Ex Parte StarlingDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 14, 201712804701 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/804,701 07/27/2010 Gordon Sterling Starling AMK-5961-2 9651 23117 7590 08/16/2017 NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC 901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR ARLINGTON, VA 22203 EXAMINER KING, BRIAN M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3744 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/16/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com pair_nixon @ firsttofile. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte GORDON STERLING STARLING Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 Technology Center 3700 Before DANIEL S. SONG, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and ANTHONY KNIGHT, Administrative Patent Judges. SONG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—7 in the present application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b) and 134. We AFFIRM. The claimed invention is directed to a cooling device for bottles (Title; Abstract). Representative independent claim 1 reads as follows (Response to Notification of Non-Compliant Appeal Brief, Claims App’x, paragraphing added for clarity, italics also added): Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 1. An apparatus for cooling liquid stored in bottles for use with a cooling medium in a thermally insulated chest, the apparatus comprising a plate having a plurality of spaced holes each for receiving a respective one of the bottles therein, wherein said holes are sized to accommodate standard size beverage cans and bottles, said holes spacing keeping each of said bottles from physical contact with the bottles adjacent thereto, said holes establishing gaps between the respective bottles and said respective hole surfaces to enable flow of the cooling medium through said gaps adjacent and in contact with said bottles, a support surface on one side of said plate for supporting the cooling medium thereon, the support surface defining a convective cooling area via the cooling medium for the liquid stored in the bottle, and means for mounting said plate within the thermally insulating chest. The claim language italicized above was not present in the claims as filed, but was added by amendment. Independent claim 5 similarly recites that the holes are “sized to accommodate standard size beverage cans and bottles,” this limitation also having been added by amendment. The Examiner rejects the claims as follows: 1. Claims 1—7 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as filing to comply with the written description requirement (Final Office Action (hereinafter “Final Act.”) 2). 2. Claims 1—7 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite (Final Act. 3). 2 Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 3. Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Silberman1 (Final Act. 4). 4. Claims 2, 4, and 5—6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Silberman in view of Tedder2 (Final Act. 5). 5. Claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Silberman (Final Act. 6). 6. Claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Silberman in view of Drummond3 (Final Act. 7). 7. Claims 5—7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Silberman in view of Tedder and Drummond (Final Act. 7). ANALYSIS Only those arguments actually made by the Appellant have been considered in this decision. Arguments that the Appellant could have made but chose not to make have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Written Description Claims 1—7 stand rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement (Final Act. 2). The Examiner rejects independent claims 1 and 5, finding that “[t]he specification does not establish a standard size for the bottles and 1 U.S. Patent No. 8,065,889 Bl, issued November 29, 2011. 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,763,959 B2, issued July 20, 2004. 3 US. Patent No. 4,821,525, issued April 18, 1989. 3 Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 only references ‘bottles on the market’ and ‘90% of beverage bottles’ which is not the same as standard size and as such this is considered to be new matter.” (Final Act. 2). The Examiner also finds that “no cans are referenced in the specification as originally filed and as such this is also considered to be new matter.” (Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 11). Claims 2—\ and 7 stand rejected as being dependent upon a rejected claim (Final Act. 3). The Appellant disagrees and argues that the references in the specification to holes that are sized “slightly larger than the maximum diameter of most of the beverage bottles on the market” and to holes dimensioned to “accommodate the circumferences of about 90% of beverage bottles 17 (Figure 1) offered for retail sale” as well as Fig. 1 itself provide support for this claimed feature of the invention. (App. Br. 9; see also Spec. Tflf 6, 14, 15). The Appellant also argues that an industry standard is established by the industry itself. According to various sources, the industry standard bottle (ISB) for beer, for example, is the North American longneck. The standard size measures 9" in height and 2.4" in diameter. See, for example, www.yankeeschooner.com, “Glass Beer Bottles — 12 oz. Longneck.” See also the Wikipedia entry for “beer bottle,” referring to the longneck as an “industry standard bottle (ISB).” (App. Br. 9). The Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Initially, we observe that the Examiner is correct that “no cans are referenced in the specification as originally filed,” and as such, there is no written description for the claim limitation “standard size beverage cans.” (Final Act. 2; Ans. 11). In addition, it cannot be reasonably disputed that size of beverage bottles varies 4 Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 widely. While the Appellant has introduced some evidence as to the dimensions of a “longneck” bottle being a standard, we agree with the Examiner that at best, the Appellant has only established a standard “with respect to beer bottles,” and not for other non-beer beverage bottles (Ans. 11). In other words, even if there is evidence as to a standard for beer beverage bottles, that standard may, or may not, be applicable to other beverages or to other beverage industries that may utilize different standards, and thus, the proffered evidence fails to demonstrate a “standard size beverage” bottle as recited. The Appellant further explains that it “twice attempted to delete the purported ‘new matter’ from the independent claims” via amendments, but these amendments were denied entry (App. Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 1—2). However, the Examiner’s decision to not enter a submitted amendment is not an appealable issue. In re Watkinson, 900 F.2d 230, 233 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Board has no jurisdiction for matters within the discretion of the examiner and not tantamount to a rejection of claims). Such procedural matters should have been raised by way of a timely petition pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.181. Accordingly, in view of the above considerations, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—7 based on lack of written description is affirmed. Indefiniteness Claims 1—7 also stand rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for indefiniteness (Final Act. 3). The Examiner finds that independent claims 1 and 5 are indefinite because “beverage bottles exist in 5 Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 an extremely wide range of sizes and shapes,” and that it is “well known that beverage containers come in ranges from very small to very large and as such there is no standard size for beverage cans or bottles.” (Final Act. 3). Claims 2—\ and 7 stand rejected for being dependent upon a rejected claim (Final Act. 3). We again agree with the Examiner. The Appellant argues that those of ordinary skill in the art would readily appreciate the size of the holes relative to ‘standard size beverage cans and bottles’ as such standard sizes are well-known and well-established in the beverage industry. (App. Br. 10). In support, the Appellant refers to the arguments submitted with respect to the written description rejection (App. Br. 9), and again points to the Specification, which “describes that the exemplary dimensions ‘will accommodate the circumferences of about 90% of beverage bottles offered for retail sale,’” so that “those of ordinary skill in the art would readily appreciate the metes and bounds of the invention.” (App. Br. 10-11; see also Spec. 6, 14, 15). However, as the Examiner finds and as discussed supra relative to the written description rejection, the existence of a “standard size” for beverage cans and bottles has not been demonstrated by the record. To the contrary, the Specification instructs a person of ordinary skill in the art that “the invention is not limited in its scope to specific dimensions.” (Spec. 114). Accordingly, the claim language in light of the Specification would not provide clarity to those skilled in the art regarding the scope of the subject 6 Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 matter which the claims encompass. See In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378 (CCPA 1970). The Appellant further argues that “Appellant attempted to eliminate this issue for appeal by specifying a specific dimension of the holes.” (App. Br. 11). However, as noted above, the Examiner’s decision to not enter a submitted amendment is not appealable. In re Watkinson, 900 F.2d at 233. Accordingly, in view of the above considerations, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—7 based on indefiniteness is also affirmed. Prior Art Rejections Since claims 1—7 fail to satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, we are constrained to reverse, pro forma, the prior art rejections because they necessarily are based on speculative assumptions as to the scope of the claims. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862—63 (CCPA 1962) (holding that the Board erred in affirming a rejection of indefinite claims because the rejection was based on speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims); cf. In re Smith, 2008 WL 4998624 (BPAI 2008)(declining to reach art rejections “because an affirmance of the lack of written description rejection disposes of all claims on appeal,” and it is not “necessary to address the obviousness of claims which contain a limitation not described by the specification, as filed.”). CONCLUSIONS 1. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—7 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is AFFIRMED. 7 Appeal 2016-005332 Application 12/804,701 2. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—7 as unpatentable under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is AFFIRMED. 3. The Examiner’s prior art rejections are reversed, pro forma. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation