Ex Parte Martini

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 31, 2017

13896215 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/896,215 05/16/2013 Paul Michael Martini 38097-0004001 1986 20985 7590 09/05/2017 FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (SD) P.O. BOX 1022 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022 EXAMINER SCHEUNEMANN, RICHARD N ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3624 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/05/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PATDOCTC@fr.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PAUL MICHAEL MARTINI Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,2151 Technology Center 3600 Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL An oral hearing was held on April 13, 2017. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Paul Michael Martini (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1-7, 9-17, 19-26, and 28-33. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM. 1 The Appellant identifies iboss, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 THE INVENTION Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method comprising: receiving, by one or more computers, first information corresponding to a directory service of network users, the directory service configured to organize the network users into a plurality of user roles, each network user belonging to one or more user roles, each user role having a user role name that comprises a human readable string and is unique among the plurality of user roles; receiving, by at least one of the computers, second information corresponding to a resource available to the network users, the resource having a plurality of policy groups, each policy group having one or more associated usage policies, and having a policy group name that comprises a human readable string and is unique among the plurality of policy groups; comparing, by at least one of the computers, a first human readable string for a first user role name with a second human readable string for a first policy group name; automatically determining, by at least one of the computers, that the first user role name comprises the same human readable string as the first policy group name in response to comparing the first human readable string for the first user role name with the second human readable string for the first policy group name; and automatically linking, by at least one of the computers, a first user role corresponding to the first user role name with the policy group corresponding to the first policy group name such that the one or more network users in the linked first user role are subject to the usage policies associated with the linked policy group in response to automatically determining that the first user role name comprises the same human readable string as the first policy group name. 2 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Banks-Binici Harvey ‘613 Harvey ‘632 McPherson Park Lewis US 2004/0148517 US 2006/0020613 US 2007/0118632 US 2007/0283443 US 2009/0235334 US 7,865,959 B1 A1 July 29, 2004 A1 Jan. 26, 2006 A1 May 24, 2007 A1 Dec. 6, 2007 A1 Sep. 17, 2009 Jan. 4, 2011 The following rejections are before us for review: 1. Claims 1-7, 9-17, 19-26, and 28-33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. 2. Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11-13, 15-17, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 30-33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson and Banks-Binici. 3. Claims 2, 14, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici and Harvey ‘613. 4. Claims 4 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici and Lewis. 5. Claims 9, 10, 19, 20, 28, and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici and Park. 6. Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, Lewis and Harvey ‘632. 3 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 ISSUES Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-7, 9-17, 19-26, and 28-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter? Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11-13, 15-17, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 30-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson and Banks-Binici? Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 2, 14, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici and Harvey ‘613? Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 4 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici and Lewis? Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 9, 10, 19, 20, 28, and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks- Binici and Park? Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, Lewis and Harvey ‘632? ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1-7, 9-17, 19-26, and 28-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Claims 1-7, 10-17, 20-26, and 29-33 The Appellant argued these claims as a group. See App. Br. 10-15. We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and the remaining claims 2-7, 10-17, 20-26, and 29-33 stand or fall with claim 1. 37C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv). 4 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 Alice Corp. Party Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) identifies a two-step framework for determining whether claimed subject matter is judicially-excepted from patent eligibility under § 101. According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,” such as an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. In that regard, the Examiner determined that the claims were directed "towards the abstract idea of linking user roles with policy groups, a method of organizing human activity." Non-Final Rej. 5. The Appellant argues that "the claims recite a concrete implementation of a directory service that is both applied and practical, and are in no way theoretical. The claimed subject matter is not difficult to understand, and it does not relate to abstract concepts like ‘truth’ or ‘justice.’" App. Br. 12. Whether or not something as claimed is concrete, theoretical, difficult to understand, and/or relate to abstract concepts like "truth" or "justice" is not the test for determining whether claimed subject matter is judicially-excepted from patent-eligibility. If that were the case, claims to computers would necessarily be patent eligible. But that is not the case. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358-59: The fact that a computer “necessarily existfs] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual realm” ... is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a “machine”), or that many computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant concept. 5 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 Furthermore, claim 1 does not recite an "implementation of a directory service" (App. Br. 12). According to the method of claim 1, information "corresponding to a directory service of network users [is received], the directory service configured to organize the network users into a plurality of user roles . . . Said directory service is used to receive corresponding information, rather than implemented. The Appellant also argues that the claims are directed to a method for "comparing ... a first human readable string for a first user role name with a second human readable string for a first policy group name" and "automatically linking ... a first user role corresponding to the first user role name with the policy group corresponding to the first policy group name such that the one or more network users in the linked first user role are subject to the usase policies associated with the linked policy group", which in no way is an abstract idea but rather requires meaningful tests and control of devices based on those tests. App. Br. 12-13. However, the Appellant does not actually dispute the Examiner's articulation of claim 1 as being directed to "linking user roles with policy groups" (albeit the Appellant does challenge claim 1 as being directed to an abstract idea). Instead the Appellant appears to propose an alternative; that is, claim 1 is directed to a combination of the third and fifth steps recited in the claim. But the combination of the third ("comparing . . . ") and fifth ("automatically linking [user roles with policy groups]") steps is simply describing what claim 1 is directed to at a level of abstraction that is lower than what the Examiner has described it as being directed to. The Federal Circuit determined that [a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction. As the Board has done, the claimed abstract idea 6 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 could be described as generating menus on a computer, or generating a second menu from a first menu and sending the second menu to another location. It could be described in other ways, including, as indicated in the specification, taking orders from restaurant customers on a computer. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240-1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Be that as it may, even if we assume arguendo that the concept to which claim 1 is directed to is better described by the Appellant's proposed alternative than the Examiner's articulation of it, we do not see that the alternative is any less an abstract idea. “[Cjomparing one thing to another” is an abstract idea. See Blue Spike, LLCv. Google Inc., No. 14-CV-01650-YGR, 2015 WL 5260506 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015), affd, No. 2016-1054, 2016 WL 5956746 (mem) (Fed. Cir. Oct. 14, 2016). As for "linking" as that term is used in claim 1, we see little difference between its abstract nature and that of "comparing." The "linking" step of claim 1 links a role with a policy group "such that the one or more network users in the linked first user role are subject to the usage policies associated with the linked policy group." That is to say, the act of "linking" a role to a policy group is defined in terms of the result ("such that. . .") that is intended to be achieved. In that regard, “[generally, a claim that merely describes an ‘effect or result dissociated from any method by which [it] is accomplished’ is not directed to patent-eligible subject matter.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). In our view, the "linking" as claimed is an abstract idea. Also cf. 7 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 Linkgine, Inc. v. VigLink, Inc., CBM2014-00184, 2015 WL 1263583 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Mar. 18, 2015), affd, 2017 WL 1960009 (Mem) (Fed. Cir. 2017). And, merely combining abstract ideas (e.g., "comparing" and "linking") does not render the combination any less abstract. Cf. Shortridge v. Found. Constr. Payroll Serv., LLC, No. 14-CV-04850-JCS, 2015 WL 1739256 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015), affd, No. 2015-1898, 2016 WL 3742816 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2016). Furthermore, claim 1 does not recite a method that "requires meaningful tests and control of devices based on [ ] tests " (App. Br. 13). That part of the argument is not commensurate in scope with what is claimed. Accordingly, the arguments challenging the Examiner's determination under step one of the Alice framework Non-Final Rejection are unpersuasive as to its error. Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73 (2012)). In that regard, the Examiner determined that [t]he claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea because no improvement to another technology or technical field is recited, nor do the limitations recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself. The limitations require no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer 8 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry. Non-Final Rej. 5. The Appellant does not disagree with the Examiner that "no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions" (Non-Final Rej. 5) is needed to conduct the method as claimed. This is consistent with the record. Each step of the claim 1 method calls for, without limitation, "one or more computers" or "at least one of the computers" and the Specification discloses that such "computers" cover general purpose ones (see e.g., paras. 163-167). The Appellant argues instead that "there is significantly more in the claims than ‘linking user roles with policy groups’" (App. Br. 13) because claim 1 includes concrete, physical limitations. If the Office had in fact considered the actual language of the claims, it would have recognized that they include myriad concrete, physical limitations that tie the claim to the applied, practical and physical world. For example, claim 1 recites a directory service with information about network users and the use of that information and includes the following real, physical, concrete, tangible components that are in no way theoretical or abstract: • One or more computers • A directory service of network users • A resource available to the network users Again, the Office has provided absolutely no explanation or analysis in support of its conclusion that these real, physical, concrete, tangible components can be completely ignored in declaring the claims as directed to an abstract concept. App. Br. 13. 9 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 We addressed the concreteness argument above. But it is also important to emphasize that claim 1 does not reflect the contention underlying the Appellant's argument - that what is claimed is limited by certain "concrete" aspects. For example, it is true that claim 1 mentions "a directory service of network users" and "a resource available to the network users." But, as claimed, they limit the type of information that the method receives; that is, corresponding to "a directory service of network users" and "a resource available to the network users," a "first" and "second" information, respectively, are received "by one or more computers." Claim 1. Notwithstanding the question of the patentable significance of contextual limitations {see In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 850 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), the claim limitations "a directory service of network users" and "a resource available to the network users" do not "tie the claim to the applied, practical and physical world." App. Br. 13. They limit the content of the received information, not "a directory service of network users" or "a resource available to the network users," or the information's source and generation. Accordingly, when the Appellant argues that the claims recite patent eligible subject matter because they are an improvement to another technical field, specifically the technical fields of directory services (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directory service) and access control (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Access control), App. Br. 15, the argument is not commensurate in scope with what is claimed and thus cannot be persuasive as to patent-eligibility. The Appellant further argues that "the claims recite patent eligible subject matter because they are analogous to other claims that the Supreme Court has found to be patent eligible," discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 10 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 U.S. 175 (1981). App. Br. 12-13. The Appellant reproduces nearly the entire claim, but as we understand it, the Appellant focuses specifically on the claim terms and phrases "computers," "a directory service," and "a resource" as the reason claim 1 is "analogous to Diehr's control of the rubber-mold press" (App. Br. 14). We do not see it that way. We have explained that the evidence supports reading the "computers" recited in the claim as covering generic computers and that "a directory service of network users" or "a resource available to the network users" do nothing more to the claimed method than limit the type of received information. We do not know how these limitations render claim 1 analogous to the Diehr claims - which "involved] the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing" {Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184). The Appellant also cites Research Corp. Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) in order to argue that it is similar to "each of the independent claims 1,13, and 22 [which] recite[ ] ‘one or more computers,’ ‘a directory service,’ and ‘a resource available to the network users.’" App. Br. 14-15. Here, too, we do not see the analogy. Research involved claims to a process for rendering a halftone image. "These inventions address ‘a need in the art for a method of and apparatus for the halftone rendering of gray scale images in which a digital data processor is utilized in a simple and precise manner to accomplish the halftone rendering.’ '310 patent col. 3 11. 33^40." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 869. By contrast, the instant invention "relates to systems and techniques that facilitate the linking of user access policies across different network services and products." Specification, para. 1 (emphasis added). Rendering a 11 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 halftone image is not analogous to linking policies. The former "presents functional and palpable applications in the field of computer technology" (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 868). The latter does not. Accordingly, the arguments challenging the Examiner's determination under step two of the Alice framework in the Non-Final Rejection are unpersuasive as to its error. Why the Examiner designated a new ground of rejection in the Answer but yet the rejection is substantially repeated from the Non-Final Rejection is unclear. The articulation of the abstract idea ("linking roles with policy groups" (Ans. 4)) and the determination that the "claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more that the judicial exception" (Ans. 3) are the same as what was stated in the Non-Final Rejection. Apart from newly citing SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Laboratories, SA, 555 Fed. Appx. 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert, denied, 135 S. Ct. 58 (2014) (see Ans. 4), the thrust of the Examiner's position does not appear to have changed. In light of the new ground, the Appellant proceeds further to argue that Appellant's claimed solution does not preempt the method disclosed in McPherson (U.S. Pub. No. 2007 /0283443), which describes a method for " [translation of role-based authoring models for managing RBAC 'roles' to resource authorization policy (RAP)" (McPherson at Abstract). Accordingly, the alleged abstract idea ("automatically linking a first user role with a policy group") can be performed in myriad other ways and thus is not preempted by the claims on appeal. Reply Br. 1. What the Appellant means to argue is not entirely clear. 12 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 If the Appellant means to argue that the claimed method is new and nonobvious (over e.g., McPherson) (an argument similar to the one made on page 7 of the Reply Brief), it is unpersuasive. A finding of novelty or nonobviousness does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that subject matter is patentable eligible. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass ’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013). Indeed, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 . . . (1981) (emphasis added); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303-04 (rejecting “the Government’s invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under § 101”). Here, the jury’s general finding that Symantec did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that three particular prior art references do not disclose all the limitations of or render obvious the asserted claims does not resolve the question of whether the claims embody an inventive concept at the second step of Mayo/Alice. Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (footnote omitted). If the Appellant means to argue that the claimed method is but one a number different ways to "automatically link[ ] a first user role with a policy group," it is unpersuasive. That a claim could be drafted differently from claim 1 and still be directed to said abstract idea does not affect the determination that claim 1 is directed to said abstract idea. “What matters is whether a claim threatens to subsume the full scope of a fundamental concept, and when those concerns arise, we must look for meaningful limitations that prevent the claim as a whole from covering the concept’s 13 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 every practical application.” CLS Bank Intern, v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., Ill F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring). Emphasis added. To be clear, the proper focus is not preemption per se, for some measure of preemption is intrinsic in the statutory right granted with every patent to exclude competitors, for a limited time, from practicing the claimed invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154. Rather, the animating concern is that claims should not be coextensive with a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; a patent-eligible claim must include one or more substantive limitations that, in the words of the Supreme Court, add “significantly more” to the basic principle, with the result that the claim covers significantly less. See Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1294. Thus, broad claims do not necessarily raise § 101 preemption concerns, and seemingly narrower claims are not necessarily exempt. Id. See also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[wjhile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”). Nevertheless, because we find the claimed subject matter covers patent-ineligible subject matter, the pre-emption concern is necessarily addressed. “Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, [] preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1379. The Reply Brief then takes issue with the Examiner's statement at page 3, para. 2, of the Answer that ‘ [t]he claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more that the judicial exception because the claims do not recite an improvement to another technology or technical field, nor do they recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself. ’ 14 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 Reply Br. 2 (emphasis Appellant's). The Appellant contends that "[the Examiner's] assertion is incorrect. The claims do in fact recite an improvement to the functioning of a computer." Reply Br. 2. The record supports the Examiner. The Appellant argues that "uncontroverted evidence of record establishes that the claims on appeal ‘recite and improvement to the functioning of the computer itself,’ and thus recite patent eligible subject matter." Reply Br. 2. In support thereof, the Appellant cites Paragraph 9 of Paul Martini's declaration describes one client's praise of the invention and how it improves their systems compared to previous software: "we use iboss [the product which uses the invention] to dynamically apply directory policy when a user is authenticated. The advantage of the iboss [system] allow[s] us to simply create a group name which matches our directory workgroups [and] minimizes set up time. In addition, this ability has allowed us to apply directory group policy against our BYOD network which in the past was only able to provide directory user information." (Declaration filed under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 on August 13, 2014, page 3.) Reply Br. 2. However, (a) a client's praise (or not) is insufficient as a basis for resolving whether claim 1 adds significantly more to transform the abstract idea of linking user roles with policy groups into an inventive application. (b) Claim 1 makes no mention of "dynamically applying] directory policy when a user is authenticated." Accordingly, that is not a reason to find claim 1 adds significantly more to transform the abstract idea of linking user roles with policy groups into an inventive application, (c) Regarding "allow[s] [us] to simply create a group name which matches our directory workgroups 15 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 and minimizes set up time" and "th[e] ability has allowed us to apply directory group policy against our BYOD network which in the past was only able to provide directory user information," like (b), they are not reflected in the wording of claim 1. Claim 1 does not limit the covered subject matter to the alleged computer-based improvements. It is much broader than that. Accordingly, they cannot serve as reasons to find claim 1 adds significantly more to transform the abstract idea of linking user roles with policy groups into an inventive application. The same theme - that claim 1 is rooted in computer technology - threads through the remaining arguments in the Reply Brief. But the arguments suffer from the same problem. Limitations said to show a rooting in computer technology are simply not present in the claim. “[T]he name of the game is the claim.” In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Reply Brief is replete with arguments that are not commensurate in scope with what is claimed. “Many of appellant’s arguments fail from the outset because,. . . they are not based on limitations appearing in the claims.” In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). See also In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994): Warmerdam's other argument, that the manipulation of data as described in the claims constitutes or represents a sufficient level of physical activity to impart patentability to the claim, is not convincing. It is true, particularly with ideas expressed in mathematical form, that if a claim requires more than the manipulation of ideas so that the process described in the claim produces something quite different, then the process might indeed describe statutory subject matter. The problem with Warmerdam's argument is that the claims here do not have that effect. It is the claims which define the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system. Zenith 16 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 Lab. Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424, 30 USPQ2d 1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Thus, the argument is unavailing. We conclude the Board did not err in sustaining the rejection of claims 1-4 under § 101. The Appellant argues that "the claims address a specific problem of network administrators when creating user roles and policy groups and how a system applies the policy groups to devices that correspond to the user roles" (Reply Br. 3) and yet claim 1 is not directed to a method of improving the administration of networks. On pages 4 and 5 of the Reply Brief, the Appellant cites disclosure from the Specification regarding a [technique whereby] the network resources can communicate using the directory service group name to which the specific user belongs, and which corresponds to the names of the usage policies for the network resources. This technique allows the two network resources to quickly and easily identify the usage policies to apply for the specific user or the specific user device. Para. 30. But claim 1 is not directed to a method of improving network resources. Similarly, the Appellant further mentions a "directory service" application executing on a server (Reply Br. 5), "the use of a network, computers, and network resources" (Reply Br. 6; emphasis added); and a "database" (Reply Br. 7), none of which claim 1 is limited to. We have considered all of the Appellant’s remaining arguments in the Reply Brief and have find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, because representative claim 1, and claims 2-7, 10-17, 20-26, and 29-33 which stand or fall with claim 1, are directed to an abstract idea and the Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner was in error in determining that they do not present an “inventive concept,” we 17 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 sustain the Examiner's determination that they are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35U.S.C. § 101. Claims 9, 19, and 28 Both the Appeal (page 5) and Reply (page 10) Briefs point out that claims 9, 19, and 28 [and thus claims 10, 20 and 29 that depend therefrom, respectively] further define patentable subject matter. For instance, these claims recite additional hardware - a user device - and communication between various hardware components: "receiving, by at least one of the computers, a resource access request for the resource from a user device" and "determining ... access permissions for the user device to the requested resource." App. Br. 15. But a user device, communicating between hardware components are well known generic computer functions that add little to transform the abstract idea into an inventive concept. Receiving a resource access request for a resource from a user device and determining access permissions for the user device to the requested resource similarly add little to transform the abstract idea into an inventive concept. Cf. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert, denied, 838 F.3d 1266 (2017); Appistry, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 WF 4210890 (W.D. Wash. 2015), affd, 2017 WF 541015 (Mem) (Fed. Cir. 2017); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Company, 850 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Jericho Systems Corp. v. Axiomatics, Inc., 2015 WF 2165931 (N.D. Tex. 2015), affd, 642 Fed. App’x 979 (Mem) (Fed. Cir. 2016); Nextpoint, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2016 WF 3181705 (N.D. 111. 2016), affd, 2017 WF 977036 (Mem) (Fed. Cir. 2017); and, Prism Technologies LLC v. T-Mobile 18 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 USA, Inc. 2017 WL 2705338 (Fed. Cir., 2016-2031, 2016-2049, June 23, 2017). We have considered all of the Appellants' remaining arguments in the Reply Brief and have found them unpersuasive. Claims 9, 19, and 28 [and thus claims 10, 20, and 29 that depend therefrom, respectively] are directed to an abstract idea and the Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner was in error in determining that they do not add significantly more to transform the abstract idea into an “inventive concept.” Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's determination that they are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 11,21, and 30-32 The Appellant argues that "[w]ith respect to the 101 rejection, claims 11,21, and 30-32 further define patentable subject matter. For instance, these claims recite additional features of ‘receiving ... a policy group update’ and ‘automatically changing ... one or more access permissions for at least one of the network users. App. Br. 16 (a similar argument is made at Reply Br. 10-11). We are not persuaded that steps of "receiving" certain information and "automatically changing" “access permissions" add significantly more to transform the abstract idea into an “inventive concept.” Such steps are themselves abstract ideas. Receiving information is an abstract idea. When “the focus of the asserted claims” is “on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,” the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). And automatically changing access 19 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 permissions is similar to the abstract idea “providing restricted access to resources” (Prism Technologies LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (Fed. Cir., 2016- 2031, 2016-2049, June 23, 2017)). Claims 11,21, and 30-32 are directed to an abstract idea and the Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner was in error in determining that they do not add significantly more to transform the abstract idea into an “inventive concept.” Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's determination that they are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 33 The Appellant argues that [w]ith respect to the 101 rejection, claim 33 further defines patentable subject matter with the features of "providing, by at least one of the computers, instructions for the presentation of a policy group details user interface ... to a user device" and "receiving, by at least one of the computers, the policy group update ..." Additionally, claim 33, similar to the claims in Research Corp. Tech., requires "a user device" and "providing . . . instructions for the presentation of a . . . user interface." App. Br. 16 (a similar argument is made at Reply Br. 11). We are not persuaded that said "providing" and "receiving" steps add significantly more to transform the abstract idea into an “inventive concept.” Such steps are themselves abstract ideas. Individually and in combination, receiving and providing information are abstract ideas. When “[t]he focus of the asserted claims” is “on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,” the claims are 20 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 33 is directed to an abstract idea and the Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner was in error in determining that it does not add significantly more to transform the abstract idea into an “inventive concept.” Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's determination that it is directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11-13, 15-17, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 30-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson and Banks-Binici. The rejection of claims 2, 14, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, and Harvey ‘613. The rejection of claims 4 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, and Lewis. The rejection of claims 9, 10, 19, 20, 28, and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, and Park. The rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, Lewis, and Harvey ‘632. All the independent claims, and thus all the claims, require "comparing, by at least one of the computers, a first human readable string for a first user role name with a second human readable string for a first policy group name" (claims 1,13, and 22). The Examiner found that said limitation is disclosed in Banks-Binici (para. 31 and Fig. 2). Non-Final Rej. 8. We have reviewed Banks-Binici. For the reasons discussed in the Appeal Brief (pages 18-19; see also the Reply Brief, pages 13-20), we agree with the Appellant that Banks-Binici does not adequately disclose the comparing step as claimed. 21 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 The rejection of the claims under § 103 over the cited prior art combinations are not sustained on the ground that as prima facie case of obviousness has not been made out in the first instance by a preponderance of the evidence. CONCLUSIONS The rejection of claims 1-7, 9-17, 19-26, and 28-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter is affirmed. The rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11-13, 15-17, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 30-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson and Banks-Binici is reversed. The rejection of claims 2, 14, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, and Harvey ‘613 is reversed. The rejection of claims 4 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, and Lewis is reversed. The rejection of claims 9, 10, 19, 20, 28, and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, and Park is reversed. The rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McPherson, Banks-Binici, Lewis, and Harvey ‘632 is reversed. 22 Appeal 2015-006544 Application 13/896,215 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-7, 9-17, 19-26, and 28-33 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 23