Ex Parte McGee et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 28, 2017

13454799 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/454,799 04/24/2012 Steven McGee ORA120318-US-NP1 2571
55498 7590 08/30/2017
Vista IP Law Group, LLP (Oracle)
2160 Lundy Avenue
Suite 230
San Jose, CA 95131
EXAMINER
TRUONG, CAM Y T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2169
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/30/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@viplawgroup.com
ev@viplawgroup.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN MCGEE, JIANGBIN LUO, BENEDICTO GARIN,
MAHESH GIRKAR, MICHAEL HARVEY, NITIN KARKHANIS,
STEVE LEE, JUAN LOAIZA, ROBERT MCGUIRK,
and HONGJIE YANG
Appeal 2017-005336
Application 13/454,7991
Technology Center 2100
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MACDONALD, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—2, 4, 6—9, 11, 13—22, 24, and 26—31, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 3,5, 10, 12, 23,
and 25 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is Oracle International
Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-005336
Application 13/454,799
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants’ described and claimed invention relates generally to
synchronizing a primary database with a standby database via a “repeater” or
“redo repeater,” which is used to store and forward redo logs to the standby
database. See Spec. Tflf 4, 28.2
Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows (with the disputed
limitations emphasized)'.
1. A method implemented with a processor, comprising:
generating redo records at a primary database, the redo
records corresponding to changes to database data on the primary
database;
sending the redo records to a repeater;
forwarding the redo records from the repeater to a
standby database for maintaining copies of the database data,
the repeater being geographically separated from the standby
database', and
the repeater not being a database that stores a copy of the
database data, the repeater being located geographically closer to
the primary database than the standby database, the repeater not
sharing a common point of failure with either the primary
database or the standby database such that a failure condition that
causes failure at the primary database or the standby database
does not also cause failure at the repeater.
Supp. Appeal Br. 44 (Claims App.).
2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed Jan. 14, 2016
(“Final Act.”), Appellants’ Supplemental Appeal Brief filed Oct. 14, 2016
(“Supp. Appeal Br.”) and Reply Brief filed Feb. 13, 2017 (“Reply Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer mailed Dec. 12, 2016 (“Ans.”), and the original
Specification filed Apr. 24, 2012 (“Spec.”).
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Application 13/454,799
Rejections on AppeaP
Claims 1, 7—8, 14, and 28—29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Vivian Schupmann, Oracle® Data Guard,
Concepts and Administration lOg Release 2 (10.2), Oracle, (2008)
(“Schupmann”), in view of Sen et al. (US 2007/0220320 Al; published Sept.
20, 2007) (“Sen”).3 4
Claims 2 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, and further in view of Kundu et al.
(US 2009/0157764 Al; published June 18, 2009) (“Kundu”).
Claims 4 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, and further in view of Chen et al.
(US 2011/0093522 Al; published Apr. 21, 2011) (“Chen”).
Claims 6 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, and further in view of Vivian et al.
(US 2012/0030508 Al; published Feb. 2, 2012) (“Vivian”).
Claims 15—17 and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, and further in view of Taylor et al.
(US 6,658,589 Bl; issued Dec. 2, 2003).
Claims 18—21, 27, and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, and further in view of the
admitted prior art of Appellants’ application.
3 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1—2, 4, 6—9, 11, 13—22, 24,
and 26—31 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph for lack of written
description. See Ans. 7.
4 The header of the rejection also includes claim 3, but this appears to be an
error, as claim 3 was canceled, and the body of the rejection does not include
claim 3. See Final Act. 19—24.
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Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, the admitted prior art of Appellants’
application, and further in view of Kundu.
Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, the admitted prior art of Appellants’
application, and further in view of Chen.
Claim 26 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Sen, the admitted prior art of Appellants’
application, and further in view of Vivian.
Claims 1, 7—8, 14, and 28—29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Schupmann in view of Mehta et al.
(US 2012/0159234 Al; June 21, 2012) (“Mehta”).5
Claims 2 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, and further in view of Kundu.
Claims 4 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, and further in view of Chen.
Claims 6 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, and further in view of Vivian.
Claims 15—17 and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, and further in view of Taylor.
Claims 18—21, 27, and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, and further in view of the
admitted prior art of Appellants’ application.
5 The header of the rejection also includes claim 3, but this appears to be an
error, as claim 3 was cancelled, and the body of the rejection does not
include claim 3. See Final Act. 42-48.
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Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, the admitted prior art of Appellants’
application, and further in view of Kundu.
Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, the admitted prior art of Appellants’
application, and further in view of Chen.
Claim 26 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schupmann, Mehta, the admitted prior art of Appellants’
application, and further in view of Vivian.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments in the Supplemental Appeal Brief (see Supp. Appeal Br. 25—42)
and Reply Brief (see Reply Br. 2—14), and are not persuaded the Examiner
has erred. Unless otherwise noted, we adopt as our own the findings and
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Office Action from which this
Appeal is taken (Final Act. 2—65), and in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 2—
16), and we concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For
emphasis, we consider and highlight specific arguments as presented in the
Supplemental Appeal Brief and Reply Brief.
Rejection of Independent Claims 1, 8, 15, 18 under § 103(a)
Appellants argue Schupmann, Sen, and Mehta (whether considered
individually or in combination) do not teach or suggest “forwarding the redo
records from the repeater to a standby database for maintaining copies of the
database data, the repeater being geographically separated from the standby
database,” as recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in
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independent claims 8, 15, and 18. See Supp. Appeal Br. 32. More
specifically, Appellants argue Schupmann describes sending redo log files
from a primary database to a standby database, rather than from the claimed
“repeater” to the claimed “standby database.” Id. Appellants further argue
Schupmann additionally describes adding or dropping log file groups or
members to modify one of the databases so that the redo log files contained
within the primary database and standby database are different, and thus,
fails to teach the claimed “maintaining copies of the database data.” Supp.
Appeal Br. 33—34.
We are not persuaded by this argument. Appellants’ argument that
Section 6.1 of Schupmann merely describes sending redo log files from a
primary database to a standby database does not address Figures 5^4 and 5—
5 of Schupmann, which clearly illustrate a network server process (i.e.,
LNS«) receiving redo data from a primary database, and sending the redo
data to a standby database, where the network server process teaches or
suggests the claimed “repeater.” See Ans. 7—9 (citing Schupmann
§§ 5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.3; Figs. 5—4, 5—5). Further, Appellants’ argument that
Schupmann fails to teach or suggest the claimed “maintaining copies of the
database data” because Schupmann describes modifying one of the
databases so that the redo log files contained within the primary database
and standby database are different is also not persuasive because Schupmann
fails to teach or suggest that modification of the databases occurs in every
instance of sending redo log files. Supp. Appeal Br. 33—34. See Schupmann
§ 8.3.5 (“Changing the size and number of the online redo log files is
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sometimes done to tune the database.”) (emphasis added).6 Thus, as the
Examiner correctly finds, the combination of Schupmann, Sen, and Mehta
teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1, 8, 15, and 18.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants additionally argue Schupmann, Sen,
and Mehta (whether considered individually or in combination) do not teach
or suggest “the repeater not sharing a common point of failure with either
the primary database or the standby database such that a failure condition
that causes failure at the primary database or the standby database does not
also cause failure at the repeater,” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited
in claims 8, 15, and 18. See Reply Br. 3—13. Appellants also argue that the
Examiner’s modification of Schupmann by Sen and Mehta to include the
feature of the repeater not sharing a common point of failure with either the
primary database or the standby database changes the fundamental principle
of operation of Schupmann and Sen. See Reply Br. 13—14.
These arguments were first set forth in the Reply Brief, and are
neither related to the argument in the Amended Appeal Brief nor responsive
to the Examiner’s Answer. Thus, as the Examiner has not been provided a
chance to respond, and in the absence of a showing of good cause by
Appellants, these arguments are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41 (b)(2) (“Any argument raised in the reply brief which was not raised
in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in the
[EJaminer’s [AJnswer, including any designated new ground of rejection,
6 Schupmann also emphasizes that changes to the primary database should
be synchronized with the standby database. See Schupmann § 8.3.5
(“[W]hen you add or drop an online redo log file at the primary [database], it
is important that you synchronize the changes in the standby database.”)
(emphasis added).
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will not be considered by the Board for purposes of the present appeal,
unless good cause is shown.”). Appellants have made no such showing in
this record. Accordingly, we will not consider these new arguments in the
Reply Brief.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 8, 15,
and 18 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of Claims 6, 13, and 26 under § 103(a)
Claim 6 recites the limitation “a transaction at the physical primary
database commits after receiving acknowledgment of the redo records being
received at the repeater.” Claims 13 and 26 recite identical or substantially
similar limitations. Appellants argue that Schupmann describes an
asynchronous redo log writer process that transmits redo data without
waiting for any acknowledgments in order to reduce the performance impact
on a primary database. See Supp. Appeal Br. 35, 37. Appellants further
argue that the Examiner’s modification of Schupmann by Sen and Mehta to
include a feature of a synchronous process that includes waiting to commit a
transaction at the primary database after receiving an acknowledgment: (1)
renders Schupmann unsatisfactory for its intended purpose; and (2) changes
the principle of operation of Schupmann. See Supp. Appeal Br. 35—37.
We are not persuaded by this argument. Contrary to Appellants’
argument that Schupmann requires an asynchronous redo log writer process
that transmits redo data without waiting for an acknowledgment, Schupmann
explicitly discloses that the transmission of redo data to a remote destination
can either be asynchronous or synchronous. See Schupmann § 5.3.2.
Schupmann further discloses that when the transmission of the redo data is
synchronous, transactions are committed at the primary database only after
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Application 13/454,799
an indication is received that the redo data is received at the remote
destination. See Schupmann § 5.3.2.2. Thus, Appellants have failed to
show why the Examiner’s modification of Schupmann by Sen and Mehta to
include a feature of waiting to commit a transaction at the primary database
after receiving an acknowledgment would either render Schupmann
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, or change the principle of operation
of Schupmann.
Appellants further argue Vivian merely describes a maximum protect
mode where a primary database stops processing when no standby database
indicates to the primary database that it has redo data, and thus, to the extent
the indication disclosed in Vivian teaches the claimed “acknowledgment,”
Vivian discloses that the primary database waits for the indication from a
standby database, not from the claimed “repeater.” See Supp. Appeal Br. 38.
We do not find this argument persuasive either. Rather than solely relying
on Vivian for teaching receiving an acknowledgment of redo records being
received at a repeater, the Examiner relied upon the combination of
Schupmann and Vivian for teaching the aforementioned limitation; the
Examiner relied upon Schupmann for the claimed “repeater,” and further
relied upon Vivian for teaching committing a transaction after receiving an
acknowledgment that redo records have been received. See Final Act. 20,
27; see also Ans. 7—8, 14—15. It is well established that one cannot show
non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the rejection is
based upon the teachings of a combination of references. See In re Merck &
Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Keller 642 F.2d
413, 425 (CCPA 1981). This argument is not persuasive because it does not
address the actual reasoning of the rejection.
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Appellants also argue that Vivian explicitly disparages the disclosed
maximum protect mode and instead discloses a preference for an
asynchronous transport mode that does not wait for acknowledgments. See
Supp. Appeal Br. 38-41. We are not persuaded by this argument either.
Rather than disparaging a synchronous transport mode (i.e., waiting for
acknowledgments), Vivian merely describes an asynchronous transport
mode (i.e., not waiting for acknowledgments) as having certain benefits
when compared to the synchronous transport mode. See Vivian ||18—24.
However, any tradeoffs involved in selecting either an asynchronous
transport mode or a synchronous transport mode does not undermine the
combination given the Examiner’s articulated benefit of a higher level of
data protection due to the prevention of any loss of redo data by utilizing a
synchronous transport mode. See Final Act. 27; see also Winner Int 7
Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349, n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact
that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however,
should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference
with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained,
should be weighed against one another.”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 13, and
26 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of Claims 2, 4, 7—9, 11, 14, 16—17,
19—22, 24, and 27—31 under § 103(a)
In arguing the rejection of the aforementioned claims, Appellants
incorporate their previous arguments regarding Schupmann and Vivian. See
Supp. Appeal Br. 41 42. These arguments are not persuasive for the reasons
previously described. Appellants further argue Kundu, similar to
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Schupmann, renders the Examiner’s combination improper because Kundu
explicitly describes a log-based replication of procedures that allows
asynchronous execution while preserving the original order of execution.
See Supp. Appeal Br. 42. This argument is not persuasive either. Similar to
Vivian, Kundu fails to explicitly disparage synchronous execution, and,
instead, merely describes that log based replication of procedures allows for
asynchronous execution. See Kundu 152. Thus, similar to our previous
discussion regarding Vivian, any tradeoffs involved in selecting either
asynchronous execution or synchronous execution does not undermine the
combination given the Examiner’s articulated benefit of a higher level of
data protection due to the prevention of any loss of redo data by utilizing
synchronous execution. See Final Act. 25.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—2, 4, 6—
9, 11, 14, 16—17, 19—22,24, and 27—31 for obviousness under
35U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—2, 4, 6—9, 11, 13—22,
24, and 26-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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