Ex Parte Kuo et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 10, 2013

11295291 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte CYNTHIA Y. KUO, FRITZ J. SCHNEIDER, and COLLIN E. JACKSON ____________________ Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN, and PATRICK M. BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judges. BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1–22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Illustrative Claim The disclosure relates to online security, particularly “to alerting online users to potentially fraudulent websites.” Spec. ¶[001]. Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below: 1. A computer-implemented method of alerting a user to a potentially fraudulent document, comprising: at client system having one or more processors and memory storing one or more programs, the one or more processors executing the one or more programs to perform the operations of: determining that a document requested by a user is potentially fraudulent; displaying a completely non-interactive rendering of the document; displaying a warning icon; and displaying a warning message corresponding to the warning icon. 1 The real party-in-interest is Google, Inc. Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 3 References The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Amir Shull US 2006/0041837 A1 US 2006/0212931 A1 Feb. 23, 2006 Sep. 21, 2006 Rejections The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1, 9–11, and 19–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §102(e) as anticipated by Amir. Ans. 4. Claims 4–8 and 14–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as unpatentable over Amir. Ans. 8. Claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §103(a) as unpatentable over Amir in view of Shull. Ans. 12. ANALYSIS We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief and Reply Brief, and have reviewed the Examiner’s response to Appellants’ arguments. Appellants present their claims on appeal in eight groups, labeled “A” through “H,” that we address in turn. Group A: Claims 1, 9, 10, 11, and 19 Appellants argue on pages 19–21 of the Appeal Brief and on pages 7– 9 of the Reply Brief that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 9, 10, 11, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) are in error. These arguments present us with the issue of whether the Examiner erred in finding that Amir discloses the Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 4 limitation of “displaying a completely non-interactive rendering of the document” (emphasis added), as required by illustrative claim 1. Appellants contend that Amir “teaches a particularly selective process of link and script disablement” (App. Br. 20, emphasis in original). Specifically, Appellants argue that because Amir teaches “disabling links or scripts[] only when they are likely to be dangerous and keeps them when they are considered ‘safe’” that Amir “does not teach producing a ‘completely non-interactive rendering of a document’” (App. Br. 18, emphasis added). We disagree with Appellants’ analysis. Amir discloses application of its methodology to a variety of electronic documents, including those that may have relatively few or relatively many unsafe features (see, e.g., ¶[0027]). Even if the underlying methodology includes some level of selectivity, its application to electronic documents in which all present features are determined to be unsafe necessarily results in generation and display of a completely non-interactive rendering of the document. That is, the simplest application of Amir’s methodology is to a web site having a single link that is determined to be unsafe and accordingly disabled. We therefore find that the Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 9, 10, 11, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as anticipated by Amir. Group B: Claims 5 and 15 Appellants argue on pages 9–11 of the Reply Brief that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 5 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) are in error. These arguments present us with the issue of whether the Examiner Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 5 erred in finding the limitation directed to “displaying a graphical facsimile of a rendering of the document” is obvious over Amir. Appellants argue that Amir does not directly teach the disputed limitation (Rep. Br. 11), despite the Examiner’s acknowledgment that “Amir does not specifically teach a graphical facsimile of a rendered document” (Ans. 16). But “[w]hat a reference teaches or suggests must be examined in the context of the knowledge, skill, and reasoning ability of a skilled artisan. What a reference teaches a person of ordinary skill is not limited to what a reference specifically ‘talks about’ or what is specifically ‘mentioned’ or ‘written’ in the reference.” Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Examiner found that Amir describes rendering an alternative source code from an original source code, where the alternative source code eliminates undesired operations (Amir ¶[0034]). The alternative source code renders “any type of webpage, electronic mail message, … and an application-specific electronic document” (id). As such, the Examiner’s rejection draws on what Amir suggests through its disclosure “that the original and altered document can comprise any format including an application-specific electronic document” (Ans. 16, see Amir ¶[0034]), noting that a “graphical facsimile to one of ordinary skill in the art, is an application-specific electronic document” (Ans. 17). In view of Appellants’ broad identification of a “graphical facsimile” as “an image file that portrays what the document looks like when rendered normally in a browser” (Spec. ¶[0032]), we find that Amir’s disclosure of rendering an “application- specific electronic document” reasonably suggests rendering a “graphical Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 6 facsimile” to one of skill in the art. We accordingly disagree that the Examiner has erred. Group C: Claims 20–22 Appellants argue on pages 23–24 of the Appeal Brief and on pages 11–13 of the Reply Brief that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 20–22 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) are in error. These arguments present us with the issue of whether the Examiner erred in finding the limitation of claims 20– 22 directed to “prevent[ing] user input into the one or more input fields of the document” is disclosed by Amir. Appellants contend that Amir “makes no mention of preventing a user from inputting into one or more input fields” (App. Br. 24). Specifically, Appellants provide a definition of an “input field” as “an area that allows a user to enter information” (Rep. Br. 13, emphasis added by Appellants), arguing that Amir’s disclosure of disabling links does not correspond to preventing user input into input fields. Appellants’ argument construes the disclosure of Amir identified by the Examiner too narrowly. While paragraph 40 of Amir provides an example of link elimination, it further describes the disabling of “clickable items.” Examples of “clickable elements” provided by Amir include “form buttons, figures and embedded links” (Amir, ¶[0036]). Because a “form button” provides “an area that allows a user to enter information” (see Rep. Br. 13), we disagree that the Examiner has erred. Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 7 Group D: Claims 4 and 14 Appellants argue on pages 25–27 of the Appeal Brief and on pages 13–15 of the Reply Brief that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 4 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) are in error. These arguments present us with the issue of whether Amir discloses displaying an “overlay … configured to make the document completely non-interactive” (App. Br. 25–27). Appellants agree that Amir discloses “overlay text and graphics … that may include controls … to block or approve the identified hidden commands in the electronic document” (Ans. 8, citing Amir ¶[0032], and App. Br. 26). Appellants’ argument that “the overlay of Amir is interactive and selectable” (App. Br. 26, emphasis in original) is not persuasive because the claims require only that the overlay be configured to make the overlaid document non-interactive, presenting no requirement that the overlay itself be non-interactive. Appellants’ argument that Amir fails to describe a semi-transparent overlay (App. Br. 26) is also not persuasive because, as noted supra, Amir describes that the overlay of text and graphics is over the original document (Amir, ¶[0032]). We agree with the Examiner’s rationale (Ans. 17–18) and accordingly adopt it as our own. We further note that the term “semi- transparent” includes the ability to overlay graphics and text while the original document is still visible. As such, Amir describes a semi- transparent overlay. Group E: Claims 6 and 16 Appellants argue on pages 27–31 of the Appeal Brief that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 6 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) are in Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 8 error. These arguments present us with the issue of whether “displaying the warning icon in a privileged display region of a browser application” defines a patentable distinction over Amir. Appellants’ argue that the recitation in claims 6 and 16 of displaying a warning icon “in a privileged display region of a browser application” is distinct from Amir’s disclosure of displaying a warning “in a separate region of the window” (Amir ¶[0032]) because “the location of the display message imparts a specific meaning to a user of a web browser” (App. Br. 30). We agree with the Examiner’s rationale (Ans. 19), and further note that the Specification describes a “privileged region” as “[d]isplay regions of the browser window other than the document region” (Spec. ¶[0016]). Amir describes that a description of unsafe code is displayed over the original document, in a separate region of the window, or in a separate window (Amir ¶[0032]). The “separate region of the window” described by Amir is a display region of the browser window other than the document region, i.e. the privileged region. Accordingly, Amir describes display of a warning icon in a privileged region. Group F: Claims 7 and 17 Appellants argue on pages 31–33 of the Appeal Brief that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) are in error. These arguments present us with the issue of whether “displaying the warning message so as to overlay both a portion of the displayed non- interactive rendering of the document in a document display region of a browser application and a portion of a privileged display region of the browser application” defines a patentable distinction over Amir. Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 9 For reasons that parallel those articulated supra with respect to the claims of Group E, but applying our analysis to the “warning message” instead of the “warning icon,” we are unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7 and 17 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over Amir. Group G: Claims 8 and 18 Appellants argue on pages 34–35 of the Appeal Brief that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) are in error. These arguments present us with the issue of whether “displaying the warning icon in the privileged display region of the browser application” and “wherein the displayed warning message points to the warning icon” define a patentable distinction over Amir. We agree with the Examiner’s rationale, and further note that Amir specifically describes “controls, such as buttons, dials, slide bars or checkboxes, to block or approve the identified hidden commands in the electronic format” (Amir ¶[0032]), while the Specification describes a “warning icon” as “tak[ing] on any suitable form” (Spec. ¶[0027]). The controls described by Amir are icons pointed to by warning messages embodied in the descriptive overlaid text and graphics described by Amir. We are accordingly unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 8 and 18 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over Amir. Group H: Claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 Appellants argue on page 36 of the Appeal Brief that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) are in error. Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 10 These arguments present us with the same issue we addressed supra with respect to the claims of Group A, namely whether the Examiner erred in finding that Amir discloses the limitation of “displaying a completely non- interactive rendering of the document.” Specifically, Appellants’ argument focuses on the same limitation we considered supra, supplementing their argument that the limitation is not disclosed by Amir with an argument that it is also not disclosed by Shull. Because we find that Amir discloses the limitation, we also find that the Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as unpatentable over Amir in view of Shull. CONCLUSIONS On the record before us, we conclude the following: (1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 9–11, and 19– 22 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as anticipated by Amir. (2) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 4–8 and 14–18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as unpatentable over Amir. (3) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as unpatentable over Amir in view of Shull. DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–22 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2010-012552 Application 11/295,291 11 AFFIRMED tj