Ex Parte Weng et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 4, 2017

14066423 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
1576-0944CIP 6688
EXAMINER
ZIAEIANMEHDIZADEH, NAVID
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
14/066,423 10/29/2013
10800 7590 08/07/2017
Maginot, Moore & Beck LLP
One Indiana Square, Suite 2200
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Fuliang Weng
08/07/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FULIANG WENG, ZHE FENG,
ZHONGNAN SHEN, and KUI XU
Appeal 2016-008095
Application 14/066,4231
Technology Center 3600
Before LARRY J. HUME, JOHN D. HAMANN, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1—5, 9—14, and 18. Appellants have canceled claims 6—8
and 15—17. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Robert Bosch GmbH.
App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-008095
Application 14/066,423
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellants' disclosed embodiments and claimed invention "relate[]
generally to the field of automated assistance and, more specifically, to
systems and methods for recognizing service requests that are submitted
with multiple input modes in vehicle information systems." Spec. 13.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal (emphases and formatting added to contested limitations):
1. A method of interaction with an in-vehicle
information system comprising:
receiving with a first input device in the in-vehicle
information system a first input from an operator;
identifying with a controller in the in-vehicle information
system a service request corresponding to the first input, the
identification further comprising:
identifying with the controller the service
request from a plurality of predetermined service
requests in an ontology stored in a memory, the
plurality of predetermined service requests being
associated with a plurality of predetermined
functions of the in-vehicle information system;
identifying with the controller a parameter of the
identified service request that is not included in the first input,
2 Our decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
Jan. 27, 2016); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Aug. 17, 2016); Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed June 17, 2016); Final Office Action ("Final Act.,"
mailed Sept. 1, 2015); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed
Oct. 29, 2013).
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Application 14/066,423
the identification of the parameter not included in the first input
further comprising:
identifying with the controller the parameter
that is not included in the first input with reference
to a first parameter associated with the service
request in the ontology and an indicator in the
ontology specifying that the first parameter
corresponds to input from the operator;
selecting with the controller a second input device from a
plurality of input devices with reference to a data type of the
first parameter that is not included in the first input, the second
input device being different than the first input device;
receiving with the second input device in the in-vehicle
information system a second input from the operator;
identifying with the controller referencing the second
input a value for the parameter of the identified service request
that is not included in the first input; and
executing with the controller stored program instructions
to perform the identified service request with reference to the
identified value for the parameter of the service request that is
not included in the first input.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Omi US 2005/0288934 A1 Dec. 29, 2005
Kanevsky et al. US 2006/0047386 A1 Mar. 2, 2006
("Kanevsky")
Maes et al. ("Maes") WO 02/063599 Al Aug. 15, 2002
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Application 14/066,423
Rejections on AppeaP
Rl. Claims 1, 2, 5, 9-11, 14, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a)3 4 as being unpatentable over the combination of Omi and Kanevsky.
Final Act. 4; and see Ans. 2.
R2. Claims 3, 4, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combination of Omi, Kanevsky, and Maes.
Final Act. 6; and see Ans. 2.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 13—17), we decide the
appeal of obviousness Rejection Rl of claims 1, 2, 5, 9-11, 14, and 18 on
the basis of representative claim 1.
Remaining claims 3,4, 12, and 13 in Rejection R2, not argued
separately or with specificity, stand or fall with the respective independent
claim from which they depend.5
3 We note the Examiner has withdrawn the § 101 rejection of claims 1—5,
9-14, and 18. Ans. 2.
4 We note the Examiner incorrectly characterized Rejection Rl as being
under § 102(b) in the Final Action (4). The actual statutory basis for
Rejection Rl under § 103 was clear from the Examiner's analysis (Final
Act. 4—6), and Appellants responded accordingly. The Examiner corrected
the statutory basis in the Answer (2).
5 "Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In addition, when Appellants do not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Application 14/066,423
ISSUE
Appellants argue (App. Br. 13—17; Reply Br. 2—6) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Omi and Kanevesky is in error. These contentions present
us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests "[a] method of interaction with an in-vehicle information
system" that includes, inter alia, the steps of:
identifying with the controller a parameter of the
identified service request that is not included in the first input,
the identification of the parameter not included in the first input
further comprising:
identifying with the controller the parameter
that is not included in the first input with reference
to a first parameter associated with the service
request in the ontology and an indicator in the
ontology specifying that the first parameter
corresponds to input from the operator;
selecting with the controller a second input device from a
plurality of input devices with reference to a data type of the
first parameter that is not included in the first input, the second
input device being different than the first input device,
as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments
Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we
deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Application 14/066,423
We disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claims 1—5,
9—14, and 18 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate herein by
reference and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons
and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants'
arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments
regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows.
Appellants contend Omi, either alone or in combination with
Kanevsky, fails to teach or suggest the contested limitations of claim 1, and
further alleges, "Omi. . . fails to provide a factual basis to support the
rejection." App. Br. 14. In particular, Appellants argue:
[Omi's teachings] fail to teach the requirements of claim 1 that
include selecting with the controller a second input device from
a plurality of input devices with reference to a data type of the
first parameter that is not included in the first input. Instead,
Omi is only directed to identifying if additional input
information is required for "integration" when one input source
(e.g. the speech unit) requires additional information for the
integration .... Thus, the system and method taught in Omi is
directed to identifying an input device based not on a data type
of a first parameter as required by claim 1, but merely on the
identification of the presence of any missing input that needs to
be integrated with a partial input from one input device where
the second input device is automatically selected as a fall back
input device (e.g. GUI-input instead of voice input), but not
based in any way on the data type of the input parameter.
App. Br. 15 (emphasis added).
In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, "Omi's disclosure is
directed to the very same problem that the claimed invention is attempting to
solve. That is, both Omi reference as well as the current invention are
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Application 14/066,423
concerned with resolving ambiguity in user's command by comparing two
independent inputs (e.g. voice command and keyboard or touchscreen)."
Ans. 4. The Examiner reiterates the alleged missing factual support for the
teachings and suggestions of Omi with respect to the contested limitations of
claim 1 on pages 5 and 6 of the Answer.6
With respect to the recited "data type" portion of the limitation, and
based upon Appellants' Specification (| 64), the Examiner construes this
limitation as meaning whether the data is audio or text (Ans. 5—6), and
further finds:
Omi's system clearly discloses the first and second input
devices (i.e. speech and GUI inputs) with reference to data type
(i.e. text/audio input, || 24-25 and Fig. 4) of the first parameter
that is not included in the first input (i.e. based on first input 19
and 1 36, e.g. "Ebisu" corresponding to "here" is not included in
the first input). Thus, these arguments are not persuasive.
Ans. 6.
Accordingly, based upon the above findings, we agree with the
Examiner that the combination of Kanevsky with Omi teaches, or at least
suggests, the contested limitations of claim 1.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the combined teachings and
suggestions of the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the
6 For example, the Examiner finds "Omi also covers these same functions as
well as structures as [ ] is clearly evident (see, e.g., Omi's Fig. 1, with
multimodal input integrator 105 being equivalent to the claimed multimodal
input 112 and input modalities 101 and 103 equivalent to the claimed input
modalities 104-108)." Ans. 5 (comparing Applicants' Fig. 1 with Omi
Fig. 1) (emphasis omitted).
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Application 14/066,423
disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner's
resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 2, 5, 9-11, 14, and 18 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping,
supra.
Rejection R2 of Claims 3, 4, 12, and 13
In view of the lack of any substantive arguments directed to
obviousness Rejection R2 of claims 3, 4, 12, and 13 under § 103 (see App.
Br. 17), we sustain the Examiner's rejection of these claims.7 Appellants
further state "Maes teaches an input system (see Maes, FIG. 4)" but does not
teach or suggest various limitations. App. Br. 16. We are not persuaded by
Appellants' argument. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2011) ("[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art."); cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d
388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is not the function of this court to examine the
claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable]
distinctions over the prior art."). Arguments not made are therefore waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
7 Appellants merely state, claims 3 and 4 depend from claim 1 and claims
12 and 13 depend from claim 10. For at least the same reasons presented
above regarding claims 1 and 10, Omi and Kanevsky fail to arrive at the
limitations of these claims. Furthermore, Maes fails to provide teachings
that could cure the deficiencies in claims 1 and 10, in addition to claims 3, 4,
12, and 13. App. Br. 16.
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Appeal 2016-008095
Application 14/066,423
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellants may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2—6) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in
the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised
in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the
Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37
C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellants have not shown.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejections R1
and R2 of claims 1—5, 9—14, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited
prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1—5, 9—14, and 18.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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