on the morning of July
26, someone taped one of the flyers to the smaller bulletin
board or grease board in the lunchroom.31 Later that morning,
Lovejoy held a meeting with first-shift employees, including
Blue and Finley.
Blue and Finley varied somewhat, both internally and be-
tween each other, on the specifics of what Lovejoy said, possi-
bly because they understandably lack familiarity with the legal
distinction between “solicitation” and “distribution.” Although
Lovejoy testified, he did not address the meeting or, a fortiori,
rebut anything Blue and Finley said thereon.
Vis-à-vis Finley, Blue appeared to have a greater recall of
what Lovejoy stated at the meeting, and I credit Blue’s testi-
mony as follows. Lovejoy produced the union flyer and stated
that someone had taped it to the bulletin board in the lunch-
room, it was not allowed to be hung up in the lunchroom with-
out company authorization, and an employee who did so with-
out authorization could be terminated.
Analysis and Conclusions
The 8(a)(1) Allegations
I have not credited Montez’ testimony about a December
2006 conversation with Caccioppo concerning Montez’ wear-
ing of union insignia clothing. Accordingly, I recommend dis-
missal of the allegations concerning such. In light of this, I
need not address Respondent’s contention (R. Br. at 18) that
these allegations are time barred under Section 10(b) of the Act.
As to the allegation that on May 16, Plenzler threatened Blue
with termination if he engaged in further union activity, Plen-
zler referred to company rules and did not mention the Union
except in response to Blue. He spoke in the context of the writ-
ten warning that Blue was already in the process of receiving. I
therefore conclude that any such threat is effectively subsumed
by the warning and does not constitute the basis for a separate
independent 8(a)(1) violation.

28 Testimony of Blue and Finley.
29 GC Exh. 3 at 37.
30 GC Exh. 11.
31 See GC Exh. 10, an internal management email. In the room,
there is also a larger, glass-enclosed bulletin board.
Finally are the allegations that on July 26, Lovejoy orally
promulgated a rule that employees needed management’s per-
mission to post union literature in the lunchroom, and threat-
ened employees with termination if they violated such a rule.
To the extent that Lovejoy’s statements encompassed the
bulletin boards, he was merely reciting existing policy, more
specifically, section 1.4 of the handbook, which stated that
employees needed to get permission to post anything on them.
Only company documents have been posted on the bulletin
boards. Nothing in the record establishes that employees seek-
ing to post union literature on them have been treated dispar-
ately, since there is no evidence that any employees have ever
asked for permission to post anything. See Register-Guard,
351 NLRB 70 (2007); contrast, Gallup, Inc., 349 NLRB 1213,
1213 (2007); St. Francis Medical Center, 340 NLRB 1370,
1378 (2003).
However, according to both Blue and Finley, Lovejoy’s pro-
hibition against posting in the lunchroom without authorization
was not limited to the bulletin boards, which constituted a spe-
cific vehicle for management’s communications and in practice
were exclusively used for that purpose. Rather, Lovejoy pro-
hibited employees from posting anything in the lunchroom
without management’s permission.
Essentially, Lovejoy reiterated the policy set out in work rule
34, limiting it to the lunchroom—where the union flyer had
been posted. As such, he was not “promulgating” a new rule
but, instead, partially restating an existing one. Therefore, I
conclude that the nomenclature of “announced” is more appro-
priate than the “promulgated” terminology in the complaint.
Absent special circumstances, employees have a right to dis-
tribute union literature in nonwork areas on nonworktime. See
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615, 619–621 (1962).
Moreover, an employer may not require employees to secure its
permission as a precondition to engaging in protected concerted
activities on employees’ free time and in nonwork areas. See
Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 795 (1987); Enterprise
Products Co., 265 NLRB 544, 554 (1982).
The timing of Lovejoy’s announcement—on the same day
that the Union first distributed flyers to employees in an effort
to organize them—as well as his specific reference to the flyer
lead to the indisputable conclusion that his motivation was to
interfere with the employees’ right to engage in protected activ-
ity, not for any bona fide business reason. Cf. Albertson’s, Inc.,
351 NLRB 254, 259 (2007); Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 346, 346 (2004) (a work rule not on its
face restrictive of employees’ Section 7 rights is nonetheless
unlawful if it is a response to union activity).
I therefore conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when Lovejoy announced a rule that employees
could not post union literature anywhere in the lunchroom
without first getting management’s permission, and threatened
employees with termination if they did not comply.
Blue’s Suspension and Warning, and Montez’ Termination
The framework for analyzing alleged violations of Section
8(a)(3) is Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d
899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under
Wright Line, the General Counsel must make a prima facie
FAURECIA EXHAUST SYSTEMS 391
showing sufficient to support an inference that the employee’s
protected conduct motivated an employer’s adverse action. The
General Counsel must show, either by direct or circumstantial
evidence, that the employee engaged in protected conduct, the
employer knew or suspected the employee engaged in such
conduct, the employer harbored animus, and the employer took
action because of this animus.
Under Wright Line, if the General Counsel establishes a
prima facie case of discriminatory conduct, it meets its initial
burden to persuade, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s
action. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to
show that it would have taken the same adverse action even in
absence of such activity. NLRB v. Transportation Corp., 462
U.S. 393, 399−403 (1983); Kamtech, Inc. v. NLRB, 314 F.3d
800, 811 (6th Cir. 2002); Serrano Painting, 332 NLRB 1363,
1366 (2000); Best Plumbing Supply, 310 NLRB 143 (1993).
To meet this burden, “an employer cannot simply present a
legitimate reason for its action but must persuade by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the same action would have taken
place even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Serrano
Painting, supra at 1366, citing Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc.,
271 NLRB 443 (1984).
Regarding Blue’s May 11 suspension and May 16 written
warning, Respondent was admittedly aware of his union activ-
ity as far back as December 2006. Animus against Blue is re-
flected in the series of internal management emails that ex-
pressed Respondent’s alarm at efforts for unionization of the
production employees, monitoring of Blue’s union activities,
and a desire to find a way to subject him to discipline him for
such. Two were particularly telling. First was HR Manager
John Plenzler’s December 19, 2006 email, which requested that
management at the facility investigate Blue’s union activities to
see if there was a way he could be subject to discipline. Second
was Supervisor Eric Plenzler’s July 27 email, which referred to
union activity at the facility and then indicated that Blue had
been disciplined for trying to get the names of all of the hourly
people to provide to the Union. Based on these facts, I con-
clude that the General Counsel has made out a prima facie case
that the suspension and warning were discriminatory.
The next step under Wright Line is determining whether Re-
spondent would have taken the same action in the absence of
Blue’s protected union activity. Put another way, has Respon-
dent established Blue was properly disciplined for unprotected
conduct?
I do not so conclude. I find distinguishable Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 271 NLRB 1238, 1239 (1984), cited by Respondent
in its brief (at 36–37) for the proposition that Blue’s attempts to
obtain employees’ names and phone numbers from the gap
leaders were unprotected. In that case, the employee had gone
into a private office and taken bills of lading from the em-
ployer’s files, to copy and provide to a union. In finding his
activity unprotected, the Board emphasized that he was misap-
propriating financial information to which the employer had a
strong confidentiality interest. Ridgely Mfg. Co., 207 NLRB
193 (1973), also cited by Respondent (Br. at 37), does stand for
the proposition that an employee is not protected in obtaining a
list from an employer’s records surreptiously. However, the
case also states that an employee is protected when he/she re-
quests such information, as opposed to coming into possession
of the assertedly confidential material. See also Mast Advertis-
ing & Publishing, 304 NLRB 819, 828 (1991). Here, Blue
requested the information from two gap leaders who had ac-
cess, in the regular course of their duties, to the office in which
the records were kept.
Even assuming arguendo that Blue’s conduct in seeking em-
ployees’ names and phone numbers was unprotected, the Com-
pany’s internal emails make it clear that Respondent expressed
hostility toward Blue for his union activity months previously.
I have to conclude that Respondent’s motive for disciplining
Blue in May was based at least in substantial part on his solicit-
ing coworkers to support the Union, activity that went back to
December 2006, and was undeniably protected. Accordingly,
his suspension violated the Act, even assuming arguendo that
his attempts to obtain employees’ names and phone numbers
were unprotected.
Significantly, during the 2-year period from July 26, 2005–
July 26, 2007, Respondent has disciplined only one other em-
ployee for violating the Company’s harassment/sexual harass-
ment policy, and that was for making racist remarks. Indeed,
the provision in question addresses “unlawful harassment (ra-
cial, national origin, color, disability, religious, age, sexual,
sexual orientation) of employees, including implied or ex-
pressed forms of sexual harassment.” Blue’s asking two gap
leaders for employees’ names and phone numbers with the
avowed purpose of passing the information on to the Union can
hardly be deemed “unlawful.” The record further reflects that
no employee other than Blue has been disciplined for breaching
either Respondent’s confidentiality or work environment poli-
cies.
I again note Respondent’s failure to show by any direct evi-
dence that the manner in which Blue sought the information
was sufficiently egregious to render his conduct unprotected.
In sum, I conclude that Respondent has failed to show that it
would have suspended Blue on May 11, and issued him a writ-
ten warning on May 16, in the absence of his engagement in
protected union activity. Accordingly, such conduct violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Turning to Montez, the pivotal question is whether a prima
facie case has been established. I have not credited his testi-
mony that he wore a union T-shirt to work in December 2006,
and that Caccioppo told him to take it off or cover it. Nor have
I credited his testimony that he voiced his support for the Union
at the March 2007 meeting that Caccioppo conducted. Blue
was the only witness who corroborated Montez’ claim that he
talked about the Union with other employees, and Blue testified
that he, not Montez, initiated their conversations on the subject.
There is nothing in the record to show that the “Platinum Club”
wristwatch that Montez wore clearly reflected its relationship to
the UAW or was conspicuous enough to have been reasonably
observed by management. Caccioppo, Lovejoy, and Plenzler
all denied that they had any knowledge of Montez’ union sup-
port or activities at the time of his discharge.
The General Counsel (GC Br. at 28 fn. 16) urges reliance on
the “small-plant doctrine” for inferring Respondent’s knowl-
edge of Montez’ union activity (aside from the December 2006
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD392
and March incidents in which he allegedly expressed union
support directly to management). However, as noted in Re-
spondent’s brief (at 5 fn. 1), the standard for applying the doc-
trine is that the employee’s activity was “carried on in such a
manner, or at times that in the normal course of events, the
employer must have known about them.” Coral Gables Conva-
lescent Home, 234 NLRB 1198, 1199 (1978). See also Elm-
wood Nursing Home, 238 NLRB 346, 347 (1978). Because
Montez was not a reliable witness on major matters, and in the
absence of corroboration regarding the extent of his alleged
union activity, I cannot conclude that application of the small-
plant doctrine is appropriate.
As opposed to Blue, there is no direct evidence of Respon-
dent’s animus toward Montez on account of union activity. In
the absence of direct evidence of animus, discriminatory motive
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and the record as
a whole. Verizon, 350 NLRB 542, 550 (2007); Tubular Corp.
of America, 337 NLRB 99, 99 (2001). See also Davis Super-
markets v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied 511 U.S. 1003 (1994).
Such a conclusion is not warranted here. First, crediting
Montez, Respondent (Caccioppo, specifically) knew that he
was prounion in December 2006. Yet, he was made a perma-
nent employee in February, and in March, his penalty for a
safety violation that posed a potential threat to other employees
was only a written warning. Had Respondent possessed a de-
sire to retaliate against Montez for protected activity, it could
have taken action earlier. Additionally, Respondent has termi-
nated other employees for violation of “no tolerance” policies.
Three individuals were terminated for job abandonment at TW.
Moreover, Finley was also terminated for violating another “no
tolerance” policy, use of drugs or alcohol, and he had 8 months
of permanent status at the time, whereas Montez had been per-
manent for only a little over a month.
The discrepancies that I have noted in the testimony of Re-
spondent’s witnesses concerning who made the final decision
to terminate Montez are insufficient, standing alone, to estab-
lish inferred discriminatory motivation.
I am cognizant of certain mitigating aspects of Montez’ con-
duct on March 23. I do not believe that he “walked off the job”
as that term is normally construed or that he deliberately
flaunted company policy. Rather, he left 41 minutes early un-
der an apparent misconception that he had provided Samples
with notice. However, the fact remains that Samples reported
to management that he left work on March 23 without proper
notification, an offense for which the work rules specified auto-
matic termination as the penalty.
In any event, my role is not per se to assess the appropriate-
ness of the discipline that Respondent imposed but to determine
whether its proffered reasons were pretextual, and the real mo-
tivation was Montez’ union activity. See Intermet Stevensville,
350 NLRB 1349, 1360 (2007); Detroit Paneling Systems, 330
NLRB 1170, 1171 fn. 6 (2000). Since the necessary elements
of knowledge and animus have not be established, the General
Counsel has not made out a prima facie case that Montez was
terminated for union activity, and I recommend that the allega-
tion be dismissed.
ORDER
The Respondent, Faurecia Exhaust Systems, Inc., Toledo,
Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Requiring employees to obtain management’s permission
before they distribute union literature in nonwork areas (includ-
ing the lunchroom, apart from the bulletin boards) on nonwork-
time, and threatening employees with termination if they en-
gage in that activity without such permission.
(b) Issuing warnings to, suspending, or otherwise disciplin-
ing employees because they engage in activities on behalf of
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Region 2-B, or
any other labor organization.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the rule announced on July 26, 2007, that em-
ployees must obtain management’s permission before they can
post union literature in the lunchroom, apart from the bulletin
boards.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
move from its files any references to the May 11, 2007 suspen-
sion, and the May 16, 2007 written warning, issued to Marvin
Blue, and within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that
this has been done and that the suspension and warning will not
be used in any way against him.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility at Toledo, Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix A.”32 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 8 after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since May 11,
2007.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 8 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.

32 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
FAURECIA EXHAUST SYSTEMS 393
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT require you to obtain management’s permission
before you distribute union literature in nonwork areas (includ-
ing the lunchroom, apart from the bulletin boards) on your
nonworktime, and WE WILL NOT threaten you with termination if
you engage in such activity without management’s permission.
WE WILL NOT issue you written warnings, suspend you, or
otherwise discipline you because you engage in activities on
behalf of International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Re-
gion 2-B, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as set forth at the
top of this notice.
WE WILL rescind the rule announced on July 26, 2007, that
you must obtain management’s permission before you post
union literature in the lunchroom, apart from the bulletin
boards.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the unlawful
suspension and warning of Marvin Blue, and within 3 days
thereafter notify him in writing that this has been done and that
the suspension and warning will not be used against him in any
way.
FAURECIA EXHAUST SYSTEMS, INC.