Ex Parte SinghalDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 26, 201613068328 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. 13/068,328 103550 7590 Tara Chand Sighal P.O. Box 5075 Torrance, CA 90510 FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 05/09/2011 Tara Chand Singhal 04/26/2016 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. l l 195.72C2 8516 EXAMINER HENNING, MATTHEW T ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2491 MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE 04/26/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TARA CHAND SINGHAL Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 1 Technology Center 2400 Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and SHARON PENICK, Administrative Patent Judges. PENICK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-5, 7, and 16-19.2 Claims 8-15 are cancelled. (Appeal Br. 4.) We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(l). We affirm. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is the inventor, Tara Chand Singhal, proceeding prose. (Appeal Br. 1, 4.) 2 Although Appellant states that the rejection of claims 1-7 and 16-20 are the subject of the appeal (Appeal Br. 4), claim 6 has been objected to, but indicated as allowable if rewritten in independent form to include the limitations of its base claim and any intervening claims (Final Action 6.) Additionally, the Examiner has not specifically addressed claim 20 in any of the rejections. (Final Action 3---6.) We, therefore, do not address claims 6 and 20 in this decision. Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 Invention Appellant's invention relates to security in a nationwide wireless network with geographically dispersed wireless routers. The wireless routers have an interface function with an ability to receive telephone calls from an authorized caller. The router, in response and on demand, generates a set of bounded random numbers (BRN) as a random seed for use in generation of encryption keys for communication security between the router and a portable wireless device of the caller. (Abstract.) According to one embodiment of the invention, a call screening function receives cellular calls with caller id and geographic cell data and screens permitted calls based on a prestored list of caller ids, a call mapping function that maps the call to a wireless access point (W AP) in the area identified by the cell, and a call routing function that routes the call to a telephone number assigned to a WAP in the area. (Spec. 20: 11-15.) Illustrative Claims Claims 1---4, reproduced belmv, are illustrative: 1. A system for security in a wireless network with geographically dispersed wireless access point (W AP) routers to the network and a user's wireless device desiring access to the network, comprising: a. a screen function that screens cellular telephone network originated calls originating from a device user's cell phone to a telephone number assigned to the wireless network; b. the screen function maintains a pre-stored database of caller ids of authorized users and a pre-stored database of W AP routers in the network with their geographic locations and their assigned network access addresses; 2 Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 c. the screen function screens the originating calls based on the pre-stored caller id database and then a mapping function maps to a geographic area based on the call cell area. 2. The system as in claim 1, further comprising: the call is first screened based on caller id that identifies the caller as belonging to one of a plurality of authorized group of users, then maps the geographic location of the call origination to one of the wireless access points in the pre-stored database of W APs. 3. The system as in claim 2, further comprising: the call is then mapped to a W AP router of the authorized group and a routing function then routes the call to the nearest geographic W AP router of the group. 4. The system as in claim 3, further comprising: the router, for the received call, creates an identifying record in its memory, generates a random seed and delivers the seed to the caller. Re1ectzons The Examiner rejects claims 1-3, 7, and 16-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Barnes et al. (US 4,829,554; May 9, 1989) ("Barnes") and Joseph et al. (US 2003/0123436 Al; July 3, 2003) ("Joseph"). (Final Action 3-5.) The Examiner rejects claims 4, 5, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Barnes, Joseph and Iyengar et al. (US 6,349,213 B 1; Feb. 19, 2002) ("Iyengar"). (Final Action 5---6.) Issues Did the Examiner err in finding Barnes and Joseph to be analogous art to the claimed invention? 3 Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Barnes and Josephs teaches "a pre-stored database of caller ids of authorized users," as in claim 1? Did the Examiner err in the obviousness rejection of claim 4? ANALYSIS Appellant, proceeding prose, challenges the Examiner's rejection of the claims as obvious in light of Barnes and Joseph. Appellant's arguments in the Appeal Brief are addressed to (A) Barnes and Joseph as analogous prior art, (B) whether certain elements of Claim 1 are taught or suggested by the combination of Barnes and Joseph, and (C) whether generation of a random seed (as in, e.g., claim 4) is taught or suggested by the prior art. Barnes and Joseph as Analogous Art Appellant argues that the Examiner "misunderstands and misconstrues" the invention, and provides a summary of the field of endeavor of the invention. (Appeal Br. 9-11.) Appellant refers to the first prong of obviousness analysis articulated in Graham v. John Deere, requiring a determination of the scope and content of the prior art, and argues that "[i]f the prior art teaches solution to problem A and the claims teach the solution to a problem Band where problem A and Bare unrelated then the claims are prima facie not obvious over the prior art." (Appeal Br. 14.) Appellant argues that the claimed subject matter "depends on a cellular telephone system and its ability to make a cellular telephone connection" and is directed to "a screen function ... to be able to screen incoming [cellular] calls from authorized callers and route those authorized calls to ... a Wireless Router access point." (Appeal Br. 12-13.) Appellant argues that, 4 Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 in contrast, Barnes is directed to a connection between a landline and a cellular telephone, and Joseph is directed to voice and data connections using IP protocols. (Appeal Br. 12.) The essence of Appellant's argument is that the Examiner has not shown that Barnes and Joseph are analogous art. (Id. at 14 ("the two [references] are directed to an entirely different problem")). We consider two criteria in determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor as the invention, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court directs us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly, stating that "familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). We agree with the Examiner in finding that the field of endeavor of Appellant's invention is cellular communications and authorizing cellular calls. (Answer 5.) Barnes is directed towards a flexible secure cellular telephone system including routing within that system. (Barnes Abstract.) Joseph is directed towards telephone routing over the Internet, including calls originating from cellular telephones. (Joseph Abstract.) Thus, both references, being within the field of endeavor of Appellant's invention, are analogous. Furthermore, while we recognize the differences Appellant describes between the subject matter of the invention and these pieces of 5 Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 prior art, we agree with the Examiner that these references logically would have commended themselves to the attention of an artisan of ordinary skill in considering the problems Appellant addresses, further evincing that the references are analogous art. Obviousness Rejection of Claim 1 Appellant includes in the Appeal Brief conclusory arguments, for the preamble and each element (a) through ( c) of claim 1, quoting the claim limitation and asserting for each that the limitation "is neither taught nor fairly suggested by the cited combination of the prior art." (Appeal Br. 13- 14.) "A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (2013). Thus, these arguments are unavailing. Additionally, Appellant specifically argues that the combination of Barnes and Josephs does not teach or suggest the claimed "pre-stored database of caller ids of authorized users" because Barnes "(1) stores all telephone numbers identification and (2) [they are] used for an entirely different purpose, where in contrast the claimed subject matter database is of authorized callers who would have access to" wireless access point routers. (Appeal Br. 12.) The Examiner finds that the claim limitation is taught or suggested by the set of valid and current mobile units stored in Barnes. (Final Action 4; Answer 2-3.) The Examiner notes that Barnes teaches that the set of valid and current mobile units is used to forward calls to such units, and that verification also occurs to determine that a caller is valid and a current mobile unit. (Answer 2-3.) The Appellant urges us to consider the claim limitation and more narrowly interpret it in light of the specification (Appeal Br 9, 12; Reply 8). 6 Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 Appellant argues that the claimed database consists of "authorized callers to [a] specific assigned telephone number." (Reply 7.) However, our reviewing court cautions that, "although the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments .... [C]laims may embrace 'different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification."' Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (citations omitted). A basic canon of claim construction is that one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa 'per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Because "applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee." In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, we decline to narrow the interpretation of the claim term as the Appellant urges, and we agree with the Examiner that Barnes teaches or suggests "a pre-stored database of caller ids of authorized users," as in claim 1. Thus, we are not persuaded on this basis of error in the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claim 1. Appellant additionally argues that: The claimed subject matter here, teaches elements of delivering a random seed to the ends of a communication channel using an out of band method. Since these features are not taught nor suggested by any prior art and thus the need for the second leg of the obviousness enquiry and KSR amplification of person of ordinary skill in the art does not even anse. That is the "Screen Function" of the claimed subject matter is not obvious over the cited combination of the prior art. 7 Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 Like[]wise dependent claims are also not obvious. Claim 16 and its dependent claims are method analogs of claim 1 and are also thus not obvious for the same and similar reasons. Therefore the claimed subject matter is not obvious over the cited combination of the prior art. (Appeal Br. 15.) However, while the screen function appears in claim 1, the generation and delivery of a random seed does not, but appears in dependent claim 4 (and claims dependent therefrom). Thus, this distinction also does not persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 1. Appellant includes in the Reply Brief a number of arguments made for the first time regarding the proper interpretation of claim terms under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. (Reply Br. 5-9.) We have considered supra certain arguments relating to the interpretation of the "pre- stored database of caller ids of authorized users," in light of their relation to arguments made in the Appeal Brief. However, arguments addressed towards the broadest reasonable interpretation of other terms are waived as they appear for the first time in the Reply Brief with no showing of good cause. 37 C.F.R. § (b)(2) (2013); See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (Informative) ("[T]he reply brief [is not] an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made in the principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner's rejections, but were not."). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 1, and the rejections of claims 2, 3, 7, and 16-18, not separately argued with specificity. Claims 4, 5, and 19 include a limitation with respect to the delivery of a random seed, as such we consider these claims separately in light of arguments made by Appellant with respect to this limitation. 8 Appeal2014-005356 Application 13/068,328 Obviousness Rejection of Claim 4 With respect to the issue of the delivery of a random seed and the rejection of claim 4, claim 4 was rejected over a combination of Barnes, Joseph, and Iyengar (Final Action 4), which is not addressed by the Appellant (Appeal Br. 15-16.) While Appellant describes this as a distinction over the art, no argument appears in the Appeal Brief regarding the combination of prior art and the Examiner's reliance on Iyengar, which the Examiner finds teaches or suggests the delivery of a random seed (Final Action 5). Thus we are not persuaded of error in the rejection of claim 4. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 4, and the rejections of claims 5 and 9 not separately argued with specificity. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-5, 7, and 16- 19. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv), no time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended. AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation