Ex Parte Zhao et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 12, 2016

12635346 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/635,346 12/10/2009 Xufang Zhao P008260-OST-ALS 9180
60770 7590 04/13/2016
General Motors Corporation
c/o REISING ETHINGTON P.C.
P.O. BOX 4390
TROY, MI 48099-4390
EXAMINER
ORTIZ SANCHEZ, MICHAEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2658
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/13/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte XUFANG ZHAO and UMA ARUN
____________________

Appeal 2014-004586
Application 12/635,3461
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, LARRY J. HUME, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1 and 3–5. Appellants have previously canceled
claim 2, and the Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 6 and 7.
Ans. 7. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is General Motors LLC.
App. Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellants' disclosed and claimed invention relates "[a] method of
automated speech recognition in a vehicle." Abstract.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 5, reproduced below, are representative of the subject
matter on appeal (emphases added to contested limitations):
1. A method of automated speech recognition in a
vehicle, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) receiving audio in the vehicle;
(b) pre-processing the received audio to generate
acoustic feature vectors;
(c) decoding the generated acoustic feature vectors to
produce at least one speech hypothesis;
(d) post-processing the at least one speech hypothesis
using pitch to improve speech recognition accuracy, including
rejecting the speech hypothesis if pitch is not detected in the
received audio.
5. A method of automated speech recognition in a
vehicle, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) receiving audio in the vehicle;
(b) generating a plurality of speech hypotheses from
the received audio;
(c) determining a pitch count for the received audio;

2 Our Decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
Aug. 12, 2013); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Feb. 20, 2014); Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed Dec. 26, 2013); Final Office Action ("Final Act.,"
mailed Mar. 12, 2013); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed
Dec. 10, 2009).
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(d) identifying one of the speech hypotheses as having
a syllable count equal to the pitch count; and
(e) accepting the identified speech hypothesis as
recognized speech for the received audio.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Hon et al. ("Hon") US 5,602,960 Feb. 11, 1997
Grost et al. ("Grost") US 2007/0265849 A1 Nov. 15, 2007
Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1 and 3–5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over the combination of Hon and Grost. Ans. 2.3
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 5–7), we decide the appeal
of the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 3, and 4 on the basis of
representative claim 1; and we decide the obviousness rejection of separately
argued independent claim 5, infra.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this Decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments that
Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we
deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

3 We note the Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 6 and 7 under
§ 103. Ans. 7.
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We agree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claim 5.
However, we disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claims 1,
3, and 4, and we incorporate herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's Answer in
response to Appellants' arguments. We incorporate such findings, reasons,
and rebuttals herein by reference unless otherwise noted. However, we
highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1
and 5 for emphases as follows.
1. § 103 Rejection of Claims 1, 3, and 4
Issue 1
Appellants argue (App. Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 1–2) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Hon and Grost is in error. These contentions present us with
the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests a method of automated speech recognition that includes, inter
alia, the step of "(d) post-processing the at least one speech hypothesis using
pitch to improve speech recognition accuracy, including rejecting the speech
hypothesis if pitch is not detected in the received audio," as recited in
claim 1?
Analysis
Appellants contend:
Grost does not teach or suggest rejecting speech hypothesis if
pitch is not detected in audio. The paragraphs identified in
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Grost describe a pre-processor that can account for pitch as one
of a number of feature vectors used to process incoming
digitized speech. The feature vectors are then passed to a
decoder that compares/contrasts the feature vectors and outputs
a likely subword. This does not teach or suggest rejecting a
hypothesis when pitch is not detected.
App. Br. 5. Appellants admit Grost uses pitch to identify a matching
subword; however, they assert the reference does not teach or suggest "the
processing of the pitch feature vector is used to reject speech when pitch is
not detected." App. Br. 6.
The Examiner finds, "[o]bviously if there is no pitch data in the
utterance there can be no match for the subword and therefore the hypothesis
is rejected" (Final Act. 4), to which Appellants respond "this statement is
wholly unsupported by the disclosure of Grost, which does not teach or even
suggest that its subword matching is even affected by the absence of pitch,
much less that a speech hypothesis is rejected if pitch is not detected in the
received audio." App. Br. 6.
Contrary to Appellants' contentions, the Examiner finds, "Grost
teaches that utterances within the user's speech are represented as sequences
of these feature vectors, feature vectors can be extracted and can include, for
example, vocal pitch." Ans. 9 (citing Grost ¶ 45).4 The Examiner further
finds, and we agree, Grost's process uses decision logic to compare and
contrast acoustic feature vectors (such as pitch) to choose the best matching
subword from the models as the recognized subword and, "[i]f there is no

4 "Utterances within the user's speech are represented as sequences of these
feature vectors. For example, and as known to those skilled in the art, 39
feature vectors can be extracted and can include, for example, vocal pitch,
energy profiles, or spectral attributes . . . ." Grost ¶ 45 (emphasis added).
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pitch data in the utterance there can be no match for the subword and
therefore the hypothesis is rejected." Ans. 9.
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner's finding that Grost teaches or
suggests the contested limitation of claim 1, and further agree that the
combination of Hon and Grost teaches or at least suggests all the limitations
recited in claim 1.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the combined teachings and
suggestions of the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the
disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner's
resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 3 and 4, which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
2. § 103 Rejection of Claim 5
Issue 2
Appellants argue (App. Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 2–3) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Hon and Grost is in error. These contentions present us with
the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests a method of automated speech recognition that includes, inter
alia, the step of "(d) identifying one of the speech hypotheses as having a
syllable count equal to the pitch count," as recited in claim 5?
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Analysis
Appellants contend, "Hon does not determine pitch counts or the
number of times pitch is detected as part of this analysis. Rather, Hon
creates a confidence score for each theory–and Hon does not teach or
suggest that this score has anything to do with a pitch count." App. Br., 6.
In response, the Examiner finds:
[Hon's] system includes a syllable recognition system and a
tone segmentation system which matches tone segments and
syllables, although it does not exactly teach counting each
syllable and tone calculation, it does teach that each pitch is
segmented by the tone analyzer according to the syllables in
each of the theories, the examiner believes that this is analogous
to what the applicant is claiming.
Ans. 10 (emphasis added).
Our reviewing court guides: "A prima facie case of obviousness is
established when the teachings from the prior art itself would appear to have
suggested the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art."
In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Rinehart, 531
F.2d 1048, 1051 (CCPA 1976)). While claims are to be broadly construed,5
we disagree with the Examiner's findings and legal conclusions for
essentially the same reasons argued by Appellants. App. Br. 6–7; Reply
Br. 2–3.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
persuaded of at least one error in the Examiner's reliance on the combined

5 Claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, as
understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and taking into account
whatever enlightenment may be had from the Specification. In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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teachings and suggestions of the cited prior art combination to teach or
suggest the disputed limitation of claim 5, such that we find error in the
Examiner's resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we cannot
sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 5.
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellants may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 1–3) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in
the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised
in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the
Examiner's Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37
C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellants have not shown.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to the obviousness
rejection of claims 1, 3, and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior
art combination of record, and we sustain the rejection.
(2) The Examiner erred with respect to the obviousness rejection of
claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art combination of
record, and we do not sustain the rejection.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 3, and 4, and
we reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting claim 5.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART