Ex Parte Tout et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 7, 2017

13688102 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 7, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/688,102 11/28/2012 Nigel David Tout 01637US0 1320
47766 7590 12/11/2017
VIERRA MAGEN/MICROSOFT CORPORATION
575 MARKET STREET, SUITE 3750
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105
EXAMINER
PASKO, NICHOLAS R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2872
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/11/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents @ vierramagen.com
u sdocket @ micro soft .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte NIGEL DAVID TOUT and STEVE J. ROBBINS
Appeal 2017-001326
Application 13/688,102
Technology Center 2800
Before TERRY J. OWENS, CATHERINE Q. TIMM,
and MICHAEL G. McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges.
McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner maintains rejections of claims 1, 3—10, 12, 16, and 17
of Application 13/688,102 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 103(a). Final Act. (Feb. 11,
2016) 2—59; Answer 2—3.1 Appellant2 seeks reversal of these rejections
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
1 The rejection of claims 1 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 12 was withdrawn.
Answer 3.
2 Appellant is the Applicant, Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC, which
is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 13/688,102
BACKGROUND
The present application generally relates to a near-eye display (NED)
device such as a head mounted display (HMD) device that may be worn by a
user for an augmented reality (AR) experience or a virtual reality (VR)
experience. Spec. 11. The NED of the present application includes a
peripheral display positioned on a support structure so as to direct a visual
representation of an object in peripheral field of view towards a side of a
user’s eye. Id. 12. The peripheral display has a lower angular resolution
than that of a front display. Id.
Claim 1 is representative of the pending claims and is reproduced
below:
1. A near-eye display device for use adjacent to at least one of left
and right eyes of a user and having a peripheral imagery display
capability, the near-eye display device comprising:
a see-through frontal viewing portion disposed and
configured to respectively present to at least a respective and
adjacent first of the left and right eyes of the user,
corresponding first imagery of a respective augmented reality
frontal view corresponding to an angular sweep of a first frontal
field of view of the respective at least first of the user's left and
right eyes;
a first peripheral imagery displaying portion positioned
apart from the see-through frontal viewing portion and
supported by a respective first near-eye support structure of the
near-eye display device that is adjacent to the respective first of
the user's left and right eyes, the first peripheral imagery
displaying portion being configured to direct its respective first
peripheral imagery from an interior location of the support
structure so that a visual representation of an object that is to be
perceived by the user as being in a respective first peripheral
field of view of the user is so perceived, the first peripheral
field of view being peripherally adjacent to the first frontal field
of view of the user; and
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a first imagery providing source that is optically coupled
to the frontal viewing portion and to the first peripheral imagery
displaying portion and is configured to respectively provide
each portion by way of optical coupling with at least a
respective part of the displayed imagery provided by that
portion;
wherein the first peripheral imagery displaying portion is
configured to receive light from the optical coupling and to
redirect the received light with use of one or more reflections;
and
wherein the combination of the first imagery providing
source and the first peripheral imagery displaying portion is
configured to provide a corresponding first swept angle
peripheral subfield of view having an angular resolution that is
coarser than that of other corresponding swept angle frontal
subfields of view provided by the see-through frontal viewing
portion.
Appeal Br. 24—25 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS
On appeal, the Examiner maintains the following rejections3:
1. Claims 1, 4—10, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Hennessy et al. (US 6,014,117, issued Jan. 11, 2000)
(hereinafter “Hennessy”) in view of Chaum et al. (US
2010/0149073 Al, published Jun. 17, 2010) (hereinafter
“Chaum”), as evidenced by Kaiser Electro Optics Pro View™ 30
3 The Examiner rejected claims 1 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
indefinite in the Final Rejection. Final Act. 2. These rejections were
subsequently withdrawn by the Examiner. Answer 3.
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Head-Mounted Display (2006) (hereinafter “Mindflux”). Final
Act. 3-23.
2. Claims 3 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Hennessy in view of Chaum, as evidenced by Mindflux, and
further in view of Webster (US 5,274,405, issued Dec. 28, 1993).
Id. at 23—28.
3. Claims 1, 4—10, and 12 are additionally rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as obvious over Lamvik et al. (US 7,495,638 B2, issued
Feb. 24, 2009) (hereinafter “Lamvik”) in view of Hennessy and
Chaum. Id. at 28-48.
4. Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Lamvik in view of Hennessy, Chaum, and Webster. Id. at 48—51.
5. Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Lamvik in view of Hennessy, Chaum, and Webster. Id. at 52—59.
DISCUSSION
Rejection 1. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4—10, and 12 as
obvious over Hennessy in view of Chaum. Final Act. 3—23. Appellant
alleges error on several bases. Except for claim 9, Appellant does not argue
the claims separately. Thus, we select claim 1 as representative to decide the
issues presented for claims 1, and 4—8. Claim 9 is representative for the
issues presented for claims 9, 10, and 12.
Notice of the Basis of Rejection
First, Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to provide sufficient
notice pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 132 as to the terminology “as evidenced by”
and what aspect of the Hennessy reference reads on the term “optically
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couple” (claims 1 and 9).4 Appeal Br. 11—12. Appellant has not persuaded
us of a reversible error.
Section 132 states: “Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent
is rejected,. . . the Director shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the
reasons for such rejection, . . . together with such information and references
as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of
his application.” As stated in Chester v. Miller,
Section 132 merely ensures that an applicant “at least be
informed of the broad statutory basis for [the rejection of] his
claims, so that he may determine what the issues are on which
he can or should produce evidence.” Section 132 is violated
when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the
applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds
for rejection.
Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d at 1578 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the Examiner’s final rejection informed Appellant
of both the statutory basis for the rejection (§ 103(a)), and what prior art
(Hennessy, Chaum, and Mindlux) was being applied as evidence.
In support of the rejection, the Examiner made numerous factual
findings. The Examiner found that Hennessy teaches a head mounted
display (HMD) that is “a modified Pro View HMD (Kaiser Electro-Optics),
to which is mounted left and right LCD panels 214 and 216 respectively.”
Final Act. 4 (citing Hennessy 14:22—27). The Examiner further found that
“this disclosure of a Pro View HMD reads on an imagery providing source
optically coupled to the viewing portions by way of directing light through
4 Appellant’s argument refers to the “optically project” language of claim
17, but this claim is not rejected as obvious over the combination of
Hennessy and Chaum, as evidenced by Mindflux.
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an optical system, as evidenced by Mindflux below.” Final Act. 5. In the
Answer, the Examiner cites to Mindflux’s teaching of a “plastic aspheric
lens” and “independent optical paths for each eye” in support of the finding
that Hennessy teaches an imagery providing source optically coupled to the
viewing portions. Answer 3. The Examiner further determined that “the
Mindflux reference was properly cited as extrinsic evidence to show that
Hennessy's teaching of a “‘Pro View HMD (Kaiser Electro-Optics)’ at C. 14,
L. 22-27 inherently included an imagery providing source optically coupled
to the viewing portions.” Id.
In the final rejection, the Examiner explained that Mindflux was being
used as evidence as to the Pro View HMD disclosed by Hennessy. Final Act.
4—5. Moreover, any lack of notice in the final rejection has been cured by
the Examiner’s findings in the Answer regarding Mindflux’s teaching of a
“plastic aspheric lens” and “independent optical paths for each eye.”
Appellant asserts that the Answer includes a new ground (inherency).
First, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s
argument changed the thrust of the rejection such that there was a new
ground of rejection. Thoroughness in responding to Appellant’s argument
did not change the rejection and Appellant had an opportunity to respond in
the Reply Brief. See, e.g., In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“The Board's thoroughness in responding to Jung's delayed explanation did
not change the rejection, and Jung had the fair opportunity to respond.”)
Second, an Examiner may make a new ground of rejection on
appeal. 37 C.F.R. § 41.39(a)(2). Designation of a rejection as a new ground
triggers procedural options for the Appellant. Id. at § 41.39(b). Where an
Examiner fails to follow the procedures set forth in § 41.39, the remedy lies
exclusively in petitioning the Director for supervisory review. 37 C.F.R. §
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41.40(a). Rather than petitioning the Director, Appellant has explicitly
elected to continue the Appeal. Reply 3. In doing so, Appellant has waived
its right to have the question of whether the Answer added reasoning that
rose to the level of a new ground reviewed.
In the Reply, Appellant argues that the Examiner has erred in finding
that Hennessy inherently teaches an optical coupling by its disclosure of a
Kaiser Electro-Optics Pro View HMD. We do not find this argument
persuasive for several reasons. First, the Examiner’s findings relating to the
Pro View HMD were adequately presented in the final rejection.
Specifically, the Examiner found as follows:
While the coupling from the CPU to the viewing portions
constitutes an “optical coupling” given the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claims, this disclosure of a Pro View HMD
reads on an imagery providing source optically coupled to the
viewing portions by way of directing light through an optical
system, as evidenced by Mindflux below.
Final Act. 5. Mindflux, a three page product sheet describing Kaiser
Electro-Optics’s ProView 30 HMD, was of record. Appellant does not
appeal the Examiner’s finding regarding the coupling from the CPU to the
viewing portions. Accordingly, such finding will not be disturbed.
Second, Appellant’s arguments regarding the above findings
concerning the Pro View HMD were not presented in the Appeal Brief.
Appellant had notice that the Examiner relied upon Mindflux as extrinsic
evidence. Final Act. 4—5. Reliance on Mindflux was evident from the use
of the words “as evidenced by,” a phrase rejections customarily use to
identify extrinsic evidence applied to show inherency. See, e.g., Ex Parte
Yoo, 2007 WL 2814134, at *3 (BPAI2007) (reviewing the rejection of
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being anticipated by dayman as
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evidenced by Oda and Flaitz). Such use of extrinsic evidence is permissible.
See, e.g., Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316,
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[RJecourse to extrinsic evidence is proper to
determine whether a feature, while not explicitly discussed, is necessarily
present in a reference.”).
Moreover, Appellant has failed to present evidence in support of its
argument that optical coupling is not inherently disclosed. “In relying upon
the theory of inherency, the examiner must provide a basis in fact and/or
technical reasoning to reasonably support the determination that the
allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows from the teachings of the
applied prior art.” Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d 1461, 1464 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Inter. 1990). Here, the Examiner has provided a factual basis for the
findings related to inherency (the Mindflux reference) while Appellant has
provided no evidence tending to refute such findings. Attorney argument is
not evidence. See, e.g., Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d
1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[UJnswom attorney argument... is not
evidence and cannot rebut. . . other admitted evidence . . . .”).
Appellant presents argument that “there is no scientific certainty with
respect to what a ‘modified’ ProView HMD is.” Reply 3^4. Hennessy,
however, indicates that the modification is by “mounting] left and right
LCD panels 214 and 216 respectively.” Hennessy 14:22—24. This is
consistent with the disclosures of Hennessy and Mindflux. Compare
Mindflux at 2 with Hennessy Fig. 2. “[W]hen the PTO shows sound basis
for believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same,
the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.” In re Spada, 911
F.2d 705, 708 (Fed.Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
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Moreover, Appellant has not appealed the Examiner’s finding that
“the coupling from the CPU to the viewing portions constitutes an ‘optical
coupling’ given the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims.”
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to show reversible error arising
from inadequate notice as to the basis of rejection.
The Examiner’s Proposed Modification of Hennessy
For its second argument, Appellant asserts that the Examiner’s
proposed modification of Hennessy would render it inoperative for its
intended purpose.
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner determined that it would have been
obvious to modify the display device of Hennessy with the see-through
frontal viewing display and peripheral display including multiple reflections
of Chaum. Final Act. 7—8.
Appellant argues that Hennessy teaches that the peripheral displays
should depict only “ambient symbology.” Appeal Br. 12—14. Appellant
further argues that the Examiner has implicitly proposed to modify
Hennessy additionally by proposing that the peripheral displays be see-
through, “out of widow scene” displays. Id. at 15. Appellant predicates this
on certain language at lines 10 and 11 of page 5 of the final rejection. Id.
That language, however, is merely a quotation from column 7, lines 31—50
of Hennessy (with certain language omitted as indicated by ellipses). See
Hennessy 7:31—50. The Examiner’s quotation of Hennessy does not amount
to an “implicit modification” of Hennessy.
Further, in the Answer, the Examiner states that the “Examiner has
not proposed any modification to the displaying of ‘ambient symbology’ in
the peripheral LCD monitors, and Examiner relied upon Hennessy's explicit
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teaching in C. 7, L. 30-35 and L. 44-46 of an ‘out of the window’ scene
displayed by surfaces 20.” Answer 5.
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, Appellant has failed to show
that the Examiner’s proposed modifications of Hennessy would render it
inoperative for its intended purpose.
Hennessy’s Disclosure of a “Visual Representation of an Object... in a
Respective First Peripheral Field of View ”
Appellant additionally argues that Hennessy does not teach “a visual
representation of an object that is to be perceived by the user as being in a
respective first peripheral field of view of the user” as required by claim 1.
Appeal Br. 15—16. Appellant argues that the “ambient symbology” of
Hennessy is not a visual representation of an object but rather an indication
of “movement or attitude.” Id. at 15.
During examination, claim terms must be given their broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the Specification. In re ICON
Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Construing
claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the applicant. . . because
the applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise
claim coverage.” In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004). An applicant seeking a narrower construction must either
show why the broader construction is unreasonable or amend the claim to
expressly state the scope intended. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
The Specification makes use of the term “visual representation”
several times. The Specification states that, “[a]t the furthest field of view
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angles, a visual representation can be effectively a blur represented with a
very low pixel count to achieve a surround vision system.” Spec. 1 68
(emphasis added). The Specification further states that, “[i]n some
embodiments, particularly in a peripheral display example, a 2D bounding
shape for example, a bounding circle, rectangle, triangle, etc. and the 3D
position of the object are used for rendering a visual representation of the
object on the peripheral display.” Id. 179 (emphasis added).
The Specification further provides that a visual representation may be
only a color or a single photodiode:
The object on the peripheral display may be visually
represented simply by its color or a predominant color
associated with the object. Even a line of photodiodes can have
a mapping of the field of view to each photodiode. For
example, each of five photodiodes can represent about a twenty
(20) degree slice of a total peripheral field of view of about 100
degrees. As the object moves across the field of view, its
direction of motion is visually represented by which photodiode
is lit, and its speed by how fast the each photodiode turns on
and off.”
Id. 1104 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Specification teaches that a lit
LED indicator may be a “visual representation”: “[f]or purposes of
providing situational awareness like an impending virtual helicopter on
course to crash into a user like in the example of Figure 2 A, a visual
indicator such as a lit up LED may be a visual representation indicating a
presence of image data representing an object.” Id. 1122 (emphasis added).
In view of the Specification, it is apparent that the term “visual
representation” should be construed broadly to encompass “blurs,” “shapes,”
and points on light. Hennessy teaches as follows regarding the meaning of
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“ambient symbology”:
An image including ambient symbology is defined to
have areas of differing contrast and/or differing color and/or
differing texture which are not representational of objects in the
external environment, the movement of which can be detected
in the peripheral field of view of an observer.
* * *
Typically, the ambient symbology comprises a number of
arbitrary shaped objects, areas or a pattern defined by the
differing contrast, differing color or differing texture, and does
not require any optics for the purpose of representing the
display within the focal range of the eye.
Hennessy 2:21—26; 2:32—36. Thus, Hennessy teaches the use of shapes,
areas, and/or colors in the peripheral display. These representations have not
been shown to fall outside the scope of “visual representations” as used in
the claims.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s determination that
the ambient symbology of Hennessy falls within the scope of the term
“visual representation.”
Reason to Combine the Teachings of Chaum and Hennessy
For its third argument, Appellant asserts that the Examiner has not
explained why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to use a device having a peripheral display positioned apart from
the frontal viewing portion rather than a continuous “proximal optic” as
taught by Chaum. Appeal Br. 17.
In proposing the hypothetical combination of Hennessy and Chaum,
the Examiner relied upon Hennessy (the primary reference) as teaching “a
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first peripheral imagery displaying portion (22, 24) positioned apart from the
frontal viewing portion.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner set forth a rationale as
to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the device of
Hennessy according to certain teachings of Chaum. Id. at 7—8. The
Examiner is not obliged to explain why certain separate teachings of a
secondary reference are not incorporated in the hypothetical combination.
Nor has Appellant argued that Chaum “teaches away” from the display
structure of Hennessy.
Accordingly, Appellant has not shown error in this regard.
Rejection of Claim 9
Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 9 over Hennessy in view
of Chaum is in error on several bases. Appeal Br. 18—19. Appellant asserts
that the rejection of claim 9 is erroneous because it renders Hennessy
inoperable and ignores the “proximal optic” teachings of Chaum. These
arguments lack merit for the reasons set forth above. Appellant additionally
argues that Chaum teaches that the resolution of the eye is high in the central
portion and relatively low in the peripheral portion. Id. As a consequence,
Appellant argues, Chaum does not teach a peripheral display portion with a
lower display resolution. Id. at 18.
Appellant is correct that the portion of Chaum cited by the Examiner
refers to the periphery of the retina rather than the periphery of the display.
See Chaum | 618. Thus, the cited portion does not teach a peripheral
display “configured to provide a lower display resolution than that of the
front display.” Appeal Br. 27 (Claims App.).
Accordingly, Appellant has shown reversible error in this regard.
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Rejection 2. The Examiner rejected claims 3 and 16 as obvious over
Hennessy in view of Chaum and further in view of Webster. Final Act. 23—
28.
Claim 3 requires that “the peripherally represented object belongs to a
peripheral continuation of the augmented reality frontal view.” Appeal Br.
25 (Claims App.). Appellant argues that none of the cited references teach
such feature. Appeal Br. 22.
In the rejection, the Examiner relies upon Webster as follows:
Webster teaches a wide angle viewing system that
includes a frontal viewing portion (34a, 34b, 40a, 40b) and a
peripheral imagery displaying portion (36a, 36b, 42a, 42b) that
directs a visual representation of an object that is to be
perceived by the user as being in a respective first peripheral
field of view of the user, wherein the first peripheral imagery
displaying portion comprises a projection receiving and
redirecting display that is configured to receive its redirected
projection from the imagery providing source (See e.g. Figs. 4
and 5); and the peripherally represented object belongs to a
peripheral continuation of the augmented reality frontal view.
Final Act. 23—24. Appellant’s only argument against Webster is that it
“teaches non-see-through electronically driven monitors on all sides.”
Appeal Br. 22. This does not rebut Webster’s teaching as relied upon by the
Examiner. Accordingly, Appellant has not shown error in regard to the
rejection of claim 3.
Claim 16 depends from claim 9. Appellant’s arguments regarding the
rejection of claim 9 over Hennessy in view of Chaum have been found to be
persuasive. Accordingly, the rejection of claim 16 as obvious over
Hennessy in view of Chaum and further in view of Webster will be not be
affirmed.
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Rejection 3. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4—10, and 12 as
obvious over Lamvik in view of Hennessy and Chaum. Final Act. 28-48.
Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 is in error as Lamvik does not
teach spaced apart front and peripheral displays to which imagery is
optically coupled. Appeal Br. 19. Appellant further argues that Lamvik
fails to teach a see-through display and optical coupling by the use of
reflections. Id. at 20. Appellant further argues that the Examiner has
misidentified item 224 of Figure 13. Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner determined that Lamvik teaches a
display “constructed on a clear plastic substrate, allowing the viewer to see
past the image through to the actual field of view.” Answer 11 (citing
Lamvik 6:58—61). The Examiner further determined that Lamvik teaches an
optical coupling between “foveated display 222” and an eyepiece. Answer
11 (citing Lamvik Figs. 13 and 14). This eyepiece is the element argued to
be misidentified. In regard to the eyepiece, Lamvik provides that “[ejach of
the examples in FIGS. 11-14 include a display of the present invention and a
corresponding eyepiece that can create a virtual image of the display near
infinity to compensate for the location of a display near the viewer's eyes.”
Lamvik 10:4—7. Further, the Examiner notes that Lamvik was not relied
upon as teaching that the peripheral display is spaced apart or that the first
peripheral imagery displaying portion is configured to receive light from the
optical coupling and to redirect the received light with use of one or more
reflections. Answer 12—13.
Appellant additionally asserts that the rejection of claim 9 should be
reversed. In this regard, Appellant incorporates its arguments presented in
regard to claim 1. Appeal Br. 20—21. These arguments are found not to be
persuasive for the reasons set forth above.
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Appellant further asserts that there are certain “Additional Rejection
errors” in the present rejection concerning the rejection of claims 4 and 10
over Lamvik in view of Hennessy and Chaum. Appeal Br. 22 (referring to
pages 34 and 48 of the Final Act.). Appellant argues that Chaum fails to
teach “the reflecting element being positioned to reflect the visual
representation of the object towards the side of the respective first of the
user's left and right eyes” as required by claim 4. Id. Appellant additionally
argues that Lamvik fails to teach “wherein the near-eye support structure
includes a side arm which positions the at least one peripheral display at the
side position” as required by claim 10. Id. In regard to both of these
arguments (concerning claims 4 and 10) we adopt the position of the
Examiner as stated in the Answer at pages 17—18
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to show error in any of the
foregoing with regard to the rejection of claims 1, 4—10, and 12 over Lamvik
in view of Hennessy and Chaum.
Rejection 4. The Examiner rejected claim 16 as obvious over
Lamvik, Hennessy, Chaum and Webster. Final Act. 48—51. Appellant does
not present unique argument in support of the patentability of claim 16 over
the asserted references. Accordingly, claim 16 will stand or fall with claim
9, from which it depends. Appellant’s arguments regarding the rejection of
claim 9 over Lamvik in view of Hennessy and Chaum have not been found
to be persuasive. Accordingly, the rejection of claim 16 on this basis will be
affirmed.
Rejection 5. The Examiner rejected claim 17 as obvious over
Lamvik, Hennessy, Chaum, and Webster. Final Act. 52—59.
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Appellant presents two arguments in support of the patentability of
claim 17. Appeal Br. 21. First, Appellant argues that the rejection was
made in error because element 224 of Lamvik is misidentified. This
argument fails in view of the explanation in the Answer regarding the
eyepiece as discussed above. Answer 12—14 (citing Lamvik 10:4—9).
Second, Appellant argues that the cited references do not teach “the
peripheral vision portion being configured to inwardly direct respective
peripheral imagery from the inwardly facing side position as an optically
directed projection” as required by claim 17. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant
argues that “a prime objective of Lamvik is to have one continuous” display.
Id. In the Answer the Examiner finds that Lamvik teaches a display with
various display regions “that read on an inwardly facing side portion, as they
face inwardly toward a user and are located at the sides of the central region
of display.” Answer 15. Appellant has not shown error in this finding.
Further, Lamvik expressly teaches that the display may be “an array.”
Lamvik 2:31—38, 6:11—15.
Accordingly, Appellant has not shown error in the rejection of claim
17 as obvious over Lamvik, Hennessy, Chaum, and Webster.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 1 and 4—8 as obvious over Hennessy in view
of Chaum is affirmed. The rejection of claims 9, 10, and 12 as obvious over
Hennessy in view of Chaum is reversed. The rejection of claim 3 as obvious
over Hennessy in view of Chaum and Webster is affirmed. The rejection of
claim 16 as obvious over Hennessy in view of Chaum and Webster is
reversed. The rejection of claims 1, 4—10, and 12 over Lamvik in view of
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Hennessy and further in view of Chaum is affirmed. The rejection of claim
16 over Lamvik in view of Hennessy and further in view of Chaum and
Webster is affirmed. The rejection of claim 17 over Lamvik in view of
Hennessy and further in view of Chaum and Webster is affirmed.
In view of the foregoing, the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1,
3—10, 12, 16, and 17 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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