Ex Parte Wang

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 24, 2017

13967729 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/967,729 08/15/2013 Zhennong Wang 13-0397-US-NP
(24691-669)
9137
60476 7590 08/28/2017
PATENT DOCKET DEPARTMENT
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
LANG, MICHAEL DEAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3668
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/28/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatents @ armstrongteasdale. com
patentadmin @ boeing. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ZHENNONG WANG
Appeal 2017-000869
Application 13/967,729
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. EVANS, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.
REPKO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1—20. App. Br. I.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The Boeing Company.
App. Br. 1.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection (“Final Act.”)
mailed January 22, 2016, (2) the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed June 17,
2016, (3) the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed August 26, 2016, and (4)
the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed October 21, 2016.
Appeal 2017-000869
Application 13/967,729
THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to aircraft maintenance. Spec. 11.
Specifically, the invention discovers when and how often airline operators
perform certain maintenance events. Id. Claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. A detection computing device for use in detecting
maintenance events and maintenance intervals, said detection
computing device comprising a processor coupled to a memory,
said detection computing device is configured to:
receive an electronic signal from a carrier computing
device, the electronic signal including aircraft usage data for at
least one carrier;
identify at least one potential maintenance event in the
usage data;
identify at least one actual maintenance event in the usage
data at least by comparing the usage data for a first aircraft of the
at least one carrier to the usage data for a second aircraft of the
at least one carrier during each potential maintenance event;
determine, based at least in part on the usage data, that a
decrease in usage of the first aircraft and the second aircraft is
due to an exogenous event;
store an indication in said memory that the decrease in
usage is due to the exogenous event;
determine an indicator used by each carrier for scheduling
maintenance events;
determine a maintenance interval for each carrier for an
aircraft model associated with at least the first aircraft;
generate a report including each identified actual
maintenance event, each determined maintenance interval, and
an estimated time for a future maintenance event; and
transmit the generated report from the detection
computing device to a client computing device to cause the
generated report to be displayed on the client computing device,
wherein displaying the generated report prompts an aircraft parts
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supplier to obtain replacement parts, based on the estimated time
in the displayed report, for the future maintenance event.
THE REJECTION
Claims 1—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as covering patent-
ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2—3.
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
The Examiner rejects claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claim as a whole (1) is directed to an “abstract idea” and (2) does not contain
an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claimed “abstract idea”
into a patent-eligible application. Final Act. 2—3.
Appellant argues that the rejection does not comply with the
examination guidelines. App. Br. 5—7, Reply Br. 1—3 (citing USPTO, May
2016 Update on Formulating a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection). For
this reason, Appellant contends that the Examiner has not presented a prima
facie case of ineligibility. App. Br. 7. We disagree.
As stated in the guidance, “[f]ailure of Office personnel to follow the
USPTO’s guidance materials is not, in itself, a proper basis for either an
appeal or a petition. ” May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update, 81 Fed.
Reg. 27,381, 27,382 (May 6, 2016). Rather, “[Rejections will continue to be
based upon the substantive law, and it is these rejections that are
appealable.” Id.
Considering the relevant substantive law, the Examiner has provided a
prima facie case of ineligibility. In particular, the Supreme Court’s two-step
framework guides the eligibility analysis. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CIS
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Banklnt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). According to step one, the
Examiner “must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a
patent-ineligible concept,” such as an abstract idea. Id.
Here, the Examiner has provided a rationale that identifies the abstract
idea recited in the claim and why it is considered an exception. Final Act. 2;
Ans. 2—6. Furthermore, the Examiner explains that the claims are directed to
a concept like those found by the courts to be abstract and explains why the
additional elements are insufficient to supply an inventive concept. Ans. 2—
6. Therefore, the Examiner’s rejection satisfies the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 132 because the rejection notifies the applicant of the reasons for
rejection, together with such information “as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” See In re Jung,
637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011); accord United States Patent and
Trademark Office, July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (July 30,
2015), pp. 6—7, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-
july-2015-update.pdf.
Turning now to the Examiner’s application of the first-step of the
Alice framework, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding
that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Final Act. 2. In particular,
the Examiner finds that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of
determining a maintenance interval. Id. The Examiner further explains how
the claims are similar to those involving data processing and collection that
the Federal Circuit has found patent ineligible. See Ans. 2—6.
Notably, the Examiner’s characterization (id.) is consistent with the
Appellant’s description of the problem and solution (see App. Br. 8—9). In
particular, Appellant explains that a maintenance-repair-overhaul provider
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(MRO) needs to predict maintenance events and obtain replacement parts for
those events. App. Br. 8; see also Spec. 1 5. Appellant contends that the
invention addresses this problem by using a computer to predict future
maintenance events. App. Br. 8—9; see also Spec. 1 6. Appellant explains
that the computer can predict the events accurately, which allows an aircraft-
parts supplier to obtain replacement parts before the maintenance event
occurs. App. Br. 9. By obtaining parts before the event, the invention
reduces the time that an aircraft is out of service. Id.', see also Reply Br. 3—
4.
But this is not a problem that is rooted in technology like those claims
found eligible by the courts. For example, in Enfish, the Federal Circuit
found that the eligible claims were focused on a specific software-based
improvement to database techniques. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822
F.3d 1327, 1335—36 (Fed. Cir. 2016), discussed in App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 3—
4. Likewise, the Federal Circuit has found claims eligible when “the
claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR Holdings, LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2014), discussed in App. Br. 8. The claims in DDR required an inventive
device or technique for displaying information. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257.
Unlike DDR, Enfish or Appellant’s example from the examination
guidance (App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 3—4), determining when to obtain parts
for a machine is not a problem specifically arising in the realm of computers.
Instead, claim l’s character as a whole lies in longstanding conduct that
exists apart from computers—i.e., determining when to obtain parts for
repairing a machine. For instance, Appellant points to the involvement of a
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computer to receive signals, transmit signals, and generate a report as
evidence of eligibility. App. Br. 9. But this type of computer involvement
does not show that the claimed invention is “an improvement in computers
as tools,” like those claims found patent-eligible. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Rather, claim 1 invokes
computers merely as a tool in aid of a process focused on an abstract idea.
See Ans. 4.
Claim 1 is more similar to those that the Federal Circuit has found to
be directed to an abstract idea. In determining whether claims are directed
to an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit has considered whether the claim
covers a method that human beings can perform without a computer. See
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (explaining “[t]he series of steps covered by the asserted claims . .
. could all be performed by humans without a computer” in concluding that
the claims are directed to an abstract idea). Here, claim 1 does not recite a
specific computer-based algorithm for making those determinations, like
those processes found patent-eligible. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314—15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that
claims involving a specific structure of the rules for automated lip-
synchronization of 3-D characters were patent-eligible), discussed in
Reply Br. 4—5. Instead, claim 1 broadly and abstractly recites a series of
determinations that a human can make by reviewing the usage data and
relevant records. See Ans. 3 (discussing mental processes).
Claim 1 further recites a device that receives aircraft-usage data,
identifies certain data (“events”), and stores an indication in memory.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit has also recognized that “[t]he concept of data
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collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known,” and
“humans have always performed these functions.” Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass ’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2014), cited in Ans. 4. The Examiner’s position is not that any
use of collecting, analyzing, and presenting results is abstract, as Appellant
argues. Reply Br. 3. Rather, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that the
claimed concept is similar to the above-discussed concepts found to be
abstract by the Federal Circuit. See Ans. 2—6.
In light of the precedents discussed above, we are unpersuaded that
the Examiner erred in concluding that representative claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea.
Because claim 1 is “directed to an abstract idea,” we analyze the claim
to determine if the limitations, when considered both “individually and as an
ordered combination” contain an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform
the claimed “abstract idea” into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2355—58.
According to Appellant, claim 1 recites significantly more than the
abstract idea itself. App. Br. 8—11. Appellant argues that, the recited device,
receives signals, generates a report, and transmits the report, which is
displayed. Id. at 9—10. In Appellant’s view, claim 1 is like a stock viewer
application that solves an Internet-centric problem using computer
technology. Id. at 10—11. Appellant argues that the claim involves non-
conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.
Reply Br. 4. We disagree.
First, we consider claim l’s limitations individually. See Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2355—58. Claim 1 recites conventional uses of a network such as
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receiving signals and transmitting data. Claim 1 further recites determining
results and identifying certain information within the data—i.e., “potential
maintenance events” and “actual maintenance events.” Claim 1 then recites
reporting storing results and displaying the results on a computer. Yet, to
perform these functions, the claim 1 does not call for non-conventional
computer components. Rather, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 6) that
these functions—collection, analysis, and display—merely require a generic
processor and display, which does not supply an inventive concept.
BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1349-52 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 5) that the
information source—i.e., usage data—is not even new. For example, the
Specification discloses that carriers track maintenance events and usage
data. Spec. Tflf 4—5. Additionally, the steps acting upon this data are
abstractly and broadly recited as “identifying” and “determining” functions,
instead of a concrete solution for carrying out these identifications and
determinations. Thus, the recited identifications and determinations “do not
invoke any assertedly inventive programming” to supply an inventive
concept. Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354; accord Ans. 5—6. In sum, the
limitations, considered individually, do not contain an inventive concept.
Next, we consider the limitations as an ordered combination. Unlike
the inventive distribution of function between the local computer and an ISP
server in BASCOM, claim 1 merely recites a generic computing device
carrying out the abstract idea. See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1352 (discussing
the specific location for the filtering system and role of networking accounts
in concluding that the claims did not preempt the abstract idea’s use),
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discussed in Reply Br. 4. Essentially, the claim recites an abstract idea with
the instruction to apply it on a generic computer.
Appellant argues that the invention’s ability to run on a generic
computer does not doom the claims. Reply Br. 5. Appellant also points to
the computer’s ability to accurately predict maintenance events. App. Br. 8—
9. But “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or
more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cited in Ans. 3. So, even if a computer performs the claimed method with
fewer errors than a human, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 5—6) that
using a computer in this conventional way does not supply an inventive
concept.
Therefore, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of
representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 10 and 20
Appellant’s argument for independent claims 10 and 20 raise the same
issues as those that we have addressed in discussing claim 1 above. See
App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 4—5. Accordingly, we find those arguments
unpersuasive for the reasons previously discussed.
Regarding Appellant’s additional argument that claim 10 recites
performing maintenance (App. Br. 11), this step, considered both
individually and in the ordered combination, does not supply an “inventive
concept” sufficient to transform the claimed “abstract idea” into a patent-
eligible application. In particular, performing maintenance using obtained
replacement parts is well-known, routine, and conventional. See, e.g.,
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Spec. H2—5 (discussing maintenance and repairs of aircraft based on
usage).
The Dependent Claims
Appellant’s arguments for claims 2—9 and 11—19, which depend from
claims 1 or 10, raise the same issues as those that we have addressed in
discussing the corresponding independent claim. See App. Br. 11;
Reply Br. 4—5. We find those arguments unpersuasive for the reasons
previously discussed. Therefore, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the rejection of claims 2—9 and 11—19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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