Ex Parte Kono et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 11, 2017

13812435 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/812,435 02/12/2013 Kenji Kono 005000-K00052 5360
78198 7590 12/18/2017
StiiHehaker & Rraokett PP EXAMINER
8255 Greensboro Drive AZARI, SEPEHR
Suite 300
Tysons, VA 22102 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/18/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KENJI KONO, TAKASHI MIYAKE,
TAKAYUKI SHINOZAKI, MEGUMI KUWABARA,
and JUN TAKEDA
Appeal 2017-006242
Application 13/812,435
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MACDONALD, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.
CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1—3. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
Claims 1—3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Maruyama (US 2008/0122315 Al; May 29, 2008). Final Act. 4—9.
Claims 1—3 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created
doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as obvious over Application
No. 13/812,382 and Maruyama. Final Act. 10-14; see also Ans. 3.
We affirm.
Appeal 2017-006242
Application 13/812,435
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to “a tactile sensation providing
apparatus having a touch sensor and a control method for the tactile
sensation providing apparatus.” Spec. 12. Claim 1 is illustrative and
reproduced below:
1. A tactile sensation providing apparatus comprising:
a touch sensor;
a load detection unit configured to detect a pressing load
on the touch sensor for providing a tactile sensation;
a tactile sensation providing unit configured to vibrate a
touch face of the touch sensor;
a tactile sensation provision control unit configured as a
first chip to control drive of the tactile sensation providing unit;
and
a main control unit configured as a second chip to control
an application, wherein
the tactile sensation provision control unit starts detecting
the pressing load in response to receiving a pressing load
detection instruction from the main control unit, and transmits
the pressing load to the main control unit,
the main control unit performs application process based
on an output of the touch sensor and the pressing load received
from the tactile sensation provision control unit, and
the tactile sensation provision control unit stops detecting
the pressing load in response to receiving a pressing load stop
instruction from the main control unit.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential).
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Application 13/812,435
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER MARUYAMA
Contentions
The Examiner finds Maruyama’s CPU 32 (Fig. 13) teaches the recited
(claim 1) “tactile sensation provision control unit” and the recited (claim 1)
“main control unit.” See Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds Maruyama’s steps
G3, G4 (“Which Mode?” “Button Icon Input Mode,” “Detect Press Force
F”) (Fig. 17) teach the recited (claim 1) “the tactile sensation provision
control unit starts detecting the pressing load in response to receiving a
pressing load detection instruction from the main control unit, and transmits
the pressing load to the main control unit.” See Final Act. 4—5; see also
Ans. 2. The Examiner finds Maruyama’s step G12 (“Terminate?”) (Fig. 17)
teaches the recited (claim 1) “the tactile sensation provision control unit
stops detecting the pressing load in response to receiving a pressing load
stop instruction from the main control unit.” See Final Act. 5; see also
Ans. 2.
The Examiner finds “Maruyama does not teach that the tactile
sensation provision [control] unit is configured as a first chip and the main
control unit is configured as a second chip.” Final Act. 5. However, the
Examiner reasons
it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention to provide different chips for
different functions. The examiner takes official notice that every
chip contains at least an integrated circuit which performs at least
one function. Maruyama teaches that the control means 15
performs all the functionality of the first and second chips as
provided by the applicant, therefore one would [have been]
motivated to separate or combine the functionality of different
units into one chip or separate them into different ones since one
with ordinary skill in the art would [have] immediately realize [d]
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that any function may be assigned to any one or plurality of
chips.
Final Act. 6.
In the Answer, the Examiner further reasons
Since the CPU of Maruyama performs all the tasks of the tactile
sensation provision control unit [(TSPCU)], similar to the
CPU/GPU example provided above [(provisioning graphics
functionalities of a CPU to a GPU in a separate chip)], one would
have been motivated to provide a dedicated chip for the CPU and
the TSPCU in order to reduce the processing load of the CPU
regarding tactile sensing[,] which leads to a reduction of power
consumption and improper heating of the CPU chip. Upon
creating a CPU/TSPCU configuration, all the commands
previously internal to the CPU regarding tactile sensing would
necessarily be transmitted to the external TSPCU similar to the
CPU/GPU configuration.
Ans. 3.
Appellants present the following principal arguments:
i. “[S]tep G3 is not a command from a main control unit
(CPU 32) to a tactile sensation provision control unit. To the contrary,
Maruyama discloses that the CPU 32 (not some other circuitry) directly
reads and processes the D2 force input.” App. Br. 5.
ii. “[S]tep G12 is not a stop command issued from CPU 32, but an
internal process decision node whereby the CPU 32 may or may not perform
other tasks.” App. Br. 6.
iii. “[T]he Examiner improperly attempts to assert that the CPU 32
of Maruyama is both a main control unit and tactile sensation provision
control unit, which is improper under U.S. claim construction practices.”
App. Br. 6.
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Application 13/812,435
iv. “There literally can be no transmitting of instructions by
CPU 32 to a tactile sensation provision control unit as one doesn’t exist[] in
Maruyama. Additionally, there is no disclosure in Maruyama of a tactile
sensation provision control unit transmitting a pressing load to the main
control unit.” App. Br. 6.
v. There is no motivation to modify Maruyama. See App. Br. 7—8.
While ordinarily there may be a general motivation
making “that which is integrated, separable,” there is no
motivation on record to modify the primary reference to include,
for example, the specific pressing load detection and stop
detection instructions of the present independent claims, which
work to provide power advantages not found in the applied art of
record.
Applicants also observe that the Examiner has again
overlooked the requirement that all claim limitations must be
shown or suggested independent of providing a motivation to
modify/combine, and that the Examiner has failed to provide any
reference for the recited start and stop commands.
Reply Br. 2.
Analysis
We do not see any error in the Examiner’s findings. Nor do we see
any error in the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Appellants’ arguments (i)—(iv) are unavailing because these
arguments are directed to the specific disclosures of Maruyama, whereas the
Examiner rejects the claims based on Maruyama as modified such that a
tactile sensation provision control unit is configured as a separate chip from
CPU 32. See Final Act. 6, Ans. 3.
Regarding Appellants’ arguments (i) and (ii), Maruyama’s steps G3,
G4 (“Which Mode?” “Button Icon Input Mode,” “Detect Press Force F”)
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Application 13/812,435
(Fig. 17) teach Marayama’s CPU 32 starts detecting the pressing load. When
Maruyama is modified such that a tactile sensation provision control unit is
configured as a separate chip from CPU 32, the separate chip starts detecting
the pressing load in response to commands from CPU 32.
Similarly, Maruyama’s step G12 (“Terminate?”) (Fig. 17) teaches
Maruyama’s CPU 32 stops detecting the pressing load. When Maruyama is
modified such that a tactile sensation provision control unit is configured as
a separate chip from CPU 32, the separate chip stops detecting the pressing
load in response to commands from CPU 32.
Regarding Appellants’ argument (iii), the Examiner does not assert
that CPU 32 is both control units. Instead, the argued claim limitations are
taught when Maruyama is modified such that a tactile sensation provision
control unit is configured as a separate chip from CPU 32. See Final Act. 6,
Ans. 3.
Regarding Appellants’ argument (iv), our analysis is similar. The
argued claim limitations are taught when Maruyama is modified such that a
tactile sensation provision control unit is configured as a separate chip from
CPU 32.
Thus, this appeal hinges on Appellants’ argument (v), which focuses
on motivation to modify Maruyama.
On the record before us, we find the Examiner’s reasoning is rational.
See Final Act. 6; Ans. 3 (“reduce the processing load of the CPU regarding
tactile sensing”). In passing, we note that a general desire for power savings
is well-known and conventional to one of ordinary skill in that art. For
example, Huang (US 7,774,629; issued Aug. 10, 2010) discloses “[a]
method for power management of a CPU and a system thereof, which drive
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the CPU to enter a more efficient power saving state.” Huang, Abstract.
Further, in general, making separable that which is integrated is an obvious
design choice when there is a reason (for example, reducing processing load)
to make separable. See In re Dulberg, 289 F.2d 522, 523 (CCPA 1961).
Weighing the Examiner’s findings and reasons in light of Maruyama,
against Appellants’ arguments without further evidence, we find that on this
record the Examiner has sufficiently established that Maruyama’s teachings
would have rendered the claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection based on Maruyama
of claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection based on Maruyama of
claims 2 and 3, which are not separately argued with particularity.
THE PROVISIONAL OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE DOUBLE PATENTING
REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1-3
First, we note that Application No. 13/812,382 issued as U.S. Patent
No. 9,170,651 on October 27, 2015. As such, the provisional rejection has
ripened into a non-provisional obviousness-type double patenting rejection.
Appellants argue that the instant claims are patentably distinct from
the claims of the ’382 application, and Maruyama does not cure the
deficiencies of the claims of the ’382 application. See App. Br. 8—9.
For reasons discussed above, the Examiner has sufficiently
established that Maruyama’s teachings would have rendered the claimed
invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention.
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Application 13/812,435
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection based on Application
No. 13/812,382 and Maruyama of claims 1—3 in this proceeding.
ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—3 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
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